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“Will it be we, the women living in the Muslim city, who will pay the price, we who bear 
the boundary against desire tattooed on our bodies?” 
 
Fatima Mernissi – 
Islam and Democracy 
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Abstract 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This thesis investigates the modalities and conditions of Afghan women’s reappearance 
in the public domain following the downfall of the Taliban regime. Based on a twelve-
month ethnographic fieldwork conducted in 2007 among different groups of women 
(women MPs, women’s rights activists, female University Students) mostly based in 
Kabul, I study women’s responses to various social anxieties that have emerged as a 
consequence of this new visibility. I argue that while the current ‘reconstruction’ project 
has opened new possibilities for women and created new imaginaries pertaining to their 
role in society, the ideological framework (i.e liberal notions of equality and human rights 
etc.) on which it is grounded together with the strong military presence of foreign troops, 
have fuelled tensions at different levels of the Afghan society. Pressurized by their 
community to remain faithful to their ‘culture’, ‘religion’ and ‘tradition’ on one hand, and 
encouraged to access the public and become ‘visible’ by global forces on the other hand, 
women have been left with little choice but to adapt and find alternative ways to preserve 
a sense of autonomy. I describe these tactics as ‘oppositional practices of everyday life’ 
(De Certeau 1984), i.e complex practices of dissimulation which under the necessary 
appearance of compliance and conformity allow women to reconfigure social norms and 
create new spaces for themselves. More generally, this work engages with issues such as 
nationalism, Islam, gender, veiling, modernity, agency, rights and the public sphere. 
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Introduction 
 
  
 A few days before the first bombs were dropped on Kabul, I was sitting in a 
small NGO office in Paris, watching on my computer screen news releases announcing 
the formation of a coalition of Western nations getting prepared to launch a war against 
a country that few people had heard of before. For many Westerners, Afghanistan 
kindled fantasies of deserted landscapes, bearded tribal warriors and burqas. The NGO 
for which I worked was born with the Afghan conflict and had remained in Afghanistan 
since 1979, when the first French doctors were sent to the Panjshir valley to care for war-
wounded ‘freedom fighters’. It was with a mixture of anxiety and deep sadness that the 
NGO’s emergency unit was now organizing the repatriation of the expatriate volunteers 
that worked in Afghanistan. But to my astonishment, the Afghan staff would have to 
stay in the country and ‘endure freedom’, as the name of the US military operations 
ironically phrased it. A page of history was being turned before my eyes and I struggled 
to make sense of the flow of images and information I received. How to reconcile 
bombardments of already impoverished people and the war against terrorism? What was 
the rational in the discourses that defended the war in the name of women and human 
rights? How could women be liberated through bombs and massive killings3?  
This research originated as a result of dissatisfaction with the way the Muslim 
world had been talked about following the events of 9/11. These dissatisfactions have to 
do with the way Muslim minorities living in Western countries have become the object 
of constant public scrutiny, the way the US and their allies have used women’s rights to 
justify their occupation of Afghanistan and Iraq, and finally the way Afghan women have 
been depicted as powerless victims in need of rescue from their controlling men in the 
international press.  
When the US began bombing Afghanistan on October 7, 2001, the oppression of 
Afghan women was used as a justification for invading Afghanistan and overthrowing 
the Taliban regime. Five weeks after the first bombings, America’s first lady, Laura Bush, 
                                                
3 According to Prof. Marc W. Herold’s (an economist at the University of New Hempshire) extensive 
database, Dossier on Civilian Victims of United States’ Aerial Bombing, between 3,100 and 3,600 civilians 
were directly killed by U.S. Operation Enduring Freedom bombing and Special Forces attacks between 
October 7, 2001 and June 3, 2003. This estimate counts only "impact deaths" - deaths that occurred in the 
immediate aftermath of an explosion or shooting - and does not count deaths that occurred later as a result 
of injuries sustained, or deaths that occurred as an indirect consequence of the U.S. airstrikes and invasion. 
Herold’s database relies upon a variety of aggregated web-based sources collected inside and outside the 
US. Cf. http://pubpages.unh.edu/~mwherold/dossier 
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triumphantly announced: ‘Because of our recent military gains in much of Afghanistan, 
women are no longer imprisoned in their homes. The fight against terrorism is also a 
fight for the rights and dignity of women.’ (Bush 2001) Laura Bush was soon followed by 
Cherie Blair, who launched a campaign using similar arguments to support her husband’s 
decision to go on war, despite massive demonstrations in the streets of London. In 
November 2001 Colin Powell, the US secretary of state, insisted that: ‘The rights of 
women in Afghanistan will not be negotiable’ (Powell 2001).  
This degree of attention to women’s condition in Afghanistan was certainly 
welcome, given that the issue had been barely covered by the media or even publicly 
discussed by policy makers in the past. Yet this focus on women’s liberation, when seven 
years later Human Rights organizations report continuing violations of women’s rights 
including state sanctioned discrimination, women’s self immolation and various forms of 
violence against women (UNIFEM 2008; Amnesty International 2005; UNDP 2007), 
appears as little more than a cynical political strategy to sell the war to the public. As the 
‘War on Terror’ continues and the perspective of a time-honoured peace for Afghanistan 
has faded away, the use of women and their ‘human rights’ as justification for US 
aggression needs to be interrogated (Gul Khattak 2002, Hirschkind and Mahmood 2002). 
Prior to the fieldwork on which this thesis is based, I had worked in Afghanistan 
for a period of twelve months between 2003 and 2004 as a humanitarian worker in a 
small medical NGO specialized in training of medical staff. This experience had deeply 
challenged some of my prior assumptions on the Afghan society as a whole and on 
Afghan women in particular. At that time, NGOs were still facing difficulties to recruit 
local female staff but the few women with whom I spent time had little in common with 
the ones depicted in the international press.  
Women in chadari, what the Western press calls the burqa4, were slowly going back 
to work and lifting the veil was definitely not their priority. They were willing to 
participate in the reconstruction of their country and they had things to say about the 
ways in which such a task should be achieved. I learned more from them than they could 
ever learn from me as a poorly experimented humanitarian worker. While money was 
anarchically distributed by the donors’ community for ‘women’s empowerment’ 
programs, no one asked Afghan women what they really wanted for themselves and for 
their country. I left Afghanistan with a bitter feeling that time and money was once again 
wasted on humanitarian activity, serving international political agendas rather than the 
                                                
4 I use here the Afghan word chadari in order to refer to the full covering garment commonly referred to as 
burqa in the press. The word burqa is an Urdu term and is rarely used in Afghanistan. 
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people and with this statement of one of my male colleagues stamped in my head: ‘Tell 
your people there in Europe that Afghan men are not bad to their women’. 
This research is an attempt at unveiling the complex local and international 
dynamics that have shaped the modalities of women’s re-entry in the public domain after 
the downfall of the Taliban regime. While interrogating some of the analytical categories 
traditionally used to evaluate the state of individual freedoms and human rights in the 
transition of ‘Third world states’ towards democracy (individual/family, private/public), 
it looks at how new social imaginaries and social practices have emerged out of 
Afghanistan’s encounter with the West over the past century. I take the issue of gender 
as an entry point to these broader questions because the ‘conflict’ between Afghanistan 
and the ‘West’ has historically crystallised around the woman’s question. I look more 
specifically at the veil, under its most varied forms (burqa or chadari, chader, hijab and 
fashionable veils), in an attempt to evaluate what it conceals and reveals, for women’s 
covering practices are informed by relationships and discourses produced at the local, 
national and international levels. This research is therefore as much about women as it is 
about spaces where identity, subjectivity and agency are remoulded, refashioned and 
redefined according to a wide range of opportunities and constraints born out of this 
complex web of interactions.  
I am concerned with the global vision that emerges from the particular. For this 
reason, I chose to study these questions from below by looking at how they affected 
women on the ground. In order to get a vision from the grassroots level, I conducted a 
12 months ethnographic fieldwork in various women’s groups in Kabul and some other 
Afghan cities. The choice of ethnographic fieldwork as a research method was informed 
by both ethical and strategic considerations. Ethnographic fieldwork, compared to other 
research methods used by social scientists, provides greater opportunities to gain 
knowledge through experience and therefore to recapture the voices of those who are 
generally silenced by journalists. On the other hand, the validity of the data is guaranteed 
not only by the trust and relationships the researcher manages to negotiate with 
informants, but also by the fact that living among them helps the researcher develop a 
sense of empathy towards ‘others’ that no other research methods can achieve. This 
responsibility that arises out of this intimate encounter carves the ethical basis of this 
study (Amit 2000). 
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1. Women in the public sphere 
 
This thesis looks at ‘public’ women who are at the frontline between the local 
and the International and whose position represents a potential for redefining gender 
roles and power hierarchies. Like any classic ethnography, it aims at identifying who 
these women are, what they are trying to achieve, how they think they can achieve it and 
what is the price they have to pay for it.  
Against commonplace ideas that defend with certainty the theory of a ‘clash of 
civilizations’ (Huntington 1993), this thesis argues that culture is politically constructed 
and can therefore be de-constructed. A close look at women’s everyday practices shows 
that, even in the most difficult circumstances, women demonstrate a high level of 
creativity and ingenuity when it comes to negotiate the norms that directly impact their 
lives. Women’s bodies are not simply passive symbolic recipients of religion, politics or 
the market but also tools women themselves are using to convey paradoxical meanings 
and reinvent their position in the world. This research pays homage to everyday acts of 
women’s resistance, under their most complex and invisible forms, in an attempt at 
unveiling conflicts over meanings and values that have emerged in the context of foreign 
military occupation. These micro forms of resistance, as marginal and symbolic as they 
may appear, should not be trivialized since they reflect the very narrow space for agency 
in which women under the current circumstances have to operate.  
The women I met during this research neither shared a common feminist agenda, 
nor a common understanding of Islam. They came from various ethnic, social and 
educational backgrounds. Some were married and had children and were therefore 
responsible for maintaining a family, others were single young professionals or students, 
trying to reconcile their professional and personal ambitions with the aspirations ‘others’ 
had for them, at the ‘private’, local and international levels. What these women had in 
common, however, was a new form of ‘visibility’ in the public domain that had been 
carved out of Afghanistan’s violent encounter with global forces: NATO troops, foreign 
diplomats and policy makers, NGOs, Western feminists and the newly emerging market 
economy.  
I qualify this encounter of violent because the current 
‘democratization/reconstruction’ exercise in Afghanistan, far from following a 
progressive transition from chaos to order – contrary to the original plans of 
modernization theorists - is facing increasing resistance. This resistance is partly due to 
the fact that the ‘reconstruction’ project is not value-free and bears the seeds of 
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important social changes that more and more Afghans perceive as alien to their ‘culture’. 
The way this ‘resistance’ is imprinted on women’s bodies, through legislation, market 
liberalisation, ‘religious’ prescriptions and community politics is what makes the study of 
Afghan women particularly enlightening of the post colonial dynamics that frame the 
modalities of Afghanistan’s ‘reconstruction’.  
Indeed, debates that are currently taking place in the political arena are 
predominantly focused on women because women, as symbolic reproducers of the 
nation and collective identity, have social responsibilities towards the ‘culture’ to which 
they are expected to belong. Considering the endemic social problems Afghanistan is 
currently facing, discussions at the National Assembly around the necessity to re-
establish the Ministry of Vice and Virtues and to ban Western consumption goods such 
as cosmetics and fashion may appear as totally inappropriate and somewhat trivial. 
However, the recurrence of these debates underlines the broader social anxieties and 
moral panics around issues of national identity that have emerged in the context of 
foreign occupation.  
This study aims to highlight how women, from various social positions and 
religious and ethnic backgrounds, ‘resist’ these anxieties in both overt and covert 
manners. It focuses on the ‘public domain’ as the stage on which ideological battles are 
taking place around ‘culture’ and ‘religion’ and where actors are obliged to perform 
various identities according to various audiences. I therefore concentrate on women’s 
bodywork (and in particular veiling practices), women’s use of language and religious 
repertoires as well as women’s emotional performances, as these ‘everyday practices’ 
represent in themselves a potential for social transformation. 
In addition, ‘difference’ is not a term to use only for drawing attention to 
dissimilarities between ‘Muslim’ and ‘Western’ ways and views. It is also a useful term to 
note the contrasts among the ways and views from Muslim societies. In addition, Islam is 
only one factor that impacts on the ways gender relations are shaped in society. But 
Islam is not all there is to know. Gender arrangements also vary according to policies, 
legislation and practices, which represent the diverse cultural complexities Islam 
encounters. Therefore, the position of women in Muslim societies must be grounded in a 
detailed examination of the political projects of contemporary states, their historical 
transformation and the broader geopolitical context in which they occur. This study 
attempts to historicise the ‘women’s question’ in Afghanistan while taking into account 
contributions of political scientists and thinkers of International Relations. 
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Finally, although this thesis is primarily based on empirical fieldwork, it also aims 
to speak to lawyers interested in constitution-making processes and rule of law 
enforcement that are part of ‘democracy-building’ exercises in Third World countries. 
While providing a critical analysis of these legal developments grounded on empirical 
evidence and a review of the academic scholarship, I highlight the inconsistencies, 
impasses and ambiguities that arise when ‘democracy building’ is accompanied by 
military occupation. I emphasise on the discrepancies between official reforms and the 
reality of justice for ordinary Afghans and I underline how such reforms impact on 
women’s lives, their subjectivities and their capacity to ‘resist’. 
 
2. Chapters outline 
 
The first chapter of this thesis sets the methodological and theoretical 
frameworks of this study. I give a general overview of the geography of Kabul as a 
primary field site and I describe the constraints attached to conducting ethnographic 
fieldwork in a war-torn country. I define the scope of my research and I explain the 
strategic and ethical choices I had to make in order to reach my informants and research 
participants. Finally, I sketch the themes and the body of literature with which I engage 
in this study. 
The second chapter is a historical account of the fashioning of the Afghan 
Nation through the lenses of gender. I argue that the ‘woman’s question’ from the reign 
of King Amanullah in the 1920s up to the rise of the Taliban has been central in defining 
national identity. I show how the modern history of Afghanistan is marked by a constant 
focus on women’s bodies, as either sites upon which the State strove to apply the stamp 
of ‘modernization’ or on the contrary, the stamp of a reinvented ‘tradition’.  Afghanistan 
wounded relationship to the West (and to modernity) is illustrated through a socio-
historical analysis of State policies relative to women and their position in society, taking 
into account broader geopolitical developments that have influenced these policies. 
In chapters 3 and 4, I explore the contemporary ‘post-war/reconstruction’ 
process and the political agenda set up for women after the fall of the Taliban regime. 
Chapter 3 focuses on the justice sector, as the most prominent locus for the emergence 
of new discourses on women’s rights. I underline some historical continuities between 
previous foreign influences in the internal affairs of the country, especially during the 
Cold War and the current ‘state-building’ project. I argue that the current judiciary 
system, as designed in Bonn and later on during the Constitutional Loya Jirga relies on a 
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similar exogenous transplant with no solid local roots. I show how ‘women’ have 
become the primary targets for modernizing the Afghan society and how the focus on 
women’s rights has awoken reactionary readings of the sharia, which challenge the 
emancipatory potential of the Constitution. The result of such a political development is 
that the entire judiciary apparatus suffers from a lack of legitimacy that renders the 
struggle for women’s rights extremely precarious.  
In chapter 4, I further develop this argument by taking a closer look at the actors 
and discourses of social change. I aim to demonstrate that the ‘reconstruction’ project in 
Afghanistan can be assimilated with another attempt at ‘modernizing’ the country, which 
bears many similarities with earlier modernization attempts carried out under King 
Amanullah, King Zaher Shah and later on, the Communist regime. The current efforts to 
include women in politics and to promote women’s rights are integral parts of the 
‘modernization’ project. However, despite attempts at presenting these reforms in 
technical terms, their content is not value free. I take the example of a ‘gender 
empowerment’ training programme carried out by the Ministry of Women’s Affairs as 
part of its broader ‘gender mainstreaming’ mandate, to illustrate how certain ideas 
pertaining to modern state building and citizenship are being infused in the Afghan 
society. 
The chapters that follow are exploring micro practices of resistance through the 
prism of embodiement and performance. Chapter 5 is an ethnographic account of the 
responses of female students at the University of Kabul to moral panics that have 
emerged in the national and local press as a result of the apparition of certain commodity 
and cultural products such as cosmetics, fashion and Indian soap operas on the local 
market. These panics flagged the threat of moral dilution and cultural pollution and 
urged policy makers to react in order to re-establish social order. Taking these social 
anxieties into account, I explore how dormitory girls from various social and ethnic 
groups struggled to position themselves in a new life environment, away from their 
families. I argue that girls’ everyday practices revealed a constant tension between the 
necessary fulfilment of different roles as dutiful and modest daughters and as young 
urban educated women, aspiring to present themselves as ‘modern’ and yet Muslim. 
In chapter 6, I aim to characterize new meanings attached to women’s veiling in 
an Islamic public space, drawing from ethnographic data collected among various 
women’s groups in Afghanistan. It is argued that while the chadari has become the 
ultimate symbol of women’s oppression for Western audiences, it is necessary to take a 
closer look at its multiple and often contradictory uses and to contextualise the reasons 
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for its maintenance, despite the downfall of the Taliban regime. The ethnographic data I 
collected among women’s rights activists and women MPs demonstrate that women who 
are attempting to access public spaces have developed creative strategies of dissimulation 
to get public recognition. They have become visible under the veil and have sometimes 
been able to challenge gender hierarchies behind the appearance of compliance and 
conformity. These findings challenge liberal ideas according to which women’s visibility 
in public spaces is a necessary guarantee for their emancipation and their agency. In the 
context of foreign military occupation and increased insecurity, the control by the state 
of women’s appearance in public settings is to be understood as a means to assert 
sovereignty and to preserve a sense of national autonomy. As in earlier colonial 
encounters, an area of cultural resistance has developed around women’s bodies that 
constrain the modalities of women’s re-entry in the public sphere. As a result, women 
have been left with no other choice but to adapt and find alternative ways to make their 
voice heard. This means, in practice, that veiling and bodywork in general are to be read 
as feminine performances destined to manage others’ impressions and not as mere acts 
of obedience to religious prescriptions.  
Chapter 7 investigates women’s emotional performances and discourses of 
feelings and affects. It argues that these distinctive feminine expressive forms are used by 
women to maintain relationships, honour and gain public recognition. This analysis of 
the poetics and politics of emotions among Afghan women aims to highlight the 
relationship between expressions of affects and ordinary social life in which cultural 
notions and values orient individuals’ actions and interactions. I pay a particular attention 
to feelings of suffering, since those were recurrent in women’s speeches. I show how 
these ambiguous communicative tools serve to make commentaries on social relations 
and gender hierarchies without totally disrupting the honour code and the ideal of female 
modesty. I also analyse how more dramatic gestures, such as suicides, can be read not as 
mere signs of despair, but also as non discursive communicative acts that constitute part 
of women’s broad repertoire of what I identify as ‘rituals of resistance’.  
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Chapter 1 
Entering the Field of Interpretation: Women, Modernization 
and Resistance 
 
Fatana Gailani speaks for International Day on Violence Against Women, Jalalabad, November 2007 © 
Julie Billaud 
 
 
 In January 2007, four years after my first journey, I landed in Kabul for 
the second time. Little had changed in the city except that now stifling traffic jams, 
abundant advertisement billboards and beggars in rags had become part of the urban 
landscape. Electricity and roads were as scarce as before. On the airport’s main entrance 
wall, the same giant portrait of Commandant Masood was hanging. Shar-e-Naw, the city 
centre, was exhibiting a few shopping malls made of bricks and glass, chaotic copies of 
Dubai’s modern buildings as well as luxurious hotels, which remained empty during most 
of the year. 
 Like any research conducted in highly unstable political environments, this study 
has been accompanied by many constraints, which have deeply influenced the design and 
methodology of my work. Unable to settle in one single site location in the manner 
classic ethnographers traditionally work, I was forced to adapt and navigate in different 
circles, according to the opportunities that arose out of my encounters. I became a 
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‘mobile ethnographer’ (Marcus 1995: 96), pushed and pulled according to circumstances 
over which I had little control.  
However, my position as a slightly odd and out of place character in the chaotic 
context of the ‘post-war’ was not specifically due to my being a foreigner. The intense 
conflict and economic hardship that have marked the past thirty years have forced many 
Afghans to either seek asylum in Iran, Pakistan, India or further afield or to move from 
one province or village to another. According to the United Nation Humanitarian 
Commission for Refugee’s statistics (UNHCR 2009), about six million Afghans have left 
the country from the 1980s until the US military intervention in 2001. Altogether, almost 
a third of the population has been displaced. In 2007, over 350,000 refugees were 
repatriated from Pakistan under the UNHCR’s voluntary repatriation programme 
(UNHCR 2007). Most of my research participants, in the National Assembly, at the 
Women’s National Dormitory and in women’s organizations, were to different degrees 
displaced or uprooted. The dormitory girls were coming from different provinces of 
Afghanistan and many of them had lived abroad during the civil war and the Taliban 
regime. Some of them, who had grown up in Iran in a relatively secure environment, 
confided to me that they felt like foreigners in their own country. The women’s rights 
activists I met at the Afghan Women’s Network and in other women’s organizations had 
repatriated their activities from the refugee camps located in Pakistan or in Iran to Kabul, 
where the community of donors had settled after the military intervention. As women 
who had emerged in public, they suffered from a double form of displacement: as 
returnees and as women working in men-dominated arenas. My own displacement as a 
white single non-Muslim woman not involved in ‘reconstruction business’ mirrored, to 
some extent, their ‘uprootedness’.  It was not rare for me to hear: ‘you understand, 
because you are a foreigner’ or other comments that implicitly acknowledged a certain 
level of complicity and mutual understanding.  
 The external perception of vulnerability that was projected on my persona 
allowed me to gradually gain the trust of the women I met. As a ‘loose cannon’, I 
inspired a mixture of admiration, oddness and a sense of responsibility. The dormitory 
girls welcomed me among them because they felt that it was neither appropriate nor safe 
for a girl (including me) to live on her own away from her family. My access to political 
women was somehow facilitated by the fact that I had made a long journey to talk to 
them. Many of my informants valued knowledge and intellectual work in general and 
demonstrated high respect when I told them I planned to write a book on ‘culture and 
Afghan women’.  
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 It was not without a pinch of suspicion, though, that they accepted to share their 
experience with me. There were very few independent researchers in Kabul and 
‘research’ was often equated with intelligence gathering activity. In order to overcome 
this reluctance; I often found it more rewarding to be introduced by other participants 
with whom I had developed some relationship than to contact individual women 
independently. However, the ‘snow-balling’ technique did not necessarily lead to the 
results I initially anticipated, i.e being allowed to shadow a woman in her daily activities 
or being offered the opportunity of a second interview. I quickly realized that I had some 
valuable skills that could be exchanged against their knowledge and insight: I could teach 
languages, write funding proposals and give them some visibility through my writings. 
The services I offered in the Dormitory, in the Afghan Women’s Network and other 
women’s organizations opened spaces from where to conduct research. They also 
addressed some of the ethical dilemmas and concerns I experienced while researching 
women who were, as women, in vulnerable positions. Because I was able to contribute 
modestly, I felt the inequality between the researcher and the researched was somewhat 
reduced.  
1. Methodology 
 
Because of the difficulties of conducting independent research in a country still at 
war, I had found myself a position in a Communication Agency specializing in social 
marketing and public information. I worked there as a Project Manager/Researcher for a 
few months until I had managed to develop enough contacts in the women’s groups I 
was interested in studying to continue the fieldwork on my own. My position within the 
company allowed me to conduct research in the Ministry of Women’s Affairs, where the 
company was in charge of running the Public Relations and Information Department as 
well as in other public administrations and organizations where female staff were 
employed (Independent Human Rights Commission, police stations, Attorney General 
Office etc.).  
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Kabul city, a view of the ‘Titanic’ bazaar along the Kabul river – October 2007 © Julie Billaud 
 
 
At the same time, I had recruited a translator/Dari teacher, Lutfia, who 
supported me in my conduct of interviews, translations and in building contacts among 
women MPs, female students and activists. Lutfia was a 22-year-old University student, 
originally from Kapisa province, where her family was still living. She boarded at the 
Women’s National Dormitory, on Kabul University campus. Thanks to her advocacy 
with the Dormitory’s director, I was offered a room among female students in return for 
English and French lessons. I lived there for four months, sharing girls’ daily activities, 
improving my Dari while getting an insight into what made up their everyday lives: 
worries, dreams, gossip, Indian soap operas, poetry, music, make-up and of course, 
studies. My relationship to Lutfia gradually moved towards friendship. I did not only 
benefit from her linguistic skills but also from her patience and kindness in explaining to 
me the complex rules of the Afghan etiquette. Our daily discussions helped me question 
and challenge my knowledge and gain a deeper understanding of the ways in which 
gender relations were constructed, negotiated and challenged by the changes the Afghan 
society was facing in the ‘post-Taliban’ period. 
Naturally, the girls to whom I became the closest were predominantly among 
Lutfia’s friends. Besides sharing Room 42 on the dormitory’s ground floor, these six girls 
had lots in common, in spite of their diverse ethnic and social backgrounds. All of them 
had grown up abroad, in Iran or in Pakistan and as a result of this experience, they 
considered themselves as more ‘modern’, urban and progressive than the other girls who 
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had always remained in the country. The way they spoke Dari with a slightly foreign 
accent, the way they dressed and their general attitudes distinguished them from the 
other girls who called them, with a touch of contempt and jealousy, ‘khaliji’ (foreigner) or 
‘Irani’ (Iranian), for the ones who spoke Farsi, the Persian from Iran. Many of these girls 
studied foreign languages and were hired in part-time jobs. They were more or less 
financially autonomous and were able to purchase consumption goods such as mobile 
phones and fashion accessories that were part of the attributes of a certain social class to 
which many dormitory girls aspired to belong. The six girls of room 42 introduced me to 
some of their friends and relatives, and I was often used as a token of their 
cosmopolitanism and open-mindedness. I was introduced as the ‘dokhtar-e Fransawi’ (the 
French girl) who had come to Afghanistan to study ‘women and culture’.  Altogether, I 
conducted fifteen semi-structured interviews in the dormitory but the most valuable data 
was gathered through observation and informal conversations. 
I also volunteered for a few months at the Afghan Women’s Network, a network 
of women and women’s NGOs, helping them with proposals, reports and fundraising. I 
was introduced to the network through Hossai, a student in Sciences, who became my 
translator when Lutfia obtained a scholarship from the French embassy in Kabul and left 
to study at the University of Rennes. Hossai’s mother worked for AWN and my offer to 
volunteer for the NGO was received with great enthusiasm. I taught English to the staff 
and in return for my services, I was introduced to the women’s organizations working 
under the umbrella of AWN. Thanks to this new connection, I managed to collect in-
depth semi-structured interviews with thirteen women’s rights activists in Kabul and 
Herat, where AWN had recently opened an office. I also followed for a few weeks two 
renowned women’s rights advocates who ran programmes in rural areas, in Nangahar 
and Hazarajat.  
My initial aim was to conduct research among political women exclusively. I 
thought, a bit naively, that female MPs and women employed in the highest levels of 
public administrations would be quite accessible and would be willing to share their 
experience with me. As an anthropologist, I was interested in getting a greater 
understanding of women’s political participation in the context of ‘post-
war/reconstruction’. But it soon appeared that Afghanistan was neither in a post-war nor 
in a reconstruction stage, as international organizations stubbornly asserted. Regular 
suicide attacks in the country’s major cities, daily NATO bombings in rural areas where 
Taliban’s presence was suspected together with the poor achievements of the 
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reconstruction process proved that Afghanistan was still at war and that, as a 
consequence, development was simply not taking place.  
The political context itself made it difficult for political women to talk freely. The 
2005 Legislative Elections had brought former jihadis and conservative political leaders 
back in power, creating a general climate of distrust that deeply challenged my ability to 
gain the confidence of my participants necessary to collect valid and reliable data. My 
interviews in the National Assembly often started with this statement: ‘You know that we 
cannot talk about everything, don’t you? There are some topics we should avoid.’ My 
participants shortened interviews as soon as I tried to engage them in giving their views 
on more politically sensitive issues. Very few of them accepted to be interviewed more 
than once but I nevertheless managed to conduct twenty semi-structured interviews with 
women MPs, either directly in their houses, or in the journalists’ room of the Parliament. 
Talking to foreigners could indeed turn into a life-threatening act, since the 
insurgency targeted in priority individuals involved in any kind of transactions with them. 
Kidnappings, life-threats and murders were the plight politicians willing to challenge the 
status quo had to face. Female public figures were the favourite targets of fundamentalist 
groups. In February 2007, I was given the opportunity to interview a female MP who 
belonged to an important pro-mujjahedin group in the National Assembly. I was told to 
come to her house directly so that we could enjoy more privacy. Three men armed with 
Kalashnikovs guarded the entrance gate of her house. Lutfia and I were directed in the 
modest meman-khana (guest room) where the MP’s husband was waiting for us. The man 
was turning the pages of a family photo album and pointed to a photograph of his 
daughter, a beautiful young woman dressed in army clothes and riding a horse. Today 
was the one-year anniversary of her death, he explained, and his wife was not feeling very 
well. ‘She is the one who should have died on that day. The murderers were targeting my 
wife. They shot my daughter by mistake’ (Fieldnotes 23/02/2007). Sadly, as I progressed 
in my research, stories like this were recurrent. 
Fieldwork in such an environment necessitated a high degree of flexibility. My 
navigation in different circles was dependent upon the willingness of the women I met to 
open up and on the quality of the relationship I managed to develop with them. There 
was no guarantee that the doors that were opened one day would still be opened the next 
day. As a result, opportunism was the only strategy I found relevant. I shadowed a 
woman activist in her activities for a few days here, conducted participant observation in 
a women’s organization for another few days there, eagerly jumping on each opportunity 
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that presented itself. Planning was a useless exercise. I ended up following a metaphor, 
an idea, rather than the specific informants I had initially thought of.  
In spite of all my efforts to get some kind of insight into the space I was 
interested in, it is undeniable that my particular position within that space profoundly 
affected the nature of the work I could do. My informants had some valid reasons for 
showing suspicion towards my ultimate intentions: there were very few independent 
researchers in Kabul, I was not representing any particular institution and I was an 
‘unaccompanied’ Western woman. As a result, it was not rare for me to be taken for 
either a spy or a journalist.  
I was concerned not to follow the footsteps of some autodidact anthropologists 
such as Norwegian journalist Asne Seierstad who wrote The Bookseller of Kabul, shortly 
after the ‘liberation’ of Afghanistan. Her work presented many of the ethical problems 
caused by the structural constraints of her profession: a lack of understanding of the 
social, historical and cultural context of the society under study and a weak mastery of 
local languages, eventually leading to the reproduction of Western preconceptions about 
the oppression of women in Islam. Not only had she betrayed the confidence of the 
Afghan family that had generously opened its door to a ‘foreign guest’, but she also 
received, through her book, a visibility and a public recognition that the bookseller, the 
‘subject’ of her story, would never be able to get, despite his desperate attempts at suing 
her in the tribunals of her own country5. 
In order to preserve the anonymity of my informants, I have sometimes changed 
their names and used pseudonyms. I have systematically anonymised the women I 
interviewed at the National Assembly, since their high visibility makes them more 
vulnerable to attacks and threats than any of the other women I have researched. I just 
mention whether they are coming from rural or urban areas (since it is a significant 
distinction that involves a radically different position), but I have coded their interviews 
and removed biographical elements that may make them too easily identifiable. I did not 
do it for the character of Malalai Joya (MP of Farah province) since she is internationally 
renowned and has made herself famous on the global scene by giving interviews, 
participating in documentary films and, recently, writing her own biography. I also kept 
the original names of the women activists who were willing to gain some public visibility 
                                                
5 I met the Bookseller of Kabul myself during my fieldwork. Following the publication of Seierstad’s novel, 
his wife had sought asylum in Canada and he had published his own response to the Norwegian writer 
under the title: ‘Once Upon a time, there was a bookseller in Kabul’, which I hastened to purchase. The 
novel starts with this sentence: ‘Norwegian journalist Asne Seierstad parachuted into Afghanistan and told 
the West exactly what it wanted to hear about that nation’s women. The truth, as usual, is more 
complicated.’ I kept the bitter statement of the Bookseller in mind during the entire length of my stay in 
Afghanistan.  
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through my writing. All the women who have shared with me some intimate stories, 
which I have used to support and inform my argument, have been given pseudonyms.  
 
Without the contacts I had built with some women during my first journey in 
Afghanistan, it is doubtful that I would have been given a chance to see above the 
surface. It took a lot of energy to get around the Afghan rules of politeness that 
predispose people to please their ‘foreign’ guests with answers they believe are 
appropriate. My status as a ‘returnee’ and as a student (i.e knowledgeable and educated in 
local understanding) together with my modest command of Dari helped me to overcome 
the initial reluctances I faced when I first introduced myself. 
This was also for me a sort of embodied discovery of what living in a climate of 
fear exactly meant. I understood that the purpose of my work was less about finding the 
most efficient way of interpreting the deeds and thoughts of the Other, than having to 
face the existential problem of living in a moral universe that was being pulled asunder 
and rendered meaningless (Hoffman 2003; Nordstrom and Robben 1999). Research in 
an insecure context corrodes the fundamental assumptions of ethnography: social 
stability, bounded and coherent communities, and the possibility of engaging in 
significant human relationships. The fragmented nature of my fieldwork and the fragile 
relationships I managed to develop were somehow the reflection of the fragmented 
relationships the social landscape in which I operated was made of. I was there as a 
witness, manipulated, influenced by my emotions, always confused by rumours that 
circulated around me. This experience was however crucial to get an understanding of 
the complex dynamics of these spaces and to incorporate into my ‘witnessing’ knowledge 
of cause and implication unavailable to observers who were not as much immersed in the 
daily life of ordinary Afghans.  
 The National Women’s Dormitory was, in a sense, the safe haven I, as an 
anthropologist, had dreamed of. Open in 2004 thanks to US funding to accommodate 
female students coming from the different provinces of Afghanistan, this place 
represented more than a simple student accommodation. For most of these girls, it was 
their first experience of living outside of their families’ homes and getting to mingle with 
girls from different regions, ethnic, religious and social backgrounds. The dormitory was, 
with the Women’s Garden, one of the rare places in Kabul exclusively reserved to 
women, a place where these young women could consider their own. As the only 
Westerner living there, I was as much interested in getting to know them that they were 
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in getting to know me. The time I spent with the dormitory girls will remain in my 
memory among the most pleasant and genuine moments I spent in Afghanistan. 
 
2. Fieldwork and field sites 
 
Most of my fieldwork was conducted in Kabul, even though I travelled to other 
regions on several occasions. Various considerations informed this choice. First, Kabul is 
one of the most important humanitarian scenes in the world. The visible presence of the 
international community, military forces and institutions of power make it a particularly 
interesting site of study. I was particularly keen to observe how the transition towards 
‘democracy’ was going to be negotiated and how women would be involved in this 
process. The women of Kabul were the ones most exposed to the new possibilities and 
dilemmas created by the ‘reconstruction/democratization’ effort and were therefore 
particularly interesting for me to study. Second, Kabul was the place where most 
women’s organizations were located and where they were the most active. Finally, and 
perhaps most importantly, Kabul was considered as the most ‘progressive’ city of 
Afghanistan, which represented a valuable asset for an independent researcher.  
More generally, the city has often been the setting where changes in gender 
relations first occur. As Rieker and Asdar Ali put it in their study of urban spaces in the 
‘Third World’: ‘the city emancipates women far more than rural life or suburban 
domesticity’ (Rieker and Asdar-Ali 2008, 1). While the city also creates new hierarchies of 
power and domination, it remains the locale from where women may experience new 
forms of mobility and gain some visibility. My focus on Kabul as the centre of power 
was influenced by the idea that it represented a site of relative personal autonomy and 
political possibilities for women, a site where modern citizen-making was being 
processed while, in the meantime, notions of corruption and pollution remained deeply 
associated with that space in the collective imagination. 
Shaped by colonial encounters with the West from the end of the 19th century, 
Kabul remains today ‘modernization/reconstruction’ shop’s window (Suhrke 2007). As 
such, it is an enclave. Contrasts that one can notice in other Third World capital cities 
here reach extremes. Wealth rubs elbows with extreme poverty. Infrastructures are 
inadequate to meet the needs of an exponential population growth. Since the downfall of 
the Taliban regime and the arrival of international aid agencies, Kabul has attracted a 
massive number of rural migrants and returnees from neighbouring countries, in search 
for job opportunities and humanitarian assistance. According to World Bank’s estimates, 
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between 1999 and 2002 the city’s population grew at 15% per year and counted 3 million 
inhabitants in 2004 (World Bank 2005, 2). Informal settlements shelter about 80% of 
Kabul’s population and cover 70% of the city’s residential lands (Ibid. 2). UN, 
international organizations and NGOs’ staffs occupy the city centre with its comfortable 
and spacious houses guarded by private security guards behind compound walls and 
barbwires. Here, like in Sherpur, a district of Kabul grabbed by former militia 
commanders to develop a pompous complex of Pakistani-style villas rented to 
internationals, private generators provide electricity and water is never lacking. The crisis 
of housing and the freeze on land allocation does not apply to the wealthy, the well 
connected, the commanders or the drug lords (Constable 2003).  
The spectacle of an import-dependent consumption boom in Kabul coexists with 
deep impoverishment and destitution. Shopping malls, the mobile-phone boom, huge 
Toyota Land Cruisers - the chosen vehicle of the donor community - jostling for space 
on narrow pot-holed streets, the five-star luxury hotel, the Kabul Serena, rising sphinx-
like in the centre of town courtesy of the Aga Khan Development Network (AKDN)… 
Symbols of Western-style liberalism and modernity are growing in the middle of poverty 
and chaos. Supreme Market, on Jalalabad road and other places where alcohol is 
available, are reserved for foreigners. 64.500 ISAF6 troops and private mercenaries 
protect the wealthy occupiers and the government they support. 
Kabul’s landscape is very telling by itself for what it reveals about the political 
economy that is guiding the reconstruction. Sherpur with its cream cake villas constructed 
on top of confiscated lands inscribes in the urban geography the brand of the new 
Islamic Republic. Most of the buildings that have sprung up in the capital city are funded 
by opium money: it is ‘narcotechture’, in expatriates’ language (Loyd 2007). Seven years 
after the fall of the Taliban regime, Afghanistan has turned into a narco-state with a 
flourishing criminal informal economy, a sadly recognizable feature of neoliberal 
globalization. The general climate of impunity is favourable to widespread criminality 
financed by the revenues generated by the opium trade.  
If the Taliban banned poppy cultivation in 2000 and put a halt to opium growing 
in the 2001 season, it is the US-led war that ousted the Taliban in 2001, that prompted 
Afghan farmers to plant the opium poppy again over tens of thousands of hectares. As a 
result, the opium cultivation has doubled between 2005 and 2006. The Vienna based UN 
                                                
6 The International Security Assistance Force was established by the UN Security Council at the end of 
December 2001 to secure Kabul and the surrounding areas. NATO assumed control of ISAF in 2003. By 
July 23, 2009, ISAF had around 64,500 troops from 42 countries, with NATO members providing the core 
of the force. The United States has approximately 29,950 troops in ISAF (NATO/ISAF 2009). 
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Office on Drugs and Crime estimates that the 2007 harvest has been of the order of 
8,200 tonnes, 44 times its production levels in 2001 under the Taliban government 
(UNODC 2007, iii). The UN estimates that for 2007, the contribution of the drug trade 
to the Afghan economy is of the order of 4 billion USD, an increase of 26% over 2006. 
These records have placed Afghanistan at the top of the list of opium producing 
countries (93% of the global opiates market) (Ibid. iii). More than 95 percent of the 
revenues generated by this lucrative contraband accrues to business syndicates, organized 
crime and banking and financial institutions. This illegal economy has re-empowered 
drug barons and former militia commanders, who hold positions in the highest 
government offices (Felbab-Brown 2005). 
Additional data were collected through ‘shadowing’ participants involved in 
women’s rights activities in Jalalabad and in Hazarajat. I also spent a few weeks in Herat 
where I conducted interviews among different women’s NGOs. In comparison to 
Kabul, border cities such as Herat, in the West, are far more organized and developed. 
Under the grip of powerful warlord Ismael Khan, tax revenues made from trade with 
border countries have been invested in the maintenance of Herat’s infrastructures: roads 
and electricity are not lacking. However, the continuation of conservative politics, with 
the reintroduction of the moral police conducting virginity tests on women venturing in 
the streets with unrelated men (Kristof 2004), made women’s re-entry in the public 
domain less easy. Ironically, the iron hand of Khan also provided the majority of Herati 
women with an important asset: security, making Herat the city where the greatest 
number of girls accessed education (IRIN-News 2007). These short trips to other 
Afghan cities helped me to contextualize and evaluate the scope of possibilities open to 
women in the ‘reconstruction’ period, while making me realize the variety of situations 
according to geographic locations. 
 
2. Women’s political participation and the conflict in Afghanistan since 2001 
 
The issue of women entered the political agenda mostly through the insistence of 
the US feminist movement (the Feminist Majority7), which had developed strong links 
with Afghan women activists on the ground, mostly from the Revolutionary Association 
of the Women of Afghanistan (RAWA) founded by Meena Kishwar Kamal in 1977. 
According to Hafizullah Emadi (2002), RAWA is the women’s section of the Afghan 
Maoist movement, which had as its primary objective to make women participate in the 
                                                
7 See the Feminist Majority’s website: http://feministmajority.org/ 
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struggle for national liberation against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. RAWA has 
been instrumental in fuelling Western media with ‘Orientalist notions of veiled Afghan 
women living in seraglios, jealously guarded by bearded Musulmans wielding scimitars’ 
(Azerbaijani-Moghaddam 2004, 101). RAWA members have indeed developed efficient 
communication strategies8 and have been particularly resourceful in publicizing women’s 
rights abuses under the Taliban, reporting through an ultra emotive framework, with 
little analysis, exactions committed against them to journalists greedy for horror stories.  
RAWA has also been highly critical of the US military invasion and continues to report 
on exactions committed against women and civilians under the current occupation.  
However, in spite of this intense lobbying, very few concrete actions were taken 
to include women in the decision making process following the downfall of the Taliban 
regime. In spite of the UN Resolution 1325 that urges member states to ‘increase 
representation of women at all decision-making levels in national, regional and 
international institutions and mechanisms for the prevention, management, and 
resolution of conflict’ (UN Resolution 1325, art. 1), very few women took part in the 
Bonn conference. The Bonn Agreements that took place in December 2001, was the 
initial series of agreements intended to re-create the State of Afghanistan following the 
U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in response to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. 
Only three Afghan women were invited to Bonn, all of them chosen from the ranks of 
those who were politically inexperienced and therefore, who would not challenge the 
patriarchal status quo (Azerbaijani-Moghaddam 2004, 107). This ironical outcome had to 
do with the contradictory political decisions taken by the international community, 
which, on one hand, had given its military support to the conservative mujjahedin in order 
to fight against the Taliban, and on the other hand, had used the rhetoric of women’s 
emancipation to gain public support in the war effort. 
The Bonn Agreements together with the new Afghan Constitution have 
recognized the principle of gender equality within society while making Islam the official 
State religion. The new constitution states that ‘In Afghanistan, no law can be contrary to 
the beliefs and provisions of the sacred religion of Islam’ (Article 3). This language leaves 
matters where there is no specification in the Constitution or law to adjudication by 
religious laws, rendering women’s rights vulnerable to conservative interpretations of 
Islam (ICG-Asia 2003). However, The Afghan Constitution also obliges the government 
to ‘protect human rights’ and to ‘abide by the UN charter, international treaties, 
                                                
8 See RAWA’s website: www.rawa.org 
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international conventions that Afghanistan has signed, and the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights’ (Preamble). Afghanistan acceded to the Convention on the Elimination 
of All forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) on March 2003, without 
reservations. These efforts have undeniably prompted women’s re-entry in the public 
domain: a Ministry of Women’s Affairs is in charge of ‘mainstreaming gender’ in the 
Afghan institutions, women benefit from a 25% quota in the Wolesi Jirga (House of the 
People), half of the seats appointed by the president to the Meshrano Jirga (House of the 
Elders) are also reserved to women and Women’s Organizations sponsored by 
international donors have mushroomed in Afghanistan’s major cities. In addition, the 
2005 Electoral Law guarantees one quarter of the seats to women in the Provincial 
Councils (Shah 2005: 248).  
As a result, the 2005 legislative elections saw 68 women join the Wolesi Jirga and a 
woman run for the Presidential elections for the first time in the history of Afghanistan 
(Wordsworth 2005). In the meantime, over half of the elected deputies were previous 
militia commanders or associated with the old mujjahedin parties. Some of them are 
accused by human rights organizations of having been involved or/and of still being 
involved in human rights abuses and crimes. They have rapidly taken control over the 
presidency as well as the parliamentary committees. The jihad party leaders, commanders 
and supporters still closely associate themselves with the jihad, politically and 
ideologically. They generally share a conservative outlook on social, cultural and religious 
affairs and many have a shared objective of ‘defending the jihad’ and establishing a more 
conservative Islamic state governed by Islamic laws (Wilder 2005, 6). Their strong 
foothold in the parliament represents a challenge to the advancement of liberal reforms 
and to the promotion of women’s rights. 
Some of the women who have joined the National Assembly have, for strategic 
and political interest, associated themselves with some of these groups. This is for 
instance the case of the Head of the Women’s Affairs Committee who is openly affiliated 
with an important pro-mujjahedin group defending conservative gender ideologies within 
the shura (Parliament). Very few women have managed to remain independent from 
political parties, which are dominated by men and constructed around ethnic and 
religious divisions. As a result, female representatives within the Assembly, like their male 
counterparts, have tended to engage in identity politics and stress the specific suffering 
and plight of their ethnic or religious group, while dismissing that of others (Wilder 
2005).  
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The few women who continue to work outside of party politics are originally 
from Women’s Civil Society Organizations. Their isolation deeply challenges their 
capacity to sustain an alternative and more progressive stand on issues related to 
women’s rights. For example, Masooda Zaryab (pseudonym), a women’s rights activist 
and independent MP, told me: ‘When your own women, who have a little bit of 
experience and could talk, are not supporting you, it becomes very difficult to do 
something positive for women. These tough women are on the side of mullahs, 
extremists and commanders…so fighting in this kind of atmosphere can be extremely 
depressing’ (Interview – MP3, 16/09/2007). 
The sectarian nature of Afghan politics considerably narrows the possibility for 
non-sectarian initiatives by women’s groups. In addition, the context of foreign 
occupation has helped to create an intensification of conservative gender ideologies, 
which are promoted not only among insurgent groups but also political parties in 
government. Attacks against girls’ schools, women’s rights activists and other female 
public figures have become common events. In April 2009, Kandahar city councillor 
Sitara Achakzai, a fervent advocate of women’s rights, was shot in front of her house as 
she returned from a meeting at the provincial council. In September 2008, Malalai Kakar, 
the first woman of Kandahar to have joined the Police, was shot by the Taliban in front 
of her house (BBC-News 2008b). In June 2007, Zakia Zaki, owner and manager of Peace 
Radio in Afghanistan, was gunned down in front of her 8-year-old son inside her house 
in northern Parwan province (Daily Mail 2007). Zaki had been critical of local warlords, 
who had warned her about the station’s content. The same month, Shokiba Sanga 
Amaaj, a newscaster for private Shamdhad TV, was shot in the back inside her house in 
Kabul. In September 2006, Safia Ama Jan, the southern provincial head of Afghanistan’s 
Ministry of Women’s Affairs, was shot dead outside the front gate of her Kandahar 
home as she was walking to her office. Ama Jan was known for being an active 
proponent of women’s rights and education. In May 2005, Shaima Rezayee, 24, who 
replaced her burqa with Western-style dress and became a host on an MTV-style music 
show, was shot in the head at her Kabul home (AP 2007). The perpetrators of these 
crimes have never been arrested and prosecuted and the list of their victims continues to 
expand on a regular basis.  
Many women activists have left the country or have simply abandoned their 
positions after receiving death threats from armed groups. The ones who remain in place 
fear for their lives and those of their families. The official police force and the 
government have done little to protect women (Amnesty International 2005). Indeed, 
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because of widespread corruption, many Afghans have no trust in the police and in the 
national army to provide security to common people. Obviously, this impacts 
tremendously on the ability to sustain women’s activism. Indeed, women activists 
emphasize the ongoing conflict as a major barrier to their activities, especially in the 
Southern provinces of Afghanistan where fighting prevents NGOs’ access. Women 
activists see different reasons for the violence, including regular civilian casualties 
resulting from NATO bombings that reinforce popular support to the insurgents, the 
conflict between different militias under the command of warlords, the ineffectiveness of 
the police and the Afghan National Army, the poor socio-economic conditions that drive 
young men to join armed groups as well as the terrorism perpetrated by the Taliban and 
Al-Qaeda-led foreign fighters. All these sources of violence are interlinked, as the 
invasion and occupation have created the conditions for the growth in power of 
communally based political groups who use conservative gender ideologies in the process 
of asserting their authority against rivals, as well as the widespread availability of small 
arms, high unemployment and deteriorating humanitarian conditions (Oxfam 2008).  
 
3. Public visibility and ‘counter-publics’ 
 
This study looks at everyday practices of public women in an attempt to evaluate 
the degree of agency they are able to exercise in the context I have described above. I 
provide a critical analysis of Western understandings of the ‘public’ and underline the 
creative ways in which Afghan women have created spaces for themselves. Indeed, the 
distinction between private and public in Afghanistan, as this study will show, does not 
totally convey the same meanings as in the West. The public/private dichotomy does not 
capture for instance the complex inter-relations and interpenetrations that exist between 
the two domains. As Nancy Lindisfarn-Tapper (1991) has shown in her study of a 
Durani Pashto community from Northern Afghanistan, women are often able to 
influence public affairs notably through lobbying their husbands and other male relatives. 
Negotiations that take place in the household have a direct impact on what is decided in 
public place.  
The ‘public sphere’ has been defined by Jürgen Habermas (1989) as the locus of 
‘communicative action’, i.e as a site where cooperative action is undertaken by individuals 
based upon mutual deliberation and argumentation. Individuals engaged in such dialogic 
transactions are making full use of rational reason in order to reach a consensus, which, 
in turn, guarantees the protection and defence of ‘the common good’. The formation of 
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(inclusive and rational) public spheres in Western societies has been instrumental in 
establishing democracies and in producing citizens. Western classical liberalism has 
presumed the universal necessity of differentiated public/private spheres for the 
development of citizenship, civil society and democratic nation/statehood.  
However, feminist scholar Nancy Fraser (1990) has criticized this idealized 
definition of the public sphere and has underlined the hegemonic and exclusive elements 
that are inherent to its constitution. She writes that the public sphere was initially 
conceived as ‘the arena, the training ground and eventually the power base of a stratum 
of bourgeois men who were coming to see themselves as a “universal class” and 
preparing to assert their fitness to govern.’ (Fraser 1990, 60). In Western societies, white 
men have dominated the public domain, forcing other groups (women, ethnic minorities) 
to form their own ‘subaltern counter publics’, i.e ‘parallel discursive arenas where 
members of subordinated social groups invent and circulate counter-discourses to 
formulate oppositional interpretations of their identities, interests, and needs’ (Fraser 
1990, 67).  
We can add to Fraser’s feminist critique, a post-colonial critique of Habermas’ 
definition, which challenges the possibility of using the ‘public’ as a universal principle. 
In the context of Afghanistan, the ‘public’ domain, far from being a site of dialogical 
negotiations, is better understood as a stage for performance. I borrow this idea from 
Nilüfer Göle (2006) who explains how, in the context of voluntary modernization 
policies in Turkey, the public sphere has been conceived as a place of performance. She 
writes: ‘Because the public sphere provides a stage for performance rather than an 
abstract frame for textual and discursive practices, the ocular aspect in the creation of 
significations and the making of social imaginaries becomes of utmost importance’ (Göle 
2006, 177). Göle’s insistence on the performative dimension of non-Western public 
spheres, especially in countries where the process of State formation has been shaped by 
unequal interactions with the West is, I think, key to understanding the nature of the 
political debates around ‘women’s issues’ that have emerged in Afghanistan following the 
fall of the Taliban. 
This study explores those spaces forged and created for women and by women, 
these ‘counter-publics’ where new gender identities are negotiated and transformed 
through the tensions that shape women’s experience with ‘modernity’. It criticizes the 
universality of abstract categories such as public/private, family/individual and 
demonstrates how the boundaries between them are in fact fluid and porous. Because all 
boundaries and categories are sites of struggle, focusing on these spaces allows one to 
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make a broader diagnostic of power while evaluating the room for manoeuvre that 
women, of different classes, religious and ethnic backgrounds, have managed to create 
for themselves in the ‘reconstruction’ period. As Sullivan (1995, 128) observes, ‘The 
demarcation of public and private life within society is an inherently political process that 
both reflects and reinforces power relations, especially the power relations of gender, 
race, and class.’ My purpose is therefore to suggest a culturally and historically specific 
analysis of the new forms of visibility women have gained as a result of ‘democracy 
building’, while locating this process in the broader power relations at stake in the 
context of foreign military occupation.  
The interest of studying female public figures inheres in what the tensions 
created by women’s public visibility reveal about the broader social and political context 
in which the ‘transition towards democracy’ is taking place. These tensions have to do 
with the fact that in a country where Islam represents a central and essential part of 
people’s everyday life, women represent the cornerstone of communal and national 
identity. Women overriding socially accepted hierarchies and stepping into spheres 
traditionally occupied by men are potentially threatening as they put into question norms 
and values that are key to social order and to identity. The woman question has become 
even more sensitive now that military occupation is broadly experienced as a form of 
cultural pollution (see chapter 5).  
In such a context, the formal rights ensured in the new Constitution and in the 
different international treaties that Afghanistan has signed following the Bonn 
Agreements (CEDAW, UN Convention for the Elimination of Violence Against 
Women) have had little chance to be enforced. On the contrary, I argue that the public 
face of justice in Afghanistan is disconnected from the social reality of ordinary Afghans 
and is therefore perceived as an instrument of acculturation (chapter 3). In political 
circles, a battle is currently taking place between conservative forces that view 
international instruments designed to protect women’s rights as ‘foreign’ and ‘un-Islamic’ 
and a more liberal minority that is struggling to promote an interpretative approach to 
sharia law. As the insurrection is intensifying in rural areas with a government failing to 
deliver basic services to the population, the former approach is currently dominant. This 
development leaves women involved in politics with no other choice but to strengthen 
the status quo by defending essentialized versions of ‘culture’ and ‘religion’ in order to 
keep the support of their communities. The nationalist backlash that emerges as a natural 
response to military occupation has blocked any possibility of ‘communicative ethics’ 
(Habermas 1990) within the public legal domain. As Jane Cowan (2008: 16) points out in 
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her writings on ‘culture and rights’:  
 
Vigorous public debate within a cultural group among all kinds of persons affected by a policy —
in multiple forums of public and, indeed, private space — does have the potential to transform 
the terms of culture — at least, its explicit terms — quite fundamentally. Such an approach is not 
only vastly superior analytically and theoretically but also politically more enabling than the liberal 
choice: to either live “according to the culture’s terms” or leave. 
 
An analysis of the Constitution-making process (chapter 3) demonstrates that 
although it could have represented a major opportunity for Afghans to collectively 
redefine the terms of ‘culture’, the ‘vigorous public debate’ which Cowan advocates did 
not take place. On the contrary, new laws and reforms were quickly drafted, under the 
pressure of exogenous forces, to bolster the idea of reconstruction for the Western 
public. One of the negative effects of this missed opportunity, besides the broader 
silencing of Afghans’ own aspirations for the future, has been to produce discourses 
about the ‘authentic Afghan culture’ defining itself in radical opposition to ‘Western 
values’. This thesis explores how externally imposed legal reforms have turned the debate 
on women’s rights into a cultural battle over ‘national identity’ in which the control of 
women and their bodies has become the symbolic marker of national sovereignty. While 
engaging with the post-colonial legal literature on ‘gender and rights’ (Kapur 2004, 
Menon 2004), I provide empirical evidence for the ambiguities, contradictions and 
impasses that are inherent to efforts at ‘building democracy’ from outside instead of 
from within. This study should therefore speak to a public of lawyers interested in the 
practical aspects of indigenous struggles for women’s rights.  
 
The presence of women at important decision-making levels remains a highly 
controversial issue. This is because, as Nilüfer Göle phrases it, ‘women are the 
touchstone of the Islamic order (…), the trait d’union between identity and community’ 
(1996, 21). In the case of Afghanistan, the issue of women’s public visibility is all the 
more problematic in that over the past thirty years Afghan collective consciousness has 
been marked by a double trauma: the Soviet occupation on one hand and Islamic 
fundamentalism under its most radical form: the Taliban, on the other hand. In both 
cases, the reshaping of the Nation was achieved through policies aiming at ‘remaking’ 
women and controlling their public visibility. While the communist regime forced 
women to unveil and to become exposed to the public gaze, rules imposed by the 
Taliban pursued a diametrically opposed objective, i.e making women disappear from the 
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‘public’ (Emadi 2002). The impact of these policies has been particularly traumatic for 
women, whose ‘bodies’ have been instrumentalized in order to assert power and define 
the terms of national construction.  
In the history of Afghanistan (see chapter 2), women have been at the centre of 
various modernization projects initiated by the different regimes that have succeeded one 
another (King Amanullah, King Zaher Shah and later on, the Communist regime). 
History also shows that all these attempts have been defeated by strong resistance 
movements that emerged in rural areas under the control of powerful conservative 
leaders. Resistance from the countryside increased in intensity when the foreign footprint 
on modernization became more obvious (Roy 1985).  
The current ‘reconstruction’ project can be identified as another modernization 
attempt, but this time, with a stronger international footprint and a greater financial and 
military involvement. The recrudescence of the insurgency when seven years earlier the 
coalition forces had won victory in a matter of a few weeks tends to confirm that the 
country is taking a similar path as in the past. Western-style modernity, imposed with 
little cultural sensitivity, together with poor material improvements in the lives of 
ordinary Afghans, has opened spaces for new forms of resistance to emerge. The 
‘Taliban’ in 2008 is no longer a unified movement but a conglomerate of various 
nationalist groups with contrasted politico-religious views and external supports, which 
only have in common their opposition to a corrupt government ‘sold’ to its foreign 
supporters (Weber 2008). The rapid military gains made by the Insurgents since 2001 
tend to demonstrate that more and more Afghans share the view that ‘democracy’ is 
nothing else but an ideological instrument of Western domination. At the political level, 
the fuelling of moral panics and popular fears around ‘cultural loss’ has contributed to 
reinforce these views (chapter 4). The systemic frauds registered during the last 
presidential elections and the cancellation of the second round run off vote between 
president Karzai and his main rival Abdullah Abdullah have added an extra layer of 
scepticism towards the central government and its capacity – and will – to serve its 
people.  
Whereas Afghanistan is once more facing the threat of political and ethnic 
fragmentation, the reappearance of women in the public domain is more than ever the 
object of intense controversies. Caught between a discursive struggle portrayed as simply 
a matter of human rights on one hand, and ‘local’ political discourses that defend with 
absolute certainty the terms of ‘culture’ on the other hand, Afghan women’s capacity to 
remain in control of their own lives has been extremely constrained and limited. As this 
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study demonstrates, women’s public visibility in such a context cannot be interpreted 
straightforwardly either as evidence for their public agency or as a feminist 
consciousness. Women who have entered in politics have had limited opportunities to 
defend a feminist agenda, whether in the Western sense, or under an indigenous form. In 
most cases, they have had to develop alternative public spaces, or ‘counter-publics’ to use 
Nancy Fraser’s (1990) expression, in order to renegotiate their position at the margins of 
society only. 
 
4. Resistance, subjectivity and social transformation 
 
This research engages with theoretical debates dealing with issues of subjectivity, 
agency and power taking into account not only indigenous understandings of ‘culture’ 
but also the broader geopolitical context in which such developments are occurring. 
Through meticulous descriptions and analysis of public women’s practices, I try to 
distinguish between those practices that are part of the ‘habitus9’ and those that can be 
read as more subtle forms of resistance, both conscious or unconscious. 
Indeed, the aim of this research is to investigate how transformation is actually 
taking place despite women’s incapacity to straightforwardly challenge ‘indigenous’ 
politics at a moment when foreign military occupation threaten to trigger a nationalist 
backlash. One methodological stance is to highlight the inherently ambiguous and 
complex ways in which women respond to gendered system of domination. My decision 
to engage with ambiguity (and as a natural methodological consequence, with descriptive 
thickness) was informed neither by an overly optimistic stance that wants to see ‘agency’ 
everywhere, nor was it motivated by a fear of falling into theoretical extrapolations that 
tend to fix constantly shifting realities. Rather, it is because resistance cannot be 
summarized by actions solely taking place within organized forms of opposition to 
power that ‘complexity’ becomes a necessary tool of analysis. Attempting to come to 
grips with complex and ambiguous forms of ‘resistance’ requires more than simply 
reiterating a post-modern statement about the constantly shifting nature of social realities 
in a globalized world. It requires an analytical stance that is also a moral and ethical 
posture in which the ‘victimization’ of subaltern groups is rejected and their creative 
                                                
9 The concept of ‘habitus’ developed by Bourdieu (1977, 77) refers to ways in which representation 
explains behaviour through ‘a whole body of wisdoms, sayings, common places, ethical precepts and at a 
deeper level, the unconscious principles of the ethos (…) which determines ‘reasonable’ and ‘unreasonable’ 
conduct for every agent’. These differences are never spoken about or taught.  
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ways of achieving the expression of discontent, even in the most oppressive and brutal 
circumstances, is acknowledged. In Sherry Ortner’s words (1995, 187): 
 
(…) The question of adequate representation of subjects in the attempt to understand resistance 
is not purely a matter of providing better portraits of subjects in and of themselves. The 
importance of subjects (whether individual actors or social entities) lies not so much in who they 
are and how they are put together as in the projects that they construct and enact. For it is in the 
formulation and enactment of those projects that they both become and transform who they are, 
and that they sustain or transform their social and cultural universe.  
 
Ortner’s insistence on the concept of ‘project’ is, I think, useful as it helps to 
foresee how the practices of particular individuals carry in themselves a potential for 
broader social transformations. The everyday oppositional practices of individual Afghan 
women are revealing of this potential. When a female student practiced Kung Fu in an 
underground club, when a woman’s rights activist wore chadari to talk to religious leaders 
in rural areas or when a female MP refused to appear on TV in order to have free hands 
for backstage political negotiations, all these women struggled to transform their social 
and cultural universe and to create new spaces for themselves. 
Since the late 70s, a body of feminist literature (Rosaldo 1980, Moore 1988, 
Strathern 1987) has been concerned with the ways anthropology has traditionally 
represented women and culture. This work has encouraged feminist anthropologists to 
study historical processes through which women contest, resist and manipulate social 
structures and cultural representations. Many of these studies have however tended to 
analyse agency in terms of ‘strategies’, or ‘negotiations’ rooted in individual 
‘consciousness’ (Nelson 1984). These formulations are problematic for several reasons. 
First, the underlying assumption is that ‘post-modern’ actors are objective-driven, 
rational, and individualistic. Second, this model tends to work with the view that power 
asymmetries are monolithic instead of multidimensional. Finally, this approach does not 
account for more subtle and ambiguous forms of resistance through which women 
‘trying to get the better of a repressive system, may in other ways be acquiescing to it’ 
(Cowan 1990: 15). The women I present in this work belong to different ethnic, social, 
generational and religious groups. If as women, they all must, to various degrees, engage 
with certain cultural ideas of womanhood, they neither share a common ‘political 
consciousness’, nor a common experience of ‘oppression’.  
I share with Sherry Ortner (1995), Abu-Lughod (1990) and other feminist 
anthropologists (Cowan, 1990: 14) the view that in order to take ‘resistance’ seriously, a 
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theoretical move away from the oppression/resistance dichotomy and a more 
problematized approach to ‘agency’ are necessary. In this sense, the work initiated by 
Michel Foucault (1977; 1976) is an important step towards a more critical analysis of 
power. Foucault argues that far from being unidirectional, power is instead asserted 
through dominant discourses (particularly the humanistic discourse of Enlightenment 
that enabled the emergence of the human sciences) as well as a set of non-verbal 
disciplinary techniques that form what he calls a ‘microphysics of power’. For him, 
subjectivity is the product of this power/knowledge combination: what one feels, thinks 
or desires is filtered through discourses intimately linked to practices of power as well as 
disciplinary technologies which combined together, give shape to ‘docile bodies’. In 
addition, ‘as Foucault’s work on sexuality (…) suggests, relations of domination can be 
expressed in the midst of pleasurable activities, with the apparent consent of the 
dominated’ (Cowan, 1990: 16). What Foucault does not consider, however, is how the 
discourses and practices that forge subjectivity do in turn get transformed by the varied 
subjectivities they produce.  Foucault provides an interesting insight into the socio-
historical production of subjectivity but he fails to explain the mechanisms through 
which historical change occurs (Benhabib 1992, Fraser 1989). 
Political thinkers such as Williams and Femia (quoted in Cowan, 1990: 14) have 
counterbalanced the Foucauldian pitfall by proposing to look at power through a more 
dynamic approach. In her ethnography of ‘dance-events’ in Northern Greece, Jane 
Cowan (1990: 15) uses Williams and Femia’s re-readings of Gramsci to define the 
multiple power dynamics that shape everyday gender practices, especially in the context 
of pleasurable social activities such as dance parties. She argues that the Gramscian 
concept of ‘hegemony’ has too often been understood as the maintenance of domination 
through the cultural manufacturing of consent among subaltern groups, when it actually 
encapsulates more subtle possibilities of resistance as well as accommodation. With 
Williams and Femia, she sees ‘hegemony’ as a process that ‘powerfully penetrates 
individuals’ senses and their senses of themselves, yet it is never total or totally 
determining’ (1990: 15). The work of ‘hegemony’ involves the implicit and embodied 
production of meanings that are known and felt but not necessarily articulated. 
Along similar lines, Scott argues that hegemony is never total and that subalterns 
retain a critical perspective on their domination. In Weapons of the Weak, Scott (1985) 
explores secretive verbal and practical acts of resistance in contexts where the ‘weak’ 
cannot afford to openly confront power holders. He does this by carefully listening to 
subtle criticisms, parodies, jests, and so forth, embodied in expressive speech and 
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folkloric performance. This is methodologically important, since it widens the range of 
evidence for detecting actions that go against the will of superordinate groups.  
Scott’s account of everyday forms of peasant resistance shows how relations of 
power are characterized by a dual transcript (1990). The ‘official transcript’ asserts and 
legitimizes the position of superiors and strengthens the mechanisms by which 
subordinates are controlled. These mechanisms are enacted through face-to-face 
interactions between subordinates and superiors. However, all ‘officials transcripts’ have 
their invisible counterparts, what Scott calls ‘hidden transcripts’. These transcripts are 
realized ‘back stage’, where dissenting voices can safely express themselves. Only in 
situations of despair do the ‘weak’ resort to open rebellion or revolutionary activities. 
Most of the time, the ‘weak’ use hidden transcripts as a safer coping strategy.  
Another important contribution Scott makes to ‘resistance’ studies is to 
demonstrate that dominant and subordinate discourses are mutually constructed. The 
‘weak’ are not the passive victims of their superiors, but they actively negotiate their 
position vis-à-vis those who are more powerful. Those who dominate are constrained by 
the hidden transcripts of their subordinates. Most importantly, situations of domination 
are never static; the negotiations that take place in any social interaction alter both official 
and hidden transcripts. 
While Scott brings essential nuances to earlier studies of power by highlighting 
the relational and co-dependent dimensions of relations between superordinate and 
subaltern groups, he tends to ‘romanticize’ resistance (Abu-Lughod 1990) by detecting 
agency in each and every act of subordinate groups. Scott seems more invested in 
identifying heterogeneous practices of resistance than in explaining the social meaning 
and theoretical status of such acts. What is somehow lacking in this analysis is a deeper 
engagement with the different layers that constitute subordinates’ subjectivities which 
limit or, on the contrary, enable them to act in specific ways. By assuming that all 
subordinates are able to strategize, challenge and negotiate their position, Scott depicts 
the figure of a rational peasant who stands outside the field of hegemonic effects. Such a 
picture not only tends to essentialize the ‘subaltern’ by producing an image of a 
homogenous and fixed group but it also ignores other forms of protest, dissent or 
opposition that do not necessarily involve calculated manipulations. His concept of 
‘double transcript’ is somehow too neat and rigid to account for more subtle and more 
multiple forms of resistance. 
De Certeau’s notion of ‘oppositional practices of everyday life’ is close to Scott’s 
‘everyday forms of resistance’, yet I find the former much more illuminating than the 
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latter. Indeed, De Certeau is less interested in detecting agency in everyday practices than 
in analyzing them as potential sources of social transformation. He therefore 
distinguishes between strategy, ‘a calculus (or the manipulation) of relations of force which 
becomes possible whenever a subject of will and power (a business enterprise, an army, a 
city, a scientific institution) can be isolated’ (1980, 5) and tactic, ‘the calculated action 
which is determined by the absence of a proper place’ which he identifies as ‘the art of 
the weak’ (1980, 6). Tactics, according to De Certeau, are utilised by individuals to create 
space for themselves in environments defined by strategies. In his view, the everyday life 
works by a process of impinging on the territory of others, recombining the rules that 
already exist in culture and society in a way that is influenced, but never wholly 
determined, by those rules. De Certeau’s interest is more focused on the workings of 
transformation, the openings and foreclosures of social space for political intervention, 
the subtle change of meaning in dominant discourses, than it is focused to the expression 
of ‘agency’ among the subalterns, as it is the case in the work of Scott. 
The difference between Scott and De Certeau might sound minor, but I find it 
important for a study of resistance that is careful to avoid both ‘ethnographic refusal’ 
(Ortner 1995) and ‘the romance of resistance’ (Abu-Lughod 1990). I understand the 
women’s practices I have presented in this work as occupying precisely the complex 
space created by these marginal forms of opposition. When some dormitory girls walked 
the narrow alleys of Kute-Sangi bazaar with colourful square veils and make-up, when 
women’s rights activists wore chadari to travel to rural areas and talk to religious leaders, 
or when female politicians reclaimed the rhetoric of the jihad for themselves, they all 
struggled to reconfigure the rules that influenced their lives. But by doing so, they also 
experimented with the boundaries of the social order and explored the possibilities of 
social transformation. These direct and indirect acts of defiance, far from being heroic 
gestures motivated by the broader political agenda of a given formal social movement, 
were everyday ‘tactics’ (in the sense of De Certeau) utilized by women to create space for 
themselves.  However, the extreme ambiguity and complexity of these tactics reflects the 
narrow scope of possibilities opened to women in the ‘post-war/reconstruction’ era. I 
would ultimately argue that the sole description of these micro-practices says as much 
about the ‘system’ itself as it reveals the inner subjectivities of these ordinary women. 
The question that remains to be formulated in the context of such an observation 
is how does transformation occur within a system that tends to reinforce gender 
hierarchies? To ask this question is to ask if women’s capacity to open themselves to new 
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worlds and imaginaries is a strong enough inclination to actually achieve change in the 
‘real’ world. It is also to ponder the possibilities and limits of feminist transformation.  
Poststructuralist scholars such as Derrida (1978), Foucault (1972) and Lacan 
(1966) have associated the formation of subjectivity with the acquisition of language. 
Language, they argue, gives meaning to who we are in the world by rooting subjects in a 
symbolic order that forms the very ground of culture and social relations. We may wish 
to make our language our own, but we must first recognize that we are moulded into 
speaking subjects by language and that language shapes our perceptual world. The 
categories produced by discourses, Foucault argues, are the fundamental instruments of 
regulatory regimes. For poststructuralist feminists (Cixous 1976, de Lauretis 1984), 
because culture and ideology are shaped by language, traditional forms of discourses are 
necessarily modulated and codified by patriarchal cultural values. Since language fails to 
acknowledge women’s experiences and dispossesses women of their own subjectivity, 
women’s relation to language is inherently wounded. As subjects, i.e as beings capable of 
discourse, women can only speak through the disruption of language, through gaps that 
point to what is silenced and suppressed in dominant male representations.  
This being said, to acknowledge the structural limitations and constraints to 
women’s political expression does not amount to rejecting all the other transformative 
possibilities that language offers. Since language is not a stable object, which exists 
outside its realization by a subject, to speak means that one is constantly in the process of 
comparing signifiers in order to give them signification. As much as our interactions are 
shaped by language, language is also transformed by interaction. Even in the context of 
neo-colonial Afghanistan, where gendered discourses are overdetermined by the 
exclusion of women, individual women are able to disrupt dominant representations and 
alter the meanings of dominant discourses.  
The idea that language reveals as much as it conceals is the standpoint from 
which feminist theorist Judith Butler has started to explore the possibilities of gender 
transformation. Because speech is fundamentally ‘performative’ and ‘excitable’, i.e 
vulnerable to subversive appropriation and re-citation (Butler 1997), it may be wrested 
from its prior contexts and cited against its utterer’s intentions and expectations. 
Transformation therefore occurs in the ‘unanticipated future of signs’, through the ever 
sliding of meaning. In this thesis, I attempt an ethnographic analysis of how these 
processes are accomplished in everyday practice. I show how women shake up 
mainstream conventions from within and manoeuvre around social expectations of 
women’s silence by writing up poetry, mobilizing emotional repertoires, making different 
 42 
uses of their bodies and reclaiming narratives of martyrdom and jihad (chapter 7). These 
practices are significant precisely because they are displayed within a shared universe of 
meaning and because their iterability triggers new forms of representation and 
knowledge.   
 
5. Veiled performances 
 
Afghanistan is a strongly patriarchal society in which men’s control over women 
is a matter of honour. Honour’s code therefore imposes rights and duties to both men 
and women. A woman preserves her family’s honour by observing ‘pardah’ while a man’s 
honour (namus) is preserved by his ability to control women. A man unable to exercise 
such a control over female members of his family is pointed at as ‘be-namus’ and a woman 
breaking the rules of ‘pardah’ is called ‘be-pardah’, both terms meaning: ‘without honour’, 
the worst insult an Afghan can ever receive (chapter 6).  
If the code of honour is universally followed in Afghanistan, its modalities vary 
greatly according to various factors. Veiling practices in general, and the wearing of the 
chadari in particular, present many variations. Western representations of the chadari as an 
instrument of women’s subordination have negated the complex and various meanings it 
acquired when used by women from different regions, ethnicity, age and class. Originally 
used by urban upper class women to differentiate themselves from working-class 
women, the wearing of the chadari has been made compulsory for all women by the 
Taliban in an attempt to institute an ‘authentic’ Islamic state.  
Turned into a symbol of women’s oppression after the Western invasion of 
Afghanistan, the ‘first fashion show after the Taliban’ organized in a luxury hotel in 
Kabul in July, 2006 showcased a model under a chadari, lifting her veil at the end of the 
catwalk. The designer was an Afghan woman from the Diaspora in exile in the States 
recently returned to Kabul, all the models and most of the audience were foreigners. The 
image was strong and the event soon made the headlines of Western newspapers (BBC-
News 2006), journalists making comments on the important sign of progress and 
‘normalization’ the fashion show represented in the war-torn country. The commonplace 
idea that associates women’s public visibility with progress and normality was again 
reiterated, despite the fact that for ‘security’ reasons, no Afghan woman had come 
forward on the catwalk.  
The work of social scientists who have studied Muslim societies shows that the 
issue of the veil cannot be discussed out of context, without taking into account, in 
 43 
addition to the particular ‘culture’ in which it appears, the social, political, historical and 
personal developments that give meanings to women’s covering. Nilüfer Göle (1996), 
among other academics who have researched this topic, encourages us to locate debates 
around the ‘veil’ in the specific history of Muslim societies’ encounters with colonial 
powers. These encounters, she argues, implied complex negotiations and struggles 
between local and foreign elites, often resulting in policies aiming at reshaping the social 
landscape under a more ‘modern’ fashion. However, social engineering was rarely 
achieved through simply copying the West. Oftentimes, these negotiations gave birth to 
hybrid and locally processed versions of ‘modern’ models of social organization and 
practices.  
Afghanistan did not escape this rule. The history of the veil in Afghanistan is a 
product of its involvement with the West; it had never been considered as an issue that 
required public discussion before this encounter. Under the rule of King Amanullah 
(1919-1929) women for the first time in Afghan history were encouraged to unveil and 
follow the model of Queen Soraya, the first Afghan Queen to appear unveiled in public 
(Ahmed-Ghosh 2003). But even under these circumstances upper class women of that 
era utilized the veil to accommodate their cultural beliefs. In elite circles, veils became 
smaller or women started wearing hats to cover their hair, while adopting some elements 
of Western fashion like skirts falling under the knee as opposed to the long tunics over 
large trousers than women traditionally wore. Similar practices were encouraged under 
the reign of Zaher Shah. Those fashions were symbols of class distinction and could be 
observed among a very small segment of 
Afghan urban elite. At the same time, the 
cosmopolitan background of the elite was key 
to the move towards more Western style 
codes of dressing (Dupree 1973).  
Under the Soviet military occupation, 
the process of unveiling women turned into a 
large-scale operation, no longer confined to 
the urban upper class. It was accompanied by 
forced secularization and compulsory 
enrolment in literacy programs. Women’s 
bodies became more than ever before sites of 
political struggle (Zulfacar 2006). The Russian 
occupiers used the argument of the ‘civilizing 
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mission’ as one of the justifications to invade the country and include it into the Soviet 
Union. In this context, the veil was seen as a sign of backwardness and it was therefore 
considered as a priority to encourage women to take it off. In a political book published 
by the PDPA in 1984, Babrak Kamal, general Secretary of the PDPA Central Committee, 
states: ‘Now, men and women are working side by side to defend the gains of the 
Revolution and extract the country from its backwardness’ (Government of Afghanistan 
1984). The statement is illustrated by a photograph of a female factory worker, unveiled, 
wearing make-up and a dress of Western fashion (see picture page 43): the embodied 
symbol of a country that had reached modernity.  
Such a discourse naturally fuelled feelings of humiliation and was soon to 
produce its opponents. In the countryside, women displayed resistance by keeping their 
veil and using it to support the jihad. The veil became an instrument to hide weapons, to 
carry strategic messages to various mujjahedin factions and to distribute anti-soviet 
publications. In Kabul, women’s veiling became a sign of protest against the occupation 
(Zulfacar 2006, 39). Even during the same time period, the veil carried different political 
meanings according to women’s varied positions. For instance, in the refugee camps 
under their control, the mujjahedins enforced women’s total covering under chadari in an 
attempt to establish strict Islamic rules. Religious decrees imposed on women by the 
Taliban were only a step further in the march towards the establishment of a ‘true’ 
Islamic State, free from Western imperialism. The meaning of women’s veiling cannot be 
fully understood without taking into account the unequal power relations that marked 
Afghanistan’s encounter with the West as well as the contrasted social positions of 
individual women. 
 This study aims to examine the new meanings of women’s covering in the 
current political climate. Afghan women are once again positioned at the interface of 
three forces: personal aspirations, social expectations from both Islam and the Western 
occupiers and material realities. In addition to those forces, the manoeuvring of their 
public appearance is also shaped by the memory of a double trauma: the Soviet 
occupation and Islamic fundamentalism. For most women, the anonymity provided by 
the chadari is currently of paramount importance to ensure personal safety. This is the 
reason why when, in 2005, hundreds of Kabul war widows demonstrated against the 
kidnapping of Italian aid worker Clementina Cantoni, it was a flock of blue chadari that 
invaded the streets (BBC News, 2005).  In the same way, many female MPs continue to 
wear chadari when visiting their home province. They stress safety and convenience as the 
major reasons for their covering. ‘I was one of those women who advocated against the 
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compulsory wearing of chadari under the Taliban’, a female MP once told me, ‘and now I 
tell women from my province to wear it again to protect themselves (against 
commanders’ militias)’  (Interview - MP5, 10/03/2007).  
But despite the very volatile political climate, pockets of admissible spaces have 
started to appear in Kabul. In the shopping malls and beauty salons of Shar-e-Naw, on the 
University campus, in the residential areas of Qala-e-Fatullah, a few women have started 
to appear wearing square veils tied up under their chin or chadar of various colours. 
Younger ones have adopted blue jeans and knee-length black blouses of Iranian design. 
The arrival of fashion products from Iran and India on the local market has created 
opportunities for women to experiment with their public appearance. However, the 
women who are the most attentive to fashion are the younger educated ones, who have 
lived in exile during the Afghan wars and who have not experienced the double trauma 
of older women. For these young women who have recently returned from Iran or other 
countries from the Middle East, displaying a ‘modern’ persona is of utter importance. 
Female University students who have lived abroad and have brought with them new 
fashion items and consumption habits do not want to be associated with the girls who 
dress up more traditionally and whom they jokingly call ‘Taliban’. Displaying a 
fashionable yet Muslim self is for them a way to keep the independence they have gained 
abroad. By contrast, for the girls who have experienced fear under the Taliban, fashion 
and cosmetics are seen as tools to attract men’s attention; they are therefore a challenge 
to non-make-up-wearing girls’ credibility in their claim to deserve the same education as 
boys (chapter 4).  
 The complex body politics that shapes women’s veiling practices underlines that 
women’s covering is situational and mostly voluntary. Veiling is part of negotiations of 
power between women and men but also among different women. Choices of veils are 
the result of processes by which women evaluate, negotiate and weight the 
appropriateness of their appearance according to the different circumstances they 
encounter. It is as much a work of impression management as it is a work of self-
construction. In Nilüfer Göle’s words, ‘veiling is a discursive symbol that is instrumental 
in conveying political meanings’ (1996, 6). Looking at women’s discourses around the 
veil and women’s bodywork is key to understand the negotiations taking place at the 
interface between Islam and the West in the ‘post-war/reconstruction’ context. 
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6. Modernity and its discontent 
a. Modernizat ion and the West 
 
Modernity is not a new word in the Afghan political culture. It refers to particular 
moments of the Afghan history when modernization theory exercised a powerful 
influence on the Afghan intelligentsia and political elite. The word has no Dari equivalent 
but is endowed with a particular aura in intellectual circles especially among the more 
cosmopolitan ones that have been directly or indirectly exposed to other modernization 
projects conducted in the region - in Iran, Syria or Turkey. Modernization refers to a set 
of values derived from the Enlightenment according to which people are part of a 
natural order. In this view, workings of human society are subject to natural laws that can 
be discovered by scientific enquiry; society can then be moulded for the benefit of 
individual men and women. Historical progress can be universally achieved through 
technological innovation, the ultimate outcome of rational reason. 
 In the 1920s, the presence of Afghan intellectual Mahmood Tarzi in the close 
entourage of King Amanullah Khan was critical in initiating major reforms that would 
conduct Afghanistan on its long journey towards modernization (Gregorian 1967). 
However, unlike in Europe where modernization was the result of endogenous processes 
of industrialization, production and class conflict, Afghan modernization was the result 
of exogenous influences exercised by the elite. For these early modernizers, social 
engineering through women’s emancipation from the traditional Islamic way of life was 
pivotal in making Afghanistan ‘catch up’ with more modern and developed countries. 
However, social reforms initiated by Amanullah Khan on his return from his trip around 
Europe in 1928 in a country still not united as a nation, were received with great 
resistance in rural areas where tribal leaders felt challenged in their authority.  For these 
segments of society, modernization was synonymous with the corruption of the values, 
principles and morals that were constitutive of Afghanyiat (Afghan-ness) (Dupree 1973).  
 Despite the more careful manner with which King Zaher Shah continued the 
agenda of reforms initiated by Amanullah, the model chosen remained similar. 
Institutions, ideas and manners that the King promoted were the reflection of his overt 
admiration for ‘modern’ Europe (Cullather 2002, 521). In Kabul National Theatre, 
comedians performed Shakespeare and Moliere’s plays to the great delight of the royal 
family and Kabul upper middle class. In social gatherings as well as at the workplace, 
segregation of the sexes and women’s veiling started to disappear (Interviews – Makai-
Shah 12/09/2007, Seraj 07/10/2007). As the lifestyle of the urban working-class 
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gradually tended to copy the West, life in rural areas remained largely untouched by these 
developments. Kabul and to a lesser extent other cities, became isolated islands in a 
society that remained predominantly rural.  In the countryside, the government and 
Kabul inhabitants who received the greatest benefits from the reforms and the modest 
industrialization were seen as morally corrupt (Emadi 1991, 229).  
 The Red Army’s invasion of Afghanistan in 1981 was seen as the concrete 
evidence of the corrupt nature of the ruling class (Dupree-Hatch 2001). Here, as in other 
countries under imperial domination, Russians used the argument of the necessity to 
civilise and modernize a tribal society to justify their military intervention. Afghanistan’s 
violent encounter with foreign occupiers revealed that its relationship to the ‘developed’ 
world had never been based on equality. Reforms conducted by the Communist 
government, such as secularization and women’s emancipation, placed the West as a 
reference point of modernity. The Revolution’s objectives had to do with extracting the 
country from the inherent ‘backwardness’ in which it had been kept by tradition and 
religion. Individual men and women’s forced enrolment in literacy programs and 
Defence Committees of the Revolution while regime opponents were tracked, arrested 
and tortured turned the experience of modernization into a painful experience of 
humiliation (Barry 2002). 
 The resistance that emerged in the Afghan refugee camps in Pakistan and in 
Afghanistan’s rural areas is to be understood in the light of these developments. 
Mujjahedin groups were not simple ‘freedom fighters’ supported by the US in the context 
of the Cold War. Far from the romantic caricature of mystical holy warriors untouched 
by modernity Western journalists made of them, the mujjahedins were on the contrary 
pure products of modernity. To get a greater sense of the insidious exchanges that 
existed between the resistant groups in Peshawar and the rest of the world, the work of 
earlier anthropologists such as Pierre and Micheline Centlivres (2007), Nancy and Louis 
Dupree or David Edwards is worth re-reading. In an article of Cultural Anthropology 
published in 1994, Edwards makes an interesting account of his first encounter with the 
mujjahedins from the ‘interior’.  
 
It is cool in the mountains, cool enough that the few people I pass wear their shawls wrapped 
tightly around their shoulders. Climbing a short hill on the outskirts of the village, I see a mullah 
with a billowy white turban seated in the chair of a two-barrel Dashika antiaircraft gun. The 
Dashika is a Soviet design, but markings on the gun indicate that it is of Chinese manufacture. 
These guns are shiny and new and only recently arrived by camel caravan across the Pakistani 
frontier. The mullah is young-late-twenties-and he scans the sky for signs of Soviet MiGs. Only a 
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few weeks before, mujahidin gunners had brought down a MiG-23 not too far from here, and there 
is fighting going on not too far away; so the mullah is keeping careful watch. As he does so, he 
listens to a cassette on his Japanese tape recorder of an Egyptian muezzin chanting verses from the 
Qur'an.  
Later in the day, I meet another ex-soldier, a Persian-speaking Tajik from the Kohistan region just 
north of Kabul (…). Unlike most of the other mujahidin I have met, he has little time for Islam and 
openly admits to me that he had been a follower of a famous leftist guerrilla leader named Majid 
Kalakani who had been captured and killed by the government some years before. He talks proudly 
of his time with Kalakani and tells me of the American sniper rifle that he used to own. It had a 
scope on it, and once he killed four Soviet tankists as they drove in a convoy down the main road 
toward Kabul. The beauty of the American rifle, he says, is its small bullets and its silent action. 
(Edwards 1994, 347) 
 
The Egyptian muezzin singing on a Japanese tape recorder, the Dashika antiaircraft 
gun designed in the USSR and manufactured in China, the American sniper rifle…the 
material details Edwards provides in his description are revealing of the complex global 
dynamics in which the resistance movement was entangled. Descriptions like these show 
that the Mujjahedins stood at the crossroads of modernity, technological innovation and 
global conflicts. The policies some of the most radical Mujjahedin groups implemented in 
the refugee camps they ruled were a direct reaction to ‘Westernization’. Constraints 
imposed on women’s movements and public appearances in the camps directly answered 
to State-sponsored women’s emancipation programs taking place in the country.  
b. Ident i t i es  for  Sale  
 
 As Nilüfer Göle (1996, 12) argues, ‘as Western experience and culture basically 
define the terms of civilization, attempts at modernization in a Muslim country centre 
around Westernization’. The current ‘reconstruction’ project, in this sense, presents 
similar trends with the modernization project conducted under the Communist regime: a 
focus on centralized instances of governance to carry out important social reforms with 
the military support of foreign troops. In this project, like in the Communist one, 
women’s public visibility is the benchmark upon which ‘progress’ is measured. Despite 
the fact that the political jargon used to foster ‘modernization’ is apparently less 
ideologically connoted, the neo-liberal agenda associated to it is far from being value free. 
Modernity in the post-modern world is associated with individuals’ capacity to consume 
products available on the global market. Becoming a consumer is part of the experience 
of building a modern identity.  
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However, the distinction between the Islamic world and the West has too often 
been monolithically explained in terms of ‘culture’ vs ‘consumption’. As Yael Navaro-
Yashin rightly argues (2002, 78), this perspective ‘imagines “culture” to be manifested 
originally outside political economy, or, that perceives economy to be an ensuing 
appendage upon an interruption of a formerly pristine domain of culture’. Trans-national 
economic exchanges in Afghanistan are not a new phenomenon. Located on the Silk 
Road, Afghanistan has been since around 100 BC an important market place for goods 
produced in the region (Christian 2000, 14). Historical figures like Alexander the Great, 
Marco Polo, Genghis Khan and Tamerlane were all familiar with the Silk Road. As 
merchants and other travellers traversed the Silk Road, they also carried with them 
culture, art, philosophies and beliefs.  
Islam came to Afghanistan on the Silk Road and Buddhism, Christianity, 
Zoroastrianism and Confucianism all had their itinerant proselytisers (Whitfield 1999, 8). 
The famous Buddha of Bamyan, the Zoroastrian sanctuaries of Balkh and the Marco 
Polo Hotel in Kabul are the symbolic reminiscences of these various influences that 
placed Afghanistan at the crossroads of cultures. If luxury products such as silk and 
spices were available on merchants’ arrays, so were other products that were consumed 
as symbolic markers of these different identities.  
The history of the origins of the chadari, the heavy tent-like veil, is also revealing 
of the fundamentally hybrid nature of the Afghan culture. According to Lederman (2002: 
50), the practice of wearing chadari started with upper-class Christian women of the 
Ottoman Empire. For status, safety and comfort, they were frequently carried about in 
curtained sedan chairs, which were similar to the sedan chairs of the Hindu aristocracy or 
European royalty. The chairs enabled riders to avoid the mud of rough roads that would 
sully their finery. Lederman believes that the complete covering used by women in 
Afghanistan and in some parts of Pakistan was originally an imitation of upper-class 
Ottoman women’s style rather than a religious requirement. It is through economic 
exchanges accelerated by the opening of transport and communication infrastructures 
that practice such as women’s veiling changed over time.   
In his anthology of Afghanistan, Louis Dupree (1973) explains how in the late 
1920s King Amanullah Khan made the wearing of Western clothes compulsory in Kabul. 
Bazaars around the capital city started to sell suits and bowler hats to provincials who 
wanted to enter the city. In Afghanistan, like in other countries of the Middle East under 
the influence of ‘Western’ ideas, the elite perceived the wearing of these clothes as a 
status symbol, a public display of a modern self.  
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Taking these historical elements into account, the extraction of ‘culture’ from the 
commodification domain is intellectually artificial. The recent attempt by the National 
Assembly to ban the use of cosmetics and the wearing of Western clothes shows that 
‘culture’, far from being static, belongs to the political domain and is a constant object of 
contestation. With the arrival of new commodities such as cosmetics, soap operas, 
mobile phones and Internet on the local market, an area for a redefinition of cultural 
identity has opened. Besides the traditional chadari shops, other shops are now offering a 
wide choice of veils imported from India, Pakistan and elsewhere. The availability of 
these products has created opportunities for experimentation among the urban working-
class.  
  In Kabul, young educated women have started to wear bright coloured veils 
imported from India, trying to model their appearance on the Indian actresses starring in 
their favourite television series. For them, there is no contradiction between their Muslim 
faith and their interest in fashion. By wearing fashionable veils, these young women try 
to answer contradictory social expectations to behave in accordance with Islamic 
principles and personal aspirations to be read as ‘modern’. The complex body work in 
which they are engaged is an attempt at reconciling Islam and modernity. Practices of 
this kind prove that if confrontation between Western and Islamic value regimes seems 
to be the norm, processes of inter-penetration and hybridity are in actuality prevalent 
wherever this encounter occurs. Kaka, a taxi driver I often used to travel in the city, was 
proud to show me the ‘Allah Akbar’ ring tone his son had downloaded for him on his 
new mobile phone. Each time his phone rang, Kaka caressed his ears and beard with 
both hands and murmured ‘Bismillah’10 before answering the call. And I could not help 
smiling each time I witnessed this scene.  
 In this thesis, I explore the complex and subtle ways in which women 
accommodate contradictory expectations relative to their bodies. I specifically insist on 
the performative and symbolic nature of their engagement with discourses on modernity 
and tradition, to uncover the processes of social transformation they are able to initiate 
‘under the veil’. I also examine how these ambiguous forms of ‘resistance’ participate in 
the creation of alternative public spaces for women while allowing them to receive a 
certain degree of public validation. 
                                                
10 Opening phrase of all suras in the Koran, Bismillah means ‘in the name of God’. The short form of 
Bismillah is used as a part of daily language, normally as a way of underlining sincerity and honesty. 
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Chapter 2 
Queen Soraya’s Portrait: Making Women, Making the 
Nation 
 
 
Official portrait of Queen Soraya Tarzi © www.afghanistan-photos.com 
 
 
 
In December 2001, a few days after the Interim Government was officially 
appointed, the Ministry of Information and Culture opened on its ground floor a hall for 
press conferences. On the large walls of the conference room, paintings of the different 
kings of Afghanistan, Timur Shah, Abdur Khaman, Habibullah, Amanullah, Nadir Shah 
and Zahir Shah were displayed in chronological order. Only on one painting did the king 
appear with his wife. The painting was a replica of a famous photograph of King 
Amanullah and Queen Soraya Tarzi. However, the Afghan authorities had slightly 
modified the original picture of the Royal couple. A veil had been painted over Soraya, a 
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very large veil in the manner of wedding veils going all the way to the floor, a veil that 
did not appear on the original photograph. 
The addition of such a garment to the portrait of a Queen is more than a simple 
anecdote. By doing so, the authorities had deliberately rewritten one of the most 
important pages of the Afghan history. In her wedding veil, the eminent political role 
Soraya had played during the rule of her husband in the 1920s was simply denied while 
her wife status was re-emphasized. Her solitary feminine presence in a portrait gallery 
dominated by masculine political figures could no more be read as a symbol of women’s 
participation in politics. 
In the epigraph of his famous novel 1984, George Orwell wrote: ‘Who controls 
the past, controls the future. Who controls the present, controls the past’. The way 
history is written and taught influences the way we envision the future. Historical 
distortions, once discovered, tell a lot about the nature of political regimes and the 
national projects they support. In the aftermath of September 11, and the downfall of the 
Taliban regime, the veiling of Soraya’s portrait can be understood as a symptom of the 
critical and contested role women are meant to play in the reconstruction of the Afghan 
nation.  
The need for norms of behaviour and traditional practices to be continually re-
invented through the rewriting and reinterpretation of Afghan history hints both at the 
precariousness of cultural homogeneity within the national community and at the 
centrality of gender in articulating and perpetuating a sense of national belonging. 
Somebody has to invoke and perform the ‘rituals’ that reinforce these norms and to 
inculcate them into the next generation in order to ensure historical continuity. This 
‘somebody’ is woman-as-mother-of-the-nation (Peterson 1994). Her body is a site of 
political struggle. 
In the portrait gallery of the Ministry of Information and Communication, 
History pays homage to the great male Afghan leaders who have conducted soldiers to 
the battlefield against foreign invaders or national development projects to modernize 
their country. However, little is said about their fellow women. Yet, these untold 
women’s stories bring another layer of understanding to the Afghan past. If Afghan 
women have endured wars and have suffered from it in a specifically feminine way, as 
mothers, as wives, as daughters, their life stories show that they were neither simple 
victims nor agents of resistance. These stories reveal how Afghan women have creatively 
and actively adapted to rapidly changing situations, in times of war and peace, with 
pragmatic decisions to ensure survival. Wartime women have struggled to sustain their 
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families while the infrastructures were reduced to ashes. They have resisted political 
oppression. Sometimes, they have directly or indirectly participated in the conflict. Under 
the different reigns of the Afghan kings, women have occupied various positions as 
housewives, as women’s rights defenders, as factory workers, as teachers and nurses. 
What did Afghan women do under the different political regimes and during the 
Afghan wars? Why did they do it? How do they reflect on their past experience? Has war 
shaped a particular consciousness that informs the way they envision the future of their 
country? And most importantly, what do these stories reveal about the nature of state-
building in Afghanistan? 
With Nadje Sadig Al-Ali (2007), I share the opinion that all histories are 
constructed and therefore, the result of a process by which the narrator selects and 
reconstructs memories that are by nature, fragmented, partial and subjective. 
‘Experience, memories and truth do not necessarily overlap’ (Sadig-Al Ali 2007, 3). The 
purpose of telling these untold women’s stories is less to reveal the truth about a 
particular event or social context than to show how different women have experienced 
different historical moments in different ways. This alternative historical account should 
bring nuances to the deeply homogenizing discourses on the ‘plight of Afghan women’ 
that emerged in the media post 9/11. The women I talked to were from different 
generations, from different political, religious and ethnic backgrounds. Some of them 
had left Afghanistan after the Saur revolution that brought the communists in power and 
had recently returned to their home country after the fall of the Taliban regime. These 
women kept a nostalgic memory of the 60s and 70s and viewed this period as the 
‘Golden Age’ of Afghan history. Some others had been affiliated with the People 
Democratic Party of Afghanistan and had supported its proactive gender policies. The 
experiences of these middle and upper middle class women were in sharp contrast with 
the lives of the rural women who had witnessed the violence with which the government 
had attempted to enforce its policies. These women’s narratives reveal contrasting views 
towards the different regimes. And as these women recalled their past and tried to make 
sense of it, they also revealed their visions for the future of Afghanistan.  
In this chapter, I explore four major periods of the Afghan history: the 
emergence of modern monarchies (1920-1973), the communist regime (1979-1992), the 
civil war (1992-1996) and the Taliban period (1996-2001). I look at these periods from 
the standpoint of women in order to underline the ways in which the different political 
regimes have used the ‘woman question’ in order to articulate ideas about national 
identity and to develop a vision for the society. Gender politics, expressed in debates 
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around the importance of ‘remaking women’, to use an expression of Lila Abu-Lughod  
(1998), were at the core of each of these respective historical moments.  
I also relate the ‘woman question’ to the broader process of nation building and 
the particular relationship between tribal and central institutions of power. As Kandiyoti 
(2007, 4) points out, ‘issues surrounding the position of women in the Afghan society 
need to be placed in the context of evolving state-society relations, where the place of 
Islamic law and practice has been central to political contestation’. The birth of the 
Afghan state can be dated to the 18th century when a confederation of Pashtun tribes was 
created in order to administer lands they conquered. Because of the paradoxical relations 
between tribes and state, the Afghan state has mostly remained peripheral (Tapper 1983). 
Indeed, the creation of a modern State is largely the product of competing imperial 
influences in the region, providing financial subsidies and arms to the ruling elite in 
Kabul in an attempt at asserting their own control over the country while providing the 
State with the means to impose its will on the tribes (Roy 1985).  
Indeed, during the 19th century, Afghanistan was under the influence of two 
imperial powers: Russia in the North and England in the Indian sub-continent. It was the 
threat of the expanding Russian Empire beginning to push for an advantage in the 
Afghanistan region that placed pressure on British India, in what became known as the 
‘Great Game’. The Great Game set in motion the confrontation of the British and 
Russian empires — whose spheres of influence moved steadily closer to one another 
until they met in Afghanistan. It also involved Britain’s repeated attempts to impose 
puppet governments in Kabul. Afghanistan gradually fell under British control (1880) 
and was eventually used as a buffer state to prevent the expansion of Russia, until the 
country obtained its independence in 1919. King Amanullah whose political legitimacy 
got strengthened by his victory in the struggle for national liberation, engaged the 
country in a vast program of reforms aiming at modernizing the country (Barry 2002).  
1. Modern monarchies: 1920-1973 
 
Often described as the Ataturk of Afghanistan, the entourage of King Amanullah 
was composed of liberal and nationalist intellectuals whose political views were 
influenced by modernization reforms conducted in neighbouring countries such as Iran 
and Turkey. The reign of Amanullah is characterized by a continuous effort to radically 
transform the face of the Afghan nation (Zulfacar 2006, 30).  
Amanullah’s modernization programme was undeniably inspired by the liberal 
ideas of Mahmud Beg Tarzi, father of Queen Soraya, Amanullah’s wife. Educated in 
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Syria and Turkey, son of the famous poet Gulham Mohammad Tarzi, Mahmud Beg 
Tarzi is one of the most influential intellectual and nationalist figures of his time. The 
Tarzi family was forced in exile by Amir Abdur khaman Kan after Gulham Mohammad 
broke with the Amir over his strictness and brutality towards his enemies (Dupree 1973, 
437). The Tarzi family only returned to Afghanistan in 1903. In 1911, Mahmud Tarzi 
founded a modernist-nationalist newspaper, the Siraj-ul-Akhbar-I Afghan (The lamp of the 
news of Afghanistan). His writings, influenced by modern interpretations of Islamic 
jurisprudence, advocated for modern education while denouncing western imperialism 
together with the timid liberal reforms initiated under the reign of Habibullah  (Dupree 
1973, 440).  
Exposed to the new gender policies implemented in other Middle Eastern 
countries where he had travelled during his years of exile, Tarzi became a strong 
supporter of women’s rights in his own country. He believed in women’s ability to 
participate in public life, claimed that fully ‘educated women were an asset for future 
generations, concluded that Islam did not deny them equal rights’ and that women 
should be therefore entitled to become full citizens (Ahmed-Ghosh 2003, 4). One 
section of his newspaper was dedicated to women’s issues under the title ‘Celebrating 
Women of the World’ and edited by his wife, Asma Tarzi (Ibid 2003, 3). But in spite of 
its liberal approach towards the position of women in society, authoritarian modernism 
to maintain the monarchy, creation of a centralised state, and safeguarding the 
independence of the country constituted the core themes of the newspaper. 
 
a. The Reign o f  Amanul lah:  1919-1929 
 
As soon as the independence was achieved, Amanullah recruited Tarzi, his 
influential father-in-law, as his Minister of Foreign Affairs. Soraya Tarzi was King 
Amanullah Khan’s only wife, which broke centuries of polygamous tradition. Her 
presence in the Portrait Gallery reveals that she was more than the wife and the daughter 
of eminent politicians. Indeed, Soraya played a central role in redefining the position of 
women in the Afghan society, at a major moment of social change and nation building.  
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Queen Soraya and King Amanullah in England, 1928 © www.afghanland.com 
 
When the prince became Amir in 1919 and subsequently King in 1926, the 
Queen had an important role in the evolution of the country, always close to her 
husband. He had her take part in all national events. He once said, ‘I am your king, but 
the minister of Education is my wife, your Queen.’11 Queen Soraya was the first Muslim 
sovereign to appear in public together with her husband. She participated with him in 
hunting parties, riding on horseback, and in some Cabinet meetings. She appeared in the 
King’s lodge during Military Parades.  
King Amanullah Khan publicly campaigned against the veil, against polygamy, 
and encouraged girls’ education not just in Kabul but also in the countryside. At a public 
function, Amanullah said that “Islam does not require women to cover their bodies or 
wear any special kind of veil.”(Ahmed-Ghosh 2003, 4). At the conclusion of the speech, 
Queen Soraya tore off her veil in public and the wives of other officials present at the 
meeting followed her example.  
Throughout her husband’s reign, Queen Soraya, wore wide-brimmed hats with a 
diaphanous veil attached to them (Ahmed-Ghosh 2003, 4). This exhibition of modern 
feminine fashion, inspired from Europe, became part of national rituals aiming to 
symbolically bolster the idea of progress and modernization. For instance, the Queen’s 
visit to Turkey in 1929 made the headlines of Cumburyet, an Istanbul daily paper 
sympathetic to the goals of the new Republic’s modernizing regime, in which 
photographs of her wearing a sleeveless summer dress, with hair, face and shoulders 
                                                
11  Mahmud Tarzi official website. http://www.mahmudtarzi.com/MahmudTarzi/InAfghanistan.asp. 
Accessed in March, 2008.  
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uncovered were displayed (Holly-Shissler 2004, 113). The circulation of images of upper-
class women dressed in Western clothes and their public visibility at official ceremonies 
represented a radical step in a society where most women had historically been 
segregated from men and preserved from the gaze of outsiders. However, the 
introduction of women in public space and public life was undertaken to serve ends 
other than the development of each woman’s autonomy. According to Zulfacar (2006, 
31) corruption and governmental injustices practiced in rural parts of the country 
rendered these public ceremonials outrageous to villagers. 
Many women from Amanullah’s family publicly participated in organizations and 
went on to become government officials later in life. For instance, the Anjuman-i Himayat-
i-Niswan (Association for the Protection of Women) was established in 1928 by Seraj al-
Banat and Queen Soraya to encourage women to demand the rights provided by King 
Amanullah’s reforms of marriage customs and restrictive social practices, and advocacy 
of women’s education (Dupree 1973). 
With the help of Queen Soraya, women were encouraged to get an education and 
in that attempt, 15 young women were sent to Turkey for higher education in 1928. 
Soraya was very instrumental in enforcing change for women and publicly exhorted them 
to be active participants in nation building. In 1926, at the 7th anniversary of 
Independence, Soraya delivered the following message in a public speech (Ahmed-
Ghosh 2003, 4): ‘It (Independence) belongs to all of us and that is why we celebrate it. 
Do you think, however, that our nation from the outset needs only men to serve it? 
Women should also take their part as women did in the early years of our nation and 
Islam. From their examples we must learn that we must all contribute toward the 
development of our nation and that this cannot be done without being equipped with 
knowledge. So we should all attempt to acquire as much knowledge as possible, in order 
that we may render our services to society in the manner of the women of early Islam.’ 
These societal reforms were further accelerated fallowing a six months trip 
around Europe Soraya and Amanullah made in 1927-1928. On this trip Soraya and 
Amanullah visited Rome, Paris, Brussels, Bern, Berlin, London and Warsaw. They 
received honorary degrees from Oxford University. The Queen spoke to a large group of 
students and leaders. She was photographed dressed up in Western clothes, without a 
veil, dining with foreign men and having her hand kissed by the leader of France. 
On their return, the Royal couple initiated a programme of new reforms, 
including the creation of a constitutional monarchy, an elected assembly, a secular 
judiciary, and most significantly, compulsory education for both sexes and plans for co-
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educational schools. Amanullah also encouraged women to unveil and asked his wife 
Soraya to show the example, by officially appearing without a veil during the Loya Jirga 
(Grand Assemby). 
However, the European tour of the Royal couple was received with hostility in 
their own country (Alimajrooh 1989, 94). While Soraya and Amanullah were touring 
Europe, conservative forces at home began a campaign condemning their personal life 
and their modernization programs as anti-Islamic. Images of the Queen, unveiled and 
wearing Western clothes, presumably distributed by the British eager to destabilize a 
regime that had defeated them during the third Anglo-Afghan war, circulated in the tribal 
regions of Afghanistan (Ahmed-Gosh 2003, 5). According to Dupree (1973, 452), 
‘Amanullah stuck at the roots of conservative Islam by removing the veil from the 
women, by opening co-educational schools and by attempting to force all Afghans in 
Kabul to wear Western clothing”.  
As the reform increased in momentum, resentment grew among conservative 
religious leaders. The revolt, probably helped by the British smarting from the defeat in 
1919, quickly spread and a tribal army moved on Kabul, recruiting supporters on its way. 
The King’s neglect for the creation of a national army to support his programs at a 
moment when Afghanistan was barely united in a sense of nationhood left him disarmed, 
with no choice but flight (Dupree 1973, 450). Despite his last minute attempts to 
negotiate with tribal leaders and his efforts to tackle public discontent by withdrawing 
some of his reforms, Amanullah was finally overthrown and replaced by a new 
generation of Kings who avoided pushing the women’s agenda to the detriment of tribal 
rules. Habibullah II, who ruled for a period of nine months after Amanullah, totally 
abrogated gender equality laws. Nadir Shah, who ousted him, introduced cautious rights 
for women. After the reign of Amanullah, it took another thirty years before any further 
significant moves towards women’s emancipation occurred. 
b. The re ign o f  Zahir Shah and the decades o f  Daoud: 1953-1973 
 
By the mid-century, massive foreign and technical assistance from the Soviet 
Union pushed Afghanistan forward on its journey towards modernization. Women were 
encouraged to participate in the economic effort in order to support the country’s 
development goals. The 1940s and 1950s saw the first women nurses, teachers and 
doctors (Ahmed-Ghosh 2003, 6). 
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The original caption says: ‘Rural nurse from village clinic near Kabul’ (Planning 1969, 56) 
 
The Muassasa-i Khayriyya-i Zanan (Women’s Welfare Association, WWA), 
established by the monarchical state in 1946, was founded by Zaynab Inayat Siraj and 
Bibi Jan, both members of the royal family. Its members consisted of liberal upper- and 
middle-class activists. Although it tried to promote unveiling, the emphasis of WWA was 
to encourage income-generating activities and to modernize women by providing literacy, 
family planning, and vocational classes. In 1953 it established the journal Mirman. In 1975 
WWA became institutionally independent and changed its name to the Women's 
Institute (WI). The WI had branch offices in ten provincial cities and grew to 8,000 
members. However, Parvin Alimajrooh (1989, 95) notes that despite its attempts at 
reaching out rural women by opening offices in the provinces, the organization failed to 
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take steps outside elite social classes. Kubra Noorzai, the institute’s director, was 
nevertheless elected to the National Assembly under President Daoud, and the 
organization began to promote gender equality through the state’s modernization policies 
(Emadi 2002, 91–2). 
In 1959, the government of King Zahir Shah formally announced the voluntary 
end of female seclusion and the removal of the veil. However, it was left to individual 
families to decide how to respond to these greater freedoms and, outside the major 
urban centres, life for most women remained largely unchanged (Zulfacar 2006, 33). 
Nevertheless, in the following years, some gradual changes did take place, including the 
introduction of girls’ schools and medical facilities for women, where they could receive 
training in both nursing and administration. The constitution of 1964 accorded 
significant rights to women, including the right to vote. The overall participation of 
women in politics remained however extremely low. 
As a result of the slow process of modernization initiated in the 1960s and 1970s, 
especially in the capital city, changes began to take shape in urban areas. With new 
education and employment opportunities available, the urban population became more 
stratified. This period saw the emergence of an educated middle class in the major cities 
of Afghanistan. Women who found employment in the public administration began to 
develop new viewpoints and expectations. According to Moghadam (1994, 863), ‘Many 
urban women remained illiterate or undereducated, and their activities were restricted to 
household work. But the situation was different for the daughters of civil servants and 
other professionals, as they had the possibility of secondary and higher education and 
work outside the home. In the 1970s the stratum of urban elite women began to grow; 
these women had (and have) very different lifestyles from those of rural women, working 
alongside of men in professional, technical and support functions in government services 
and the private sector.’ 
In 1965, the people’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), a soviet backed 
socialist organization was formed. The same year, the first women’s group, the 
democratic organization of Afghan Women (DOAW) was created. Its main objectives 
were to eliminate illiteracy, ban bride price as well as forced marriage.  
However, Hafizulah Emadi (2002) notes the reaction that even these limited 
reforms produced amongst religious conservative. Violent demonstrations took place in 
the country’s major cities, especially in Universities where unveiled women wearing short 
skirts had acid thrown at them. Conservative religious reactions to women’s education 
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and emancipation were a key feature of the anti-government protests of the 1970s, which 
finally resulted in the leftist coup d’état of April 1978. 
c .  Cultural  and art i s t i c  l i f e  
 
Kabul was a thriving cosmopolitan city with its vibrant artistic, intellectual and cultural life. There 
were poets, musicians, and writers. There was also an influx of western culture, art, and literature 
in the 60s and 70s. We had private house parties in Wazir Akbar Khan12. In our houses, young 
men and young women got together, listened to the music and talked. On Fridays, we were going 
for picnics to Gargha lake or to Paghman13. Girls were wearing short skirts. We had movie theatres. 
We had concerts. We had nothing to make us envy the West.’ (Interview - Seraj, 07/10/2007) 
 
The vivid description of Kabul’s cultural and artistic spirit by Maboubha Seraj, 
the niece of King Amanullah resonates with the stories and impressions of the Afghan 
women who shared with me their experience of the 1960s and 1970s in Kabul. For 
urban, upper and middle class women, this was a period of openness and freedom. 
Afghanistan was at peace. Located on the hippie trail, Kabul attracted tourists from 
Europe and Northern America, searching for spirituality, adventure and cheap drugs. In 
Kabul, Chicken and Flower streets had shops, cafes, guesthouses and restaurants where 
Afghans and foreigners met, exchanged and sometimes made friends.  
 
 
The original caption says: ‘Phonograph record store, Kabul’ (Planning 1969, 145) 
 
                                                
12 District of Kabul that used to accommodate Afghan high ranking civil servants as well as foreign 
diplomats in the 60s. Wazir Akbar Khan is now the district where UN and ICRC staff lives.  
13 Gargha Lake and Paghman are located a few miles West of Kabul. These two places still remain today 
the most favourite picnic spots of middle and upper class families at week ends. 
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Radio Television Afghanistan broadcasted foreign movies in which new lifestyles 
were promoted. With the creation of the first national film production company Afghan 
Film in 1965, the Afghan film industry blossomed. It produced documentaries and news 
films highlighting the official meetings and conferences of the government before it 
started to produce its first feature films in the 70s. Radio Kabul, later on renamed Radio 
Afghanistan, the State owned radio, hosted a whole generation of modern Afghan artists 
such as Ustad Mohammad Hussain Sarahang, Ustad Farida Mahwash14, and Ustad 
Mohammad Hashem Cheshti (Baily 1988, 81). These master musicians were revered not 
only in Afghanistan but also in India, Pakistan, and the entire Middle East. King Zahir 
Shah also promoted dramatic art by creating the National Theatre Company and building 
Kabul National theatre, today deserted, roofless and in ruins.  
 
 
The original caption says: ‘Radio Kabul announcer during one of the station many daily news program’ (Planning 1969, 
110) 
 
                                                
14 Farida Mahwash remains the only female singer in Afghanistan to have received the title of Ustad. This 
title was awarded by the Ministry of Information and Culture. This was a controversial step, as this 
honorific title is normally reserved for men. The 1960s and 1970s were the golden age of music, the heyday 
of Radio Afghanistan and Kabul as a cultural centre. Farida Mahwash is remembered as the greatest woman 
singer of the time. She came from a highly respectable Kabul family. Her mother was a teacher of the Holy 
Quran, and she started work at the radio station as a typist. Her wonderful voice and exceptional musical 
abilities were discovered by Radio Afghanistan's director of music, and her career as a radio singer was 
launched. 
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Gul Makai Shah is a former actress. She left Afghanistan in the Seventies and 
returned to Kabul in 2001, to become the new director of Kabul National Theatre. She 
was promised the Theatre would be rebuilt and she would be allocated a budget to 
launch a new programme. None of these promises were kept. She spent the first two 
years of her return living in two rooms that had been renovated inside the destroyed 
theatre, waking up every morning with the dream of seeing this place alive again. As we 
walked together in the empty rooms of the building, across the stage, Gul Makai Shah 
recalled the creative atmosphere that characterized the place. Here used to be the 
dressing room, there a portrait gallery of famous actors and actresses, a bit further, the 
rehearsal room.  
 
The theatre started in the 60s in Afghanistan, under President Daoud. It used to be a wonderful 
place. We had a huge audience. Once we had a performance that got fully booked for three 
months. 700 hundred spectators, every night, for three months. Can you imagine that? The public 
used to bring me flowers after the show…good things (dreamingly). A beautiful stage. Very 
professional. Actors were employed by the Ministry of Culture. They received monthly salaries 
from the Government. (Interview - Makai-Shah, 12/09/2007) 
 
Gul Makai Shah showed me some old photographs of the theatre as well as press 
articles of this period. When I asked her whether it was socially acceptable for women to 
be actresses at that time, she laughed and said: 
 
Look at this picture. Here was the lodge for the king’s family. And this is King Zaher Shah. The 
performance was “Mother-in-Law” and I was acting the daughter-in-law in. Next to me is the 
actress who was playing the mother-in-law. You can see our dresses. We had short sleeves. Now 
we have to wear chadari. At that time we wore maxi, mini, medium and short sleeves. The king’s 
family was coming to see the performances. It was not a problem to recruit actresses. It 
was…How to say? It was very free! (Interview- Makai-Shah, 12/09/2007) 
 
Gul Makai Shah’s narrative certainly provides a good picture of Kabul in the 
Sixties and Seventies. The capital city always remained a world apart in the Afghan 
landscape. The lighthearted and liberal atmosphere has obviously disappeared nowadays, 
but in comparison to rural life, Kabul keeps on exhibiting a vague impression of 
modernity. However, the Kabul Gul Makai Shah and Mahbouba Seraj remember might 
have been accessible to a minority of middle and upper middle class women benefiting, 
as we said earlier, from government’s reforms and development programs.  
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This image of ‘modernity’ the different governments, from Amanullah to Zaher 
Shah and later on Daoud and the communists, tried to impose remained largely alien to 
the majority of the Afghan population. Inspired by Turkey, Europe, the USSR, the 
agenda of reforms, especially on the women’s question, kept a foreign taste for the 
poorer class excluded from the process. This reconfiguration of Afghan identity around 
values and lifestyles considered as ‘foreign’ did not help unite the Afghan population and 
indeed achieved the opposite. The absence of communication and mutual 
incomprehension between the ruling class and the vast rural majority were largely caused 
by the secular criteria for modernisation. They meant cultural alienation for those who 
felt threatened by these new norms, a situation which became acute when a Marxist 
modernizing elite started to exert its influence within the government from the mid 
1960s onwards. 
2. The Communist regime: 1979-1992 
 
In 1965 the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) was formed, a 
pro-Communist group which may have helped Mohammad Daoud to seize power from 
his cousin King Zahir Shah and declare Afghanistan a republic in 1973. He was toppled 
in turn by his former PDPA allies in April 1978 during what is known as the Saur 
Revolution.  
The period of the communist government was marked by a proactive approach 
toward the implementation of gender policies. Decrees were introduced as part of a 
programme of social and political reforms intended to effect the rapid transformation of 
a patriarchal society (Moghadam 2004, 454). For instance a decree banned the payment 
of bride price and gave greater freedom of choice to women in respect of marriage. 
Another one raised the age of marriage for women to 16 years. In addition, the 
government launched an aggressive literacy programme aimed at educating women and 
removing them from seclusion (Alimajrooh 1989, 90). In the city, each family 
accommodated aspects of modernity compatible with their general lifestyle, which 
generally meant a certain degree of compliance with patriarchal demands and norms 
when it came to important decisions regarding female mobility and above all marriage. 
Such intimate family matters belonged then as now to personal space (mahram) and suffer 
no interference in urban and rural families alike.  
During this period, women were present in all major government departments, as 
well as in the police force, the army, business and industry. Women taught, studied and 
acted as judges in the Family Court, dealing with issues related to divorce, custody of 
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children and other family matters. They comprised over 75% of teachers, 40% of 
medical doctors and almost 50% of civil servants, all of them city based (Emadi 2002). 
According to Moghadam (2002, 24), in 1980, women represented 65% of the students in 
Kabul University. 
Women were also present in the different ranks of the party and the government, 
with the exception of the Council of Ministers. The Loya Jirga (parliament) counted 7 
female members in 1989. The Central Committee of the PDPA, included Jamila 
Palwasha and Ruhafza (alternate member), a working-class grandmother and ‘model 
worker’ at the Kabul Construction Plant, where she did electrical wiring (Moghadam 
2002, 24). Women were working in security, intelligence, the police. They were employed 
as logisticians in the Defence Ministry. In 1989, all female members of the PDPA 
received military training and weapons.  
 
 
General Khotul Mohammadzai, 1970s (photograph from her photo album) 
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General Khotul Mohammadzai joined the air force in 1984. From an educated 
Kabuli family background, she remains the first and only female parachutist in 
Afghanistan. She views the communist period as a moment when many opportunities 
were offered to women to start new careers, including in domains that were traditionally 
reserved to men. In comparison to the civil war and the Taliban regime during which she 
lost her husband and many other male members of her family, the communist era was 
for her a period of grace. From her small apartment located in Makrorayon, an area of 
Kabul made of concrete blocks built by the communist government to accommodate 
civil servants and members of the party, General Mohammadzai turns the pages of an 
old photo album. On the black and white photographs, she appears in uniform covered 
with medals, delivering a public speech during a national celebration day, or with her 
parachutist equipment, stepping in a military plane. She comments: 
 
Everyone in my family was educated. My father never objected to my wish to join the army and 
to become a parachutist. He even encouraged me because he knew I liked sport and I wanted to 
serve my country. There were few women in the army at that time. We had a women’s 
organization within the military. But I was the only woman parachutist. (Interview - Mohamadzai 
08/04/2007) 
 
The true innovation of the People Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) lay 
in the women’s group, the Democratic Organization of Afghan Women (DOAW), also 
founded in 1965 which set about to address specifically every aspect of women’s 
condition, not just limited to marriage, with the aim of turning women into citizens and 
partners in an egalitarian secular society (Moghadam 1994).  
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Women’s March15 (Government-of-Afghanistan 1984) 
 
 
Nevertheless, the distance between reforms on paper and actual practice was 
considerable. DOAW and its supporters were generally sophisticated cosmopolitan 
middle to upper-class women with a foreign education- just like the progressive circles 
around Kings Habibullah or Amanullah with equally limited connection to the rural 
majority. According to Nancy Hatch-Dupree (1984, 317), women’s activists under the 
communist regime were totally co-opted to ‘the purposeful manipulation of the women’s 
movement as an appendage to national politics’. As a result, no strong and well-
organized women’s movement emerged from this period. 
Throughout the various political changes that marked the late 70s and 80s, many 
of the women I interviewed appear to have been enjoying active and varied social and 
cultural lives. This was mostly true for the upper-middle-class women whose families had 
seen some kind of benefits from economic development, either in terms of employment 
                                                
15 Nancy Hatch-Dupree (1984) mentions that the enrolment of women in grand marches was one of the 
Party’s favorite political rituals to foster ideas of progress and women’s emancipation. She writes: 
‘Frequently, these grand marches ended in ‘volunteer clean-up’ sessions, and the people of Kabul were 
treated for the first time to the sight of girls wielding brooms, sweeping the streets in public in the 
company of men’ (1984, 318) 
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or in terms of education for their children. These women associated this period with the 
liberalization of social relations, dress codes and gender relations as a result of economic 
policies implemented by the communist government. At that time, Farida, a woman who 
ran a clandestine school in her apartment located in Makrorayan during the Taliban rule, 
was a teacher in a high school. Her parents worked as civil servants in Ministries. She 
recalls: 
 
Women, like me, who came from educated and liberal families, stopped wearing the veil. At that 
time, the Russians built many factories, many infrastructures. We had constant electricity in 
Kabul. This made a great difference in people’s lives. I think that if men have access to jobs, they 
stop bothering about what their wives and their daughters wear. (Interview - Farid and Farida, 
30/01/2007) 
 
However, these women were part of the urban minority who enjoyed a relatively 
wide range of career opportunities and freedom of movement. In the countryside, the 
imposition of compulsory education for both boys and girls, the forced enrolment of 
men and women in ‘detachments for defence of the Revolution’16 and the coercive 
secularization attempts provoked strong resentment and resistance. In general, the 
gender policies implemented under the Soviet Occupation were imposed with little 
sensitivity for local codes and practices, often using heavy-handed tactics to implement 
programmes.  
Oliver Roy (1985) and David Edwards (2002) have maintained that the PDPA 
coup of 1978 met with violent opposition not so much because of its progressive 
ideology but because of the brutal way of putting it into practice, which cost the lives of 
thousands of Afghan citizens. Roy and Edwards argue that the problem was that instead 
of presenting the reforms in a pragmatic, technical manner, they were given a Marxist 
packaging that alienated the pious traditionalist population who would have been the 
principal and not unwilling beneficiaries.  
 
                                                
16 Detachments for the Defense of the Revolution were created short after the Saur revolution. As 
resistance against the Soviet occupation grew all over the country, in cities as well as in rural areas, the 
government recruited ‘Volunteers’ who were given weapons in order to fight against the ‘enemies of the 
revolution perpetrating acts of sabotage’. They took part in guarding industrial enterprises, public buildings 
and maintaining order (Government-of-Afghanistan 1984, 187).  
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The original caption says: ‘Volunteer detachments for the Defence of the Revolution include urban and rural workers, 
men and women, middle aged people and young patriots of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. Their country 
has given them arms to fight the enemies of the Revolution and they are defending it without thought of their own life’ 
(Government-of-Afghanistan 1984) 
 
If women like General Mohamadzai or Farida recall the communist period with a 
sort of nostalgia, other women living under different circumstances, especially in the 
countryside, have had a drastically different experience. The social reforms imposed by 
the government caused concerns among the mullahs and tribal chiefs. They viewed 
compulsory education, especially for women, as going against tradition, anti-religious and 
a challenge to male authority. As Ahmed-Ghosh points out (2003, 6) this lack of regard 
for religious and societal sensitivities resulted in massive backlash from the rural 
population.  
The war against the Soviet occupation had a devastating impact on Afghanistan’s 
economy. An estimated five million people fled to Pakistan, Iran and further afield. As a 
result of the war, social services provided by the government became largely limited to 
the urban centres. Both the human and economic costs and losses of the war were 
enormous.  
a. J ihad  
 
Armed by the United States, the different mujjahedin factions organized resistance 
from the refugee camps in Pakistan to their villages of origin. Village women participated 
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in the movement in various ways: by transporting weapons under their chadari, installing 
landmines around their village, looking after the wounded, cooking for the combatants 
(Hatch-Dupree 1984). An ex-mujjahedin from Jalalabad who retired from politics when 
the civil war began, explained to me how he received once a letter from a group of village 
women asking for weapons in order to be able to participate in combats. Seating next to 
the fireplace, staring at the dancing flames, he recalled: 
 
I saw some women setting blankets on fire with kerosene and throwing them at the Russian tanks 
passing by. In Kabul, we used women as messengers. Some of them carried weapons under their 
chadari. Women were cooking for us, baking bred, hiding us in their homes. Without their 
support, we would not have made it through this war. (Fieldnotes - 13/10/2007) 
 
Naheed Sultan (pseudonym), now a representative of an Eastern province at the 
National Assembly, is the widow of a commander who participated in the jihad. Attached 
to a mujjahedin faction under the command of Mojadidi, her husband disappeared when 
the Taliban took control of the country, leaving his wife and his daughter abandoned to 
their fate in a Pakistani refugee camp. For her, the period of resistance against the Soviet 
occupation represents a moment of her life when she was given the responsibility to 
serve a noble cause.  
 
I am illiterate. I never went to school. I didn’t write down about my experience but I learnt a lot 
of things from life. My best memory is my work beside my husband. I cooked food for 50 to 60 
mujjahedin every day. I saw planes in the sky bombarding our villages. Working with my husband is 
my best life memory. On one side I had my husband, on the other side I had the mujjahedin and I 
was very happy with them. They respected me a lot. (Interview - MP2, 11/09/2007) 
 
Women did not only support the jihad but they also encouraged their husbands to 
go to war. Of the time of resistance against the Soviets, Nancy Dupree (1986, 10) writes:  
‘During the jihad one would often see men coming home from the war to rest with their 
families in the Pakistani camps. If they were a little slow about going back to the 
battlefield, the women would push and shame them into doing their duty for the jihad. 
The women therefore played a vital part in the war, for it was their strength that 
motivated men to keep fighting.’ 
Women’s influence on men to participate in combats can also be found in the 
pieces of oral poetry Pashtun women exchanged in the Pakistani refugee camps. Women 
brought in their exile the tradition of landay, popular poetic improvisations, brief songs 
celebrating nature’s beauty but also honour and courage. Landay is the Pashtun version of 
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Japanese haiku, traditionally written by women. In Songs of Love and War, the dissident 
poet and philosopher Sayd Bahodine Majrouh has assembled some of the landay refugee 
women used to recite in the camps. Many of them are inspired by nationalist and 
patriotic feelings, encouraging men to take arms against the ‘Infidels’. In the one below, 
the love of the homeland is the ultimate condition for conjugal love to be realized 
(Bahodine Majrouh 2003, 45): 
 
If you truly love me, my love, go off and liberate our land! 
My exquisite and tender mouth will belong to you forever. 
 
These terse verses summarize a militant women’s perspective on the years of war 
and exile. They demonstrate how some women got involved in the war and likewise 
bring out the nostalgia and heartbreak of the refugee experience.  
But if resistance was mostly conducted in rural areas where the government had 
always had a limited access, some urban women also resisted and protested against the 
Soviet occupation. After the invasion by the Red Army on December, 1979, the great 
demonstration of April 1980 was organized by women. Girls from the elementary and 
secondary schools of Kabul, students of the university, teachers, workers, and even 
homemakers and mothers went out into the streets heading for the government’s palace. 
Russian tanks broke into the crowd and dozens were killed and wounded. Nahid Sahed, 
one of the women who had coordinated the protest march, called out at the parchami17 
officer who had his gun on her (Majrouh 2003, 39): ‘Hey, you coward! Since you are 
incapable of defending your honour you are not a man anymore. Here, take my veil, put 
it on your head and give me your weapon. We women will be better at defending this 
country than you are.’ The officer fired and Nahid, mortally wounded, fell. Since then, 
she has become, with Malalay who conducted Afghan soldiers to the battlefront against 
the British invaders, the symbol of women’s resistance. 
From their participation to the resistance movement, women developed a sense 
of pride and usefulness. In recognition for their participation in the war effort some of 
them were given political positions once the mujjahedin government took over Kabul. 
Masooda Hamidi (pseudonym) now MP for Kabul province, and member of the United 
National Front –the most influent political party in the current parliament- wrote 
shabname (clandestine political poem) to support the jihad. In 1992, she was appointed 
                                                
17 Member of another faction of the Afghan Communist party. 
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head of Shura-i-Zana (Women’s Assembly), an organization in charge of women’s affairs, 
when the troops of Commandant Massoud took Kabul. She explains: 
 
I was a student when the Red Army invaded our country. I was quite young but I remember this 
period very well. I was writing patriotic shabname to denounce the occupation and to encourage 
people to support the mujjahedin. Already at that time I was convinced that women could work 
beside men to defend the country. And indeed, without women’s support, the mujjahedin could 
not have won this war. (Interview - MP11, 27/06/2007) 
 
b. Pul- i -Chakhi 
 
But conducting such clandestine activities was not without risk. Repression was 
severe, systematic and merciless. Political opponents were tracked by the secret services, 
arrested, tortured and executed. Located just east of Kabul, the prison of Pul-i-Charkhi 
became one of the blackest holes in the last quarter-century of Afghanistan’s war-torn 
history. During the years of Soviet and Communist control, hundreds of thousands of 
prisoners passed through the solid stone walls and into the dark concrete cells, and 
unknown thousands never came out alive, victims of nightly executions on the military 
range beyond the prison walls (Barry 2002).  
Maboubha Seraj, an Afghan woman recently returned to Afghanistan, is a 
survivor of Pul-i-Chakhi. She left Afghanistan in 1978, a short time after the Saur 
revolution. She and her husband were just married when they were arrested and jailed. 
After their release, the couple fled Afghanistan and sought asylum first in Germany and 
finally in the United States, where they lived for more than 20 years. Maboubha’s mother 
was the daughter of the Afghan ambassador in Japan. Her father was King Amanullah’s 
brother, but he never really took part in politics. Her link to the Royal family was 
sufficient enough for her and her husband to be considered as potential opponents to 
the Party. Mahboubha describes the Saur revolution and the Soviet invasion that 
followed, as the end of what she now perceives was the ‘Golden era’. 
 
I was not particularly pro Monarchy, if you like. As a University student, I was quite attracted to 
socialist ideas of justice and equality. Students in general have leftist tendencies. I knew there were 
some problems with Monarchy. Knowing the story from the inside, I was aware that some of the 
Afghan kings had made irreparable mistakes. But when President Daoud sold our country to the 
Russians, it became clear that there would be no end to war and suffering. My 20 days of 
detention at Pul-i-Chakhi will remain my worst life experience. (Interview - Seraj, 07/10/2007) 
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Another woman, Soraya Perlika experienced the similar twist and turns of 
Afghan politics when the Khalq faction of the communist party threw her in the 
notorious prison. In 1978, when the communists came to power in a coup, Parlika was a 
member of the new ruling People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan, PDPA. She had 
studied in the Soviet Union in the Seventies and she still speaks quite passable Russian. 
Accused of fomenting underground sabotage activities with a group of women she had 
formed, Parlika survived 18 months of brutal treatment until December 1979, when a 
second coup, backed by Moscow, ousted the Khalqis and replaced them with the PDPA’s 
Parcham faction. From her months of detention, she keeps the scars of cigarette burns on 
her arms. However, this horrifying experience did not convince her to leave the country, 
like most of the other intellectuals who got jailed in Pul-i-Chakhi did when they were 
eventually released.  
 
My father always told me I should help the poor people of my country. I felt this was my mission. 
So when the government offered me to become the head of the Women’s section of the party, I 
felt compelled to accept. I felt I had to struggle for women’s rights. And this is what I have done 
up to now. (Interview - Perlika, 03/07/2007) 
 
What happened behind the stonewalls of Pul-i-Chakhi reflects the dark side of the 
PDPA’s political agenda. Modernization projects conducted under the Communist 
government were a means to convey an ideology, a particular idea of what new Afghan 
citizens, men and women, should be like. The social engineering conducted by the 
regime under the banner of development was meant to gain people’s consent for the 
country’s occupation by the Red Army. But the re-moulding of the Afghan nation along 
secular lines alienated the peripheries and brought out a wide range of tensions 
associated with social changes perceived as threats to the Afghan culture. In obedience of 
the Islamic principle to leave lands occupied by ‘infidels’ millions of Afghans sought 
refuge in Iran and Pakistan. 
c .  Li fe  in re fugee  camps 
 
During this period, Afghanistan became the battlefield upon which the US 
conducted a proxy war against the Soviet Union (Mackenzie 2001). The Afghan 
resistance movement was organized around US sponsored conservative Islamist groups 
under the rubric of the mujjahidin. The very first refugee camps were probably extensions 
of military training camps that the Pakistani government built for the opponents of the 
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left wing and pro-Soviet elements in the Afghan government. Since 1973 (nearly six years 
before the Soviet intervention) Hekmatyar, Massoud and Rabbani,
 
leaders of the fight 
against the Soviet army had fled to Peshawar to build up support with the help of the 
Pakistani government. A number of camps, military in origin, may have been conceived 
as rallying points around specific warlords with strong fundamentalist leadings, not just 
as neutral gathering places for refugees (Mann 2005, 8). 
According to former CIA director Robert Gates (quoted in Stabile and Kumar 
2005), aid to the mujjahidin began in June 1979, months before the Soviet invasion. 
Zbigniew Brzezinski, President Carter’s national security adviser, in a now famous 
interview, explained this funding and support prior to any act of Soviet aggression in the 
following terms: ‘According to the official version of history, CIA aid to the mujjahidin 
began during 1980, that is to say, after the Soviet army invaded Afghanistan [in] 
December 1979. But the reality, secretly guarded until now, is completely otherwise: 
indeed, it was July 3, 1979, that President Carter signed the first directive for secret aid to 
opponents of the pro-Soviet regime in Kabul. And that very day, I wrote a note to the 
president in which I explained to him that in my opinion this was going to induce a 
Soviet military intervention (…). The day that the Soviets officially crossed the border, I 
wrote to President Carter: We now have the opportunity of giving to the USSR its 
Vietnam war.” (Stabile and Kumar 2005, 767). 
As in Chile, Guatemala, Indonesia and Congo, the US supported opponents to 
the pro-Soviet regime, without any regard for their violations of human rights or their 
reactionary social goals. Warlords such as Gulbudin Hekmatyar, who later became a 
fervent supporter of the Taliban and who received substantial financial support from the 
US, were considered by the US as ‘freedom fighters’ and were trained in military camps 
in Afghanistan and in Pakistan. ‘The US not only armed and trained the Islamists, they 
also poured money into the region: some US $3 billion, more than any other aid program 
to insurgent groups, was spent on this effort.’ (Stabile and Kumar 2005, 768). 
 Unlike other liberation movements elsewhere, the Afghan Mujjahedin never 
encouraged the active participation of women in jihad. Women in Peshawar who 
criticized the politics of the Mujjahedin were threatened and sometimes killed. This is 
what happened to Meena, founder of the Revolutionary Association of the Women of 
Afghanistan, who denounced the gender discriminatory policies of the fundamentalist 
groups together with the Russian occupation of Afghanistan (Moghadam 1994). 
 Attacks against women did not begin with the Taliban. In the mujjahedin-ruled 
refugee camps in Pakistan, women had to face constant restrictions of movement and 
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life threats. In 1989, a fatwa (religious decree) was promulgated against women who 
worked for humanitarian organizations. Women were also requested to wear the hijab, a 
black garment that covers the whole body. According to the fatwa, ‘women were not to 
wear perfume, noisy bangles or Western clothes. Veils had to cover the body at all times 
and clothes were not to be made of material which was soft or which rustled. Women 
were not to walk in the middle of the street or swing their hips, they were not to talk, 
laugh, or joke with strangers or foreigners’ (Moghadam 2002, 25). A year later, girls were 
forbidden to attend school. The US never reacted to these decrees and simply 
abandoned the Afghans, once their proxy war with the USSR was over.  
Farida Azizi was born in Kabul but grew up in the Afghan refugee camps in 
Pakistan where her father, a military doctor, was forced to flee with his family after the 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. She has worked for international NGOs in refugee 
camps in Pakistan and in Afghanistan and is now the Special Advisor for Afghanistan 
and the Middle East in the non-profit Vital Voices, a Washington-based group that 
promotes progress for women in politics, economics and community affairs worldwide. 
The way she describes the situation of women in the camps reveals many similarities with 
their situation under the Taliban regime: 
 
My family left Afghanistan in 1980 to seek refuge in Pakistan. The living conditions in the camps 
were very difficult. We were living under tents; there was no water, no electricity. After a while, 
when people understood they would not be able to return to Afghanistan soon, they started to 
build mud houses. People were scared that their young daughters would be kidnapped and raped. 
That’s also the reason why they started to build mud houses. At the beginning, there were no 
schools, no doctors. Sometimes some Pakistani doctors conducted some vaccination campaigns 
but that was all. Little by little, people started to move to other cities. In 1983 I think, the first 
school was built with the support of some NGOs. But the extremists were controlling the camps 
and they were threatening girls and women who left their houses to attend school or other 
activities. Each camp was controlled by one party. The camps that were controlled by 
Heykmatyar, Sayyaf…these men who are now sitting in the parliament, were the worst for the 
women. They were warning and threatening girls in the streets (…). 
The mujjahedin called themselves ‘holy warriors’ but in fact they were fundamentalists who were 
threatening women. Our University was also a political site. Rabani was teaching there. The 
president of the University forced us to wear hijab, the Arab black covering. They taught us 
mostly religious topics. They shared the same ideas as the extremists. They taught us the theories 
developed by their Ulemas. We had to learn these things. We were taught by some Arabic women 
who did not even know our language. We had to learn verses of the Koran by heart, all in Arabic. 
Later on, I started a network of activists for peace. We were publishing a magazine called 
‘Rainbow’ with peace messages for school children. Because I understood that the school system 
in the camps was killing people. You know, during the Soviet regime, in schools children were 
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learning how to count with bullets and Kalashnikovs. These books were funded by USAID and 
the University of Nebraska. In our math books, we had to add bullets, rockets and Kalashnikovs. 
2 Kalashnikovs plus 2 Kalashnikovs equal four Kalashnikovs. That kind of things. In our history 
books, we learnt that the mujjahedin were good and that the Russians were bad. And I felt this hate 
for the Russians myself, in my heart. Because I had learnt this hate. But many Russians did not 
want to be in Afghanistan. They were sent by their government to fight in Afghanistan. They did 
not want to be there (…). 
On the other side, Saudi Arabia had done the same. Saudi Arabia promoted their own version of 
Islamic law through the schools they supported. We had to learn verses of the Koran in Arabic 
even though we did not know this language. We had to write in Arabic. We were all brainwashed 
and we were discouraged because we could not get good marks with exams in Arabic. In the 
camps, each school had different curriculum, depending on the parties and the support they could 
get from the different countries. So I became aware I was being brainwashed. I myself felt like 
killing Russians. We were taught that we had to kill Russians (…). Everyone is using us. We are 
used because we are illiterate. If we had been educated, we could have defended ourselves. 
Mullahs can control us because no one has knowledge of Islam. The Iranians are doing the same 
with the Shiah. Everyone has a responsibility in the long war that has ravaged this country. 
(Interview - Azizi, 23/10/2007) 
 
As this description demonstrates, the treatment of women served to erase all the 
differences between modern Islamism and the tribal code. Under Mujjahedin control, the 
camps provided laboratory conditions to experiment with modern forms of gendered 
repression. The rigorous separation of the sexes was reinforced through the mobilization 
of men to the cause of jihad and military operations. Separated from their male relatives, 
women were rooted in the camps, under the control of religious and fundamentalist 
leaders (Olesen 1996). Therefore, the fundamentalist attitude to women could be 
summarized as a vindictive application of sharia within the context of a political 
programme aiming at the establishment of a totally Islamic state, justified by a literal 
interpretation of the Koran. Traditional appeals to modesty and self-effacement were 
turned into systematic persecution of any visible kind of expression of femininity 
interpreted as anti-Islamic. These policies were implemented by the Mujjahedin when they 
took control over Kabul in 1992, and further reinforced when the Taliban came to 
power. 
 
3. The Civil war: 1992-1996 
 
During the years of Soviet occupation, Kabul had been perceived as the origin of 
all the country’s misfortunes. For the conservative rural-based Mujjahedin opposition, 
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which had been supported by the United States during the Cold War, Kabul and other 
cities were perceived to be the centres of ‘sin’ and ‘vice’ precisely because of the high 
visibility of educated, emancipated, urban women. There was a widespread perception 
that the population of Kabul had collaborated with and had been therefore corrupted by 
the Soviet regime. Many Mujaheddin groups shared the idea that the people of Kabul 
should be ‘punished’ for their ‘immoral values’ (Kandiyoti 2005). As Tamin Ansari (2002) 
puts it: ‘When the Mujaheddin finally toppled the last Communist ruler out of 
Afghanistan and marched into Kabul, it wasn’t just the triumph of the Afghan people 
against the foreign invaders, but the conquest, finally, of Kabul (and its culture) by the 
countryside’. 
One of the first orders of the new Mujahhedin government was that women 
should be veiled in public. In August 1993, the Government Office of Research and 
Decrees of the Supreme Court went a step further by issuing an order to dismiss all 
female civil servants from their post. The decree stated that: “women need not leave 
their homes at all, unless absolutely necessary, in which case, they are to cover 
themselves completely; are not to wear attractive clothing and decorative accessories; do 
not wear perfume; their jewellery must not make any noise; they are not to talk gracefully 
or with pride and in the middle of the sidewalk.” (Emadi 2002, 124). 
The decrees promulgated under the Taliban regime presented the same 
recommendations. The Taliban did not introduce a radically new regime but officialized 
dressing codes and social conducts for both men and women, which were anyhow 
followed by the majority of the population under the different Mujahhedin governments, 
for fear of repression. 
The high hopes that greeted the arrival of the new Mujahhedin government were 
quickly dashed as conflict erupted between the different factions in the coalition. Most of 
Kabul was reduced to rubble, as ceasefires were agreed and then broken and alliances 
changed, so frontline shifting within the city. There were widespread reports of women 
being raped, as different factions wrested control of opposing neighbourhoods of the 
city. Women, who represented the majority of trained teachers and nurses, lost their 
employment due to the closing and destruction of most infrastructures.  
Farida Azizi who had returned to Kabul in 1993 with her family, recalls how the 
civil war had turned Kabul into a battlefield.  
 
One month after my return, big fights started in Makrorayan, the district where I was living. 
Makrorayan became the front line between Dostum and Massoud. Everywhere around the blocks 
there were dead bodies and scattered body parts. Fighting was going on from one street to 
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another, between blocks. Some block apartments and some houses got completely destroyed. We 
could see impacts of rockets and bullets on the walls. A lot of people died at that time. I 
remember, in Makrorayan 3, in one day we received more than 70 rockets. We had to stay in our 
block basement all night and day because it was the only safe place. We ate nuts and some people 
brought their bokhali (stove) to heat the place. On that night, all the inhabitants of our block 
decided to move. At 2 o’clock in the morning, we all left. We walked for the entire night to Khair 
Khana, where my cousin lived. Then a few days later we went back to Pakistan. I remember that 
on that night, I walked on dead bodies. My trouser was red with blood. Everyone lost a family 
member on that night. (Interview - Azizi, 23/10/2007) 
 
Many Afghan women do not make any distinction between the mujjahedin regime 
and the Taliban regime. These two periods involved brutality, seclusion and economic 
difficulties. This point was underlined by Orzala Ashraf, deputy director and founder of 
Humanitarian Assistance for Women and Children of Afghanistan, an NGO providing 
shelters and vocational training for women victims of violence in Kabul. The Taliban are 
gone but women’s shelters are still operating secretly since the current government is not 
able or willing to provide security to the women who escape from their abusive homes. 
During our interview, she insisted on the fact that women’s suffering had to be 
understood not only as the result of Taliban policies but also as the outcome of long 
years of war during which extremism developed solid roots in an impoverished society. 
 
To be honest, I think the Taliban were not the only cause of women’s problems. If women were 
restricted, it is not as a result of the Taliban only. During the 30 years of war, women lost their 
husbands, their fathers, their brothers. Women were the first victims of war. They endured rape 
and the loss of their family members. I, myself, lost a great part of my family. War destroyed the 
systems that protected women. The mujjahedin were not that much different from the Taliban. 
During the mujjahedin time, women were raped, school girls were kidnapped. So what is the 
difference between the Taliban and the mujjahedin? (Interview - Ashraf-Nemat, 26/09/2007) 
 
 The mujjahedin rule was therefore the blueprint upon which the Taliban 
phenomenon could rise. Rather than a breach in policies the Taliban rule represented in 
many aspects, a continuity with the mujjahedin government. Their success in getting 
control over the country was not the result of their fundamentalist ideology, generally 
perceived as excessive and unacceptable among the majority of the population, but rather 
as the outcome of a well trained and properly equipped military contingent.   
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4. The Taliban rule: 1996-2001 
 
The Taliban emerged in a political vacuum, created by the civil war and people’s 
longing for security and the end of conflicts between the different Mujahhedin factions. 
The movement was created in the Afghan refugee camps in Pakistan, where its major 
figures received religious and military education. Indeed in 1977, Pakistan’s dictator, 
General Zia-Ul-Haq enforced an Islamic constitution, ostensibly to bring legal, social, 
economic and political institutions of the country in conformity with the Koran. He 
naturally backed the Afghans militants in Peshawar and financed the building of 
thousands of madrassas in the vicinity of refugee camps, with help from Saudi Arabia. 
Impoverished Afghan widows reassured by the promise of regular meals and a minimum 
education eagerly entrusted their sons to the care of the madrassas, which became the 
training grounds for the Taliban and Al-Qaeda supporters. Herded in decrepit boarding 
houses, cut off from contact with mothers and sisters, they were fed an extremely 
simplified messianic Islam, which was to become the Taliban creed (Stedman and Tanner, 
2003: 83).
 
 
Three years after their emergence on the Afghan military scene, the Taliban had 
taken control of over 80% of Afghanistan. As they gradually consolidated their power, 
security improved in the cities, facilitating exchanges and circulation of goods and 
therefore, reviving the economy. Even in the Taliban-controlled areas, women continued 
to participate in the functioning of the local economy.  
According to Nancy Dupree (2001, 151), the Taliban’s decision to impose the 
strict curtailment of women together with their compulsory veiling under chadari in 
public was a means for the regime to ‘send a message of its intent to subordinate the 
personal autonomy of every individual, thereby strengthening the impression that it was 
capable of exercising control over all aspects of social behaviour, male and female’. 
When the international community reacted against these measures and denounced what 
was soon labelled ‘gender apartheid’, the Taliban high authorities argued that their aim 
was to ensure their sisters’ security in a period when the priority was the establishment of 
law and order. Whether or not the limitations imposed on women would have 
progressively disappeared had the Taliban totally eliminated their opponents and had 
been recognized by the international community, remains a difficult question to answer. 
However, the Taliban policies were marked by many contradictions and inconsistencies, 
which left an important room of manoeuvre for interpretations and accommodation at 
the local level.  
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The Taliban central government was far from functioning effectively. Its base of 
power lay primarily in a very young militia nurtured in the isolation of ultra-conservative 
madrassas where they imbibed ideas by rote without encouragement to reason. Most of 
them had never been exposed to urban living. The weakness of the central government 
allowed to a great extent decisions to be taken at local level. Women’s condition 
therefore varied from one region to another, according to the degree of flexibility of local 
Taliban authorities (Dupree-Hatch 2001).  
The management of local affairs was deeply reliant on local Taliban leaders, some 
of whom allowed a certain level of negotiation on their policies. For Sosan Sharifi 
(pseudonym), a gynaecologist and representative of a province currently under Taliban 
control, the security that marked the Taliban rule in her province was a precious asset for 
women. Compared to the present days, when combats between NATO troops and 
regime opponents are constants and continuous, the life of the women from her 
province was relatively easier: 
 
During the Taliban, I worked in the hospital and I organized consultations for women in my 
house. Because they (the Taliban) needed me and I was the only gynaecologist in my province. So 
they did not create any problems for me, they even supported me very much. As you know, 
security at that time was very good. Once, a Taliban asked me to wear chadari. I told him: ‘Show 
me the passage in the Koran where it is written that women should wear chadari and I will wear 
one on the top of the other. I am a Muslim and I swear, I will do it if you can show me that this is 
written in the Koran!’ (she laughs). He never bothered me again afterwards. (Interview - MP10, 
22/09/2007) 
 
It is certainly in the cities, where women had traditionally enjoyed a greater 
degree of freedom and autonomy, that the rules imposed by the new regime appeared 
the harshest. As the Taliban captured Kabul in 1996, they closed schools and Kabul 
University to female students and teachers. These policies had a devastating impact on 
both boys and girls’ education as women represented an important proportion of 
teachers and University professors. Women’s seclusion was announced on Radio Sharia 
on the same day. During the entire length of the Taliban rule, the regime would inform 
the population about new rules and regulations through this same Radio: “Women, you 
should not step outside of your residence. If you go outside the house you should not be 
like women who used to go with fashionable clothes wearing cosmetics and appearing in 
front of every man before the coming of Islam (…). Women should not create such 
opportunity to attract the attention of useless people who will not look at them with a 
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good eye. Women have the responsibility as a teacher and coordinator for her family. 
Husband, brother, father have the responsibility for providing the family with the 
necessary life requirements (food, clothe, etc).” (Rostami-Povey 2007, 24).  
But men were not protected from the regime’s stronghold on their lives. The 
length of their beard and the appropriateness of their clothes were under the constant 
scrutiny of the religious police. The regime emphasized on punishing them for 
infractions committed by their female relatives, reflecting the acceptance of male 
responsibility for controlling women (Dupree-Hatch 2001).  
In a matter of a few decades, Afghanistan had moved from a regime that in the 
1920s, under the reign of King Amanullah, had imposed the wearing of Western clothes 
in Kabul to a regime that wanted to break away from any form of Western influence and 
return to what it perceived was ‘authentic tradition’. In both cases, ideas about modernity 
and tradition were translated in regulations targeting individuals’ physical appearance in 
public spaces. This ‘disciplining of bodies’, to use Foucault’s expression, and the specific 
attention put on regulating and controlling women’s bodies in particular, are 
symptomatic of the broader struggle between Kabul and the periphery, on one hand, and 
Western interpretation of modernity against reinterpretations of tradition under the name 
of Islam, on the other hand. Women’s bodies stood at the frontline of this ideological 
battle. The failure of the successive governments to carry out positive development 
projects in the peripheries together with foreign interference in internal affairs had 
produced a unique form of counter modernity.  
As a social, ideological and political phenomenon the Taliban are indeed utterly 
modern. The origin of the Taliban movement, its military development and its political 
project can be considered as pure products of modernity. Their emergence on the 
Afghan political scene is not to be interpreted as a simple return to an authentic Afghan 
tradition. On the contrary, their hybrid characteristics provided the fertile ground from 
which tradition could be imagined, reinvented and reinterpreted. Their hybridity stands 
first in the influence of external Islamic sources on their political ideology. Educated in 
madrassa, the Taliban were introduced to the Deobandi school of thoughts by semi-
literate Pakistani mullahs, associated with Pakistan’s Jami’at-e Ulema-e Islam (JUI) political 
party (Rashid 2002, 92). A lack of appreciation on the part of the mullahs of the 
reformist Deobandi agenda, brought the schools and its curricula closer to 
ultraconservative Wahabism (found in Saudi Arabia), which claims to teach strict 
adherence to the practices of the Prophet Mohammad and the Four Caliphs (Rashid 
1999, 26). This interpretation of Islam provided the ideological framework from which 
 82 
the Taliban formulated their opposition first to the Communist government and later on 
to the Mujjahedin, in cultural terms that were relatively efficient to rally rural masses, 
especially in the Pashtun South of the country. It is to be mentioned that Deobandi 
Islam had no roots in Afghanistan. It however provided a template for reinterpreting the 
Pashtun code of honour, codifying it through decrees and finally unevenly implementing 
it at the national level when they came to power. Second, the Taliban political project is 
quintessentially cosmopolitan. Armed by Pakistan, supported by the US and Saudi Arabia 
and trained by transnational Islamic mercenaries, the Taliban were well equipped to win 
on the military front. Their political agenda aimed at creating a pure Islamic State based 
on sharia law, a state that would protect people from the ‘polluting’ West. Ironically, the 
ones who called themselves ‘Taliban’ (literally, students in religion) were often illiterate 
and therefore unable to read a line of the Koran (Devji, 2005).  
Most of them had had little contacts with women prior to entering the capital 
city. Like the young Mujahhedin who came to Kabul in 1992, they shared similar ideas 
about upright female behaviour: ‘good’ women stay at home, ‘bad’ women’ expose their 
faces (Dupree-Hatch 2001, 150). However, the policies that they implemented regarding 
women provoked adaptations that were far from their initial intent. As Nancy Dupree 
points out (2001, 160), women creatively adjusted to this political change by making their 
own fashion statement. Reporting on the forced veiling of women under chadari, she 
writes: ‘Burnt orange and forest green are fashionable in Jalalabad; various clear shades 
of blue accented by occasional canary yellow flit about Kabul; black was never usual, 
except among some groups in Herat. Made mostly of soft artificial silk, the veils shimmer 
and billow with a certain mysterious seductiveness’.  
The Taliban enforced the total curtailment of women’s freedom to move, work 
and to be educated. Discrimination was officially sanctioned and pervaded every aspect 
of women’s lives. Girls were forbidden to attend school, even when provided at home. 
Women were denied the freedom to work and were forbidden to leave their homes 
unless completely veiled under chadari and accompanied by a male relative (mahram). 
Women faced draconian punishment for adultery. Such restrictions were particularly 
alien to women in Kabul and many were slow to comply. Confrontations between 
women and the religious police created by the Ministry for Prevention of Vice and 
Promotion of Virtue, the most powerful arm of the regime, occurred daily until, 
paralyzed by fear, women finally complied. Women were beaten up in the streets, for 
wearing nail polish, white socks (the colour of the Taliban flag), shiny shoes or chadari 
not long enough (Dupree-Hatch 2001, 152).  
 83 
These recent and traumatic events are strongly engrained in the psyche of urban 
women. The women I talked to keep a very vivid memory of the fear and the atrocities 
they experienced during this period. For many of them, like Orsala Ashraf, their 
personalities and their subjectivities have been deeply transformed as a result of these 
experiences: 
 
You know, I grew up in this context where women were muted, I cannot be soft anymore. If I 
speak about these atrocities, it is because I have faced these atrocities myself. When I sleep, all my 
nightmares are about the Taliban discovering that I have books and arresting me. Every night, I 
have these nightmares. (Interview - Ashraf-Nemat, 26/09/2007) 
 
Despite of their fear, many women often with the support of male family 
members started to organize underground activities and support networks. These 
activities helped them cope with the stress of their secluded life. By morally supporting 
each other and providing services for their community, women regained a sense of worth 
and usefulness. For Farida and Farid, who ran a clandestine school from their small 
apartment in Makrorayan, working side by side changed the gender dynamics within their 
own family. They explained to me how, thanks to the school, they got to know and 
respect each other more. When I asked them what had changed in their relationship, 
Farida smiled and said: 
 
We became closer. When the school got discovered by the Taliban, Farid was imprisoned in Pul-i-
Chakhi for six months. I was extremely worried. I was not allowed to visit him. I could not get 
any news from him. In the years following his return, we had two children. (Interview- Farid and 
Farida, 30/01/2007) 
 
Most women who conducted such activities do not view their involvement as a 
political act but as a survival strategy, deeply embedded in the material conditions of their 
everyday lives. Leila, for instance, began to give private courses for girls under the 
Taliban. Her husband, who had worked as a military officer under the mujjahedin regime, 
could not leave the house for fear of being arrested. Ironically, the arrival of the Taliban 
in power reversed gender roles within her family. 
 
The Taliban years are the worst years of my life. When the Taliban took over Kabul, I was a 
student at the faculty of Chemistry and I was forced to abandon my studies. Because of the 
position he had occupied under the previous regime, my husband had to hide in our house and I 
had to find a way to make money to feed my family. In my neighbourhood, I found girls who 
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wanted to continue their education and I became their teacher. I was teaching them from their 
home, sometimes from my home or from my relatives’ homes. We changed locations all the time 
in order to avoid being discovered. (Interview - Rashidi, 08/02/2007) 
 
To be able to run such activities and keep a minimum of mobility, women had to 
develop creative strategies. Some of them recruited and employed fake mahram when 
male relatives were not available. Others mobilized other women from public spaces 
where women’s presence was not suspicious, like mosques and ziharat (pilgrimages). 
During this period, the chadari became a protective device, a ‘mobile home’ which 
allowed women to circulate in public spaces without being questioned or threatened. 
Women used their chadari to smuggle books and stationary for their schools, the same 
way they had smuggled weapons during the jihad. Soraya Parlika, Director and founder of 
the Union of the Women of Afghanistan, explained to me how she informed other 
women about her activities from mosques and ziharat (pilgrimages), wearing chadari. 
 
During the Taliban and the mujjahedin, we were organising our meetings in people’s houses and in 
mosques, during funeral ceremonies. We were attending women’s gatherings in mosques. From 
there, we informed other women about our activities and we encouraged them to live and to be 
hopeful for the future, because many of them were so depressed and desperate that they were 
thinking of killing themselves. 
We were encouraging women to resist the Taliban regime. We told them this situation would not 
last and things would change at some point. We told them we should be well prepared for the 
future because the regime would change soon. In order to prepare women for this change, we 
established English, computer, Koran, handicrafts and sewing courses. 
No one knew who had established these courses. We had developed two strategies: one was 
Nazer Mâlida18 and the other one was Nazer charmarz19. On these two occasions, women gathered 
in Ziharat (pilgrimages) and mosques. These women’s gatherings provided us with the opportunity 
to meet other women and to let them know about our activities. We told them about our courses 
and our small businesses. No one could see our faces because we wore chadari. This technique 
worked very well and our network expanded day by day.  
When our teachers migrated to other countries or to other provinces, they established courses 
there as well. Women who had worked in factories or for the government before and who 
became jobless started to make handicrafts from home. Through our networks, their products 
were sold in Pakistan. (Interview - Perlika, 03/07/2007) 
 
                                                
18 Nazer Malida: When women have a dream or a wish, they prepare Nazer Mâlida, a mixture of bread, 
sugar and oil. For two or three days, the preparation remains untouched then women go to the mosque 
and distribute it to other women in order to have their wish fulfilled. This usually takes place on 
Thursdays. 
19 Nazer Charmaz: same as Nazer Malida except that it is made out of dried fruits and it takes place in 
Ziharat (pilgrimage) instead of mosques.  
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Thanks to these informal courses, many young women managed to continue their 
education and to escape from their total isolation. However, women could pay a high 
price if discovered. Orzala Ashraf, who was only 22 years old when she established her 
organization, first in Pakistan and then in Afghanistan, recalls how her activities were 
discovered by the Taliban a few days before the downfall of the regime: 
 
Some Taliban women, sent by their husbands, were attending the classes. The Taliban women 
finally reported us to the Taliban headquarters and two of our teachers got arrested. We managed 
to get them released by bribing the police. These women were not like official spies of the 
Taliban. They were their wives, their daughters or their sisters. They had been in our classes for a 
long time and we did not know anything about them. But when they saw that I was filming the 
classes in order to document our activities and inform the West about Afghan women’s lives, they 
finally decided to report us. (Interview - Ashraf-Nemat, 26/09/2007) 
 
Listening to these women’s stories, I was amazed by the extraordinary personal 
resources they had managed to mobilize in order to cope with the everyday. Women 
demonstrated a real sense of creativity and ingenuity in the face of particularly difficult 
economic and social conditions. However, contrary to Elaheh Rostami Povey (2007, 37), 
who argues that these events helped to develop a particular political consciousness 
among women, I don’t think these strategies were politically motivated. Indeed, Povey 
insists that after the fall of the Taliban regime, some women, empowered by their 
experience of resistance to the Taliban rules, started to challenge patriarchal gender 
relations. What comes out of my interviews does not confirm this finding. Most of the 
women I talked to underlined the necessity to find alternative livelihoods and the 
importance of giving meaning to their lives as primary motivations for their involvement. 
Of course, some women became more politically aware as a result of these life 
experiences and even reached high political positions when the Taliban regime collapsed. 
However, the vast majority refused to be labelled ‘political activists’. For most women, 
belonging to a network was a means to escape from boredom and to find moral support. 
By attending or running courses, women opened for themselves spaces where they could 
share their sorrows and exchange small services. These everyday small acts of resistance 
may have empowered women and enhanced their self-confidence. But this did not 
necessarily led them to frantically challenge broader gender hierarchies, especially in a 
context where maintaining social relations was and is still perceived as vital. The material 
realism with which women like Orzala (quote below) make sense of their experiences 
underlines the rational choices that guided their actions: 
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I got money (for my organization) from strong political movements (in Europe). But they were 
surprised I was not political. You know, they were talking about the Women in Black and all these 
transnational women’s organizations but I always told them HAWCA is apolitical. HAWCA is 
not political but we need your money. I am saying I am not political because we had such a strong 
dictatorship in my country and politics has always been about people killing each other, so as a 
woman, I felt I had to be more practical than political. (Interview - Ashraf-Nemat, 26/09/2007) 
 
 Orzala and other women’s accounts demonstrate that the Taliban regime affected 
different women in different ways. The relative peace the Taliban brought in rural areas 
provided women with a sense of safety they had not been able to enjoy during the civil 
war. The stability they recovered during this period allowed them to participate in the 
local economy. In cities, however, the brutality with which they implemented their 
policies remains a traumatic experience for most women. The everyday acts of resistance 
in which urban women engaged reveal as much about the nature of the regime in terms 
of its structures and strategies as about the possible political awareness that would have 
motivated their action.  
 
Conclusion 
 
The plight of Afghan women under the Taliban rule became largely publicised in 
the aftermath of the 11 September 2001 attacks on the United States, as one of the 
humanitarian issues justifying intervention. However, the political context in which the 
Taliban movement emerged was hardly mentioned. Their gender discriminatory policies, 
which resulted in the social exclusion of women were mostly explained by misidentified 
expressions of local ‘culture’. But the Taliban did not arise out of nowhere. In this 
chapter, I have tried to show how the emergence of religious fundamentalism in the 
region has been the result of broader geopolitical developments that included the 
interference of foreign countries such as the US, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia during the 
cold war period. I have also underlined aspects of their hybrid identity, which support 
the idea that as a political movement that presents itself as ‘counter-modern’, the Taliban 
are in reality pure products of modernity.  
The addition of a veil over Queen Soraya in the portrait gallery of the Ministry of 
Information and Culture just after the collapse of the Taliban, while at the same time, 
images of women lifting their veils in the streets of Kabul were broadcasted on Western 
TV channels as symbols of ‘women’s liberation’, underlines the complex position of 
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women as embodied symbols of the nation. Their bodies, at times veiled and hidden, at 
others displayed and unveiled, have been and still are the sites of political struggles over 
identity, citizenship and cultural ‘authenticity’. As Zulfacar (2006, 28) summarizes it well: 
 
The gender issue has been manipulated as a symbolic instrument serving to foster larger political 
ideals. The most significant state-initiated gender policies occurred during King Amanullah’s reign 
(1919–1929) as part of his ‘modernization’ plan; the Marxist regime (1978–1989) as part of their 
‘revolutionary’ political scheme; the Mujahidden/Taliban regimes (1992–2001) as part of  ‘pure-
Islamization’ of the nation; and the Interim and the Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan 
(2002–present) with the establishment of the first ever Ministry of Women Affairs. 
  
Furthermore, the history of women in Afghanistan shows how, in addition to 
gender, other sets of variables such as class and the urban/rural divide have to be taken 
into account in order to understand the variety of women’s experiences. Although most 
of the women I interviewed were of urban background, their narratives and historical 
documentation provide evidence for the sharp disjuncture between urban and rural lives. 
Women in the countryside benefited neither from the expanding public services nor 
from the dynamic cultural and intellectual movements and events that made the period 
prior to the Soviet occupation exhilarating and inspiring for the older women I 
interviewed. Another immense rupture existed between social classes with the majority 
of women belonging to impoverished classes with no access to education or adequate 
health care facilities. The revolutionary changes and relatively liberal social values and 
norms experienced by educated middle and upper class women in the 60s and 70s stood 
in harsh contrast to the tribal and traditional patriarchal values shaping the life of the 
majority of Afghan women at the time. 
 Finally, the history of Afghanistan shows that reforms aiming at changing the 
status of women raised hopes and fears, expectations and resistance in the social arena. 
From the reign of Amanullah to the Taliban regime, the contested rights of women 
became a primary symbol of the new order. In the context of what may well be Asia’s 
most tribal and patriarchal society, the resistance to Western modernization is unique in a 
country, which could have been, alongside Turkey, at the avant-garde of progressive 
Muslim nations as early as in the 1920s. All efforts by reformist kings from the early 20th 
century onwards were doomed due to their incapacity to incorporate the peripheries in 
their programs and to envision indigenous ways to achieve social transformation. When 
the communist government attempted to introduce an egalitarian society and implement 
women’s rights under a secular framework and through coercion, acute civil strife ensued. 
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This generated full-scale war when their Soviet allies came to the rescue and the US, 
through their assistance to fundamentalist groups, turned this into the last conflagration 
of the Cold War. The failure of modernist reformers as well as the interference of 
foreign countries in Afghanistan’s internal affairs has produced a unique form of counter 
modernity, that may well re-emerge in the near future if lessons from the past are not 
learnt. 
 I underline this trend in the following chapter by investigating the agenda for the 
enforcement of the rule of law in the new Islamic Republic. As the history of 
Afghanistan demonstrates, the battle between modernists and traditionalists has 
traditionally crystallized around the place of sharia law in society.  In spite of an attempt 
at reconciling these tensions by inscribing Islam at the heart of the new Constitution, the 
political bargains behind the Constitution making-process and the bureaucratic 
framework supposed to put into effect the rule of law over the territory, present many 
similarities with earlier modernization attempts. The urge with which the West hastened 
to rebuild centralized state institutions, write laws and bring Afghans to polling stations 
in a country described by the Human Poverty Index as one of the worst in the world, 
tends to demonstrate that the agenda for reconstruction set up in Bonn was driven by 
imperatives of political visibility rather than a clear commitment to alleviate poverty and 
enforce justice. In such a framework, the visibility of women and the recognition of the 
gender equality principle ‘on paper’ were key to bolster the idea of reconstruction in the 
West. 
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Chapter 3 
The Public Face of Justice in the New Islamic Republic 
 
 
Poster encouraging people to vote for the legislative elections - 2005 © Sayara Media and Communication 
 
 
 
 
‘Law has been used not only as a site of empowerment, but also as a device for excluding the world’s 
Others, or including them on terms that are quite problematic both historically as well as in the 
contemporary context. These inclusions and exclusions have been produced in and through law, either by 
emphasizing the difference of the subaltern subject as incapable of choosing and contesting, and thus 
incapable of exercising rights, or as backward and uncivilized, to be redeemed and incoroporated into the 
liberal project through the process of assimilation.’   
Ratna Kapur, Erotic Justice (2004, 2) 
 
 
In thirty-five years, Afghanistan has known a series of regime changes: a 
Constitutional Monarchy (under Zaher Shah), a Republic (under Daoud and the PDPA), 
an Islamic Emirate (under the Taliban), and finally an Islamic Republic (under President 
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Karzai). Each of these regimes has defended contrasted - and contested - interpretations 
of sharia law and granted it a different position within the legal apparatus, especially in 
areas concerned with family law. Family law reforms have constituted – and still 
constitute – one of the most conflictual sites of reforms between liberals and 
conservatives in Afghanistan. This is because, as Nancy Dupree (1984, 299) phrases it: 
‘In Afghanistan, like elsewhere in the Muslim Middle East, the legal code relating to 
marriage and the family is based directly on the shari’a or canon law of Islam, and 
reforms in this area have typically provoked extreme reactions, explicitly in defense of 
Islamic principles’. As I have underlined in the previous chapter, despite his last minute 
attempts at reframing his reforms under an Islamic rhetoric, King Amanullah could not 
contain the eruption of the opposition among tribal and religious leaders. After his 
eviction in 1929, his successor Habibullah Ghazi insisted upon a return to reactionary 
customs regarding women. ‘He demanded that women remain behind the veil under 
strict male control and that girls’ schools, together with all other vestiges of the women’s 
movement, be suspended’ (Dupree-Hatch 1984, 319). Women had to wait for another 
thirty years before a new set of reforms were introduced, under Prime Minister Daoud. 
However, the non-binding nature of the laws produced during this period, together with 
the gradual development of the country and the tough repression of political opponents 
prevented any strong opposition from disrupting the progresses of women’s 
emancipation20. A few years after the Republic was declared in 1973, a Penal Code (1976) 
and a Civil Law (1977) were introduced, both of which following the constitutional 
injunction that ‘there can be no law repugnant to the sacred religion of Islam’ (Dupree-
Hatch 1984, 320). These laws, however, maintained the ideal of patriarchal control and 
women were kept in positions that did not challenge their ‘honor’ and the one of their 
family. By contrast, during the Communist regime, the more aggressive approach to 
women’s empowerment and the secularist rhetoric that accompanied these reforms were 
decisive factors in the resistance that emerged in the countryside and that later on gave 
birth to the Taliban. 
The Bonn agreements signed in 2002 showed a commitment to repair past 
injustices committed under the Taliban regime and to establish gender equality in the 
country. However, this commitment is subject to contested understandings of human 
and women’s rights, which are broadly perceived as instruments of foreign domination. 
Indeed, in December 2003, during the constitutional debate in Loya Jorga, its chairman, 
                                                
20 Nancy Dupree however mentions occasional incidents of unveiled female students being attacked with 
acid thrown at their faces on Kabul University’s campus (1984, 311). 
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Sighbatullah Mojadeddi said to a woman delegate: ‘Do not try to put yourself on a level 
with men. Even God has not given you equal rights because under His decision two 
women are counted as equal to one man’ (Waldman 2003). A comment of this kind from 
an eminent member of the Loya Jirga, acknowledged religious leader and former president 
of Afghanistan, is revealing of the ideological struggles in which women’s rights are 
currently entangled. It also highlights how discourses of ‘women’s rights’ have tended to 
crystalise anxieties and feed a nationalist backlash. 
The new Afghan Constitution approved by the Loya Jirga in January 2004 was 
broadly acclaimed in the worldwide press as a major step forward for the establishment 
of democracy21 and for gender equality in Afghanistan. In this chapter, I interrogate this 
view and argue that constitutional engineering is of little significance for women’s rights 
unless the Rule of Law is established in the country, security is guaranteed over the 
territory, human rights offenders are prosecuted and more importantly, a space for 
collective discussion around the common values that should be enforced through laws is 
provided. In recent years, scholars of human rights (Hart and Irving 2005; Chinkin 2003; 
Waylen 2006; Travis 2005) have started to argue that processes of constitution-making 
are key moments in peace-building, since they provide an opportunity for a national 
debate to take place and for citizens to collectively decide about their future. In the case 
of Afghanistan, the tight schedule allocated to draft the new constitution, the absence of 
nationwide consultation and the poor representation of the civil society in key debates 
demonstrate that the international community’s interest laid more in producing a text 
that would bolster the idea of ‘reconstruction’ in the West than in setting up the 
conditions for participatory citizenship.  As this chapter shall demonstrate, a closer look 
at the constitution-making process and the model chosen to establish the rule of law 
highlights the precariousness of the system as an instrument designed to enforce rights in 
general and women’s rights in particular. 
The first section of this chapter explores the political negotiations that formed 
the basis for thinking and designing the new State apparatus prior to the Bonn 
agreements. I provide a critical analysis of discourses on ‘democracy building’ by 
underlining how realpolitik instead of human rights was the guiding principle behind the 
US strategy in the country (section 1). I then move on to analyse the constitution making 
process and the content of the constitution itself in order to evaluate the legal framework 
                                                
21  In an interview with New York Time reporter Carlotta Gall, Interior Minister Ahmed Ali Jalali 
commented: ''The spirit of this constitution will provide an opportunity for the country to move on the 
path of democracy''. Gall, C. (19/10/2003). New Afghan Constitution Juggles Koran and Democracy. The 
New York Times. 
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that is supposed to support women’s rights in the ‘post-war’ period (section 2). Finally, I 
examine the institutions that have been set up in order to enforce justice and guarantee 
gender equality. 
The central objective of this thesis is to explore the various ways in which 
women have had to improvise in order to find their own political expression and develop 
alternative forms of political presence. Their strategies to access the public cannot be 
understood without taking into account the backdrop upon which these practices have 
appeared. The purpose of this chapter is to question hegemonic narratives of ‘liberation’ 
used by the US administration to frame its post-September 11 military intervention in 
Afghanistan. Contrary to USAID policy reports on reconstruction (USAID 2002; 
USAID 2004), neither ‘freedom’ nor ‘democracy’  has reached Afghanistan yet.  
 
1. Political bargains: Historical continuities 
 
The enthusiasm that came out of international press reports following the 
presidential elections in 2004 gave the false impression that Afghanistan had eventually 
joined the ranks of democratic countries. What greatly lacked in those reports was a 
deeper analysis of the political bargains that were made in higher instances of power 
prior to sending Afghans to the polls. The general disregard for these developments is all 
the more problematic in that it reduces exercises in democracy building to their mere 
technical and logistical dimensions, while negating the ideological framework that guide 
them. 
It is therefore important to keep in mind that the US military strategy for its 
intervention in Afghanistan was driven by the political choice to keep a ‘light footprint’ 
in Afghanistan, using local commanders on the ground and supporting them with US 
airpower. As a result of this tactical choice, mujjahedin factions that had been responsible 
for the destruction of the country during the civil war and that had been marginalized by 
the Taliban, reappeared as legitimate partners in the political negotiations that followed 
the war. The ‘winners’ were given important positions in the government, while keeping 
their stronghold in their bastions of origin.  
The reasons behind the US’ ‘light footprint’ strategy are certainly varied but one 
has to remember that the primary purpose of the intervention was to ‘fight terrorism’, 
not to install democracy, even though this argument was used later on as a rhetorical 
envelop to sell the occupation to the public. Indeed, the Afghan territory represented an 
important strategic military spot for the US: it was located at the doors of Iran (a 
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historical enemy) and Pakistan (a historical ally), it offered an ideal access route to gas 
from Central Asia and a perfect military base from which to reshape the map of the 
Middle East and reassert US strategic dominance. With the backup of the UN and the 
support of the NATO to ensure security, a government that would support US strategic 
interests in the region was installed, with little consideration for the legitimacy this 
government would be able to gain among the people it was supposed to represent. The 
‘light footprint’ was nothing else than a means for the coalition to avoid being entirely 
held responsible for the reconstruction of the country. The concrete evidence for this is 
that the promised aid has fallen short by $ 10bn (Norton Taylor quoted in Lindisfarne 
2008) while total aid per capita per year in Afghanistan has been 4 times less than in 
Kosovo (Zia-Zarifi 2004). The US ‘footprint’ remained literally one: democracy on paper 
mostly. 
 As Barnett Rubin points out, the use by the United States of “terms such as 
‘peace building’ and ‘post-conflict reconstruction’ displace these operations from their 
historical context” (Rubin 2006, 177). Indeed, the scenario that I have described above is 
in line with geopolitical developments that have recurrently marked the history of 
Afghanistan. During the expansion of Russian and British imperial aspirations at the end 
of the nineteenth century, the British – after several failed attempts to conquer the 
Afghan territory – used Afghanistan as a buffer State to protect the borders of the Indian 
Empire from Russia in an episode commonly known as ‘the Great Game’. British 
financial aid enabled the Afghan Amir Abdor Rahman to ‘stabilize’ the country with a 
repressive state and unify its territory under a single kingdom. As the clear-sighted Amir 
explained to his successors: ‘Afghanistan (was) only a goat between two lions’ (quoted in 
Barry 2002, 190) and history proved that it would often be the case.  
Indeed, during the Cold War, Afghanistan became the battlefield upon which the 
US and the USSR fought their proxy war. The battle initially consisted in competing 
foreign aid projects. In Kabul, the ruling elite around King Zaher Shah used the financial 
support it received from both sides to assert its power and engage the country on its 
journey towards modernization, which excluded and alienated large segments of the 
Afghan society, especially in rural areas. The US support shifted towards the various 
factions of the resistance when the USSR invaded Afghanistan in 1980, throwing the 
country in a long war of independence and a civil war when the Soviet troops withdrew. 
It is only through the support they received from the outside that the ruling elites in 
Afghanistan managed to maintain their position. The process of State building during the 
20th century was influenced by external forces attempting to assert their dominance over 
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the country. Thus, it is not surprising that once the great powers withdrew from 
Afghanistan in the 90s, the whole State apparatus collapsed. 
The current political system, as designed in Bonn and later on during the 
Constitutional Loya Jirga relies on a similar exogenous transplant with no solid local 
roots. Its inherent fragility is the result of its lack of popular validation (see 2) and its 
extreme dependence on international aid and military support to sustain itself. According 
to Rubin, the whole system suffers from a crisis of ‘dual legitimacy’. The double 
objective of eradicating ‘terror’ and democratizing Afghanistan has led to contradictory 
political choices, i.e the legitimating of warlords to get their military support on the 
ground while their very presence in the government and State institutions represents a 
major threat to democracy (Rubin 2006). International and local commentators have 
qualified the whole exercise of ‘democracy building’ as meaningless since the return of 
warlords in power represents the primary threat to peace and stability (Schneider 2005, 
209). The US administration has defended its position by arguing that a strong 
presidential system would allow Karzai to keep warlords under his command. Deputy 
Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz told the U.S. Senate in 2002: ‘I think the basic 
strategy here is first of all to work with those warlords or regional leaders, whatever you 
prefer to call them, to encourage good behavior’ (quoted in Ingalls 2004). Such realpolitik 
underestimated the fact that warlords were now given the opportunity to play a double 
game with the government: keeping military and political control over their bastions 
while sabotaging from within any attempt at reducing their regional power.  
These contradictory policies have fuelled a general climate of impunity, which 
fosters increasing violence. In August 2008, for instance, the Afghan president has 
pardoned men convicted of gang rape, based on their affiliation with a powerful 
commander with whom the Government did not want to enter into conflict. The father 
of the victim, in an outburst of anger, threatened to become a suicide bomber if justice 
was not granted for his daughter (Clark 2008). Cases of this kind are not rare 
occurrences. During my fieldwork in 2007, women’s rights activists systematically 
mentioned the corrupt nature of the government and the justice system as the main 
barriers to women’s access to justice. Indeed, the main judiciary institutions have been 
staffed through clientelism and neo-patrimonial networks, affecting the quality of the 
services delivered and as a consequence, fuelling Afghans’ reluctance to refer to them.  
The few women employed as judges do not escape the rule. Interviews 
conducted in legal institutions demonstrate that most of them tend to reproduce 
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hegemonic interpretations of ‘women’s rights’ in order to preserve their position. Hence 
the Head of the family Court’s comment on women seeking divorce:  
 
Our country is attached to its culture and its tradition. Most women dislike getting separated from 
their husbands even though they are beaten up. In our country, women know it is difficult for 
them to find a place in society after a divorce because divorce brings shame on them. Women 
know that their husband’s house is a safe place for them. (Interview - Head of the Family Court, 
23/09/2007)  
 
At each level of the judiciary apparatus, from the courts to the General 
Attorney’s office, the women I interviewed tended to defend conservative interpretations 
of sharia law. The ones who tried to use a more interpretative approach to sharia faced 
constant death threats and murder attempts. Many of them were being discouraged from 
continuing their work and were simply considering quitting their positions. Maria Bashir, 
the Chief prosecutor of Herat, explained to me how she helped women obtain divorce 
from their abusive husbands and sent the offenders to prison, a little revolution in a city 
renowned for its overwhelming cases of women’s self immolations. But the lack of 
political support and protection made her feel extremely bitter about the new 
government. She said: 
 
The situation of women working in the Judiciary is not good. As a result, Afghan women are not 
able to fully enjoy their rights. Our role here is symbolic. It is for the show…just to show people 
that we have a democracy. (Interview - Bashir, 13/09/2007) 
 
With Drumbl (2004, 362), I agree that laws have an expressive potential and can 
deliver a message that shapes social norms. In the absence of law and order and with 
corruption now so deeply engrained in the judiciary system, the expressive function of 
the law is simply deactivated.  As a result, the State apparatus is broadly perceived as an 
instrument of oppression in the hands of the West instead of an entity meant to protect 
human rights. This has created a climate of impunity favourable to the resurgence of 
violence against women. 
 
Finally, these political developments have rendered the rights secured in the 
Constitution subject to conservative/orthodox interpretations. With the amnesty of 
human rights offenders and their reintegration in the political apparatus, the 
emancipatory potential of the Constitution has been drastically challenged. Afghanistan’s 
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ratification of the Constitution and the Women’s Convention has no real significance 
unless Islamic law dealing with women’s rights is offered a space for re-interpretation, a 
process that may well be ignored by law makers, since the Supreme Court responsible for 
revising the laws has no female judge and is infiltrated with conservative Ulamas. The 
Constitution making process itself lacked popular participation and fair representation of 
women, which further limited its potential as a strategy for enhancing gender rights. 
 
2. Constitutional engineering for whom? 
 
The new Constitution that officially came into force after the Constitutional Loya 
Jirga in January 2004 has generally been commented in the international press as a major 
success for the advancement of democracy and women’s rights in Afghanistan. The 
inclusion of the gender equality principle together with Afghanistan’s recognition of 
international conventions pertaining to women’s rights have been broadly read as 
positive outcomes for women. However, if it is undeniable that these developments have 
an emancipatory potential, the extent to which this potential can be realized has to be 
further evaluated.  
Institutional engineering has been a key component of the efforts to ‘build 
democracy after conflict’, most notably in Iraq and Afghanistan. In both cases, gender 
issues have been brought up to the drafting commissions by external forces, with little 
internal support to ensure continuity and with a naïve reliance on quotas, gender 
mainstreaming and women’s machineries as preferred strategies to enforce gender 
equality. In Iraq, like in Afghanistan, the poor security and the tight timetable, prevented 
the process from being open to women’s organizations campaigning for the inclusion of 
gender rights (Waylen 2006, 1218). It is therefore necessary to evaluate not only the 
content of the Constitution itself but also the process through which it was drafted, as 
issues of representation and democratic participation are key to democratic transition. As 
Waylen puts it, ‘constitutional building processes are not a universal panacea that will 
enhance gender rights. They offer some opportunities but are only one strategy among 
others, and a limited one (…)’ (Waylen 2006, 1219). 
Georgina Waylen (2006) identifies three essential benchmarks upon which the 
success of Constitution making can be measured. First, women should be adequately and 
proportionately represented in the different instances in charge of drafting the 
constitution. Second, women from political parties and from the civil society should be 
able to develop strategic alliances and a common agenda in order to form a women’s 
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national coalition or a women’s movement that appropriately represent women’s 
interests. This means that adequate time should be allocated to democratic debates and 
popular consultations. Third, women’s lobbying and advocacy should be internally driven 
rather than the result of external constituencies. In the case of Afghanistan, the 
constitution was designed through a process that included few women, lacked 
transparency and from which many women’s organizations felt marginalized and 
excluded.  
a. The const i tut ion-making process  
 
In December 2001, in the midst of the US-led rout of the Taliban, the United 
Nations brokered the so-called Bonn Agreements – named after the city where the 
agreements were signed – creating a roadmap for the development of a new government 
in Afghanistan. The Agreements also stipulated that a new constitution would be 
adopted by a Constitutional Loya Jirga. A Constitution Drafting Commission composed 
of 9 members, including 2 women, was given the responsibility to draft a preliminary 
constitution while a Constitution Commission with 35 members (including 7 women) 
was established with the assistance of the UN to carry out public consultation. President 
Karzai appointed Vice-President Nematullah Shahrani, a prominent conservative, to 
head both commissions, a signal to many that the constitution would mandate strict 
religious law. 
The Constitution Commission was attributed the responsibility to facilitate and 
promote public information on the constitution-making process during the entire period 
of its work and to conduct public consultations in each province of Afghanistan, and 
among Afghan refugees in Iran and Pakistan and, where possible, in other countries, to 
solicit the views of all Afghans regarding their national aspirations, and receive written 
submissions from those wishing to do so. However, despite the repetitive demands of 
the Independent Human Rights Commission (Schneider 2005, 191), the draft 
constitution was not made public before the consultation period, which rendered the 
whole exercise highly untransparent and problematic. 
Popular consultation is pivotal to develop a sense of ownership and to ensure 
that the final text reflects a transparent and democratic process. However, due to the 
very volatile security conditions and the tight timetable set up by the international 
community, consultations that were initially planned in each province of Afghanistan 
were considerably limited. According to several human rights organizations’ reports 
(Brunet and Solon-Helal 2003; ICG-Asia 2003), consultations lasted for a mere two 
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months and the meetings held in provincial centres saw very few women participants. 
The Constitutional Review Commission worked with the Ministry of women’s Affairs 
and UNIFEM to organize educational workshops for women but in the end, only 19% 
of those who participated in the consultations were women (Oates and Solon-Helal 
2004, 13). In South Africa, the consultation making process that was launched following 
the fall of the apartheid regime took two years and involved intense negotiations with 
women who were included in all the negotiating teams (Waylen 2006, 1214).  
Women’s rights activists had foreseen the window of opportunity opened by the 
Loya Jirga for channelling their demands regarding women’s rights (Schneider 2005, 192). 
Small women’s NGOs organized workshops on the Constitution in villages to encourage 
rural women to give their views and women in the government created the Gender and 
Law working group and passed their recommendations to the Commission and to the 
delegates of the CLJ. ‘Closer to the CLJ, a broadly representative coalition of civil society 
groups compiled a list of more than 60 women, with 25 individuals prioritized, based on 
their progressive agenda for women’s rights’ (Oates and Solon-Helal 2004). The list was 
passed on to Karzai, who selected only 3 women from it out of the 50 delegates the 
president appointed to the CLJ. More generally, the demands of civil society 
Organizations were not easily channelled because of the recrudescence of conservative 
forces harbouring an agenda harmful to women’s rights in the provinces (Waylen 2006: 
1219).  
Before the CLJ, warlords were already organizing themselves to push forward the 
recognition of special rights for former jihadis and limit civil liberties and the rights of 
women. This agenda dominated all aspects of political participation with warlords 
filtering the flow of information between the government and Afghans, both in terms of 
the messages Afghans wanted to transmit to Kabul and the ones Kabul needed to pass 
on to Afghans before consultations effectively started. Whereas the disarmament process 
(Demobilization, Disarmament & Reintegration programme) was making little progress 
on the ground, warlords were already regaining their control over their bastions of origin, 
perpetuating insecurity and hindering the meaningful involvement of civil society in the 
constitution making process in order to give priority to their own agenda (Goodson 
2005, 89).  
The ICG Report (ICG-Asia 2003) commented: ‘The transitional administration 
and the UN are now heading down a well-trodden path in the Afghan history whereby a 
constitution is proclaimed but no one, let alone those in control of state power, have any 
incentives’. Such a situation presents many similarities with earlier Constitution making 
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exercises, notably the 1977 Constitution imposed by President Daoud (under the 
pressure of the USSR) that declared Afghanistan a Republic and that failed to quell 
chronic political instability in the country. In the same way, the government and the 
UN’s inability to fulfil all the necessary conditions for consultation to take place at the 
national level represented a major limitation to the democratic process. By avoiding to 
engage in a fair debate with the Afghans, the interim Government missed a fantastic 
opportunity to empower itself by strengthening its authority through popular validation.  
The President called the Constitutional Loya Jirga (CLJ) in December 2003 to 
review and agree on the text of the Constitution. The CLJ was composed of 500 
representatives, 450 of which were elected members and 50 of whom were appointed by 
the President. Altogether, 64 women delegates (2 per province) were elected by women 
representatives of the 32 provinces, which represented 20% of the total seats reserved to 
women. According to UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000), women are 
considered as a central part of the solution to conflicts and therefore should be 
represented at all levels in decision making, especially during peace processes (paragraph 
8, section b). UNIFEM suggests that women should represent 30% of the participants in 
all peace negotiations (Brunet and Solon-Helal 2003). The 20% quota allocated to them 
in the CLJ together with the lack of transparency of the CLJ’s electoral process are 
revealing of the lack of measures put in place to ensure women’s fair representation. 
According to reporter John Sifton (2004), “the majority of the 502 delegates to the Loya 
Jirga were members of voting blocs controlled by military faction leaders, or warlords. 
Some good people were elected, but they were outnumbered--and scared.”  
Some women’s delegates at the CLJ complained of receiving threats and 
intimidations. There were also allegations of irregularities during the voting (Schneider 
2005). When Malalai Joya, a delegate from Farah province, denounced the presence of 
warlords in the Assembly, Sibghatullah Mojaddedi, Chairman of the Loya Jirga, called her 
an ‘Infidel’ and a ‘communist’ and expelled her manu militari from the tent where 
negotiations were taking place. Since then, Joya has received regular death threats and 
survived four assassination attempts. Following this event, female candidates did not 
dare expressing their views for fear of being bullied, threatened or expelled from the 
assembly (ICG-Asia 2003). These irregularities in the democratic process, together with 
the lack of time allocated for women to network and organize themselves, made the 
participation of women in the constitution-making process a mere symbol for 
democracy. As Vivien Hart and Helen Irving (2005) put it, for gender rights to be 
efficiently incorporated in a constitution, ‘the democratic process should be participatory, 
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inclusive, accessible, open-minded, open-ended, and transparent and accountable’. None 
of these adjectives can be used to qualify the constitution-making process in Afghanistan.  
In short, because of the general climate of insecurity and the re-emergence of 
conservative forces at the centre of the political arena, the Constitution-making process 
failed to be inclusive and participatory. As a result, the actual final product (The 
Constitution) represents a ‘potential’ for promoting women’s rights through an Islamic 
framework but without proper representation of women dedicated to women’s rights in 
key political institutions like the Supreme Court, the president’s cabinet, the Ministry of 
Justice and the Parliament, conservative interpretations of Islam will necessarily tend to 
dominate.  
This flawed procedure was premonitory of the current weaknesses of the State 
apparatus to enforce the rule of law and promote gender rights. Conservatism is already 
on the rise. The Vice and Virtue department has been re-established within the Ministry 
of religious affairs. The parliament has already examined legal proposals for banning 
cosmetics, long hair for men, jeans and other products and behaviours considered as ‘un-
Islamic’. In 2009, the parliament voted a law allowing men to starve their wives in case 
they refuse to answer their husbands’ sexual needs (Coghlan 2009). These developments 
demonstrate that democracy building cannot be reduced to State institutions building. 
Without security, the rule of law and popular support, the Constitution may well suffer 
the same fate as the country’s previous ones.  
I share with Wilson (2001, 3) the view that ‘a ‘culture of human rights’ cannot so 
easily be separated from classic communitarian forms of nation-building’. It is because, in 
the case of Afghanistan like in the one of South Africa that Wilson analyses, human 
rights talk is integrated within the nation-building project as part of its ideological 
legitimization that it is subject to conflicts and resistance. ‘Contrary to the myth of legal 
neutrality, the law is always a form of politics by other means, as it is normative as well as 
merely formal, rational and self-referential. Legal meaning is always enmeshed in wider 
value systems, and is caught within other competing normative discourses, which are 
political, cultural, and more often than not, nationalist.’ (Wilson 2001, 5). The content of 
the Constitution is in itself open to a variety of interpretations, which may have both 
reactionary and emancipatory potentials for women. However, the current occupation of 
the country by foreign military forces is reactivating conservative approaches to sharia law 
and silencing the voices of those that have a more liberal agenda for women. 
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b. Content o f  the const i tut ion 
 
If the Constitution can be read as a fragile compromise between International 
Human Rights and sharia law, the international community and the Government should 
have paid more attention to the Constitution-making process itself and ensured that the 
final text was the result of a valid consensus (Schneider 2005, 206). Once limitations to 
fair, transparent and inclusive consultations are identified, the inclusion of gender 
equality principles in the Constitution together with the signing of International Human 
Rights Conventions tend to appear as mere concessions made in order to preserve the 
international community’s support necessary to receive aid. 
The constitutional commitment to human rights at national and international 
levels relies primarily on the National Independent Human Rights Commission (IHRC) 
and the observation of International Human Rights Standards. Both systems present 
major weaknesses (Niaz Shah 2005, 249). First, the IHRC’s mandate is to monitor and 
observe human rights in the country. It receives complaints from victims of human 
rights violations and assists them in defending their rights. The Commission is also in 
charge of enforcing the UN Convention for the Elimination of Violence Against Women 
among other conventions Afghanistan has signed. However, the Commission is primarily 
an advising and assisting body with no effective power to declare human rights 
violations. During an interview with Soraya Sobhrang, a former gynaecologist who runs 
the women's rights department of the IHRC, the Commissioner mentioned warlords’ 
proselytism and intimidations as major barriers to her work. She said: 
 
They say we are not Muslims… that we are not from Afghanistan. But we keep on doing our job. 
Because we believe that there cannot be peace without justice. (Interview - Sobhrang, 
17/09/2007)  
 
Second, the constitution makes frequent references to the protection of human 
rights. The preamble declares respect for the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
and the Charter of the United Nations. The Constitution also abides by gender equality 
principles. Article 22, Chapter 2 mentions that: ‘the citizens of Afghanistan – whether 
man or woman – have equal rights and duties before the law’. However, the document 
does not use any strong language to empower institutions to uphold those rights. 
Besides, Article 3 (chapter 1) states that laws cannot be passed that contradict ‘the beliefs 
and provisions of the sacred religion of Islam’, leaving a large scope open for contested 
interpretations of Islamic laws regarding women’s rights. The exact position will require 
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further clarification either by the new legislature or by rulings from the Supreme Court 
since only government or courts can bring the issue of review to the Supreme Court. But 
staffed as they are now, neither body looks like it will support an interpretative approach 
of sharia law that would enhance gender rights (Niaz Shah 2005).  
Indeed, the Supreme Court was renowned for its conservatism until its previous 
Chief Justice, Fazil Hadi Shinwari, a cleric with no higher education degree, got removed 
from his position and replaced by the more moderate Abdul Salam Azimi, a University 
professor educated in the US. But despite Azimi’s efforts at fighting corruption, the 
Supreme Court, with its well established council of clerics that reviews questions of 
Islamic law and very few of its members presenting a recognized degree in either Islamic 
or civil law, appears to be highly susceptible to conservative legal interpretations. No 
female judges are present in this institution that has been exclusively male dominated 
since its creation. Interviewed in August 2007, a female judge currently working at the 
Family Court confided to me: 
 
I wish I could work at the Supreme Court one day but it’s impossible in our society. Being a 
woman is always a disadvantage. (Interview - Judge at Kabul family court, 22/08/2007) 
 
Despite these limitations, Article 84 (chapter 5, article 4) of the Constitution 
guarantees that women are represented in the Senate (50% of the seats are reserved to 
women in the Meshrano Jirga). Article 83 (chapter 5, article 3) also ensures that women are 
represented in the House of Representatives (25% of the seats are reserved to women in 
the Wolesi Jirga) as well as in the 34 Provincial Councils (at least 2 women per PC). 
Quotas have indeed been regarded as the mechanism of predilection to ensure the 
participation of women in the political bodies. However, as Chinkin argues (2003, 27), 
‘women’s political participation cannot be addressed by quotas or other measures 
directed at representation alone. These must be accompanied by measures for identifying 
obstacles to women’s participation, identifying and training women candidates, 
facilitating networking between women in politics and education of women voters’. The 
security of women candidates should also be taken into consideration.  
Many women candidates to the parliamentary elections in 2005 ran their 
campaign putting their lives in great danger. This was for instance the case of Spozmai 
Rostami (pseudonym), a female candidate from a Northern province, who received four 
bullets in her legs while visiting on foot an isolated village of her province. A few days 
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before I interviewed her in her modest house in Kabul, she had received anonymous 
death threats. She said: 
 
You know, these local strong men who ran for the elections felt threatened by a woman like me, 
who had no car, no money and no guns, because they knew that people could make the 
difference between me and them. Wherever I went, even in very remote villages, people 
welcomed me. So they (local power holders) felt threatened. That’s why they tried to kill me. 
They spread the word that electing a woman was against Islam…that it was a blasphemy… and 
now that I am elected, they continue to intimidate me. (Interview - MP7, 23/02/2007) 
 
All these developments collude to confirm that the Constitution in itself is of 
little significance for the advancement of women’s rights unless more pragmatic steps are 
taken to tackle corruption, warlordism and insecurity and to ensure that appointments at 
key positions in the administration are transparent and provide candidates with equal 
opportunities.  The description of the Constitution-making process I have made in this 
section underlines a general lack of will from both the government and the international 
community to address these urgent needs and an inclination for hastened and visible 
political decisions that render the whole process of democracy building a mere 
administrative exercise in which women’s voices have been muted.  
 
The reform of the justice system does not escape this general trend. Instead of 
building upon and including existing traditional structures into the judiciary more 
formally, the international community has opted for a total revamping of judiciary 
institutions. This has led to the marginalization of indigenous law through 
transplantation of Western civil and criminal codes, both of which are regarded with 
great suspicion in rural areas where traditional modes of dispute resolution still prevail.  
 
3. Justice externalized 
 
Since the Bonn Agreements, the task of reforming the judiciary has mostly 
remained in the hands of the international community. Transitional justice in 
Afghanistan has mostly been a top-down exercise in democracy building with no 
participation from local Afghans on the ground. For example, the drafting of the new 
criminal code has entirely been realized by Italian jurists with the support of US military 
lawyers and with no input from the Afghans (Ahmed 2007). The final text, like the 
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changes made to the Constitution22, was adopted under strong foreign political pressure. 
Behind the rush of the international community to produce a new criminal code were 
beliefs in the necessity to develop standardized juridical practices in a country where wars 
had created a myriad of different jurisdictions over the territory. As Ahmed puts it (2007, 
113): ‘the Italian criminal procedure code is part and parcel of a broader plan to 
professionalize and centralize Afghanistan’s judicial system by establishing district courts 
that will apply the same code’. 
What was seriously lacking in this approach was a greater understanding of the 
complex relations between the central government and the peripheries where local power 
holders have always been very reluctant to endorse decisions taken in Kabul. By 
imposing such a system, the international community did not consider rural sensitivities 
and reinforced sentiments of alienation that had already emerged during the Loya Jirga. 
The resistance of the ulama (religious leaders) to an imposed foreign code complicates 
the efforts to build the rule of law based on a centralized judiciary and codified laws, 
especially given the profound influence and historically deep roots of ulama in social and 
political life in Afghanistan. This resistance is already sensitive in the intensification of 
attacks against governmental buildings such as schools and police stations in rural areas. 
Contrary to dominant analysis provided in the media, recent reports from human rights 
organizations23 highlight that while attacks are predominantly attributed to the Taliban, 
the actual perpetrators are often independent local warlords who view the government 
encroaching upon their authority.  
The present judiciary structure of state-run courts in Afghanistan includes a 
Kabul-based Supreme Court, provincial high courts of appeal, and local district courts 
dispersed in some of the major cities of the country including Kabul, Herat, Kandahar, 
Nangahar and Balkh. Since the downfall of the Taliban regime, the international 
community has concentrated its efforts on rebuilding these structures and launched 
ambitious training programs for judges, prosecutors, defence attorneys and municipal 
police forces. These training programs have mostly been held by international experts 
employed by private contractors specializing in justice reforms in Third World countries. 
This is for instance the case of the PAE group, a global security company specialized in 
military equipment and technologies, but also running the US State Department 
sponsored Justice Sector Support Program (JSSP) in Afghanistan. In his Pakistani villa 
                                                
22 Schneider (2005: p116) mentions that the consensus over a strong presidential system was reached 
‘because of the UN’s special envoy and the US ambassador to Afghanistan who held closed-door 
negotiations with rival delegates on January 3, 2004’.  
23 See Human Rights Watch, Sept. 2004, Rule of the Gun 
 105 
guarded behind barb wired walls by Nepalese DynCorp24 security guards, a JSSP team 
member was feeling cynical. He explained: 
  
There are three things the international community is interested in doing: writing the laws, giving 
training and building buildings. They appoint “experts” to give power point presentations. These 
experts are paid incredible salaries and most of them have no experience with the legal practices 
of this country. I remember one of these experts giving a presentation on an international 
Convention Afghanistan hadn’t even signed. This is how the money is going back to us. Take the 
example of the PAE group: we spent millions of dollars to train 20 police officers and 10 
prosecutors. (Fieldnotes - 16/08/2007) 
 
Following for a few days the activities of one ‘gender legal advisor/law 
enforcement officer’ working for the same group was in itself a very revealing 
experience. Brenda, a tall and slender American woman in her mid-forties wearing short 
leaved tunics, a helmet covered with a panther-print fabric and a bulletproof jacket, had 
worked in the Balkans before coming to Afghanistan. With her military equipment and 
her two bold headed and heavily armed bodyguards, she looked as if she had been 
directly recruited from a Mad Max movie. She was a ‘post-conflict’ specialist who had 
seen her share of human horrors since she had started her career. She had survived a 
suicide attack in Herat a few months before we first met and she was about to be sent to 
Iraq once her ‘mission’ in Kabul was over. As we crisscrossed the city in an armoured 
vehicle on our way to the Family Response Units located in the major police stations of 
the capital, she explained how she was given only a two-week ‘R&R’ (Relax and Rest) in 
a luxury hotel in Dubai after the incident. Brenda was ‘psychologically strong’, as she 
liked to say, and she felt the legal training of the Afghan policewomen she was in charge 
of was a very important responsibility (Fieldnotes – 01/08/2007)25.  
In 2005, two American policewomen employed by DynCorp, working as police 
advisors in police stations in Kabul, took the initiative to set up the first Family Response 
Unit (FRU). The objective was to provide the four police women employed in the station 
in a variety of low-level, non-police duties with policing competencies while providing 
                                                
24 According to Corporate Watch, DynCorp is ‘The world's premier rent-a-cop business’. DynCorp ‘runs 
the security show in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the US-Mexico border. They also run the coca crop-dusting 
business in Colombia’. See http://www.corpwatch.org/article.php?list=type&type=18  
DynCorp mercenaries have been accused of various human rights abuses in their different countries of 
operation, notably in Bosnia where DynCorp police trainers would have been involved in scandals related 
to trafficking of women, weapons and passports. In Afghanistan, DynCorp is the principal contractor in 
charge of the police-training program. 
25 These data were collected on August, 1st 2007 during my visits with the JSSP women’s rights advisor 
(here called Brenda to preserve anonymity) to the Family Response Units located in Kabul. All the details 
were recorded in my field diary. 
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policing services for those women in the communities who were the victims of family 
violence. The four policewomen were trained on ‘family violence’ by the UNAMA 
gender advisor while police techniques were taught by the American police advisors 
attached to the unit. In 2007, there were 4 FRUs available in Kabul city and 9 FRUs 
available in the provinces (1 in Baghlan, 2 in Herat, 1 in Jalalabad, 1 in Kunduz, 3 in 
Mazar e Sharif and 1 in Takhar). Most of them had been installed in furnished containers 
given by UNFPA.   It consisted of a reception, an office, a separate interview room and a 
washroom. Policewomen working in FRUs received on-job training and supervision by 
the DynCorp policewomen advisors while Brenda covered the legal part of their training.  
Our car finally reached the first FRU located in Kabul Central Police Station. 
Our two bodyguards stepped out first and took position on each side of the container, 
anxiously screening the surroundings from behind their black shades. Behind the 
Formica desk, the policewoman in chief was glancing through a pile of reports. When 
she approached to welcome us, I felt a shiver running along my neck. I knew this face. I 
had seen this woman interviewed in a Channel 4 documentary on women’s rights abuses 
under the Taliban26. With her dark sunglasses, her blond dyed hair and the small white 
veil that could hardly hide her monstrous facial deformation, I could surely not be 
wrong.  The little doubts I had left were swept away when she herself confirmed that she 
had worked for 10 years as the head of the women’s prison in Kabul before being 
assigned to the FRU when the Taliban regime fell. In the documentary, she explained 
how the detainees, including a woman who had been publicly executed on Kabul 
stadium in November 1999, had deserved their fate since they had disobeyed their 
husbands, a major infraction to sharia law ‘Taliban’ style. With regime change, masks had 
been replaced and from an officer in charge of implementing the inhuman Taliban 
policies, she had been turned into a women’s rights protector.  After a short 
conversation, I understood that her new position did not mean much change to her. ‘I 
have a lot of experience’, she said with self-confidence. ‘I know how to handle family 
problems. If these women ask for divorce, they know that there will be nothing left of 
them. They may even end up in prison. So I encourage them to talk to their husbands 
and their relatives and to become reasonable’ (Fieldnotes - 01/08/2007).  
Perplexed, I sat on a sofa and observed Brenda giving her ‘training’ to the few 
policewomen, some in uniforms, some others wearing their own clothes, present in the 
FRU. Brenda asked me to take pictures of the session to be later on inserted in her 
                                                
26 Inside Afghanistan: Behind the Veil, Saira Shah, BBC, Channel 4, June 2001 (Saira Shah 2001) 
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weekly activity report. ‘Here is the Constitution of Afghanistan and here is the Civil 
Code’, she said while the interpreter simultaneously translated her words. ‘You have to 
study these two books very carefully because I will come back and question you’, she 
added. She pointed at sections of the books mostly relevant to the policewomen’s task 
and concluded the session by asking questions related to the cases they had received over 
the past month. I discreetly asked Brenda whether all the police officers employed in the 
station were literate. Apparently, only the Policewoman in Chief was. ‘That’s annoying, 
commented Brenda worriedly, I guess the ones who can read will have to read the 
Constitution and the Civil Code to the ones who cannot’ (Fieldnotes - 01/08/2007). 
Problem solved. We gave our goodbyes and jumped back into the car. 
The FRUs provided a structure for women victims of family violence, but a lot 
remained to be done to make them work effectively. Interviews were neither conducted 
in a confidential environment nor in a non-judgmental manner. The few cases observed 
during my visit showed that many policewomen lacked empathy towards their clients and 
often advised them to return to their violent home instead of informing them about the 
entire panel of solutions at their disposal. Despite daily mentoring efforts, a conservative 
attitude towards women prevailed. In addition, policewomen appointed to work in the 
FRUs were regularly moved to other positions by their male superiors and were 
oftentimes deprived of access to vehicles to conduct their investigations. Turnover of 
staff was a major barrier to their training and to the good functioning of the Units, as 
follow up of cases could not be properly conducted. Sharing my concerns with Brenda, 
she admitted that there was little she could do to tackle these problems since political 
decisions were beyond her reach.  
Despite this cynical stance on the way the reconstruction process was being held, 
very few internationals envisaged alternative ways to engage with reforms in Afghanistan. 
Jirgas and shuras that were effectively in charge of administering justice at grassroots levels 
were broadly denigrated, seen as backward, conservative and traditional entities not 
worth approaching and meant to disappear once the government were to extend its 
reach over the national territory. The dominant narrative was that Afghanistan’s legal 
system had been totally destroyed by the war and was therefore inexistent. The 
imperative of establishing the rule of law, a leitmotiv in development discourses, was 
primarily understood as a matter of writing laws, building courts and training judges.  
With Drumbl (2004) and Ahmed (2007), I share the view that over passing tribal 
councils when these councils represent the only mechanisms of dispute resolution 
available and recognized in rural areas, is a major strategic mistake. ‘Like Amanullah’s 
 108 
social and educational reforms in the early twentieth century, and similarly with Afghan 
Communist party policies in the 1970s-80s, the present attempts to impose centralization 
on local adjudicatory actors in the provinces are likely to crumble’ (Ahmed 2007, 290). In 
the long run collaboration with tribal councils could be a more rewarding and sustainable 
option than transplantation of foreign justice delivery mechanisms that have no local 
appeal and are broadly perceived as forms of ‘legal imperialism’. As Ahmed argues, 
‘international intervention in the law of another society, particularly when it relates to 
social and cultural norms, tends to only exacerbate internal conflicts by politicizing and 
distorting original issues’ (Ahmed 2007, 300). 
Afghan tribal councils are made of village elderly notables who resolve day-to-day 
disputes. They apply their own sophisticated canons of laws, often combining aspects of 
Islamic sharia law with local customary and tribal law.  In the south of Afghanistan and in 
Pashtun-dominated areas, customary laws are operationalized through the Pastunwali, the 
tribal code of honor. As Drumbl argues (2004, 350), Pashtunwali is ‘politically contingent 
(and at the moment defined by patriarchal elites) instead of statically and immutably 
oppressive to women’. Scholars of Afghanistan (Dupree 1973; Lindisfarne-Tapper 1991; 
Kakar 2003) have indeed underlined the great variations that exist in local interpretations 
of the Pashtunwali between the different Pashtun communities that cohabit in 
Afghanistan, since Pashtunwali has no codified law but instead overarching principles  that 
are few in number and vary from region to region. Besides geographic variations, one 
can also identify differences according to the socio-economic positions occupied by 
individual community members. For instance, different expectations apply to the qalang 
(‘tax’) group or the urban and large landowning Pashtuns, and the nang (‘chivalrous’) 
group, or the pastoral, nomadic, hill Pashtuns (Kakar 2003, 3). As a result of this 
diversity, the rules of ‘pardah’ (gender boundaries) remain fluid and subject to 
negotiations. This is mostly visible through the wide range of veiling practices observable 
among the women of the different Pashtun communities. As Kakar puts it (2003, 5), 
Pashtunwali is better described as a continuum rather than as a set of fixed and static rules.  
On one end of the spectrum are nomad Kuchi women who do not veil in public and are 
left for weeks alone at home while men are shepherding the flocks. In the middle of the 
spectrum are the women of the nang group, who partially cover their face when they 
leave the house or out of respect for elders. Men and women have separate headquarters 
and women are able to visit other women’s headquarters within their neighbourhood.  At 
the other end of the spectrum are the women from the qalang group who never leave the 
household compound unless completely veiled, or if they have not reached a 
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marriageable age yet or are too aged to be married or to challenge the honour of their 
family.  
The council represents the legislative authority in Pashtunwali. It usually arbitrates 
on issues related to men’s sphere of authority, i.e disputes over lands, water and money. 
Council members are selected according to their records in applying Pashtunwali to the 
letter. In the qalang group, tribal leaders must also have wealth beside a honourable 
reputation. Women are usually not represented in the councils. This is because women 
have their own sphere of authority and intervene to legislate on issues related to 
household resources, marriage and family disputes27.  
The ultimate goal of jirgas is to reach a consensual decision that is most 
acceptable for and in the interest of the entire community. This form of justice is 
primarily restorative: ‘the point is not to exact retribution by punishing the offender or 
the offender’s family, but rather to make the victim, victim’s family, or clan whole in light 
of the injustice suffered’ (Drumbl 2004, 384). As a consequence, the offender or his 
family is requested to pay back his debts by giving poar (blood money) and not by being 
sentenced to imprisonment, as it is the case in Western societies. Poar can include cash, 
services, animals and also the transfer of women. The transfer of women and marriage of 
girls within the victim’s family is understood as a means to create a blood link between 
the two families, establish peaceful relationships between them and remove enmity. 
Crimes against women can be accounted for by poar or by more severe retributive 
punishments. Sexual assaults against ‘non-willing’ women (refusal is proved by a woman 
screaming and struggling) are repaired by having the aggressor’s ear cut off and 
requesting a large poar from him. The father of a woman who is physically abused by her 
husband can claim poar from the abusive husband in reparation. Adultery leads to the 
execution of both the woman and man. An unmarried girl running away from home with 
a boy can be stoned to death. All these examples show that Pashtunwali as it is practiced 
nowadays embed the subjugation of women. As a reflection of a patriarchal worldview, 
Pashtunwali is based on a misogynistic interpretation of Islamic and tribal law. 
However, because of its reliance on local religious leaders, it benefits from a 
legitimacy that the State does not currently have. As Drumbl argues (2004), if better 
included in the legal system, Pashtunwali mingled with international law could be part of a 
bureaucracy of punishment more respectful of women’s right in the long term. I agree 
with Drumbl (2004, 389) that ‘neither the global nor the local offers magical solutions. 
                                                
27 For a detailed account of women’s spheres of influence, see Lindisfarne-Tapper, N. (1991). Bartered 
brides: politics, gender and marriage in an Afghan tribal society. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 
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Consequently, Afghanistan may be a fertile ground for consideration of hybrid 
mechanisms that borrow from the international and invoke the local while pluralizing the 
types of groups that contribute to the content of the local’. This hybrid mechanism 
already exists in practice, even though collaboration between courts and jirgas is not 
officially acknowledge. In matters related to family law, judges in Kabul tend to use jirgas 
as mediators in family disputes (Fieldnotes, 1-8/08/2007). Unfortunately, decisions taken 
by jirgas are often detrimental to women. The recognition of the jirgas at the State level 
could open spaces for negotiations on women’s issues and gradually guarantee greater 
gender equity in the way justice is delivered. In the absence of dialogue between the 
centre and the peripheries, jirgas are more likely to stand on to conservative 
interpretations of sharia and customary law as a way to preserve their authority.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The legal developments that I have described in this chapter demonstrate that the 
exercise in Constitution-making has mostly ignored cultural and religious notions that are 
dear to most Afghans. This is probably because, like in earlier modernizations attempts, 
‘culture’ and ‘religion’ continue to be perceived by international actors and indigenous 
elites as barriers to progress and development. The problem with such a perception is 
that it tends to essentialize ‘culture’ and ‘religion’, instead of considering them in a more 
social-constructionist way, as sites of struggle and constant negotiations (Benhabib 1992).  
This refusal to engage with Afghans in a more productive dialogue on ‘culture’ and 
religious prescriptions such as sharia has created frustrations and anxieties towards a legal 
apparatus that is broadly perceived as ‘foreign’ and therefore, ‘un-Islamic’. The 
Constitution-making process could have represented a major opportunity to collectively 
define the values on which to build the future Afghan nation. The interaction between 
State agents, Western lawyers, and Afghan citizens could have provided sites of contacts 
from where a culturally legitimate hybrid legal system could have taken roots.  
Currently, three major developments are preventing women from accessing their 
rights. First, the political bargains Karzai – on the advice of his Western supporters - has 
engaged with local power holders who have been involved in the past in major human 
rights abuses and who continue to arbitrarily rule over their fiefdoms have severely 
jeopardized people’s trust in state institutions. Second, the Constitution remains a highly 
ambivalent text that leaves open for discussion in the Supreme Court (an institution that 
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remains under the dominance of conservative Ulamas) any international laws perceived as 
contrary to ‘Islamic principles’. The Constitution-making process failed to take seriously 
the call by the Security Council in its Resolution 1325 to ‘all actors involved, when 
negotiating and implementing peace agreements, to adopt a gender perspective’ (UN-
Security-Council 2000). As a result, the Constitution continues to be seen as a foreign 
instrument of domination that contradicts Afghan ‘culture’ and Islam. Finally, the 
externalization of justice through the imposition of a centralized form of legal 
administration inspired from the West has negatively impacted on women’s capacity to 
access justice, making them more vulnerable to arbitrary decisions of local jirgas.  
The peace-building process could have represented an opportunity for women to 
advocate for their rights and embed them in the Constitution. However, the refusal to 
establish mechanisms to prosecute war criminals and the reincorporation of warlords in 
the political apparatus have seriously damaged the image of the State as an institution 
aiming to provide for people’s needs and aspirations. The Constitution-making process is 
a good illustration of this lack of political will. If gender equality principles are mentioned 
in the final document, no strong language is used to empower specific institutions to 
transform this principle into reality. In the same way, if the international community can 
rejoice of the quotas reserved to women in the National Assembly, the Senate and 
Provincial Councils, representation of women alone is not sufficient to guarantee the 
advancement of a feminist agenda in political negotiations. Women have now the right to 
participate in public life but this right may well remain abstract if their security is not 
ensured, if the political system remains infiltrated by human rights’ violators and if 
Western legal prescriptions continue to jeopardize the women’s movement. 
When the police, the courts and the legislature altogether have failed to enforce 
the rule of law in Afghanistan over the past seven years, rights secured in formal, 
constitutional and international documents appear as purposeful manipulation of human 
rights and women’s rights discourses as an appendage to military occupation. The 
ratification of these texts rather than their practical application has been the central focus 
of the international community. The tight agenda for ratifying the Constitution and 
organizing the elections supports the thesis that at each step of the process, symbols had 
more value for policy makers than concrete actions that would have boosted popular 
participation and collective definition of the rules of engagement of the State with the 
people it is supposed to represent. The bureaucratic work undertaken by the 
international community aimed to symbolically grant Afghanistan’s entrance into the 
democratic world and supply Western audiences with illusory narratives of progress. For 
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most Afghan people and for women, rights have remained on paper only. Like in other 
colonial encounters, constitutionalism in Afghanistan has inherited the propensity for 
violent social exclusion from the ‘modern’ (Menon 2004, 2). In denying the subjective 
and moral dimensions that are inherent to State-building projects, the entire process was 
driven towards the erasure of any kind of normative ethic that would diverge from the 
liberal Western version of Constitutionalism. These dynamics ultimately deprived Afghan 
women’s rights activists from any capacity to defend on their own terms a common 
agenda for women. 
The discrepancy between the public face of justice in the ‘post-Taliban’ era and 
the actual state of lawlessness that marks this period has increased Afghans’ resentment 
towards the central government and opened rooms for conservative interpretations of 
sharia. The continuous loss of credibility of public institutions of justice delivery has 
meant in practice that local jirgas have become entirely responsible for delivering justice. 
These developments have rendered women more vulnerable to distorted versions of 
Islamic law while forcing them to develop alternative means of public expression.  
The chapter that follows further explore these developments by taking a closer 
look at the model of social change and the actors and machineries involved in 
implementing this change.  I use the case study of a gender empowerment training 
workshop ran by the Ministry of Women’s Affairs in Kabul to highlight the discursive 
framework that guides current efforts at enforcing gender rights in the country. I argue 
that like in earlier colonial encounters, current liberal discourses on women’s rights have 
fuelled tensions around ‘culture’, ‘tradition’ and ‘religion’ at various levels of the Afghan 
society. These tensions have reinforced social expectations towards women and their 
responsibility to preserve national identity. 
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Chapter 4 
Women under Cosmetic Transformation: The Making of 
Modern Afghanistan 
 
 
Woman’s face erased on an advertisement billboard, Kandahar, 2007. 
  
 
What surprised me perhaps the most when I landed in Kabul for the second time 
in 2007 was to discover that six years only after the eviction of the Taliban regime, 
billboards and commercials had anarchically reappeared in the streets of urban centres. 
This new phenomenon signalled a radical shift since the Taliban had forbidden the use 
and possession of cameras, video cameras and TV sets as well as all visual 
representations of human beings perceived as instruments of ‘Westoxication’. Saraya 
Media and Communication, the firm for which I worked for a while at the beginning of 
my fieldwork, was one of the many advertising and communication companies that had 
opened offices in Kabul in the first days of the ‘reconstruction’. Equipped with new 
white Macintosh computers, Saraya resembled any other communication agency that can 
be found in the West, a bit dustier but still a place full of trendy young people, badly 
shaved and wearing blue jeans under the local kameez. Saraya’s employees had been 
recruited locally and internationally by a team of three Western managers in their early 
thirties. From behind their computer screens, graphic designers, video producers and 
project managers were designing the new face of Afghanistan.  
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This new visual culture is not only shaping the aspirations of the Afghan 
population but is also a powerful instrument in the hands of the government and the 
international community to promote new lifestyles and ideas about modernity and 
development. The emergence of the advertising industry and its overwhelming presence 
on TV and radio is also symptomatic of the broader shift the Afghan society under 
Western occupation is witnessing. In the Afghan context, where electricity and roads are 
seriously lacking, over half of the population is living below the poverty line (CIA 2008), 
and access to health services28 (WHO 2008) and education29 (UNICEF 2008) remains 
quasi inexistent, advertisement is the symbol of a pending reconstruction, a 
reconstruction taking place mostly on paper, TV screens and radio waves. The messages 
delivered through these different media outlets associate modernity with Western 
lifestyles and modes of consumption: the smiling young couple on the billboard sharing a 
biscuit on the picture above. However, the erasure of the unveiled (probably Indian) 
woman’s face shows that this version of modernity remains highly contested and is a 
source of  deep social anxieties. 
Nilüfer Göle notes, for the case of Turkey under Kemal (Göle 1996, 15): 
‘Women’s visibility, women’s mobility, and women’s voices were and continue literally 
and symbolically to form the stakes of the battle between the modernists and the 
Islamists in Turkey and elsewhere in the non-Western world’. Indeed, with the arrival of 
international development experts, Western feminists, diplomats, NGOs’ workers and 
NATO troops, Western ideas and modernization policies are being imposed, not only 
through economic and cultural programs or by new urban conception, but also by 
changing the appearances of men, and more especially, women.  
While images of women have reappeared on media interfaces, flesh and blood 
women have gradually disappeared from the streets of Kabul, as the security situation 
keeps on deteriorating. Women’s faces show in quadric colour on the laminated covers 
of magazines. In the first episode of Afghan Star - the local equivalent of the famous TV 
show American Idol - broadcasted on Tolo TV, the first commercial TV station in 
Afghanistan, a young Kandahari woman called Lima Sahar sang her way to the top three 
                                                
28 Life expectancy rates are among the lowest in the world (42 for men and 43 for women) and 25% of 
children die before their fifth birthday. WHO website last accessed on 19/06/08 
 http://www.who.int/countries/afg/en/ 
29 ‘Thirty one attacks against schools, mainly torching schools and explosions were reported in all parts of 
the country during 2007 up to June. Deliberate attacks on girl students and women teachers resulted in at 
least 4 deaths and 6 injuries. Only in the four southern provinces of Helmand, Kandahar, Uruzgan and 
Zabul, out of a total of 740 schools, it is estimated that 262 (unconfirmed) of them are no longer providing 
education services to students’. UNICEF website last accessed on 19/06/08 
http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/afghanistan_31224.html 
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finalists. At the same time, demonstrations against the caricatures of the Prophet 
Mahomet published in Danish newspapers were taking place in the streets of Kabul (AP 
2008). To some extent, Afghanistan seems to have set its time on the global clock.  
Since the invasion of Afghanistan, the reappearance of women in the public 
sphere has been the benchmark upon which the success of the democratization process 
has been measured. In the same way as the Communist regime appropriated the rights 
and visibility of women as the central symbol of modernity, the current government has 
been encouraged by the international community to increase women’s participation in 
public life. As Surkhe points out (2007, 1303): ‘The rights of women became a primary 
symbol of the new order and, given the Taliban’s dismal record on this, an important 
post hoc justification for the intervention. Rapid growth of the independent media 
contributed to a sense of social liberation in the urban areas, above all in Kabul’. 
The current efforts to include women in politics and to promote women’s rights 
are integral parts of the reconstruction process. However, despite attempts at presenting 
these reforms in technical terms, their content is not value free. In this chapter, I argue 
that the current agenda for development supported by the international community 
contains the seeds of important social changes. In the absence of concrete material 
improvements in most Afghan people’s lives, these reforms have created anxieties and 
tensions related to a form of social engineering broadly understood as foreign to Afghan 
‘culture’ and ‘tradition’. In the first section of this chapter, I illustrate how certain ideas 
pertaining to modern state-building are being infused in the Afghan society through a 
case study of a ‘gender empowerment’ training programme ran by the Ministry of 
Women’s Affairs (section 1). I then move on to unpack the ideological framework 
through which ‘reconstruction’ is implemented while showing its historical continuity 
with earlier modernization attempts (section 2).  
 
1. ‘Live your best life! It is liberating!’ 30 
 
  ‘I came to the United States with 50 words of English and $50 in my pocket.’ 
This is how 52-year-old Sonila Danaj, an American of Albanian origin employed as a 
                                                
30 This scene was recorded during a ‘gender-empowerment training’ conducted at the Ministry of Women’s 
Affairs in March 2007. I was introduced to the trainer, Sonila Danaj (pseudonym) through my friend Saber 
Perdes, an Afghan Medical Doctor working part time as a civil servant for the Ministry of Health and part 
time as a freelance translator for various organizations. I attended this training as a participant-observer. 
The discussions reported here were recorded with a tape recorder. I recorded participants’ reactions in my 
journal. (Fieldnotes - 29/03/2007) 
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women’s empowerment trainer at the Ministry of Women’s Affairs in Kabul, likes to 
introduce herself on her blog. Sonila is officially a life empowerment coach and gender 
adviser in the United States. Her employer, Walter International Speakers Bureau, is a 
firm specialized in ‘helping Corporate and Association Meeting Planners find the 
PERFECT speakers and entertainers for their events’31. For a few thousands dollars a 
week, Sonila runs a gender empowerment training aiming at building the capacity of 
Afghan civil servants and political leaders. She is also one of the many advisers working 
beside the Minister of Women’s Affairs, under a broader Gender programme funded by 
GTZ, the German agency for cooperation and development. 
 I met Sonila at the Ministry of Women’s Affairs during one of her trainings. On 
the business card she gave me, she had written: ‘Inside every person there are strengths 
that can help you achieve an amazing success and fulfilment in your life. LIVE YOUR 
BEST LIFE. Empower yourself and change the world. It is liberating.’ In the meeting 
room, about twenty-five participants have gathered. These men and women are 
representatives of Provincial Councils32 from Baghlan, Samangan and Jozgan. Some of 
them are rish safed (white beards) who proudly wear the turban and the chapan, a long-
sleeved silk coat worn on shoulders, the traditional uniform of authority figures in 
Afghanistan.  
 Sonila does not speak a word of Dari but she wears a full covering Arabic style 
black hijab. Her training is simultaneously translated by two Afghan interpreters, who 
seem to struggle to find Dari equivalents for some of the concepts Sonila is using. My 
friend Saber, a Medical Doctor and part-time civil servant at the Ministry of Health, is 
one of the two interpreters. I ask him what he thinks of the training, thinking that I can 
rely on his opinion since he has worked with Sonila on several occasions. He answers, 
smiling: ‘The Master is an un-married woman. She is living with her cats in America and 
she has no children. In Afghanistan, we are polite with our guests. We have to make her 
feel at home’. Unconvinced by his answer, I join the group and take a seat in a corner of 
the room.   
 The first part of the training is conducted by a local staff member of Women’s 
Campaign International, an NGO promoting women’s political participation in developing 
countries. She explains the concept of ‘gender’, its historical origin and why it is a 
                                                
31 From Walter International Speakers Bureau official website. http://www.walters-intl.com/index.html. 
Accessed 2/04/08 
32 The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan stipulates in Article 138 that "a provincial 
council is to be formed" in each of country's 34 provinces that should "take part in securing the 
developmental targets of the state and improving its affairs in a way stated by law" and give "advice on 
important issues falling within the domain" of each province. 
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relevant category to use in order to explain women’s problems in Afghanistan. As the 
trainer is lecturing the audience, a man is looking at his watch. Another one is playing 
with his mobile phone. A participant eventually interrupts her. He explains that currently, 
neither men nor women can complete higher education because of the different 
problems the country is facing. ‘Women who live in the West can study for 20 years; he 
says pointing at Sonila, but here, women are just starting to study.’ Another male 
participant adds: 
 
In Afghanistan, women have more freedom than anywhere else in the world. They don’t need to 
wear the full hijab, like in Iran. Why is the facilitator wearing hijab? She does not need to. We 
would have accepted her if she had come with the clothes she is used to wear in America.  
 
This last comment is not translated to Sonila but she can already feel that tension 
is growing in the room. In an attempt to restore calm, she interrupts the debate and 
starts a relaxation exercise. 
 
Sonila: Stand up! Shake your hands! Let’s get rid of our bad energies. Hands up! And now grab 
apples! Let’s find the positive energies! 
 
While Sonila is already jumping in the middle of the room, embarrassed smiles 
have appeared on people’s faces. An old man wearing chapan throws an interrogative 
glance at one of his colleagues. Watching these women and men dressed up in their 
traditional clothes jumping together in a room and grabbing imaginary apples in the air, 
has something of a surreal scene. I wonder what people’s thoughts are behind the veil of 
compliance and docility. How does it feel like when, after a long journey from Samangan, 
you find yourself in a Ministry in Kabul doing relaxation games with your colleagues? 
Are they truly enjoying themselves or are they just trying to be polite with their ‘guest’ 
from America? These questions in mind, I end up doing strange moves with my body, 
mimicking the greatest harvest of imaginary apples I have ever had in my entire life. And 
while doing this, I am trying to forget that I am in Kabul, that it is winter and that 
outside, in front of the Ministry, children without proper shoes are selling matches to 
passers-by to make a living.  
Time for tea break has eventually come. I find Sonila sorting out papers she will 
need for the second part of the training. I congratulate her for her energy and ask her 
how the trainings have been like up to now. 
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Sonila: It is hard work, you know, but I think they are starting to get it. Look at the faces of the 
participants I had in my previous training. This is how they looked before the training (she passes 
me a sheet of paper with ID photographs of people). Watch their faces! They are all closed, 
unhappy. They look sad and worried. Now look at their faces after the training (she passes me 
another sheet of paper with pictures of the same people taken after the training was completed). 
Look at them carefully and compare! Their faces have opened up. They are smiling. They are 
happy! I think these photographs are very telling. 
 
 I have come across such methods of success measurement in women’s 
magazines where pictures of women are sometimes displayed before and after a specific 
diet, a facial makeover or a cosmetic surgery operation. I am surprised to discover that 
marketing strategies are now applied to development programmes. I look at the 
photographs and I read the names attached to them, trying to find in people’s eyes what 
Sonila calls ‘happiness’. 
The second half of the training is dedicated to techniques of self-empowerment. 
A participant is asked to come to the centre of the circle in order to talk about his 
problems to the rest of the audience. The man seems embarrassed and not very much 
willing to be the guinea pig for this experiment. But pushed by his colleagues, already 
laughing with excitement, he finally surrenders.  
 
 Sonila: So tell us, what is exactly your problem? What do you really want? 
Participant: The problem is that lots of people come to me to explain their problems. And I cannot 
do anything for them. 
Sonila: When you want something, you need to envision what you want in your head first. If you 
want to get a house, you need to see it in your head. How does your house look like in your head? 
How many rooms? How many storeys? (Addressing the audience) He only sees the obstacles!  
Participant (looking totally disoriented): For instance, I have some people who come to see me. 
Some of them have a University degree, a very good education, and they cannot find any job. I 
want to help them. But I cannot do anything for them. 
Sonila: He does not get it! I want to know what you want. What is your house? 
Participant (loosing patience): Of course, with time we can achieve some things. But worries 
remain in our heads until the problem is solved! 
Sonila: So how do you feel when you face such problems? 
Participant: I get upset, emotional…(looking for more adjectives) I worry, I get angry…and bored. 
(Translator writes on the white board: ‘upset’, ‘emotional’, ‘worried’, ‘angry’, ‘bored’) 
Sonila: Do you feel powerless? 
Participant (nodding): yes 
(Translator writes ‘powerless’ on the white board) 
Sonila: Do you feel helpless? 
Participant: Yes 
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(Translator writes ‘helpless’ on the white board) 
Sonila: Do you feel discouraged? 
Participant: Hmmm…yes…I have headaches. 
(Translator writes ‘discouraged’, ‘headaches’ on the white board) 
Participants start loosing patience. Murmurs spread in the room. 
Sonila: Be patient! This is actually the most important key of this training! 
Translator (pointing at participant): He thinks it’s enough. 
Participants laughing. Translator reads the words he wrote on the white board. 
Sonila: How do you feel when you hear that? 
Participant: When I hear that, I feel sad. 
Sonila: Read it! 
Participant reads: ‘hopeless, headaches, discouraged…’ 
Sonila: Are you still upset? 
(Participant nodding) 
Sonila: Let’s make him even more upset. Let’s read it together! 
Participants read together: ‘hopeless, headaches, discourages, disempowered…’ 
Sonila: How do you feel? 
Participant: Ok. 
Sonila: Let’s help him find a solution! What is the opposite of powerless? 
Participants: Powerful! 
Participants find the opposite of each feeling written on the white board. 
Sonila: Now let’s read these words and help him feel better!  
Participants read the words aloud altogether: Powerful, hopeful… 
Sonila: And now? How do you feel? Do you have hope now? 
Participant (looking totally bored): yes. 
Sonila (to the translator): So now, write on the white board: ‘In the name of Allah, I will make my 
dream come true’. So that the problem just becomes small. (To the man) Please, read it! 
Participant reads 
Sonila: You have to write this twice and repeat this sentence everyday so that it helps you. 
  
Trainings like these are regularly held not only in the Ministry of Women’s 
Affairs but also in other Ministries. They are part of the NGO’s package of standard 
solutions for building the capacity of civil servants and for creating a ‘team spirit’ within 
Ministries’ departments. Their long-term objective is usually labelled under the broader 
term of ‘good governance’. But trainings and workshops, like advertisement in the streets 
of Kabul, are not value free. They represent platforms from which ideas about progress, 
modernity and development are spread. Inspired by corporate management culture, their 
message is based on the view that the individual is the main actor of social change, an 
individual detached from outside constraints and whose will is essential to bring about 
progress.  
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This vision of the ‘natural order of things’ is generated by development 
discourses, transmitted through workshops, trainings and conferences and reproduced by 
development actors from both the developed and the developing world. This ‘culture of 
modernity’, to use Stirrat’s words (2000), is marked by a faith in ‘rationality’ and a belief 
in a world that can be described through fixed universally valid categories (‘individual’, 
‘community’, ‘nation’, ‘free will’). The roots of such a way of thinking about the world 
are to be found in the Enlightenment and its stress on humanity’s ability to understand 
and control the world. These are the guiding principles of the liberal project, which 
inevitably reflect the specific culture from where these ideas emerged. 
Obviously, Sonila had a hard time trying to convince participants of the benefits 
of ‘having a positive perspective on life’. Discussing the session with people at its end, I 
found that most of them took it as an entertainment, a way to pass the time, an escape 
from the repetitive and conventional rural life. What else is one supposed to find in a 
capital city if not shows and entertainments? ‘Sonila is funny! I like her!’, one woman told 
me. ‘She has a great personality’, another one mentioned. Very few comments were made 
on the content of the training itself, which I believe remained quite obscure for most 
participants. 
Trainings held in Kabul have become a sort of private joke among civil servants. 
They are part of the panel of activities offered by international experts to the new 
Afghan elite. And if what is discussed does not make much sense, at least participants get 
a chance to meet other people, have a nice meal, discover the capital city and return 
home with a nice handbag and stationary for their children.  
The underlying script of these trainings might not be very clear to the Afghan 
audience, but it is easily readable for the Western observer. Informed by her own life 
experience as a ‘successful’ immigrant to the US, Sonila wanted to convince her audience 
that positive change is merely a matter of individual will and self confidence. The 
complaints participants made about the structural barriers they faced in their daily tasks 
were to her eyes signs of a general negative attitude and reluctance to assume 
responsibilities. On her blog, she commented about a workshop she had run earlier: 
 
In the class they resist everything I say. They doubt, question, debate and refuse to accept. I had 
one of the worst groups ever because they would not cooperate and would not give it a chance. It 
took so much energy to convince them that governance and the government are two different 
concepts, or the difference between politics and policy. Even though they had no clue, they gave 
me such an argument like: "Our government does not listen to us, it is corrupt, we have no 
power." So when I tried to tell them that we should look at the Afghan constitution to understand 
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the government policies, they skipped the constitution and started fighting about the President. 
This group did not like the meditation, did not like conflict resolution, did not like anything I did. 
What they liked is telling jokes and so they invented a ground rule if a phone rings the person 
whose phone rang had to tell a joke. So they would call each other and they wasted most of my 
sessions by telling jokes and giggling because they thought I did not get their games, while I 
patiently waited to connect with them. They loved money and their only complain was that they 
did not receive the complete transportation reimbursement which they had spent to get to Kabul 
after travelling for days. They asked for $800 per person. When we told them that the Ministry of 
Transport has fixed rates for these provinces and it does not exceed $40, a big fight emerged. So 
they lied, had no receipts, argued, threatened and at the end said that nothing was good and this 
training was a waste of time.33 
 
The frustrations Sonila expresses in her on-line diary echo the comments I often 
heard among expatriate circles during my fieldwork in Afghanistan. Experts and 
technical assistants placed in Ministries came, like Sonila, with a whole set of ready made 
solutions to reconstruct the State apparatus. But the jargon they used - ‘governance’, 
‘conflict resolution’, ‘policies’ to cite some of the concepts Sonila unsuccessfully tried to 
pass on to her trainees – did not match the political and social reality in which civil 
servants had to perform their work.  
Identified as the ‘language of power’, civil servants themselves made a great use 
of the development jargon, without necessarily understanding its meaning or being very 
much convinced by its practical application. One can argue that this practice, often 
observed by anthropologists of development, is symptomatic of what De Sardan calls 
‘transplant’ (2005, 78). In this process, actors of social change are aware of the potential 
benefits they can gain from using the language of development. These benefits are 
varied: credibility, inclusion, access to resources. However, the ‘transplant’ remains 
exogenous and assumes a populist dimension that is, to use De Sardan’s words ‘a 
common acknowledgement that concerns are focused on people’. When talking to civil 
servants in ministries, I often heard the word ‘gender’ in sometimes unexpected 
situations. Discussing this with an Afghan female friend, I was told that the use of this 
jargon was a means to create a bond with the Western woman interested in women that I 
represented in people’s eyes. ‘This is our culture, she said, we try to find commonalties 
with our guests to make them feel at ease’.  
A similar concern for maintaining ‘order’ and ‘stability’ was observable during 
Sonila’s training. Participants were very careful not to upset the consultant, to the extent 
                                                
33 Extract from Sonila Danaj’s blog. The comments she makes here do not refer to the training described 
in this section but to another training she had conducted earlier, with a group of representatives from other 
provinces. Last accessed on April, 29th 2008 http://www.journeytowardpeace.blogspot.com/ 
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of putting aside the self-consciousness of their status as local authority figures in order to 
participate in stress relief exercises with a grace that I found particularly stunning. 
Contrary to critical views that depict development as a means to achieve social regulation 
and expand bureaucratic control, Mosse (2004, 654) describes development as a 
‘relationship maintaining system’. Building on Foucault’s notion of ‘governmentality’, 
according to which social life is regulated through productive power, engendering 
subjectivities and aspirations; Mosse suggests that relationships built in development 
encounters necessitate compromise and collaboration. The training was a good 
illustration of this dynamic. By showing respect to their ‘guest from America’ participants 
were demonstrating their allegiance to the Ministry of Women’s Affairs and to the 
Central Government as a whole. Of course, this does not mean that they were convinced 
by the ideas conveyed during that particular moment, but this was the ‘public transcript’ 
(Scott 1985, 1990) they had to convey in order to maintain their public persona. 
More globally, the training I have described here is symptomatic of the weakness 
of the Ministry of Women’s Affairs as an institution. A simple walk in the corridors of 
the Ministry gives already a sense of the inertia that paralyses the system. Hidden behind 
their computer screens, civil servants impatiently wait for the end of the working day, 
sipping tea and chatting with colleagues34. Nothing seems to happen here, except endless 
cycles of meetings during which no decision is taken. Boredom is the rule. 
 ‘We don’t want pens! We don’t want workshops! We want money to run real 
projects!’ the director of the Department of Provincial Relations at the MoWA told me 
once, in an outburst of anger (Interview – MoWA, 16/06/2007). Most departments in 
the MoWA have indeed no other budget than the one allocated to cover salaries. Offices 
have been equipped with computers and internet access, civil servants receive regular 
training, but directors of departments have very few projects on their own to run, since 
funding is seriously lacking.  
In the long corridors of the Ministry, anonymous women sometimes turn up, 
desperately seeking assistance. Many of them are war widows or victims of violence in 
their families. Their appeal to the Ministry often represents for them the last option 
when they have exhausted all the other alternatives provided by informal community 
                                                
34 Nancy Dupree (1984, 334) mentions that after the Red army invaded the country, popular support for 
reforms sharply diminished and dissidence started to emerge under covert forms even within governmental 
offices. ‘Women in government offices began slowdowns, particularly in the Ministry of Education’s 
literacy program. Books and papers were purposely delayed, misdirected, lost and damaged. More than the 
usual time was spent in the office gossiping, knitting, and thumbing through magazines. False attendance 
reports were submitted.’ This account echoes some of the personal communications I collected while 
conducting fieldwork in the MoWA in 2007.  
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support networks. Unfortunately, the MoWA has little to offer and most women are 
referred to other Ministries, supposedly better equipped to answer their demands.  
The Ministries’ vague mandate to mainstream gender and plan policies prevents it 
from answering individual demands, a role it used to play under the reign of King Zahir 
Shah. Indeed, in the early 50s, the Women’s Institute (MoWA’s ancestor) was a State 
agency that implemented very practical projects for women. It collected different 
women’s embroideries from all throughout Afghanistan, modernized them and 
developed new techniques that were taught to women. Empowered by these new skills, 
women were able to generate greater incomes for their family, while supporting the 
cultural heritage of Afghanistan. Girls who were married at an early age were able to 
attend MoWA’s schools and continue their education, without suffering from the stigma 
they might have faced had they attended regular state schools. Contrary to the MoWA, 
the Women’s Institute was a highly respected institution and was generally perceived as a 
socially appropriate place for women to go (Interview - Gross, 23/05/2007). 
The scarcity of funding in the MoWA reveals the little interest of the President’s 
cabinet in advancing women’s issues.  Since its creation in 2002 until the period of my 
fieldwork in 2007, four different ministers had been appointed. Each new appointment 
had resulted in changes in the MoWA’s administrative structure, with new staff 
appointed at each department. In an interview with Massouda Jalal, the former Minister 
of Women’s Affairs underlined the difficulties she faced when attempting to change the 
status quo. She associated her removal from the cabinet with the discontent she created 
when trying to implement initiatives favourable to women: 
 
At the beginning, they (conservative members of the cabinet) told me in a soft way that this much 
is enough for the women: one school or two schools and that’s it. Women are now in the office. 
It’s enough…enough! They were asking for cooperation. They were saying this way is the good 
Afghan approach. But I did not believe that. I was not the type of person to be convinced by 
politicians obsessed with their own interest. I am thinking about my own interest as well and my 
own interest is that women can reach equality and can live like men because I know the life of 
women inside families and outside families…even the educated ones, how it is in Afghanistan. 
We need to decrease their pain.  
So we opened offices in all the provinces. At the district level, we set up women’s councils. We 
created a big network of women. When this was created, I heard from fundamentalist leaders: ‘Dr 
Massouda, please stop these councils.’ But we went ahead and it’s going on up to now. So finally, 
they decided altogether, all the fundamentalist leaders including the government’s high authorities, 
the warlords, to remove people whose power would disadvantage them. They all joined hands 
together, they sent me home, and made a housewife out of me. Some of them are sending me 
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messages sometimes. They send me their ‘little ones’ to tell me: You’re cooking now? (Interview - 
Jalal, 22/11/2007) 
  
Dispossessed from their authority, Ministers of Women’s Affairs have had 
limited opportunities to make a real difference for women. In some departments, 
directors have been appointed through political affiliations and neo-patrimonial 
networks. Some of these directors were not very much committed to women’s issues and 
therefore, worked with the view of reinforcing the status quo. This was for instance the 
case of the Director of the Training and Advocacy department, a man in his mid forties, 
who was in charge of developing training and public information material for the 
Ministry. On March 8th 2006, for International Women’s Day, he unilaterally changed the 
messages on the banners that were to be displayed all over the capital city and came up 
with his own slogan: ‘A woman’s virginity is a jewel on her husband’s crown’. Aware of 
the internal politics, other civil servants who might have had a more liberal approach to 
women’s issues were discouraged from expressing themselves, for fear of losing their 
jobs. Sonila’s training itself did not address gender issues in great depth. The training 
rapidly turned into a self-empowerment session of the same kind as the ones run by the 
Alcoholic Anonymous.  
In the Public Relations and Information department, a great amount of time was 
spent negotiating the content of each message to be broadcasted on media outlets. The 
validation process sometimes took months, meetings being organized at each level of the 
hierarchical ladder, until the message’s content was eventually emptied of any transparent 
and readable meaning. The content of the produced documents faded away behind the 
‘aesthetics of communication’ itself (Riles 2004, 20). Designed in the newly opened 
advertisement companies of the capital city, leaflets, posters, TV and radio spots, 
brochures and other institutional artefacts were developed under the guidance of local 
and international civil servants as part of a daily bureaucratic practice meant to 
consecrate the construction of a ‘modern State’. The practice of producing 
communication and information, like Riles (2004) has demonstrated in her ethnography 
of the 1995 UN Fourth World Conference on Women, became the ultimate end of such 
projects, rather than a means to activate social change. In the ‘information age’, 
producing information and using modern media - I was amazed to discover that four 
years after my first journey in Afghanistan in 2002, almost all the Afghan Ministries had 
developed their own websites in English and Dari - can be understood as a symbolic 
marker of Afghanistan’s entry into modernity.   
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In a booklet developed by the MoWA in a public information campaign on 
‘Violence against Women’, one could read: ‘A woman’s jihad is to take care of her 
husband’. In another one published on the occasion of the International Day on 
Violence against Women, the issue of rape was illustrated by a screaming woman having 
her veil pulled away by an angry man. When shown to random Afghans, interpretations 
varied widely but the issue of ‘rape’ was not mentioned even once. In spite of its 
ineffectiveness to illustrate the topic discussed, the personnel from the PR&I department 
validated the visual on the basis that it would not upset anyone. The quest for consensual 
validation and maintenance of relationships with the broader national political apparatus 
and the international community ended up being the main activity of the Ministry. At the 
same time, producing ‘information’, organizing meetings, conferences and training, 
drafting policy papers and writing reports were practices that maintained a semblance of 
professional managerialism to the institution. 
The expatriate Technical Assistant who worked in this department explained to 
me that since the existence of the Ministry was being challenged by some conservative 
MPs, the department’s staff was very careful not to upset anyone and adopted a wait and 
see attitude. She said:  
 
Men should feel invited here, but they behave as if it was their own domain. In fact, men are the 
ones who take decisions, even in this Ministry. (Interview - MoWA, 13/02/2007) 
 
Finally, MoWA’s activities are hobbled by a hierarchical structure that impedes 
collaboration between its departments. This fragmented structure is partly due to the fact 
that various donors, with different agendas, support different departments of the 
Ministry, making them function as NGOs competing against each other. During the 
period of my fieldwork, UNDP was supporting the training and advocacy section, 
UNFPA was supporting the Health Department, The Asia Foundation was funding the 
PR&I Department, JICA was supporting the economic empowerment department and 
UNIFEM the planning and legal department. The presence of these different actors, 
despite their efforts to coordinate, contributes to the already deeply fragmented structure 
of the MoWA.  
As already noticed on other humanitarian scenes, the marketization of 
international organizations and NGOs has enhanced inter-organization competition 
(Cooley and Ron 2002).  This phenomenon is observable not only in Afghanistan as a 
whole, but also within Ministries, preventing collaboration between organizations who 
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have had to follow the different agendas set up by their respective donors. Driven by 
organizational imperatives of implementing programs and securing new contracts to 
remain solvent, NGOs have been driven by self-interested actions and consequently 
weak at sharing information between themselves (Azerbaijani-Moghaddam, 2006).  
 
The political context in which the MoWA is operating explains for a large part its 
inherent impotence. But on the expatriates’ side, the malfunctioning of State institutions 
was generally explained in strict cultural terms, instead of political ones. The absence of a 
‘public service culture’, the non-existence of a ‘culture of rights and responsibilities’ or 
the predominance of the ‘Insh’allah culture’ were common explanations for the 
ineffectiveness of the State bureaucracy. The same way Sonila complained about 
participants’ greediness in her online diary (‘they loved money’), allusions to a ‘culture of 
impunity’ or ‘culture of corruption’ were frequently made in reports written by 
journalists, international organizations and funding bodies35 (USAID 2004; ICG 2008; 
Dimanno 2008). Through these representations, the Afghan culture was used as a 
deterministic explanatory device, depicted as given, static, fixed. The general assumption 
was that culture was shared and collectively agreed upon rather than contested, 
negotiated and constantly recreated. Arguments of these kinds simply ignored broader 
political and structural reasons for people’s resentment and resistance.    
As Olivier de Sardan (2005, 8) puts it: ‘those who intervene in development (…) 
when applying in the field the technical methods they acquire through training (...) are 
confronted with a shocking reality: the behaviours of the people with whom they enter 
into contact do not coincide with their expectations’. The lack of consultation with 
Afghans concerning their needs has fed feelings of shame, despair and dispossession. 
Putting the blame on ‘culture’ for the poor results achieved in term of reconstruction 
over the past six years leaves the modes of engagement of the international community 
with Afghanistan simply unquestioned.  
Indeed, the reconstruction project in Afghanistan can be described as a cultural 
exercise. In the Ministry of Women’s Affairs, the contours of a ‘culture of modernity’ 
(Stirrat 2000) inspired from Western models of liberal democracy, is being shaped and 
moulded through workshops, meetings, conferences and information production. 
                                                
35 See USAID (2004) Human Security and Livelihoods of Rural Afghans. p 45: ‘Culture and systems of 
governance (including the formal, traditional, and customary systems) have severely curtailed the human 
rights and livelihood options open to rural Afghan women and girls.’ See International Crisis Group (2008) 
Afghanistan: The need for international Resolve. p ii: ‘Priorities and interests must be reconciled with a view to 
ensuring that the culture of impunity is tackled’. See The Star (2008, March). President Hamid Karzai: ‘This 
culture of impunity should stop!’ 
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However, the absence of solid roots within the social context in which these new cultural 
forms appear makes of these bureaucratic performances a sort of parody or mimicry of 
Western forms of governmentality. But by participating in these rituals, civil servants also 
created significations and social imaginaries that asserted their belonging to a certain elite 
endowed with national responsibilities.  
 
2. Reconstruction as modernization 
 
 The description I have made of the functioning of the MoWA underlines the 
complex relationships between development actors working under an international 
mandate for ‘reconstruction’ and local actors caught in-between divisive ideologies of 
development and nationalism. Conflicting views on the role of women in the ‘post-war’ 
period constitute one of the most controversial arenas among ‘reconstruction’ actors. 
Indeed, an observation of everyday affairs taking place in governmental institutions 
reveals that the current model for social change remains highly inspired by 
modernization ideology. As a result, instead of providing concrete opportunities for 
negotiating gender policies in the new Islamic Republic, the MoWA has become the 
symbol of hegemonic liberal Western views on gender. This direction was given during 
the Bonn conference when the agenda for reconstruction was initially designed. 
 
a. The model  for  soc ia l  change 
 
The agenda set up during the Bonn conference consisted in defining efficient 
structures to eliminate terrorism, reconstruct the state and kick-start the economy. But 
the plan for post-war reconstruction was more than a simple set of measures to deliver 
aid, ensure security and allocate resources. This series of agreements intended to reform 
the Afghan society as a whole and make it converge towards a Western model of 
democracy. The ultimate aim had therefore less to do with mere reconstruction than with 
an exhaustive and ambitious project for modernising the Afghan society according to 
criteria defined by international donors and international financial institutions. 
Programme implementation was indeed guaranteed by international funding and the 
presence of foreign troops. In addition, progress was to be monitored and evaluated 
according to indicators ‘collaboratively’ agreed upon. 
As in other post-war contexts, the model for reconstruction and development 
was derived from Western experiences in liberal political development and economic 
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growth. In Suhrke’s words (2007, 1298), the “Bonn Agreement was basically a script for 
transition to a liberal, constitutional democracy, served by an effective state apparatus 
(‘competence and integrity’) and a single army, with a commitment to ‘social justice’, 
respect for human rights, and ‘sensitivity’ to the rights of women.” The economic 
framework for development was later designed through a series of additional 
documents.36  
However, when imposing a project of ‘liberal peace’ upon Afghanistan, 
international donors poorly evaluated the scope of the task in which they were about to 
engage. Contrary to Bosnia and Yugoslavia where a vibrant civil society and strong state 
institutions existed prior to the conflict, Afghanistan presented a radically different case. 
Because of long lasting war and weak connections between central institutions of 
governance and peripheries under the stronghold of tribal leaders, the Afghan State bears 
no resemblance with the Weberian state model. First, the Afghan state never held ‘the 
monopoly of legitimate use of physical force’. Even during the Communist regime, the 
Afghan state never managed to establish a bureaucracy capable of achieving ‘legal 
domination’. Public services such as education and security were largely perceived as 
instruments of foreign domination and therefore were fiercely resisted (see chapter 1). 
Second, Afghanistan’s development trajectory did not follow the Western path. With a 
very limited level of industrialization and the reliance on subsistence agriculture to ensure 
livelihoods, Afghanistan never acceded to the open market economy and remained 
broadly dependent on foreign aid for its development. Third, Afghanistan is one of the 
rare Central Asian countries that never experienced colonial rule. Kabul and other urban 
centres apart, most Afghans have been exposed to Western influences to a very limited 
extent.  
In these conditions, current reconstruction programmes conducted under foreign 
leadership in many ways resemble the modernisation projects conducted in the 60s and 
70s. In the previous chapter, I have demonstrated how early modernization attempts 
undertaken by King Amanullah, King Zaher Shah, President Daoud and later on, the 
Communist regime presented similar aspirations to reshape the Afghan social landscape. 
Inspired by post World War 2 development literature (The Washington Consensus), the 
Afghan elite was bought into the idea that social progress would occur as a result of 
large-scale social reforms intertwined with technological innovations (Cullather, 2009). 
Modernization projects were therefore designed as a package of integrated measures. 
                                                
36 The Afghan Compact and the Afghan National Development Strategy presented during the London conference 
held in January 2006 both contain provisions supporting the integration of the Afghan economy into the 
global free market economy. For more details: http://www.ands.gov.af/ 
 129 
This package included transfer of technologies and capital from more ‘developed’ 
countries, the development of a rational and highly centralized state operating through an 
effective bureaucracy and the transformation of social mores through secularization, legal 
reform and state education. It was believed that social engineering was necessary to lift 
up the country away from ‘traditions’ perceived as major barriers to development. As the 
ruling elite failed to reach out the peripheries, the link between attempts at 
modernization and social change for women became gradually perceived as a form of 
foreign interference.  
As many critical thinkers have pointed out (Gardner and Lewis 1996; Shanin 
1997; Crew and Harrison 1998), this vision of progress remains the blueprint for 
contemporary development strategies. However, in comparison to modernization 
projects conducted under King Amanullah in the 20s and King Zaher Shah in the 50s, 
the foreign foothold on the current project is much stronger. The ‘post-Taliban’ 
democratization process was from the outset more heavily internationalized than other 
reforms in Afghan history except under the communists. Technical experts from the 
West - such as Sonila whom I introduced earlier - were shipped in to implement the 
agenda for reforms. Placed in ministries as advisors on short-term contracts, they earned 
international salaries. Salary differentials between ‘internationals’ and ‘locals’ also 
enhanced tensions and fostered disillusionment, as concrete reconstruction projects were 
slow to start.  
Expatriate modernizers, informed by their previous experiences of ‘post 
war/reconstruction’ in other countries, have tended to ignore local modes of knowledge 
and traditional practices in order to impose their own agenda. This tendancy was highly 
noticeable in the gender empowerment trainings that were run in the Ministry of 
Women’s Affairs as well as in other ‘governance’ workshops taking place in State 
institutions. Technical Assistants dedicated little time and thought to analyse indigenous 
forms of social organization, assess local needs and learn the lessons from previous 
modernization attempts. This lack of knowledge has had a direct impact on Afghan 
people’s lives and subjectivities, forcing certain categories of the population, in particular 
women, to present themselves according to categories defined by Aid agencies – widow, 
disabled- in order to access new economic opportunities (Darulatzai 2006).  According to 
Darulatzai (2006, 305), ‘important aspects of social life and experience in Afghanistan are 
largely unknown and desperately need to be studied’.  
The autonomy of the government was further limited by its strong dependence 
on international aid to finance the state apparatus and the reconstruction. This 
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dependence was created by what Barnett Rubin (2006, 179), using Ghassan Salame’s 
words, calls a crisis of ‘dual legitimacy’. On one hand, the Afghan State had to conform 
with international standards of good governance and democracy in order to ensure 
financial sustainability. On the other hand, a State able to answer international demands 
only and dominated by political figures responsible for major human rights abuses failed 
to gain the legitimacy of its citizens. The double objective of the Great powers involved 
in Afghanistan of finding an ally in the ‘global war on terror’ and reforming what the US 
called a ‘rogue state’ has led to contradictory policies that have challenged the very 
possibilities for state building, peace building and reconstruction.  
This process of ‘internationalised state-building’, dominated by contradictory 
political agendas, can find its parallel in earlier foreign funded development projects in 
Afghanistan, notably during the Cold War period (Cullather 200937). Referring to the 
period following the Second World War, Rubin shows how the US and the USSR used 
their financial support to the Afghan government in order to maintain their influence in 
the region.  ‘Afghanistan’s rulers built a state with co-ordinated flows of foreign aid; the 
state exploded in civil war when the aid flows instead subsidised competing military 
forces; and the state collapsed when the aid flows ended. The post-2001 reconstruction 
project constitutes a new round of internationalised state-building, with the UN formally 
recognised as the coordinator of international assistance’ (Rubin 2006, 178).  
However, the coordination role undertaken by the UN has failed to build the 
legitimacy and the capacity of the recipient government.  As Marsden puts it (2003, 95): 
‘Porgramme secretariats have been established in each ministry led by particular UN 
agencies, with international staff seconded to them’. In actuality, the UN are operating as 
a parallel administration, forcing the government to go and beg to NGOs when receiving 
requests for assistance. The very limited Afghan representation at key meetings is 
particularly revealing of the domination of international personnel in policy and decision 
making processes. The local ownership of development has been therefore reduced to its 
mere expression, leaving the Afghan ruling elite with no other choice but to comply with 
its obligation to produce quick and visible results.  
The first reforms undertaken by the Interim Government consisted in 
reintroducing women in politics through a quota system, creating a Ministry of Women’s 
                                                
37 Cullather (2009) demonstrates how a development project in the Helmand valley, which started in the 
50s under Zaher Shah thanks to US fundings, mobilized collective imaginaries of progress copied on 
Western experiences of development. ‘Exporting an American model of progress required continual 
redefinition of the sources of American greatness and renewed efforts to plant its unique characteristics in 
foreign landscapes (…). The Helmand project symbolized the transformation of the nation, representing 
the legitimacy of the monarchy, the expansion of state power, and the fulfillment of the Pashtun destiny’ 
(2009, 5) 
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Affairs (the first in the history of Afghanistan) and more largely, promoting women’s 
visibility in the public sphere. These reforms were the easiest ones to introduce in order 
to meet international demands for gender equality and political plurality. However, the 
inclusion of gender in the political agenda is labelled by many as a purely cosmetic sham, 
which the power elite espoused to maintain international aid flows. For instance, the new 
regime has been quite talented in bringing up to the forefront highly visible women who 
in return will not challenge the status quo. These women, most of whom are linked to 
political parties, are used as tokens of progress in the ‘democracy-building’ process.  
The timid gender reforms initiated in the social domain have however created 
anxieties among more traditional segments of society already feeling insecure regarding 
their current position and status. These anxieties were soon to be translated into the re-
emergence of the Insurgency with regular suicide attacks carried out in Kabul and 
burning of girls’ schools all over the country. During an interview I conducted with the 
head of the United National Front -the major opposition party - and a representative of 
Kabul province at the National Assembly, the political leader expressed his concerns 
about the speed and the scope of the reforms implemented by the government. He 
explained: 
 
I have a fear and I hope this will not become true. When the communists invaded our country, 
we were young. They said that they wanted to bring democracy and they encouraged women to 
go to school and to go to work and to participate in meetings, study and wear beautiful clothes, 
and remove their veils and wear short skirts. It was a pain in people’s heart, people could not 
accept that, but they could not speak. And the people knew that something dangerous was 
happening and that it would destroy our religion. And suddenly it exploded like a bomb, 
everything was finished, and the communists went away. I fear the same thing, the same 
democracy, will happen in Afghanistan. In the 20th century, under Amanullah Khan, the same 
scenario happened. During the communist regime and under Amanullah Khan, democracy was 
defeated and I fear the same will happen. At the moment, democracy is not natural in 
Afghanistan. When people see images of Afghanistan with women wearing short dresses, they 
think democracy is established in Afghanistan. If you want to bring democracy, you should start from 
the mosque. (Interview - MP4, 25/10/2007) 
 
A few days after this interview, the MP drove delegates of the National 
Assembly’s Economic commission to visit a sugar factory located in Baghlan, a northern 
province of Afghanistan. As the delegation stepped into the factory, a bomb exploded 
and the deputy together with six others who had accompanied him, died on the spot. 
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The Taliban officially denied their involvement in the attack. But since then, his 
prophecy resonates with a bitter taste of truth. 
Supporters of nation-building venture in Afghanistan, unaware of the results of 
previous modernization projects. They justify development aid to the new government in 
Kabul as a form of international social control aiming to provide a buffer against 
terrorism. What is seriously lacking in such a vision is a deeper analysis of the side effects 
such an intervention could have in the longer term.  
 
b. The actors  o f  soc ia l  change 
 
The heterogeneous and contested nature of the actors appointed to implement 
the reforms and to foster social change is another explanation for the limited legitimacy 
the reconstruction project received. On the Afghan side, the technocrats who were 
brought to the negotiation table in Bonn were selected among members of the Afghan 
Diaspora in exile in Western countries, some of whom had occupied Ministerial 
positions under previous regimes (Mustafa Kasimi, Younis Qanooni) or had worked with 
NGOs (Dr Sima Samar) and international organizations during the war. Others were 
higher representatives and military commanders from the Northern Alliance (General 
Fahim) who with the support of the coalition forces had overthrown the Taliban regime 
in the weeks following September 11.  If the former were well represented in the early 
cabinets, persons selected on purely ethnic and political criteria not committed to the 
modernist agenda were also included. As Surkhe points out (2007, 1299), ‘political 
criteria became increasingly evident in 2006 and 2007 as President Hamid Karzai sought 
to co-opt potential rivals, rebels or critics by appointing them as special advisors to his 
office and distributing gubernatorial and police chief positions in the provinces. He came 
to recognise militias run by local strongmen, a move supported by the US military for 
counter-insurgency purposes as well’. 
This scenario is well illustrated by the case of Ismail Khan, a powerful Tadjik 
commander from Herat who had fought beside Massoud’s troops in the last days of the 
war against the Taliban. Appointed Governor of Herat province after the fall of the 
regime, Khan maintained his private army and ruled his province like a private fiefdom. 
Refusing to pass on to Kabul the revenues gained from custom taxes on goods from Iran 
and Turkmenistan, Khan’s autocratic rule was soon to increase discord with the Afghan 
Interim Administration. The United States, which supports Hamid Karzai, have viewed 
Ismail Khan’s ties with Iran with concern, and advocated ousting him. In March 2004, 
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the central government sent units of its newly trained Afghan National Army to assert its 
authority over Herat (North 2004). This led to clashes with Ismail Khan’s men during 
which 100 people were killed. Among these was Ismail Khan’s son, Mirwais Sadiq, then 
Minister of Civil Aviation. Under constant pressure from both the government and local 
rivals, Ismail Khan was removed from his position in September 2004. As a conciliatory 
gesture, President Karzai appointed him Minister of Energy in his cabinet. Since Khan’s 
replacement by a new governor for Herat province, the security situation has 
continuously deteriorated (BBC 2008). Rumours say that current unrest in the provincial 
capital is sustained by Khan’s men as a strategy to challenge the current governor’s 
legitimacy and to maintain the Amir’s stronghold on his province. The case of Ismail 
Khan is far from isolated. Several other commanders who received cabinet positions in 
the Interim Government remained unwilling to abandon their personal militias and to 
withdraw from their fiefdom of origin. The collusion of diverging interests within the 
central government, with political actors providing the commodity of violence and its 
counterpart, i.e security, is qualified by Pejcinova (2006, 35) as ‘warlord democracy’. 
On the international side, the coalition in charge of the reconstruction was 
equally factious. International agencies and bilateral donors had different visions and 
competing interests. The US, for instance, openly supported the recognition of private 
militias while the UN Assistance Mission for Afghanistan and other international 
agencies and bilateral donors strongly opposed this strategy to counter terrorism. In 
addition, the NATO unit in charge of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) 
is facing difficulties in coordinating the activities of the 37 units under its command. 
Indeed, the different NATO countries are unevenly involved in the ISAF’s mission, with 
the US, Britain, Canada and the Netherlands bearing the burden of the most sensitive 
and risky operations.  
From an initially peace-keeping mandate, NATO has been forced to engage in 
the ‘war on terror’ as the insurgency gained in strength in many regions of Afghanistan. 
These unpopular military operations followed a strategy of collateral damages that cost 
the lives of many innocent civilians. These operations were counter balanced by small 
humanitarian projects carried out by Provincial Reconstruction Teams, NATO soldiers 
involved in small reconstruction projects in order to ‘win the hearts and minds’ of the 
local population. This dangerous mixture of militaro-humanitarian operations blurred the 
boundaries between the actors in charge of the reconstruction on one hand and the ones 
in charge of the security on the other hand, while reinforcing the rural population’s 
resentment against the central government and the NGOs.  
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In short, it can be argued that the current situation presents many similarities 
with the invasion of Afghanistan by the Red Army in 1981. When discontent against the 
reforms conducted by the central government started to grow in the provinces, the 
USSR opted for a military intervention. In accepting the USSR military support, the 
government publicly revealed its dependence on the ‘outside world’ to foster social 
change and assert its own power. In the public memory, this moment was associated 
with the selling out of the country to foreigners.  
 
c .  Modernizat ion and i ts  discontent 
 
The contradictions of the modernization project underlined above opened a 
space for opposition voices to be expressed. The 2005 elections saw the re-emergence of 
conservative jihadi leaders in the parliament. Indeed, over half of the elected deputies 
were previous militia commanders or associated with the old mujjahedin parties. They 
rapidly took control over the presidium and the parliamentary committees as well. The 
jihad party leaders, commanders and supporters still politically and ideologically closely 
associate themselves with the jihad. They generally share a conservative outlook on social, 
cultural and religious affairs, and many have a shared objective of ‘defending the jihad’ 
and establishing a more conservative Islamic state governed by Islamic laws (Wilder 
2005, 6). Their strong foothold in the parliament represents a challenge to the 
advancement of liberal reforms and to the promotion of women’s rights in particular.  
During an interview with Qazi Nazir Ahmad, a former jihadi from Herat close to 
Ismail Khan and deputy at the National Assembly, the MP expressed his wish to abolish 
the quota system for women at the parliament. He said: 
 
This system (the quota system)38 has been very favourable to women. In each province, women 
came (to the parliament) through this system. In Herat, 17 people were elected, 12 men and 5 
women. It was a kind gesture towards women. Had this system not existed, no woman would 
have been elected. This was a decision that was made based on the constitution so we cannot 
oppose it. But for the next elections, we (the jihadi leaders) decided that each person should come 
with its own votes. At the moment we are working on other laws, but next year we will discuss 
about this system and we will put it on the agenda. It is a favour we made to women but this 
system does not exist in any other countries. So why should we have it in Afghanistan? (Interview 
- MP13, 04/10/2007) 
                                                
38 As mentioned in the Constitution of Afghanistan, 25% of the seats in the Wolesi Jirga (lower house) are 
reserved to women. 
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Qasi Nazir Ahmad, like many other MPs sharing the same background as ex-
jihadi, has been criticised for his record on human rights. Appointed as a judge by Ismail 
Khan during the mujjahedin government, the MP is suspected of having implemented 
religious decrees with a particularly heavy hand during the course of his mandate39. The 
quality of the deputies is therefore a matter of major concern. A UN source estimated 
that of the 249 newly elected deputies, 40 are commanders still associated with armed 
groups, 24 members belong to criminal gangs, 17 are drug traffickers, and 19 face serious 
allegations of war crimes (Wilder 2005, 14). The presence of alleged war criminals and 
drug traffickers in the parliament undermines the legitimacy of the democratic system, 
arguably more so than the external controlling efforts.  
This legitimacy was even more weakened when in March 2007 conservative MPs 
passed an amnesty law, protecting them against prosecution for war crimes. The bill was 
signed by the president and approved by the Mesharano Jirga (Upper House) based on 
the argument that reconciliation was necessary for reconstruction. This decision fuelled 
resentment among the general public and among human rights activists who had 
advocated for the right of victims to receive justice.  
 
The pressure of the international community to build democracy from the top-
down with little regards for local forms of social organization and power structures and 
with no reference to military-criminal structures, has resulted in little practical 
achievements in terms of reconstruction. The broader attempt at modernizing the 
Afghan society through social engineering has created resentment when the promises to 
improve people’s living conditions and implement the ‘rule of law’ did not materialise. 
Conservative circles, by manipulating nationalist discourses about ‘national autonomy’, 
have mobilized popular discontent and regained the power they had lost during the 
Taliban years.  
In such a context, the capacity of women to participate in public debates and to 
promote women’s rights has been extremely constrained and limited. Six years after the 
‘liberation’ of Afghanistan, only one woman (the Minister of Women’s Affairs) remains 
in the President’s cabinet, not a single woman has been appointed to the Supreme court 
and very few women MPs have been able to remain independent from political factions. 
The lack of priority given to gender issues within the cabinet has left the Ministry of 
                                                
39 Interviews conducted with women working in women’s organizations in Herat in October 2007 gave 
similar reports on MP Nazir Ahmad. 
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Women’s Affairs (MoWA) particularly reliant on the international community for 
technical and financial support. MoWA’s emphasis on project implementation has been 
reinforced by donor preferences for high-visibility, quick impact projects.  
In the absence of political transparency and with the occupation of Afghanistan 
by foreign troops, measures taken to advance women’s rights are better described as 
‘cosmetic surgeries’. Their ultimate purpose is to answer the West’s needs for writing the 
success story of democracy rather than bringing positive changes to Afghan women’s 
lives.  
 
Conclusion 
 
The Gender Empowerment Training I have described in this chapter reveals the 
symbolic nature of the reconstruction process and the cultural project that is embedded 
within it. But the tensions that emerged during the workshop highlight that instead of 
building bridges between provincial administrative structures and the central 
government, encounters such as these seem to actually achieve the contrary. 
Misunderstandings that have emerged between Kabul and the peripheries have 
strengthened people’s sentiments of exclusion and alienation together with their mistrust 
for the central government. Kabul, perceived as the Capital of all vices since the Russian 
invasion, remains for many Afghans whose lives have not improved and have even 
deteriorated since the occupation, the centre of corruption, loose morals and foreign 
pollution.  
 Under such circumstances, addressing women’s issues has become highly 
problematic and sensitive. Threatened by conservative political leaders, staffed through 
neo-patrimonial networks, the MoWA, an institution originally destined to be the motor 
of major changes for women, has been reduced to a mere symbol for democracy: a space 
where cultural notions of progress and modernity are processed. At grassroots levels, 
these political developments have forced women to accommodate, adapt and find 
alternative strategies for ‘conquering the public’. 
In the following chapters, I explore in greater details women’s strategies of social 
penetration. I show how the encounter of Afghanistan with global forces has created 
discontinuities in the way Islam is understood and lived by individual women. These 
tensions have nevertheless resulted in the production of ‘alternative publics’ or ‘counter 
spaces’ (Göle 2006: 34) where women are attempting to reconcile conflicting social 
expectations pertaining to their bodies and their role in society.  
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Chapter 5  
Lipstick Jihad: Moral Panics, Indian Soaps and Cosmetics 
 
 
Bride being photographed in a wedding hall. Kabul. November 2007. © Alexandra Estève 
 
 
One of the key questions that has occupied many anthropologists (Navaro-
Yashin 2002, Mankekar 1998, Abu-Lughod 1997, Göle 1996) in the recent decades is 
how the specific communities they study are affected by the multiple forces of 
globalization. Indeed, the myth of ethnographic fieldwork as an experience through 
which the researcher relocates herself in a context culturally ‘authentic’ and ‘untouched’ 
by modernity is no longer relevant to describe the nature of contemporary 
anthropological work. This shift of focus in the discipline stands in the realization, 
against prior positivist assumptions, that culture is not manifested outside the political 
economy but rather constructed, negotiated and interpreted through the intricate power 
relations that define contemporary societies.  
This chapter studies the ways in which the apparition of certain commodities 
such as cosmetics, fashion and TV soap operas on the market have produced anxieties 
around ‘culture’ at different levels of the Afghan society. Indeed, conservative and 
religious political groups have used the media and instrumentalized popular fears of 
‘cultural dilution’ in order to challenge the current government and reassert their power 
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within their own constituencies. As a result, Indian series, fashion and cosmetics, as 
symbols of Western modernity, have become the center of legislators’ attention. I argue 
that the current making of the Afghan nation, under the presence of international 
military troops, has radicalized the debates over national identity, defining Afghan 
‘culture’ in terms diametrically opposite to those of the ‘West’. These debates have placed 
women in the uncomfortable position of being responsible for preserving ‘culture’ and 
reproducing the nation according to criteria defined by conservative nationalist leaders 
(Yuval-Davis 1997).  
In March 2007, an article entitled ‘women misuse democracy’ was published in 
Arman e Mili40, a national weekly newspaper (Arman-e-Milli 2007). The article reported 
that the Director of the Department of Women’s Affairs (DOWA) of Balkh province 
complained about ‘the semi-naked (sic) and skimpy clothes worn by women at wedding 
parties and other ceremonies in the province.’ In the interview she gave to the 
newspaper, Feriba Majid expressed her concern towards what she thought was a 
misunderstanding of women’s rights and democracy. She added that, ‘we know that 
everyone interprets democracy in his own way, but some women are shaming other 
women by showing up half naked at parties. This is quite wrong and Islam condemns it’. 
She finally announced that female security officials would be hired to check women’s 
appearance on specific occasions like weddings and other ceremonies.  
The publication of an article like this was not an isolated occurrence in public 
debates. During the same year (2007), a number of similar articles were published in the 
press, waving the threat of cultural dilution and loss of Islamic values. Because of their 
recurrence, the sensationalized tone used by journalists, and the political reactions that 
ensued, this phenomenon can be described as a moral panic: a threat created through the 
collusion of the media and conservative political leaders in order to stir up popular fears 
and construct a new national identity (Stivens 2001). 
After the downfall of the Taliban regime, polemics emerged around the increased 
Western influence and its perceived negative impact on the Afghan culture. Western style 
modernity, with new modes of consumption and life styles, was perceived as a threat to 
the ‘happy Afghan family’ and to conventional morality where men’s control over 
women was generally understood as key to social order. This occurred in a context of 
                                                
40 Among private publications in Afghanistan, Arman-e-Milli is one of the most popular, with a circulation 
of 4,200. Launched just after the fall of the Taliban, Arman-e Milli is widely seen as the mouthpiece of 
Jamiat-e Islami, the political party associated with the Northern Alliance (Commandant Massoud’s party).  
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growing resentment against the presence of international military troops, NGOs and 
foreign companies broadly perceived as ‘polluting’ traditional religious values. 
These anxieties were addressed at top political levels and fuelled heated debates 
within the National Assembly regarding the possible necessity to re-establish the 
Department for the Elimination of Vices and the Promotion of Virtue, a Ministry that 
had been initially created by the Taliban. During the Taliban rule, this Ministry became a 
notorious symbol of arbitrary abuses, particularly against Afghan women and girls. It 
ruthlessly enforced restrictions on women and men through public beatings and 
imprisonment.  
With the approaching presidential elections and the growing discontent of the 
people regarding the poor achievements of the reconstruction process, Karzai’s 
government turned up the heat on identity issues in order to gain the confidence of 
conservative segments of society. This led him to support legal proposals banning the 
broadcast of certain TV programs, the use of cosmetics, the wearing of Western clothes 
and the reestablishment of the religious police. These measures targeted segments of the 
population traditionally considered as the most impressionable: the youth in general, and 
young women in particular.  
Drawing from data collected during ethnographic fieldwork conducted in the 
Women’s National Dormitory located on Kabul University campus in 2007, where I 
lived and spent time with young Afghan female students, I explore the everyday life of 
these girls as they were trying to position themselves in a new life environment, away 
from their families. I show how their everyday practices revealed a constant tension 
between the necessary fulfilment of different roles as dutiful and modest daughters and 
as young urban educated women, aspiring to present themselves as ‘modern’ and yet 
Muslim. For these girls, the achievement of modernity was associated with their capacity 
to consume cosmetics, make-up, Western clothes, Indian series and music. As innocent 
as these activities appeared to the Western anthropologist that I was, they in fact 
represented a source of ferocious gossips and comments within and outside the 
dormitory even though the vast majority of the girls were, to various degrees, involved in 
them. At the political level, these behaviours were perceived as what could be called a 
‘lipstick jihad’ (Moaveni 2005)41. The government considered the phenomenon of such a 
magnitude that it hastened to intervene in order to preserve the social order. 
                                                
41 I draw this expression from Azadeh Moaveni’s novel, Lipstick Jihad: A Memoir of Growing Up Iranian in 
America and American in Iran (2005) as the stories I use in this chapter bear many similarities to the ones 
recounted in the book. Moaveni grew up in California, in a family that had left Iran in 1976. The 
unresolved tension she felt between her cultural identity as an Iranian and an American led her, after 
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This chapter will look at a series of moral panics about the position of young 
people, especially young women, in the ‘new Afghanistan’. It will uncover the ways in 
which these moral panics affect young women’s perceptions of selfhood by exploring the 
strategies they develop in order to meet conflicting social expectations. I argue that the 
building of the Afghan national identity is centred on anxieties about the ‘family’, 
sexuality and the youth, with a particular focus on young unmarried women.  
This chapter will therefore explore the context of these panics and the 
relationships of representation of the youth to a series of anxieties about modernity and 
national identity in contemporary Afghanistan (section 1). In the second section, I 
explore the content of the Indian soap operas that were banned by the government in 
2008 and I analyse girls’ own understandings of these series. I then move on to show 
how for Afghan female university students, the desire to physically appear ‘modern’ 
while respecting their Muslim faith has forced them to engage in other forms of self-
discipline in order to maintain status and reputation (section 3). Building on the 
anthropological literature on ‘embodiment’, I argue that girls’ creative responses to 
dominant discourses on their bodies can be understood as means to achieve 
independence, autonomy and therefore the expectations of modernity. 
 
1. Moral Panics 
 
The moral panics I describe here reveal the conflicting relation of the Afghan 
society with what could be categorized under the broad label of ‘modernity’. I use here 
the word ‘modern’ in reference to Western set of values (individualism, secularism and 
equality) produced by the Enlightenment, the industrial revolution and pluralistic 
democracy (Göle 1996, 7). The word has no Dari equivalent but has an historical 
anchorage in the modernization projects that marked the reigns of King Amanullah in 
the 20s and King Zaher Shah in the 60s and 70s and later on, the Communist regime in 
the 80s (see chapter 2). These different waves of modernization, inspired by Western 
ideas of progress, social engineering and economic growth, were designed in view of 
overcoming the lag in scientific, economic and political development. Under the 
                                                                                                                                      
college, to go to Iran as a journalist. The internal dilemmas and external pressures that the author 
experiences while reporting for Time in Teheran are, to a great extent, similar to the ones the Dormitory 
girls living in room 42 faced in their everyday life. But in contrast to the images of darkness that circulate in 
the Western press to describe the Ayatollahs’ regime, Moaveni depicts how Iranians routinely struggle to 
divert proscriptions. She recounts how Teheran girls wear veils of bright colors, invest in fashion and 
cosmetics (and even sometimes, cosmetic surgery), to preserve a sense of autonomy. The body practices I 
explore in this chapter are motivated by power dynamics comparable to the ones discussed in the novel. 
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Communist regime, ‘modernization’ was the alibi used to pursue imperialist domination. 
The counter-reactions these projects provoked among conservative segments of the 
Afghan society (tribal and religious leaders) underline the historical recurrence of 
conflicts over interpretations of modernity in the country’s political memory. The 
concept of ‘modernity’ is therefore not foreign to Afghanistan: it is an integral element of 
its intellectual and political culture, an ideology imprinted with a particular colour in 
collective memories.  
As Nilüfer Göle (1996, 8) argues for the case of Turkey, ‘if we want to 
understand and account for practices of social actors, ontological narratives, collective 
identities it is necessary to decode local construct of modernity’. The current anxieties 
around ‘culture’ at a time of military occupation and foreign led modernization are 
symptomatic of the permanent nature of this ideological conflict. Referring to death 
threats received by inhabitants of a newly built luxury residential complex located in the 
outskirt of Kandahar, President Karzai commented: ‘This is a war against modernization’ 
(Palmer 2008). For having been a representative of a mujjahedin faction in Peshawar and a 
short-term supporter of the Taliban, the President of Afghanistan is well aware of the 
resistance that is meant to emerge as a result of ‘modernization’ projects conducted by 
exogenous actors. However, with the personal fortune his family has made as a reward 
for its military participation in the fight against the Taliban, Karzai is now a direct 
beneficiary of ‘modernization’. In making such a statement, the President reactivates the 
stereotype that associates the Taliban with uneducated ‘cave men’ stuck in medieval 
traditions, conservative and backward, refusing Afghanistan’s entrance into modernity. 
Ironically, the measures recently taken by his government to re-establish ‘public order’, 
notably a legal proposal submitted to the National Assembly in 2008 to ban music, 
parties and Western clothes, show that in order to assert its power, the government has 
had to make a higher bid in the debate over identity. 
It is in this specific context that the moral panics I describe below have to be 
understood. After the intervention of the coalition forces in Afghanistan, the new 
political regime put in place with the support of the West was officially dedicated to 
establish democracy and to rebuild the country. Six years after the new Islamic Republic 
was created, as the Insurgency grew in intensity all throughout the country and the 
promises of justice, security and reconstruction remained un-kept, the government 
started to search for new ways of legitimating power structures. In the provinces, the 
2005 parliamentary elections were broadly won by conservative leaders (labelled 
‘warlords’ or ‘jihadis’ by their detractors and alternatively ‘mujjahedins’ by their supporters) 
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who called upon the people in terms of their ethnic identities and put the blame on 
foreigners and their local allies for the lack of concrete advancements in terms of 
reconstruction.  
The single non-transferable vote (SNTV) system used in the election only 
allowed voters to vote for individuals and therefore benefited independent candidates at 
the expense of political parties (Wilder 2005, 6). In the months that followed their 
election, the strategy of new MPs consisted in forming alliances according to their 
political inclinations. This resulted in a relatively clear divide between 
conservatives/traditionalists on one hand, and liberals/leftists on the other hand, with a 
clear majority of conservatives dominating the Assembly. Debates on social, cultural and 
religious issues generated some of the most heated and divisive discussions in the 
parliament. The freedom of the press and what could be aired on TV were one area of 
intense debate, as well as the role of women in society.  
With an Assembly that rapidly turned into a major force of opposition, the 
government was left with no other choice but to defend Islamic principles and the 
Afghan culture with absolute certainty in order to counter balance accusations of 
‘Westoxication’. With the media promoting distrust, the new leaders validated their call 
for mobilising the nation to wage war against un-Islamic practices. Through the 
manufacturing of moral panics by the media, the political apparatus attempted to 
construct the national identity in opposition to what was broadly and vaguely defined 
under the general label of ‘Western values and lifestyles’. In this discursive struggle, 
gender played a central role and women’s behaviours and appearances became a major 
centre of public attention. 
According to Erjavec (2003), moral panics have three main characteristics: a high 
concern over the behaviour of a certain group or category of people; an increased level of 
hostility towards the group regarded as a threat; a disproportionality in the assessment of the 
threat or danger. The media are the central actors of moral panics. They distort events by 
exaggerating their seriousness in terms of criteria such as the number of persons taking 
part in them and by representing events in a sensationalized and emotional way. Folk 
devils are reactivated in order to trigger off popular fears and enhance feelings of cultural 
dilution.  
In the last few years, the presence of ‘foreigners’ in Afghanistan has become the 
subject of more intense polemics and has revealed the heightened concern about the 
issue of national identity. These moral panics present the three major characteristics 
described by Erjavec. Indeed, series of articles have been published in the national press 
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depicting the foreign presence in the country as a threat to ‘culture’, using terms such as 
‘invasion’, ‘flood’, ‘ethical corruption’ to highlight the intensity of the phenomenon. 
Using the argument that internationals were trying to impose not only their military 
presence in Afghanistan but also their ‘culture’, the media requested more governmental 
control over their behaviour as well as restrictions on programs broadcasted by private 
TV channels and a higher attention paid to ‘un-Islamic’ practices among the Youth and 
girls in particular.  
 
 
Entrance of a beauty parlour on Flower street, Kabul © Julie Billaud 
 
 
In July 2007, the following article was published in Cheragh42, under the title 
‘Strange cultural invasion with officials as watchers’:  
 
Nowadays, discussions about culture, foreign civilizations and cultural invasion have entered a 
specific stage. This trend is accompanied by the usage of military operations and electronic tools 
and equipment to transform it into a global invasion. In Afghanistan also, after the collapse of the 
government of the Taliban and the arrival of foreign forces in the country and the establishment 
of radio and TV channels, some of the directors of the media intentionally or unintentionally 
started using the tools of propagation of foreign cultures. It should be mentioned here that if the 
culture and values of a society are faced with fragmentation as a result of the pressures of foreign 
countries or from the carelessness of the officials of the country, these changes will not be in 
favour of our regime or the people.  
                                                
42 Independent daily newspaper; generally critical of the government. Cheragh is financed by Burhanuddin 
Rabbani, the recognized president of Afghanistan before Karzai and who also heads Jamiat-i Islami-ye 
Afghanistan. The English version of this article was produced by www.afghanwire.com 
 144 
If a number of countries seek to impose their culture in Afghanistan using propaganda pressures 
and if they wish – in this way – to divert our young generations who are the backbone of society 
and want to pull them towards ethical corruption in order to lead our society to corruption and 
destruction and thus easily they seek to implement their policies in Afghanistan, then we should 
mention that as our society is an Islamic society and most of our people are faithful to Islamic 
principles, thus they will disagree with those who have been sold to foreign culture. There is no 
compatibility between these two cultures, and conflicts will erupt between these two ways of 
thought. The increase in foreign invasion will mean the general forces opposed to the 
government of Afghanistan will increase. 
In such a situation, our government officials should advise those foreigners who come to 
Afghanistan to strictly observe Islamic customs, because foreigners walking around in the city and 
bazaars wearing semi-naked clothes will provoke the hatred of the people. Our officials should 
know that the Islamic style of dressing is of great importance, and we will realize the importance 
of the Islamic hijab when we see that some foreign countries cannot tolerate the Islamic hijab of a 
Muslim student. Therefore the officials of the ministries of Hajj and religious affairs and 
information and culture should conduct research and study into the exact nature of the foreign 
invader plot and they should search for ways to prevent it. One solution to this problem could be 
the establishment of the unit of Vice and Virtue so that they could have an active presence in 
society. Otherwise, if we only remain observers, then the crisis will become more intense, and 
carelessness in this regard will harm all of society. (Cheragh 2007b)  
 
As this article shows, the perceived ‘external threat’ was articulated in divisive and 
irreconcilable cultural terms. In this short journalistic piece, the word ‘culture’ appeared 
not less than eight times and yet the fundamental characteristics of what was referred to 
as the ‘Afghan culture’ remained quite vague. In fact the article seemed to equate culture 
to religion.  Islamic values, mostly determined through Islamic dressing code (‘We realize 
the importance of the Islamic hijab’) were put in radical opposition to foreign values 
(‘foreigners walking around the city and bazaars wearing semi-naked clothes), reinforcing 
the idea that no understanding could exist between what the journalist called ‘these two 
models of thought’. By intensifying opposition between ‘us’ and ‘them’ and by 
reactivating the fear of a ‘cultural invasion’, the media 43  supported the dominant 
conservative views of the political apparatus. The youth (‘the backbone of society’) in 
                                                
43 There are three state newspapers in Afghanistan: Anis (Friend), a Dari publication, Hewad (Country), a 
Pashto publication and The Kabul Times, an English publication. Anis and Hewad both publish twice a week 
producing 5,000 and 4,000 copies respectively. The Kabul Times has a print run of 1,500 copies, of which 
nearly 25 percent is distributed free to government agencies and NGOs.  
There is also a large and growing number of private newspapers like Kabul Weekly, a weekly with a print 
rum of 3,500 copies in English, Dari and Pashto. Other private publications include Arman-e-Milli (Hope of 
the Nation), Hasht-e-Sob (8 AM), Islak (Reform), Killid (Key), Mardom (People), Cheragh (Light). Among 
private publications, Arman-e-Milli remains one of the most popular, with a circulation of 4,200. Launched 
just after the fall of the Taliban, Arman-e Milli is widely seen as the mouthpiece of Jamiat-e Islami, the 
political party associated with the Northern Alliance. Most publications do not have a regular print. 
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general, and girls in particular (‘some foreign countries cannot tolerate the Islamic hijab 
of a Muslim student’) were perceived as a particularly vulnerable and influential group, in 
need of protection.  
Similar views were expressed in another article entitled ‘Being unveiled is not the 
meaning of democracy’ and published in the same newspaper in April 2007. In this 
article, the author explicitly stated the necessity to control women’s dressing habits, 
especially in schools and Universities. 
 
If being unveiled was a sign of civilization, animals would be the most civilized! Following the fall 
of the Taliban and with the success of the interim, transitional and elected governments, people 
have been able to enjoy relative freedom. Another change that occurred was that women and girls 
started to go to work and to school. The government also carried out some projects that eased 
the return of women’s rights and allowed democracy to permeate into society. 
However, sorrowfully some women interpreted ‘democracy’ and ‘freedom’ in a negative way. 
They think that being unveiled is democracy and now such women and girls walk around the city 
wearing clothes that aren’t suitable for Afghan and Muslim girls and women. Being unveiled 
negatively affects all the members of society. Some of the media are also engaged in spreading the 
presence of unveiled and scantily clothed women with the release of immoral programs showing 
foreign dancers. They work to spread the traces of these foreign cultures. 
Therefore, some of the girls who go to school or university are now wearing clothes that are 
better suited for wedding parties. Now, the Islamic government of Afghanistan, which carries the 
word Islamic in its title, should consider the enforcement of veiling and the wearing of proper 
Islamic clothes in all spheres of society. (Cheragh 2007a)44 
 
According to the author, the responsibility to preserve Afghan culture lies 
primarily with women. The practice of veiling is understood as a means to safeguard a 
collective sense of dignity (‘being unveiled negatively affects all the members of society’) 
and avoid foreign ‘acculturation’ (‘they work to spread the traces of these foreign 
cultures’). The dramatic tone and the vagueness with which ‘improper’ Islamic practices 
are referred to are distinguishing journalistic features used to exaggerate the intensity of 
the phenomenon and spread moral panics. Indeed, by the end of the article, the specific 
behaviours the author wishes to denounce remain pretty unclear.  
In Aull Davies’ words (1995, 172), nationalism is a movement that seeks to create 
a large-scale community by building it ideologically and materially upon a particular 
idealised family form. In this process, women are often assigned primary responsibility 
for transmitting the characteristics of the nation. They are given symbolic status as 
                                                
44 This article was translated from Dari to English by www.afghanwire.com 
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signifiers of the nation, which is often represented in the national iconography as a 
woman who has to be protected from external aggressions. In the case of the article 
above, emphasis is put on the necessity to protect women from ‘external cultural 
influences’. According to Aull Davies (1995, 172), nationalism is ‘an ideology that builds 
public (large-scale) identities on the basis of private (familial) relations’. In other words, it 
can be argued that the nation is the construction of a patriarchal system at the public 
level. The need for norms of behaviour and traditional practices to be continually re-
invented through ritual hints both at the precariousness of imputed homogeneity within 
the national community and at the centrality of gender in articulating and perpetuating 
the sense of national belonging. Somebody has to invoke and perform the rituals and 
behaviours that reinforce these norms and to inculcate them into the next generation in 
order to ensure historical continuity. This ‘somebody’ is woman-as-mother-of-the-nation  
(Peterson 1994), with the nation construed as ‘metaphoric kinship’ (Eriksen 1993, 108; 
Smith 1991, 79). The insistence with which the media denounced women’s ‘deviant’ 
behaviours underlines the centrality of women in defining national identity.  
 
Indeed, confronting the information delivered in the columns of local 
newspapers with my personal experience as a Westerner in Afghanistan, it became clear 
that journalists were inventing a ‘threat’ rather than simply reporting one. My first walk in 
a bazaar of Kabul with Afghan friends was a revealing experience in this respect: I was 
definitely the only foreigner there and the way I was dressed drew amused comments 
from my friends. ‘You look more Afghan than an Afghan girl’, my friend Mustafa told 
me pointing at my long veil and large shalwar Kameez. Girls at the dormitory often found 
my clothes too ‘traditional’ and ‘rural’ to their liking and offered me their personal 
assistance in shopping in local clothes stores on several occasions.   
I was therefore surprised to read reports about ‘foreigners walking around half 
naked in the city’, not only because the foreigners I knew lived under such security 
regimes that a simple walk in the streets of Kabul was forbidden to them, but also 
because the majority of them were putting quite an effort in trying to camouflage 
themselves under large clothes (at least during the day), for these same security reasons. I 
was actually more shocked by what was happening at night behind closed doors in places 
reserved for internationals than by their public attitudes.  
For those who have never been there, Kabul is what it must have been like in a 
boom-town in the American Wild West, a surreal world of DJ disco house parties with 
bars of free flowing drinks, Chinese tea houses (you’re not going for the tea) and stacks 
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of Ak-47s. Foreigners were not walking the streets of Kabul half-naked, for sure, but 
they were certainly drinking alcohol, listening to electronic music and visiting Chinese 
prostitutes in places created exclusively for these new types of consumers, shortly after 
the Intervention.  
To help the internationals escape the anxiety of being cooped up in compounds, 
social mixers and parties were often organized. Some of these parties could sometimes 
involve a hundred internationals, dancing in a lighted garden to DJ mixes from around 
the world with a foreign mixture of flavours, camels and guns that left your senses 
buzzing. It was actually like you were transported to a zany middle world that had neither 
a home in Afghanistan nor in the West. In this strange ‘carnival of war’, humanitarian 
workers, construction contractors and private security guards were mingling and sharing 
the same dance floor at night, while meticulously ignoring each other during the day in 
an attempt to reassert the radically different nature and purpose of the work of each.  
Many of these house parties and other establishments where internationals 
socialized did not allow Afghans to enter unless they had a foreign passport or were 
accompanied by a Westerner for various reasons; alcohol being the main one. This 
segregation led some Afghans to view the international community as wasting resources 
needed for the reconstruction of their country. In Afghan Scene, a free magazine 
distributed in NGOs, international agencies’ offices and venues reserved to 
internationals, photographs of the latest expats’ parties in town were published. Rumours 
ran wild amongst Afghans about what was going on behind the internationals’ 
compound walls.   
Was this the behaviour journalists wanted to denounce when they were talking 
about ‘Western civilization’ and when they advocated for the re-establishment of the 
moral police? Or was it a broader popular feeling of alienation and dispossession that 
was to be read in the background of these press releases?  
Whatever the motives behind journalists’ accusations, it was clear that with the 
approaching presidential elections, debates intensified both in the press and at the 
political level as to whether the freedom allowed by democracy should be promoted at 
the expense of ‘religious ethics’. In the National Assembly, conservative MPs started to 
question the moral content of Indian soap operas broadcasted on the private TV 
channels that had flourished short after the downfall of the Taliban regime, as well as 
movies produced by Afghan directors.  
In September 2007, a movie critic from Cheragh, a daily newspaper, vividly 
criticized the newly released Dokhtar-e-Afghan (Afghan girl), a romantic movie produced 
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by Afghan film director Yousouf Rouyan, in which the main female character, played by 
Afghan actress Sana Tabasum is facing the moral dilemma of being in love with two men 
(Cheragh 2007c). The article mentioned that the movie was ‘the lowest example of 
Western debauchery’ and went on adding that the production of such a movie signified 
‘the loss and violation of the complete dignity of the Afghan culture’.   
As prime-time viewing slowly became a battleground between Afghanistan's 
liberals and conservatives, the government could not continue to ignore the issue. In 
May 2008 the Ministry of Culture and Information officially banned five Indian series 
from broadcast on private TV stations.  These debates had put President Hamid Karzai 
in a bind as he was continuing to lose popularity. If he rejected the ban, he risked 
alienating Afghanistan’s clerics and their conservative supporters while giving Taliban-led 
insurgents fodder for anti-government propaganda. If he supported the ban, he risked 
alienating his Western supporters. Karzai ended up supporting the ban and the influential 
conservative clerics who pushed it. In his one public comment, he said media freedom 
would be maintained but he went on to add that ‘unsuitable material should not be 
broadcasted’. He also complained that there were too many foreign shows on TV (Kim 
Barker 2008). 
What captivated my interest the most while these debates were taking place was 
the fact that series and movies that had monopolized legislators’ attention had one 
common denominator: all of them were starring female actresses playing the main 
character in the storyline. These soaps were quite traditional in many ways, showing 
prototypic female characters: evil temptresses against dutiful daughters and self-
sacrificing mothers. But if gender stereotypes were somehow reinforced, the series also 
fuelled the audience with ideals of romantic love, a needed catharsis of feelings and 
emotions after the austerity, exigence and rigidity that had marked the Taliban period.  
These series were doing more than simply feeding the masses with romance. Tulsi 
and Perina, the two most popular Indian series, were also addressing issues with which 
most Afghan families could identify: the difficult relationships between mothers-in-law 
and daughters-in-law and arranged marriage. These series also challenged some social 
taboos. Tulsi, the main character in the most popular soap, officially called ‘Because the 
Mother-in-Law was once the Daughter-in-Law’ and aired on Tolo TV, had certainly met 
with her share of un-Islamic adversity. Her husband fathered a child with another 
woman while he had amnesia. Tulsi herself nearly got married to another man twice — 
once when she was out of her mind and once when she thought her husband was dead. 
As for Perina, not only had she conceived a child with her secret lover without being 
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married to him, but she also became a rich and successful businesswoman, a status that 
remains quite un-common for a woman in the Afghan social landscape. 
The reasons for banning the Indian soaps despite their popularity were for the 
clerics, unquestionable. Perina and Tulsi showed unveiled women wearing make-up and 
dresses that revealed their waist, arms and shoulders as well as romantic scenes in which 
lovers danced, courted and embraced each other. This was enough to get the Council of 
Clerics sitting on the Supreme Court more than angry against Tolo and Afghan TV. In 
an interview he gave to Al Jazeera reporter Zeina Khodr, a religious leader explained: 
‘These programs have changed the behaviours of our children and women’ (Khodr 
2008). This comment echoed opinions I often heard in Afghan families: democracy with 
the liberalities associated with it meant that girls and women would become 
uncontrollable, that they would start wearing make-up and inappropriate clothes, that 
they would demand greater freedoms and by doing so, challenge the reputation of their 
families.  
Lutfia, my translator, invited me once to pay a visit to her sister who had just 
delivered a baby girl. Lutfia’s sister lived with her husband and three children in Khair 
Khana, a working-class district of Kabul. Lutfia’s mother had made the journey from her 
village in Paktia to see the newborn baby. When Lutfia entered the two-rooms flat, her 
mother gave one look at her and said: ‘What kind of clothes are you wearing, my 
daughter? Is this democracy?’ And she shook her head in disapproval. Lutfia wore a 
beige pair of trousers under a tight safari jacket, and a square veil tied under her chin, in 
the style of most female students on Kabul University campus. For Nasima, Lutfia’s 
mother, who had spent her entire life in an isolated village in Paktia and who had only 
attended primary school, the way her daughter was dressed was revealing of a 
fundamental shift the Afghan society had been through over the past six years. As much 
as she was proud to see her daughter having access to education and employment 
opportunities, she could not fully relate to the type of femininity her daughter embodied 
(Fieldnotes – 21/05/2007). 
A similar sentiment seemed to underlie DoWA’s director Feriba Majid’s worries 
about women’s misusing democracy by wearing skimpy clothes at wedding ceremonies. 
These were actually the most prominent contradictions I noticed when I came to Kabul 
for the second time: still no electricity, no roads, more beggars in the streets and in the 
middle of this chaos, immense wedding halls with ‘exotic’ names and neon-tubes palm 
trees on their front courts.  I could not help laughing when I saw the kitsch replica of the 
Eiffel tower in front of Sham-e-Paris (Parisian Night), the hippest Wedding Hall in town, a 
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vast complex exhibiting an ostentatious luxury of beauty salons, wedding clothes shops 
and photographers’ studios. Dresses exhibited in stores’ windows, with their flashy 
sequins and their bright colours were in sharp contrast with the monotonous conformity 
of street fashion.  
This overt exposition of private wealth in the middle of overwhelming public 
poverty provides the newcomer in Kabul with a profound feeling of disorientation.  It is 
probably to bring a semblance of order and keep a sense of public good that legislators 
like Feriba Majid felt compelled to reinforce the Islamic principle of modesty. As fashion 
showcased in stores’ windows could be read as an overt invitation to private ‘sexual’ 
display of self, the public became more and more associated with individual luxury 
consumption, a lifestyle that appeared as contradictory and even alien to Islam.  
 In the beauty salons of Kabul, the walls were plastered with posters of heavily 
made-up Indian actresses. Afghan women modelled themselves on these women whom 
they perceived as beautiful and liberated. Inside the salons, women were dying their hair, 
plucking their eyebrows, brushing colored shadow on their eyelids, to eventually hide 
their hard work under their chadari as soon as they returned in the street. Despite the 
Taliban ban on cosmetics, women had continued running beauty salons inside of their 
homes, clandestinely45. Women’s pursuit of beauty was a means for them to keep a bit of 
control over their lives that otherwise were mostly controlled by others. When the 
Taliban regime collapsed, beauty salons reopened in the country’s major cities. With 
50.000 to 70.000 estimated war widows in Kabul alone (IRIN-News 2008), the beauty 
industry had become an important and convenient business for women. Beauty salons 
often consisted in a small room with an open door on the street, attached to the 
compound of a family house.  
 A wedding has no price in Afghanistan. On this occasion, Kabulis can spend up 
to 20.000 US dollars, a small fortune when more than half of the population is living 
below the poverty line. The success of a marriage is measured by the number of guests a 
family can afford to invite. In a country where security is seriously lacking, a wedding is 
the safest means to develop coalitions and to strengthen ties with relatives and the 
broader community. The bride is never beautiful enough on her wedding day. She 
usually changes dresses up to three times during the party, disappearing for an hour to 
reappear, like in a fashion show, under a completely new face in front of the guests. The 
first one she wears is traditionally white, the second is green and the last one is either red 
                                                
45 See Deborah Rodriguez (2008). Kabul Beauty School. New York. Random House. 
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or blue. Make-up and hair design should match her dress’ colour, keeping hairdressers 
and beauticians busy for most of the night.  
 A wedding is therefore much more than just the bride’s beauty. It is an 
institution through which families display wealth and tighten connections. The issue of 
women’s dress at weddings is an issue that implicates whole families, not just the 
individual women. Before the wedding party, women from both families traditionally 
spend the day together in a beauty salon. The bride’s body is entirely waxed, her feet and 
hands are dyed with henna, her face receives a thick layer of make-up and all this 
bodywork is performed under the attentive gaze of her female relatives. Through this 
ritual, the bride’s body becomes the symbolic trait d’union between two families. The 
beautification of the bride through hair design, make-up and dresses is a process through 
which two families engage in a fruitful and rewarding cooperation. 
When, in April 2007, controversies over a legal proposal to ban cosmetics and 
the Indian soaps were raging in the National Assembly, some dormitory girls were 
getting ready for another wedding party, covering their faces with different creams, 
powders and lipsticks. And while observing them I could not help but wondering why, 
despite of the comments they would receive as soon as they would step in the muddy 
streets of Kabul, nothing and no-one could stop them from performing their beauty 
rituals. 
 
As Stivens (2001, 192) argues, “shifting relations and representation of the so-
called private sphere – issues of family, gender, home and sexuality – are key sites for the 
cultural production (…) of modernity itself, and simultaneously a favoured site for the 
expression of tensions and ambivalences about the cost of modernity’. The current 
making of the Afghan nation under the particular context of foreign occupation and 
market liberalization is a deeply gendered process, in which contrasted views about the 
position of women in society come into conflict. The post-war context has provided 
individuals with new opportunities to explore and experiment with social boundaries. 
Young girls who have opted for slightly alternative physical displays are perceived as 
threatening because as women, they are bearers and reproducers of collective values. The 
moral panics that have emerged are the product of cultural politics through which local 
instances of power are attempting to assert their control over society in front of foreign 
invaders. ‘Orthodoxy’, as Talal Asad (quoted in Meneley 2007, 232) highlights, ‘is always 
created in situations of power’.  
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Young women living in the National Women’s Dormitory on Kabul University 
campus are on the frontline of this battle: their bodies are a site of political struggles over 
identity. But if girls’ responses appear invested in the West, girls themselves imbue their 
appearance and action with a specific modern and Islamic morality. In the section that 
follows, I use dormitory girls’ interpretations of their favourite Indian series to illustrate 
the complex relationship between conflicting understandings of modernity in 
contemporary Afghanistan. I show how the interpenetration of a sense of being modern 
and being traditional is mapped onto a shifting hierarchy and competing claims to 
legitimization. Discussions girls had around these soaps provide another illustration of 
the tensions between personal aspirations shaped by the emergence of commercial media 
outlets and political imperatives to preserve a sense of collective identity. Dormitory 
girls’ struggle to position themselves in a changing political, economic and social 
environment reveals the fluctuating nature of ‘culture’ and challenge mainstream 
assumptions that view culture as fixed, monolithic and collectively agreed upon. Debates 
around the soaps invite us to question how the cultural politics of a fragmented State like 
Afghanistan articulates with contested visions of modernity. 
 
2. The objects of Indian Soap operas 
 
Kabul University is an immense construction site. Here and there new buildings 
have started to grow, all built on the same Soviet style architectural model: solid 
parallelepiped blocks of concrete and bricks, piled up on top of the other. It is the 
middle of winter and the campus is deserted. Holidays have begun with the arrival of the 
snow when it eventually became impossible to study in classrooms deprived of heating 
systems. At the end of an alley, one can distinguish a three-storey building composed of 
4 wings: the Women’s National Dormitory. The relatively new aspect of the building 
contrasts with the boys’ dormitory located a few hundred meters further. Whereas girls 
benefit from constant electricity, hot showers, a room equipped with new DELL 
computers and Internet access, boys crowd in freezing and filthy rooms that have 
remained untouched since their construction in the late 70s. 
The girls’ dormitory, like all reconstruction projects in Afghanistan, is a political 
business. Rehabilitated in 2004 with USAID financial support, the girls’ dormitory was 
America’s First Lady personal project. Its location in the capital city, on a University 
campus from where women had been excluded for thirty years, was an important symbol 
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in itself: bringing women ‘back to school’ to use the title of a UNICEF campaign, was a 
central goal of the US modernization project in Afghanistan. 
The inauguration took place six months after the first walls were erected, under 
the benevolent eye of President Hamid Karzai and Laura Bush, who personally came 
from the United States for the occasion, just in time for a few photographs which are 
now exhibited in the building’s main entrance hall. ‘There is much more to this place 
than the bricks and mortar you see around us’, Laura Bush said in her inaugural speech. 
‘The ordinary business that will take place here is, in fact, a symbol itself of the 
extraordinary leap forward Afghan women have taken’ (Herman 2005). 
It is winter and the 188 rooms, which are available in the building, are empty. 
Only a dozen of girls unable to return to their province of origin due to heavy snowfalls 
that have blocked the roads have had to stay in the dormitory, which is anyhow half 
empty during the rest of the year. On the walls of the long cold corridors lit with white 
neon tubes lights, posters of the Women’s Rights Movement in the US are hanging. 
Suffragettes and early feminists’ names and slogans appear on sepia prints, to which none 
of the girls seem to pay much attention. Because behind their closed doors, girls’ dreams 
are fuelled with different stories: Bollywood movie star Aishwarya Rai, Leonardo Di 
Caprio starring in Titanic, white babies with blue eyes and teddy bears holding pink hearts 
in their arms. The contrast between the interior decoration of the rooms and the outside 
corridors covered with posters of suffragettes captures the simultaneity of modernity and 
its underside, of the necessary reconstruction of identity in the post-Taliban era. It bears 
witness of the various series of narratives that fashion and shape these young women’s 
aspirations, desires and dreams. 
Unaccustomed to sleeping on bunk beds, the girls have recreated their traditional 
bedrooms, with mattresses displayed along the white walls, around a large central piece 
of carpet, provoking the exasperation of the director of the dormitory46. Employed by 
UNOPS to administrate this girls-only institution, the Tadjik woman in her late forties 
thinks that the dormitory is more than a simple hostel. ‘Girls from different ethnic 
backgrounds are mixing for the first time. Not only do they learn how to live together 
                                                
46 The creation of women’s dormitories on University campuses in Afghanistan has been one of the most 
visible measures undertaken by the International community to promote women’s access to higher 
education after the fall of the Taliban regime. Altogether, four women dormitories have been built in 
regional universities. At the time of my fieldwork, the girls’ dormitory in Kabul was half empty and I 
received reports that the ones built in Jalalabad and Kandahar were used by male students, since no female 
students had turned up.  It is interesting to note that the creation of ‘boarding schools’ inspired from the 
British educational model was also central to modernization efforts in rural Iran in the late 30s. Sullivan 
(1998) provides a powerful account of how girls living in these institutions were bound to their bulk beds 
with their chador to prevent their falling down at night (1998: 224).  
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away from their families but they also learn basic principles of hygiene that are seriously 
lacking in their education’, she told me when I first met her (Fieldnotes, 17/02/2007).  
In the corner of room 42, sitting on her mattress, 22-year-old Massoma is 
applying make-up on her face, getting ready to go to work at Bagh-e Zanana, the Women’s 
Park. Massoma is Hazara and she shares a room with Lutfia, a Pachai girl from Kapisa 
province, Rokia and Maryam, two Tadjik sisters from Kabul, and Mariam, another 
Hazara girl from Mazar-e-Sharif. Rooms shared between girls from different ethnic 
origins are rare but the girls of room 42 get on well. All of them have spent most of their 
lives in exile, in Iran and in Pakistan and have returned to Kabul short after the 
‘liberation’, in order to continue their studies. They have brought with them habits, 
attitudes and consumption items slightly new for the other dormitory girls whose families 
have remained in Afghanistan during the war. Girls of room 42 are second-year students 
in different faculties but also the main breadwinners in their families. They share their 
time between the foreign organizations in which they are employed and the University 
campus. As returnees, girls of number 42, like other girls who have been raised abroad, 
consider themselves as more ‘modern’ and ‘open-minded’ than the others.  
 After dinner, watching television was one of the dormitory girls’ favourite 
activities. The Indian soap Perina started at 8.00 pm, at the same time as my English 
lesson, which could hardly compete with evenings’ major source of entertainment: 
Indian soap operas. Deprived of students, it was not rare for me to cancel the class and 
join the girls rushing towards the TV common room as soon as they heard the song of 
the generic. Tulsi and Perina, the heroines of these series, represented a major source of 
inspiration for these girls who thrived to model their appearances and lifestyles on these 
women they considered as beautiful and modern.  
 
a. Viewing pol i t i c s :  f rom State-sponsored TV to commerc ia l  TV 
 
Television, as Abu-Lughod (1997, 110) argues, represents an ‘ubiquitous presence 
in the lives and imaginaries of people in the contemporary world’. Colour television 
broadcasting reached Afghanistan in 1978. Radio Television Afghanistan, the National 
state-owned TV broadcaster, was created under the Communist regime as a means to 
‘inform’ people about the achievements of the Revolution. When the Taliban took over 
Kabul in 1996, television was banned and Radio Afghanistan was renamed Radio Voice of 
sharia, the only authorized radio in the country. The religious police smashed privately 
owned television sets and strung up videocassettes in trees in a form of symbolic 
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execution by hanging. Anyone found harbouring a television set was subject to 
punishments of flogging and incarceration. 
Short after the invasion of Afghanistan by the coalition forces, the reconstruction 
of Afghanistan’s media outlets under US direction promptly began. Responsibility for 
overseeing the media development in Afghanistan rested primarily with the Office of 
Transition Initiatives (OTI), which maintains an important position in the US’s 
‘democracy promoting’ apparatus, sitting within USAID’s Bureau for Democracy, 
Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance (Barker 2008). Besides supporting the 
development of ‘independent’ non-profit printed media, radio and TV stations, the OTI 
also supported for-profit media. A $2.2 million grant went to two Afghan-Australian 
brothers to create Afghanistan’s first private media outlets, Radio Arman and Tolo TV 
(Ibid., 116).  
Western support to media outlets, especially radio and TV channels, in Third 
World countries where the majority of the population is illiterate is not a new 
phenomenon. During the Cold War, modernization theorists asserted that for the seeds 
of democracy to grow, the Third World had to extricate itself from the disabling claws of 
tradition and become modern. Mass media, as Middle East analyst Daniel Lerner argued 
in his book The Passing of Traditional Society (1958), was the most efficient means to open 
traditional minds by introducing them to difference. It encouraged opinions and political 
participation and fostered people’s mobility. To his view, media was a primordial tool to 
create the modern citizen (quoted in Abu-Lughod 1995, 190). The international 
community’s urge to promote the reconstruction of media in Afghanistan short after the 
downfall of the Taliban shows that Western concerns with ‘promoting democracy’ are 
still influenced by these views.  
However, the main difference between early modernizers and the new generation 
of those who are sent to post-war or developing countries is that they no more consider 
the State as a reliable entity to create the conditions for democracy. As a result, ‘civil 
society’ and private entrepreneurs have become privileged stakeholders in democracy 
building for the values of ‘diversity’ and ‘autonomy’ they are supposed to represent. 
Indeed, USAID, as the main funding body for media projects in Afghanistan, insisted 
that media should be ‘truly independent’, i.e ‘autonomous’ from State support and 
market-driven (Barker 2008). The creation of Tolo TV in 2004 is a good example of this 
shift in policy. 
As a commercial TV channel, Tolo TV derives all its income from sale of 
advertising and production of programming content. Tolo TV is primarily broadcasting 
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live shows, music programmes, foreign movies, comedies and soap operas. It produces 
and broadcasts Afghan Star, one of Afghanistan’s most popular television series. Afghan 
Star is of a similar format to American Idol, and is billed as Afghanistan’s biggest talent 
search. Tolo is also broadcasting Tulsi one of the five Indian soaps that were banned by 
the government in May 2008. Tolo director Saad Mohseni rejected the ban, calling the 
government’s intervention a breach to the Constitution and to media freedom. At the 
time of writing, Tulsi is still aired on TV and Tolo is still awaiting the final verdict of the 
Supreme Court. 
Since its creation, Tolo has been the target of heavy criticisms from the 
government and the National Assembly. The channel is regularly accused of 
broadcasting programs of poor informational and educational content, of promoting 
lifestyles in contradiction with Islamic principles and of creating polemics by discrediting 
members of the parliament. The strongest condemnations come from conservative 
segments of the National Assembly like Abdurrasul Sayaf, a deputy and former warlord, 
who accuses Tolo of being an entry point for ‘foreign conspiracies’ (Najibullah 2008).  
The power of television stands in its capacity to bring non-local or temporally 
remote experiences to the heart of the most local situations: the home. Access to TV in 
Afghanistan is limited to major city centres but whenever TV sets and electricity are 
available, watching TV becomes a major source of entertainment. Invited once for 
dinner at a friend’s place, I was astonished to discover that the TV set had been installed 
on the rooftop of the family’s house especially for the occasion. As we ate in silence 
seated on carpets spread on the floor, watching an Afghan black and white movie from 
the 60s aired on Aryana TV, my friend Fahair, a twenty-two-year-old car driver from 
Penjshir, suddenly asked: ‘Where is this movie from? This cannot be Afghanistan’. The 
scene was showing unveiled women wearing short dresses dancing and chatting with 
long haired men during a private house party in Wazir Akbar Khan, the upper class 
district of Kabul in the 60s and 70s, now turned into the headquarters of various UN and 
international organizations. For Fahair who was born during the war and whose male 
family members had dedicated their lives to fighting besides Commandant Masoud, it 
was hard to imagine that such a light-hearted lifestyle had once existed in his country. 
Despite my repetitive attempts at convincing him that this was Afghanistan, pointing at 
settings that were still recognizable, Fahair was stubbornly shaking his head in 
disapproval: ‘This was shot in a foreign country! This is not Afghanistan! This is foreign, 
foreign!’ he protested while I pointed at Gargha Lake where a black and white couple 
was walking hand in hand on a romantic song (Fieldnotes, 08/08/2007). 
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In post-Taliban Afghanistan, a well-intentioned conglomerate of media 
professionals sponsored by Western governments, have constructed of people like Fahair 
in general, and of women in particular a subaltern subject in need of Enlightenment. 
Influenced by Western liberal ideas, they feel endowed with the mission to alleviate 
ignorance, educate citizens and spread the seeds of a modern nation. When interviewed 
by Reuters journalist Sayed Salahuddin, Farzana Samimi, a presenter of the woman’s 
program Banu for Tolo TV, emphasized the educational purpose of the soaps 
(Salahuddin 2006). ‘It enlightens the minds of people in the family, not only of brides or 
mothers-in-laws, but others too’, said the 27-year-old psychology major turned TV 
presenter, in defence of the Indian soaps threatened of censorship. Similarly, the TV and 
Radio spots produced by Sayara Media and Communication, the Communication Agency 
for which I worked at the beginning of my fieldwork, delivered messages about the 
importance of education, the evils of poppy production and consumption, the role of the 
Afghan National Police in bringing security to the population. The agency and its clients 
(NGOs, international organizations, Afghan ministries) that ordered such 
communication products worked with the aim of educating the public, holding the view 
that positive change would occur at the national level only if Afghan individuals at the 
grassroots changed and became more ‘socially and civically aware’. 
In March 2007, a conference organized by the Media and Civil Society Forum 
was held in Kabul Intercontinental Hotel under the slogan ‘Media is Development’ 
(original emphasis). In the middle of the luxurious salon where the conference was taking 
place, an Afghan camerawoman, whose face was totally concealed under a black chader 
that left only a thin line for her eyes, was filming the event. The conference was headed 
by The Killid Group (TKG), a Media Group founded in 2002 with the financial support 
of the OTI and the European Union (Barker 2008, 115). In the report that was published 
following the conference, one could read: ‘Neither democracy nor sustainable 
development can work unless people are driving the process and feel that they are 
involved. A free and accessible media can provide the link between the people and state 
which is needed for enhancing ownership and involvement in the process.’(Killid 2007)  
There was a certain irony in the conference’s organizers reiteration of the 
commonplace idea that free media was pivotal to establish participatory democracy. 
Indeed, since their creation, TKG and other Media groups sponsored by the West as part 
of its ‘democracy promotion’ agenda had deeply jeopardised smaller provincial media 
outlets. Provincial media outlets, ran by small indigenous Civil Society Organizations and 
political parties, were no more able to compete for funding with giants like Killid. In this 
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respect, the comment made during the conference by MP Hadji Moahmmad Mohaqiq, 
chairman of the Media, Culture and Religious Affairs Committee at the National 
Assembly, was revealing of his political awareness of the double standards applied in the 
domain of ‘Press Freedom’. ‘Is the press freedom in the country driven by the presence 
of the international community or does it really reflect the degree of openness of the 
Afghan society?’ the MP asked (Fieldnotes, 29/03/2007). 
If Tulsi and Perina evidently won a certain success among the urban population of 
Afghanistan’s major cities, the effects of broadcasting such series in conservative rural 
areas where fighting and NATO bombings were still going on, might have been less 
positive than what Tolo director Saad Mohseni argued. Additionally, if TV was to be a 
guide to ‘modernity’, one could ask who was to be accountable for arbitrating the 
benchmarks upon which the progress of democracy would be measured. So-called 
independent media sponsored by the West, even if well intentioned in their claims to 
‘educate’ the Afghan public, undeniably reflected some of the ideas, values and 
aspirations of the development agencies that funded them. The Mohseni brothers 
(owners of Tolo TV), Atiq Rahimi, the Afghan film maker who had been selected by 
Tolo to direct the first Afghan soap opera, the TV presenters who ran prime time shows 
had this in common: they had lived in exile for a long period of time and had brought 
with them new ideas about ‘modernity’. They were educated and could speak foreign 
languages. As members of the cosmopolitan middle-class, they shared relatively liberal 
views. Most of them had never experienced the hardship of their Afghan compatriots 
who had not been able to flee during the wars and they remained remote from the reality 
of provincial life. Their views on how women’s lives could be improved and on the kind 
of knowledge women should gain in order to be empowered were inspired by the 
humanist ideas to which they had been exposed during their exile. They believed in the 
universal human capacity to break free from structures of subordination, despite the 
political and economic constraints that determined the every day life of common Afghan 
people.  
The conflagration of these different influences while political unrest gradually 
spread in rural areas accentuated the already existent gap between these two 
distinguishable segments of the Afghan society.  Questioning around the Afghan identity 
and the characteristics of the ‘authentic Afghanness’ were indeed part of every day casual 
conversations. Dormitory girls were not removed from these debates. On the contrary, 
the discussions they had after watching their favourite series revealed the complex ways 
in which they were engaged in interpreting these series in relation to their cultural and 
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social environment. Girls were not the passive recipients of the ideas and values 
transmitted through media works. Their interpretations were shaped by events in their 
lives and by the relationships in which they defined themselves.  
 
b. Women as Subjec ts  
 
In Purnima Mankekar’s words (1998) ‘television audiences are one among several 
sites in which local negotiations of meaning are suffused by translocal relations of 
knowledge and power’. TV stations, the funding agencies and advertisement companies 
that support them are indeed powerful tools to shape public opinions and promote 
lifestyles. But if TV may create a global community of viewers, the same soap opera may 
be differently received in different parts of the worlds. Girls’ interpretations of the soaps 
are located at the crossroads of these various instances of power but are also the product 
of their specific position within the Afghan society as well as the individual experiences 
that have marked their lives. The soaps are conversational objects that lead to the 
problematisation of the nature of the family as an institution pivotal to maintain social 
stability. 
For Lutfia, who had lived with her uncle in Pakistan during the war and who, 
unlike the majority of the girls from her generation, had received an uninterrupted 
education in Lycée Franco-Afghan in Peshawar, the feminine models proposed in Tulsi 
and Perina were highly inspirational in comparison to the hopelessness that, in her 
opinion, marked the majority of Afghan women’s lives. ‘Tulsi and Perina are not Muslim 
but they face similar problems to Afghan women: unhappy marriages, difficult 
relationships with mothers-in-laws…The difference is that they are brave and 
independent. These women don’t show weaknesses when they face difficulties. They are 
strong, independent women’, she explained (Fieldnotes, 13/02/2007). Notions of 
independence, autonomy and strength to which Lutfia referred were further explained in 
relation to a traumatic event that had occurred in her family.  
 Lutfia’s sister, Nafisa, had been kidnapped by a man from her village called 
Raouf whose marriage offers she had rejected numerous times. Raouf brought Nafisa to 
Iran where his family had found him a job. Nafisa totally disappeared for a few months, 
until she managed to convince him to return to Afghanistan. In order to preserve her 
family’s honour Nafisa had had to marry her abductor. After she delivered her second 
baby, Nafisa who was leading an unhappy life with a husband with whom she 
continuously argued, approached the village’s shura (council of elders) in an attempt to 
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obtain divorce. The divorce was eventually granted but Nafisa was refused the custody of 
her children, who according to local interpretations of sharia law, belonged to her 
husband. The pain of being separated from her children made Nafisa change her mind. 
She stayed with Raouf and a year later, gave birth to a third baby. Nafisa had turned into, 
in Lutfia’s words, ‘a prisoner in her own home’. Lutfia did not only blame Nafisa’s 
husband for her sister’s unhappiness but also her grandmother who had lobbied in 
favour of this marriage based on the argument that the family, mostly composed of 
women, and with an aging father at its head needed the support of an external man. 
Unfortunately, Nafisa’s husband revealed himself to be a mediocre businessman and 
Lutfia’s family never really benefited from this new connection (Fieldnotes, 
21/05/2007). 
It is informed by this life event that Lutfia commented on the Indian soaps. 
When I asked her how she reconciled the fact that Perina had conceived a child outside 
of marriage with the values of Islam, she simply replied:  
 
These kinds of things happen all the time in our society as well. The thing is that it is taboo to talk 
about it. Perina and Tulsi are free women. If these series are so popular, it is because everyone 
would like to be free like the characters in the series. Everyone likes freedom. (Fieldnotes, 
21/05/2007) 
 
Lutfia associated freedom with love because her sister Nafisa’s forced marriage to 
a husband who had kidnapped and abused her was, to her understanding, equivalent to a 
life sentence. In this marriage, Nafisa’s sacrifice had brought nothing to the family except 
a strong sense of waste and treason. Perina could be blamed for having an illegal child 
but ‘her love for Anurak was real and her heart was pure’ she explained. The shameful 
stamp of treachery did not mark Anurak and Perina’s story. Besides, Perina was educated 
and had proved her worth by becoming a successful businesswoman. Nafisa’s experience 
had traumatized the family to such an extent that the parents had promised Lutfia that 
she would be able to marry a man she would choose for herself. But this privilege was 
also granted to Lutfia because, like Perina, she was the main family provider and she ‘had 
a brain’, as she liked to say (Fieldnotes, 21/05/2007).   
The value of love in the face of social pressure was understood by the girls of 
room 42 as a universally applicable alternative to marriages arranged by families for 
financial and strategic reasons. To them, love not only enhanced women’s status and 
lives but was also an aspiration they could afford to have as educated women. What the 
soaps did was not simply selling ‘foreign ideas’ to the dormitory girls. As the example of 
 161 
Lutfia shows, girls were actively engaged in negotiating and interpreting these ideas in the 
specific and culturally located context of their lives. Of course, to some extent, girls’ 
perceptions of and ideas about marriage and the family were the product of cultural 
hybridization processes that had marked their lives as emigrants in Iran and elsewhere. 
They were also the reflection of the relative liberalism and cosmopolitanism that had 
suddenly reached Kabul after years of isolation due to war and civil unrest. But these 
ideas were not mere foreign transplants. The soaps were in many ways mirroring the lives 
of the girls; questioning some of their assumptions and making some of them challenge 
the boundaries of the social order.  
For most Dormitory girls the romantic stories told in Perina and Tulsi were in 
many ways similar to the ones they had read in classic Persian literature.  To a great 
extent, the soaps despite their Indian origin, could be interpreted as modern adaptations 
of the great Persian epics such as Shahname, the book of Kings written in the 10th century 
by poet Abolqasem Ferdoosi. These were stories of honour, courage and impossible love 
that often ended, like for Majnun Layla47 or for Rabia and Baktash48, by the death of the 
two protagonists. ‘I will tell you a story to show you that love can destroy mountains’, 
Maryam said once. And she spoke, while other girls sat in circle around her and 
attentively listened: 
 
My grandfather, on my mother’s side, was a dictator. He had 7 wives (she laughed). My aunt was a 
nurse in Iran. At that time, my entire family had moved to Iran. During that time, it was the Iran-
Iraq war. One day, a young soldier arrived at the hospital where my aunt was working. He was 
wounded and my aunt took care of him. This man was very handsome. He was Iranian. He fell in 
love with my aunt at first sight. He wanted to marry her. My aunt fell in love as well. The man 
went to my grandfather to ask for my aunt’s hand. My grandfather, who was a real dictator, 
always refused. My seven uncles refused as well. So there was only one solution left for my aunt. 
One day, she cut her veins. When my grandfather discovered my aunt on the verge of death, he 
got totally panicked. He understood he could not fight against such a strong love. He finally 
accepted to give her to this man. Since then, my aunt is still living in Iran and is married to this 
                                                
47 The story of Majnun Layla is based on the real story of a young man called Qays ibn al-Mulawwah from 
the northern Arabian Peninsula, in the Umayyad era during the 7th century. Upon seeing Layla, Qays fell 
passionately in love with her. But he went mad when her father prevented him from marrying her. For that 
reason he came to be called Majnun Layla, which means ‘Driven mad by Layla’. (Shafaq, 1952) 
48 Rabiah Balkhi was originally from Balkh province and is considered as one of the first Afghan/Persian 
10th century poets who wrote in modern Persian (Dari). Her father, Kaab, was a governor. When Kaab 
died, his son Haares, brother of Rabiah, became the governor. Haares had a Turkish slave named Baktash, 
with whom Rabiah was secretly in love. At a court party, Haares heard Rabiah’s secret from Rudaki. He 
imprisoned Baktash in a well, cut the jugular vein of Rabiah and imprisoned her in a haman. She wrote her 
final poems with her blood on the wall of the hamam until she died. Baktash escaped the well, and as soon 
as he learnt about Rabiah, he went to the governor’s office and assassinated Haares. He then committed 
suicide. 
 162 
man, with whom she had four children. So you see, if your love is very strong, no one can destroy 
it. (Fieldnotes, 28/03/2007) 
 
Stories like this were told and retold in the dormitory. They represented the ideal 
towards which most girls aspired. They frequently referred, always with a touch of 
admiration; to the people they knew in their circles who had ‘chosen’ each other. In the 
meantime, these ideas were highly romantic: love was an unachievable objective, an 
object of fantasy more than an idea that they thought could one day materialise. They 
warned each other about the danger of having unrealistic dreams. ‘Perina is a fiction and 
stories like that cannot happen in Afghanistan. It can happen in India, in Iran but not in 
Afghanistan’, Massoma commented after hearing Maryam’s story. ‘In real life, love does 
not matter. What matters is money.’ (Fieldnotes, 28/03/2007) 
For Massoma, who was an ethnic Hazara49, the ethnic group that suffered and is 
still suffering the most from discrimination, the upward mobility revealed in ‘love’ 
relationships could not apply to the people of her group. Among the other girls living in 
room 42, Massoma was undeniably from the poorest family. She had one sister and four 
brothers: one of them suffered from mental health problems, another one had illegally 
migrated to France and was kept in a detention centre next to Calais, and the youngest 
was only 14 years old and still attending school. The destitution in which her family lived, 
occupying a 15 square meters room in a slum located on the outskirt of Kabul, made her 
feel particularly responsible for maintaining her status as a loyal, self-sacrificing and 
dutiful daughter. Indeed, Massoma’s father was old, sick and jobless. Massoma was able 
to support the family thanks to the modest revenues she made as a sport teacher but she 
was also aware that her marriage could be a more profitable and sustainable option for 
the supportive connections it could create with another family.  
The ideal of ‘autonomy’ girls of room 42 aspired to was therefore never discussed 
outside of the kinship bounds and the material reality in which their lives were entangled. 
Dreaming was still allowed, after all. And while Massoma was getting ready to take off 
for work, Maryam and Khokia returned to their mirror to add some extra make-up to 
their eyes. This was perhaps what the soaps achieved the most efficiently: the modelling 
                                                
49 The Hazaras speak Farsi and are mostly Shi'i Muslims (primarily Twelver Shi'i, some Ismaili Shi'is), yet 
there are also some Sunni Muslim Hazaras. They settled in Afghanistan at least as far back as the 13th 
century. Hazaras have always lived on the edge of economic survival. As a result of Pashtun expansionism 
in the late 18th and early 19th centuries which was fuelled by Sunni prejudices against the Shi'i (thus 
attracting the help of the mostly Sunni Tajiks and Uzbeks) the Hazaras were driven to the barren dry 
mountains of central Afghanistan (the Hazarajat) where they live today separated into nine regionally 
distinct enclaves. Suffering from continuous racism and discrimination, Hazara usually represent the lowest 
and poorest segments of the Afghan society. (Bacon, 1951) 
 163 
of these young women’s bodies on their favourite Indian actresses. This was a comment 
I heard once from a female civil servant at the Ministry of Women’s Affairs: ‘With all 
these new products and these Indian series, women have become more greedy and it 
creates troubles in families. Their husbands cannot always afford to buy them everything 
they want and then they argue and men become violent’. In her opinion, futile 
consumption desires among young women were a fundamental explanation for increased 
domestic violence (Fieldnotes, 09/02/2007). 
Going shopping for clothes and cosmetics was indeed a major Friday afternoon 
activity. We would usually take the bus to Kute Sangi and crawl into one of these big malls 
that had survived the bombings. In what would be better described as Ali Baba’s cave, 
girls would buy for each other lipsticks, eye shadows, creams and scarves. The gifts they 
made to their friends were not only means to consolidate their friendship, show their 
loyalty and strengthen the ties between group members but also practices that defined 
them as ‘modern’, ‘independent’ but also honourable Muslim.  
Anne Meneley (2007) explains that in Yemen men and women’s public spheres 
of sociability are segregated and that women’s public sphere consists in women’s 
gatherings in family homes. Women’s capacity to invite each other in their houses is 
central to maintain a family’s reputation of hospitality within the broader community 
(Meneley 2007, 228). Hospitality is considered in Afghanistan like in many other Muslim 
societies, an important Islamic value. As a result, such gatherings were regularly taking 
place in the dormitory, girls inviting each other for tea in their rooms, wearing 
fashionable clothes and make-up for the occasion and giving gifts (perfumes, veils, 
cosmetics) to each other. Despite the little money Massoma carefully saved for her 
family, she could not extract herself from the gift economy. If she was offered a chader, 
she had to make sure she could return the gift at some point. Her incapacity to do so 
would damage her status within the group and make her more vulnerable to gossips, 
backbiting and other criticisms that were commonly perceived as the worst and most 
dangerous feminine weapons. As a Hazara and a Shia, Massoma was already more 
exposed than girls from other ethnic groups to all sorts of mean criticisms.  
As a matter of fact, the Indian series played a crucial role in creating desires and 
anxieties pertaining to different forms of modernity. For the most part, the meanings 
imputed to modernity were neither anchored in ‘the West’, nor assumed as self evident 
but were, in fact, constituted and contested through Tulsi and Perina’s discourses on 
gender and class. A ‘modern’ woman would assert her class status by consuming dresses 
of bright colours and make-up and allowing herself to ‘fall in love’ (most of the time in a 
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platonic manner) but would also remain unconditionally faithful to her kin and family by 
making sure that harmonious relationships with her relatives were maintained. In other 
words, the language that bore aspirations for modernity had a local tinge to it.  
Here I would like to use the image of Fulla, the Chador Barbie that was created 
by a Syrian-based designer studio in 2003 and that has appeared on the toy market of 
major cities in the Middle East since then. In the transcultural object that Fulla 
represents, two stereotypes of women’s oppression seem to catalyse. While the Barbie 
designed by Mattel is an icon of sexualized, commodified femininity, associated with the 
West, Chador Barbie, with her veil and long coat, embodies masculine control over 
women’s sexuality, associated with the East. However, a reading of Fulla as a pure 
instrument for self-surveillance that girls are inculcated to master is somewhat too 
simplistic. Fulla is more than the simple superposition of opposite values: like the 
Western Barbie, Fulla is sold with a whole panel of accessories such as a pink prayer rug, 
traditional silver jewellery and an extensive wardrobe including jeans and the type of 
colourful headscarves worn by many young women in the Middle East. Fulla’s colourful 
and overtly sexualized veils transformed into fashion instruments reveal what they are 
supposed to conceal. As a result, Fulla does not escape from commodification (Meneley 
2007).   
However, unlike Barbie, Fulla is still single (there is no Islamic equivalent to Ken, 
Barbie’s former boyfriend) but a Doctor Fulla and Fulla as a teacher have been created - 
both respected careers for women in Muslim societies. According to Fawaz Abidin, the 
Fulla brand manager, ‘She’s honest, loving and caring and she respects her father and 
mother.’ (BBC-News 2006). The type of femininity embodied by Fulla (educated, 
modern, financially autonomous, yet Muslim and respectful of family values) is very 
similar to the type of femininity Perina and Tulsi embodied and to the type of femininity 
on which girls of room 42 thrived to model themselves. In this subtle balance between 
contradictory meanings attached to the ‘modern’ Islamic body, Fulla helps us to think 
through the transformations and shifts in ideas young educated cosmopolitan working 
girls tried to negotiate in post-Taliban Afghanistan.  
In the early years of television in Afghanistan, modernity was articulated chiefly 
in terms of modernization, which was to be achieved through national development. 
Television was accordingly harnessed to the task of fostering development and creating 
modern citizen-subjects. The radio and TV soaps broadcasted on Radio Television 
Afghanistan aimed at ‘educating’ families and empowering women. In Tulsi and Perina’s 
discourses, modernity was associated with progress, upward mobility and higher status. 
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These representations of modernity resonated with aspirations and anxieties not just of 
girls securely positioned through their familial background within the middle class, but 
also those belonging to lower classes and upwardly-mobile working-classes. For the most 
part, Tulsi and Perina’s discourses of modernity equated with ‘modern’ lifestyles 
articulated through consumerist aspirations and desires. In other words, for most lower-
middle-class and working-class girls attending university, modern lifestyles were indexed 
by consumer goods such as cosmetics, clothes and Indian movies. As Mankekar (1998, 
38) puts it for the case of India’s booming film industry, ‘when dreams for modernity 
were woven into yearnings for modern lifestyles, viewing subjects became interpellated 
by consumerist fantasies that were part of transnational circuits of desire.’ But in 
Afghanistan like anywhere else where TV is available, these dreams were reinterpreted 
and adapted to the local context, in often paradoxical and contradictory terms.  
The Indian soaps have therefore allowed a public culture to emerge in which new 
kinds of speech can be generated, breaking certain codes of silence and creating new 
aspirations for love, companionship and consumption. However, in a context where the 
norm of the ‘harmonious family’ prevails and where kinship relations represent the most 
reliable means to maintain a sense of safety and protection, these aspirations cannot be 
expressed in a way that would make them appear as threats to the social order. Girls’ 
understandings of autonomy and independence were tightly entangled within a set of 
relations that formed the very conditions of their possibility.  
With Saba Mahmood (2001, 203), I share the view that agency ‘is not a synonym 
for resistance to relations of domination, but a capacity for action that historically 
specific relations of subordination enable and create’. In the process of interpreting the 
soaps, dormitory girls were not radically opposing structures of subordination for the 
simple reason that these very structures, despite the gender hierarchies they produced, 
were also providing them with a sense of safety that could not be found anywhere else. 
As Mahmood argues for the case of the Islamist revival in Egypt (2001), there has been a 
tendency in the feminist literature, even in the post-structuralist one, to represent the 
subject as naturally inclined to seek positive freedom - i.e to be self interested and 
autonomous in its will. ‘Freedom’, under its liberal sense, is still taken as the norm. As 
the example of the soaps in Afghanistan shows, notions of freedom and autonomy are 
discussed within the broader economy of relations girls see an important interest in 
preserving. Besides gender, other forms of social stratification, such as class and ethnicity 
are determinant factors in shaping desires and aspirations.   
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In the section that follows, I further explore these ideas through an analysis of 
dormitory girls’ bodywork. I show how everyday acts of beautification performed among 
certain segments of the girls living in the dormitory can be understood as a means to 
exercise ‘agency’ in the sense I have defined above,  i.e. through reconciling contradictory 
social expectations and preserving allegiances. I attempt to move the debate on ‘agency’ 
beyond its association with ‘liberal freedom’ that views the individual as universally and 
naturally capable of self-definition and show how notions of ‘self realization/self-
fulfilment’ vary across distinctions of class and ethnicity.  
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3. Lipstick jihad50 
 
 
Massoma applying make-up. Women’s National Dormitory. Kabul. April 2007 © Julie Billaud. 
 
 
Applying make-up is part of the girls living in room 42 everyday rituals. Quantity 
and colours vary according to the place they go, to the people they meet, and of course, 
to the money they have to purchase what are considered luxury products in Afghanistan. 
The seriousness with which these girls take their physical appearance amidst destruction 
– the area where the University is located is one that has been the most damaged by the 
fighting during the civil war – could seem, at first, anomalous. But beauty in this section 
of the dormitory is a serious business. Even in the grimmest circumstances, our 
humanity is preserved in the mundane. Self-beautification is a means to keep a sense of 
dignity and control over oneself, especially when the political, social and economic 
climate tends to limit individual agency. This is probably the reason why; despite the 
winter that turns the streets of the city into muddy paths, women continue to wear black 
suits and varnished shoes. That is also probably what can explain the fact that despite the 
                                                
50 Jihad (literally, ‘struggle’ in Arabic) is an Islamic term and a religious duty of Muslims. Jihad requires 
Muslims to ‘struggle in the way of God’, i.e to constantly improve themselves and society. Jihad that 
involves actual combats against the enemies of Islam is regulated by Islamic jurisprudence and represents a 
secondary form of struggle (See p 243). I use this expression here to describe the internal dilemmas of 
some female University students faced while trying to achieve the ideal of the ‘good’ Muslim girl and still 
appearing as ‘modern’ and ‘liberated’. 
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chadari that totally conceals their faces, some women still wear heavy jewellery, make-up 
and bright colored clothes under the veil.  
However, interest in beauty is not a specifically feminine characteristic. Acts of 
self-beautification can indeed be observed across gender. Under the Taliban regime, for 
instance, Titanic was one among the many Western movies that could be found on the 
black market. The movie, released in 1997, became such a phenomenon in Kabul that 
the bazaar located along the Kabul River got popularly renamed Titanic market (Hosseini 
2007). Fascinated by the romantic figure embodied by Leonardo Di Caprio, young men 
in Kabul started to let their hair grow just below the ear, in an attempt to copy the actor’s 
physical appearance. In order to avoid getting caught by the religious police that had 
made short hair compulsory for men, some barbers in Kabul had slightly modified the 
actor’s original haircut: only the hair layers on the top head were kept long while the 
underneath hair were shaved according to authorities’ prescriptions so that long hair 
could be hidden under a knitted Islamic cap. In the novel Kabul Beauty School (Rodriguez 
2008), American beautician Deborah Rodriguez recounts how the trick got eventually 
discovered by a Talib during a compulsory collective azan (prayer) in a mosque and how 
the Kabul hairdresser was eventually sent to prison. After the fall of the Taliban regime, 
the ‘Titanic haircut’ became authorized again and hairdressers started to advertise it on 
their front store’s windows. Men were getting shaved and bodybuilding centres 
reopened. Young men thrived to resemble famous Bollywood actors with their wet look, 
their tight blue jeans, their leather jackets and their muscular bodies. Like cosmetics for 
women, t-shirts perfectly fitting the curves of men’s muscles became the material 
symbols of the ‘liberation’.  
 
a. Bodies  as s i t es  o f  pol i t i ca l  s trugg le  
 
Our bodies and actions, according to Bourdieu (1984), rather than primarily 
cognitive models, encode cultural meanings. We bring forth worlds or make our lives 
meaningful, not only with language, rituals and works but also in and on our very bodies. 
Bourdieu claims that how one chooses to present one’s social space to the world, one’s 
aesthetic dispositions, depicts one’s status and distances oneself from lower groups. The 
motivations behind some of the dormitory girls’ pursuit of beauty, against dominant 
discourses reaffirming women’s modesty as a fundamental principle of Islam, have to be 
explored and questioned. Why were some female students refusing to follow the classic 
dressing code when the potential repercussions (gossips, sexual harassment, arguments 
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with relatives) for their non-conformity were so harsh? Were they trying to make a public 
statement when, on Fridays they made their way through the narrow alleys of the bazaar, 
wearing lipstick and bright coloured veils? Or were their bodies simply the passive 
objects of globalization and its standardized consumption items? 
Post-war periods are peculiar for the new possibilities that seem to suddenly open 
up. During my first journey in Afghanistan in 2003, just a few months after the downfall 
of the Taliban regime, women’s magazines were exhibited on newsagents’ stalls, their 
laminated front covers showing women’s faces in multiple colors when in the streets of 
Kabul most women continued to cover under their chadari.  
In the limbo that marked the post-war, between 2002 and 2007, everyone in 
Kabul seemed to be experimenting with the old and the new. Somehow, girls of room 42 
were doing the same: testing boundaries and evaluating the scope of possibilities. After a 
while, I got so used to the girls’ beauty habits that it took me a single look to tell where 
they were about to go. In Shar-e-Naw, the city centre, it was more common to see young 
women wearing jeans, semi-long jackets and make-up in the newly built shopping malls. 
In Kut-e Sangi bazaar, a few minutes drive away from the University, the crowd was more 
traditional and women tended to cover more with chadari and face-covering veils. On the 
University campus, despite its shabby aspect, and more prominently inside of the girls’ 
dormitory, I would have a permanent fashion show. When visiting their families, girls 
would generally avoid wearing make-up. Length of veils and colours changed according 
to places and circumstances. The post-war period had created pockets of expressive 
spaces – often linked to consumption spaces - in the urban landscape.  
In the narrow alleys of the bazaar, the group constituted by the girls of room 42, 
with colourful square veils, tight blouses, blue jeans, trainers and make-up, was highly 
noticeable. Men would stare as they passed. Women under their chadari would make nasty 
comments. And as the tension around them would increase, girls would start giggling and 
answering back, encouraged by the sense of safety brought by their click. ‘He has 
pinched my bottom!’ suddenly screamed Zoora as we were trying to make our way 
through an overcrowded path of the bazaar. The guilty (luckily) small man bent his head 
down and wormed into the crowd as if not concerned by the scandal he had provoked.  
But he was soon pulled back by an enraged Zoora, ready to give him a good lesson .  
‘What have you done, bacha sack (son of a dog)? What have you done?’ she 
screamed in a fury while slapping his face over and over again with a finely nailed 
polished hand. People stopped walking, interrupted in their activity by a scene that I had 
myself never witnessed before. A bookseller finally stepped out of his shop to intervene 
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in the fight. ‘What are you doing, dokhtar (girl)?’ the panicked man said while walking 
towards Zoora, raising his hands to the sky. ‘Let’s get out of here Zoora!’ pleaded Lutfia 
who sensed things would turn wrong. ‘This man is a pig! He is a dirty pig!’ Zoora said 
her face turned red of emotions. And she shaved him down like a rubbish bag, the man 
falling onto the bookseller’s array, books being displayed all over. We all ran away as fast 
as we could. In the evening, the story of the event spread like gun powder in the 
dormitory, Zoora being visited by small groups of girls eager to get a first-hand version 
of the story. And she always finished her narration on this note: ‘If we don’t react, they 
(men) will think we like it and they will continue doing it (harassing women in the 
bazaar)!’ (Fieldnotes, 11/05/2007). 
In the dormitory’s corridors, girls’ comments revealed a mixture of admiration 
and disapproval. ‘What do they expect if they hang out in the bazaar dressed up like 
that?’ I heard a girl saying outside of Zoora’s room. Girls coming from poorer or more 
conservative families or/and from rural areas perceived girls who spent time besides 
their studies, at work, shopping in the bazaar, applying make-up in their rooms or giving 
calls to their friends as a threat to their own credibility in their claims to be dedicated 
students. To them, girls of room 42 were wasting their parents’ trust and would better 
study harder instead of concentrating on their physical appearance. At the same time, the 
fact that the story came from Zoora made the whole event more acceptable. Indeed, 
Zoora was already a powerful figure in the dormitory. Her mother was a rich divorcée 
and a Representative of Badakhshan province at the National Assembly. Her aunt was 
Zakia Zaki, a radio journalist of Sada-e Suhl (Voice of Peace) who made herself famous 
for criticising local commanders and who was found shot dead in her house in June 
2007, a few weeks after I recorded these events. The first time I met Zoora’s mum, she 
had asked me only one question: ‘Are you married?’ and my negative answer had 
immediately satisfied her: ‘I will like you only for that. Men are problems, problems’ she 
had replied with a determined smile (Fieldnotes, 22/02/2007). 
Because of her mother’s political position, the dormitory’s director had selected 
Zoora as a girls’ representative. Her task mostly consisted in reporting girls’ demands to 
the dormitory’s administration and mediating disputes. In return for her services, she had 
been given a room of her own on the third floor. Zoora’s position and the authority she 
had gained from it made her a well respected and feared girl with whom no-one dared to 
argue. I would learn too late that it was better to have her on your side than to have her 
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as an enemy51. She would openly give a call to her ‘boyfriend’ in front of everyone and 
ask him to buy her shirini (sweets) and other presents that he would rush to bring her on 
the same day, in front of the dorm’s front gate. Zoora’s capacity to openly transgress 
gender norms, her ‘capacity to aspire’, to use Appadurai’s expression (2004) stemmed 
from her upper class background, her position of authority within the dormitory and the 
support she received from female members of her family. This is not to say that the 
other girls’ aspirations were radically different from those of Zoora but their capacity to 
phrase these aspirations and act according to them without too much compromise were 
constrained and limited by their lower class status.  
As the event that took place in the bazaar demonstrates, displaying non 
conventional corporeal garments in public spaces traditionally reserved to men like the 
bazaar was an extremely courageous act. The verbal aggressions and sexual harassment 
that ensued are revealing of the very narrow line in which these young women had to 
manoeuvre. It is doubtful that without Zoora’s encouragements the other girls would 
have dared behaving against the social norm of female shyness and modesty. But Zoora’s 
direct confrontation with her aggressor cannot be understood without taking into 
account her specific social location. If we consider that desires, bodies and behaviours 
are socially constructed, then notions of class and social capital informed Zoora’s 
performance. The task of realizing her right to respect in a situation where she appeared 
as a minority placed her in conflictual relations with a variety of structures of authority: 
some grounded in instituted standards of Islamic authority, some in masculine authority. 
Yet the logic of these conflicts had no predefined postulate and therefore cannot be 
understood by reference to arguments for gender equality or resistance to male authority 
alone.  Of course it can be argued that the practical effect of these practices may be 
analyzed in terms of their role in undermining structures of male domination. But with 
Saba Mahmood (2001, 2009), I agree that such a binary reading in terms of resistance vs 
subordination ‘is insufficiently attentive to motivations, desires, and goals that are 
necessarily captured by these terms’.  
                                                
51 In June 2007, I was asked to leave the dormitory. Zoora had reported me to the dormitory’s director as a 
negative influence on the other girls and as a threat to the dormitory’s reputation. However, the final 
decision to make me leave was influenced by other political developments pertaining to ‘equal access 
opportunities’. Indeed, the Ministry of Higher Education had refused several Afghan female students’ 
access to the dormitory based on the reason that the faculties in which they studied (music and dramatic 
art) were attached to the Ministry of Culture and not the MHE which was responsible for the 
administration of the dorm. The presence of a Westerner in the dorm was therefore in contradiction with 
their argument. But Zoora’s words to the director had undeniably further limited my chances to defend my 
case. 
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It is difficult to evaluate the extent to which the motivations that guided Zoora’s 
response were rooted in the social capital she had gained as a daughter of an upper-class, 
well-off and well respected family or in a feminist agenda to which she would have been 
acquainted as a daughter of a prominent female political figure. Probably both elements 
of her social capital played out at that very moment. But comparing her to other upper 
class politically conscious women I met during my fieldwork in Afghanistan, Zoora’s 
outspokenness was very much the product of her age. None of the elder women who 
had a greater political experience and broader knowledge of the political context 
considered direct confrontation as an efficient strategy to achieve change. Instead of 
engaging in a ‘lipstick jihad’ as Zoora and other girls did, older women opted for 
dissimulation (performed compliance to gender norms) to confront hegemonic 
interpretations of gender relations (see chapter 6).  
 
b. Fashionable ,  Modern and Musl im 
 
Girls who displayed their pampered and fashionable appearance most 
consistently and across most contexts were the ones who had recently returned to 
Afghanistan and who knew very little about their country. Some of them were even born 
abroad, in Iran, Pakistan or further afield. This was for instance the case of Roqia and 
Maryam, two sisters who studied foreign languages at the University and worked part 
time in a shop on an ISAF military base located on the road to Jalalabad. Maryam and 
Roqia’s father, a military officer, fled to Iran when the Russians invaded the country. He 
met his wife in Isfahan, where he worked as an electrician. Maryam and Roqia had never 
visited Afghanistan prior to their family’s return in 2002. If they had heard about the 
Taliban and if their imagination was filled with the horror stories they had heard in the 
foreign press and through friends and relatives, girls who had been brought up abroad 
had never personally experienced the fear, beatings and humiliations of the other girls 
who stayed in Afghanistan during their rule. As a result of this radically different life 
experience, girls of room 42 could intellectually and emotionally afford the cost of 
‘lipstick jihad’.   
The way violence is processed in the everyday life of Afghan women who have 
experienced the trauma of Islamic fundamentalism and civil war would necessitate 
greater investigation. However, I would like to mention here that the narratives of these 
women defy all the expectations of the Western anthropologist. These stories, often told 
during women’s gatherings, frequently led to collective outbreaks of tears and 
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lamentation traditionally performed by women during funerals. The notion of ‘poisonous 
knowledge’ Veena Das (2000) uses to describe violence committed against women 
during the Partition of India is a useful tool to analyse the process by which women’s 
subjectivity is transformed through the experience of violence52. In the current absence 
of reparative justice and with the social stigma attached to rape victims in Afghanistan, 
women have had to develop coping strategies in order to make their lives meaningful 
again. By processing violence within local structures of feelings, women have tended to 
root their subjectivity within the social order and create continuity instead of resisting the 
norms responsible for their subjugation.  
In a shrine located next to Jalalabad, for instance, mullahs became specialized in 
healing ‘crazy women’ (zan-e dewana) with exorcism and taweez53. The small consultation 
room located just behind the shrine was filled with women and their in-laws who had 
sometimes walked for several hours in order to get treatment. When I started to 
interview these women, it became clear that they had all their head and that what was 
locally diagnosed as ‘madness’ due to ‘attacks of jinns’ (evil spirits) was instead the result 
of trauma linked to violence (domestic or political). Women’s inappropriate behaviours 
in public such as walking bare-head in the village, refusing to participate in house chores, 
neglecting their physical appearance and their children were symptoms locally 
understood as ‘female madness’. But by subjecting themselves to masculine mediation to 
treat their ‘disease’ and sticking to gender stereotypes, women were using the only 
available means to express their distress and attract empathy. Violence was consumed 
and mediated within locally recognised structures of feelings. I further explore these 
feminine performances in chapter 7 but I think it is important to bear these 
developments in mind if we want to understand the radically different positions the 
young women I describe in this chapter occupied.  
Maryam and Roqia’s work with foreign soldiers, their use of Farsi expressions 
when they talked and more significantly the veils and clothes they wore distinguished 
them from the other dormitory girls. Mariam and Roqia wore colourful square veils tied 
up under their chin, bright colored T-shirts under tight black blouses, jeans and trainers. 
They drew the contour of their eyes with black eyeliner and plucked their eyebrows in a 
                                                
52 Das (1996), in discussing the violence on women during the partition of India, urges us to consider 
women’s ability to survive the ongoing presence of this pain not so much as dramatic transgression and 
defiance, but in terms of the ‘doing of little things’, that does not have the sense of ‘passive submission but 
of an active engagement’ (1996, 11-12). The experience of pain does not fully translates itself into passive 
suffering but enables certain ways of inhabiting the world that must be explored through an analysis of the 
language in which pain resides.  
53 Taweez are pieces of paper on which people write Koranic ayahs or some of the names of Allah and 
then put them in a necklace or something to wear it. 
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straight shape. They were, in short, the perfect Teheran girls. But even though both of 
them were targets of ferocious gossips by other dormitory girls and by people from their 
neighbourhood and as a result were singled out as khaliji (foreigners), Maryam and Roqia 
kept on wearing make-up, fancy veils and the clothes they brought with them from 
Iran54. When I asked them why they did not try to change some of their habits in order 
to avoid harmful comments, Maryam replied: 
 
Girls at the dorm are totally stupid. You know, the relationships that we have with foreigners are 
much easier than the relationships we have with Afghans. We feel that we are Afghans but with a 
superior culture. You know, in foreign countries, when a girl is working and is financially 
independent, it is perceived as something positive. Foreigners have a different culture and a 
different religion, but they think the same way as us. Here, it is not the same. It is very difficult for 
us to feel like foreigners in our own country. But it’s like that. If we don’t live here, where can we 
go? Afghanistan will develop one day and people will change their mind. (Interview - Roqia & 
Maryam, 08/05/2007) 
 
 Convinced as they were to belong to a ‘superior culture’, Maryam and Roqia were 
not willing to be associated with the more traditional-looking dormitory girls who wore 
large veils and loose shalwar kameez and whom they jokingly called ‘Taliban’. It seemed 
therefore natural to them to embody an identity in agreement with their understanding of 
modernity and by doing so, to reject dressing practices they considered backward. Girls 
of room 42 had made the choice to confront gossips and backbiting in order to assert 
their modern, fashionable and yet Muslim self. 
 According to Goffman (1969), there is a similarity between the actions of 
individuals in social encounters and theatrical performances. Each of us is engaged in 
performances designed to manage others’ perceptions. There is a need to tailor one’s 
performance to one’s audience. This performance has particular goals, what Goffman 
calls ‘tactical self presentation’. Honing our performances according to what we think we 
know about our audience’s expectations results in appearing to be different people in 
different situations.  
Girls of room 42 were far from neglecting to manage others’ impressions. What 
they ‘gave’, the verbal symbols and attitudes they used to convey information about 
                                                
54 During our interview, Roqia and Maryam showed me some pictures of their lives Teheran. They 
recounted with great nostalgia the picnics they had in Teheran’s parks with their family and friends on 
Friday, the comfort of the apartment they shared with relatives and the friendship they developed with 
Iranians. They remembered Iran as a place where they could mix more easily with boys and girls alike, even 
though they had to beware of the moral police. Their descriptions of Teheran youth echoed the ones of 
Kaveh Basmenji in his book Teheran Blues: Youth Culture in Iran (2005). 
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themselves and prevent false expectations, contradicted what they physically ‘gave off’ in 
public. In other words, girls were constantly involved in negotiating their appearance by 
using discursive justifications and disciplining their body in order to maintain their 
reputation. In public, their physical non-conformity was counter-balanced by a strict 
moral conformity to Islamic norms of modesty.  
While I walked in the street with Massoma, for instance, she often reminded me 
not to laugh or speak too loudly. A girl laughing in public is perceived in Afghanistan, 
like in many other Muslim countries, as wanting to attract men’s attention. Such an 
attitude is understood as a form of ‘openness’, a sign of availability that goes against 
social expectations of female modesty. Under the chadari, women’s closedness, 
containment and modesty were materially visible. I was often surprised to hear the lively 
conversations women had in bazaars, talking to each other through their chadari and 
bargaining with merchants.  
In the absence of this sartorial device, girls of room 42 had to make extra efforts 
to conform to the ideal of female closedness and modesty (Meneley 2007; Makhlouf 
1979; Popenoe 2004). This meant, in practice, walking straight without watching around, 
looking determined in order to prevent being seen as a loiterer, and avoiding any facial 
expression that could be read as ‘having a good time’: girls had to show that they were 
walking with a purpose. Their personal bodies, despite appearances, did not exist outside 
the social context in which they manoeuvred. Girls, indeed, had to ‘perform closedness’ 
since their bodies were displaying opposite meanings.  
However, such performances were mostly a means to prove to themselves and to 
other girls hanging out with them that they were good and moral Muslim girls for 
external observers were hardly able to read these signs. The constant comments to which 
they were subjected when walking the streets proved that local interpretations of female 
modesty and shyness as primarily displayed through ‘proper’ Islamic clothing were 
prevailing. It was not rare to hear women in buses commenting on young women’s 
clothes. Colourful clothes and make-up were indeed corporeal ornaments considered as 
appropriate only within the intimate sphere of the home.  But as a result of their 
education abroad and their position as breadwinners within their families, girls of room 
42 had a very different understanding of the principles of ‘shyness’ and ‘closedness’ that 
were meant to apply to their sex. Despite their efforts to perform ‘shyness’ through other 
means, girls of room 42 were read as provocative transgressors in the social imaginary. In 
the context of the Islamic Republic, the public sphere was institutionalized and imagined 
as a site for the implementation of a religious and ‘traditional’ way of life. In a Muslim 
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context, women’s corporeal visibility and social mixing in men’s spaces all counted as 
‘foreign’ and contrary to Islamic values.  
The value attached to female bodies’ closedness in Islamic cultures has been 
explored by Popenoe (2004) in her study of female fatness among the Azawagh Arabs of 
Niger. The forced-feeding of young girls in this society is intended to accelerate the 
process of sexual maturity because fatness is closely associated with womanliness. The 
sooner a girl has assumed the contours and curves that come with corpulence, the sooner 
she is considered of a marriageable age (Popenoe 2004, 44-45). Popenoe contends that in 
becoming fat, Azawagh Arab women actively cultivate an aesthetic of ‘stillness, 
steadiness and closedness’ which is in direct opposition to the aesthetic of men that 
valorizes ‘hardness, uprightness and mobility’ (Popenoe 2004, 191). According to Islamic 
scriptures, men and women are radically different kinds of beings that are best 
harmonized when opposed to one another. By disciplining their bodies to fatten, women 
prove themselves able to control the dangers of their own desires and thus prove willing 
to forego their own interest in favour of the interests of their society.  
In the Azawagh Arabs’ culture, like in Afghanistan, negative values are placed on 
that which is porous and open while positive values are placed on that which is closed 
and contained. In order to achieve the ideal of closedness, women therefore tend to 
marry close relatives, to remain remote from other ethnic groups and to close off their 
bodies through veiling and fattening. By wearing chadari, women actively reproduce the 
ideal of female closedness while showing their participation in a moral way of life, in 
which the separation of men and women’s spheres symbolizes the distinct and 
complementary roles of men and women.  Chadari works as a reminder that a woman 
belongs to her family and home, not with public spaces where strangers mingle. Chadari 
is to be understood, as Abu-Lughod puts it, as a sort of ‘mobile home’ (Abu-Lughod 
2002, 785).  
It must be stressed that unmarried women are not expected to wear this long 
enveloping robe. Young women classically wear long rectangular cotton chader of clear 
colors (beige or white symbolize purity), with delicately embroidered edges. Women start 
covering themselves under chadari when they get married, as a form of recognition of 
their new status as wives. When they become older and the pleasant appearance of their 
youth has passed - their sexual attractiveness has faded away and they are no more 
marriageable - they tend to abandon the chadari for long veils. 
Precepts addressing proper behaviours between men and women who mix 
outside kinship bonds appear in the Koran on two occasions: 
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Say to the believing men that they should lower their gaze and guard their modesty. This will be 
most conductive to their purity. Verily, God is aware of what you do. 
And say to the believing woman that they should lower they gaze and guard their modesty; that 
they should not display their beauty and ornaments except what ordinarily appear thereof; that 
they should draw their veils over their bosoms and should not display their beauty to any but their 
husbands, their fathers …(and certain other members of the household). Let them not stamp 
their feet so as to reveal what they hide of their adornments. O believers, turn onto God all of 
you so that you may succeed. (Dawood 2003. 24:30, 31) 
 
 Women, in advanced years, who do not hope for marriage, incur no sin if they discard their 
garments, provided that they do not aim at a showy display of their charm. But, it is better for 
them to abstain from this. God is All-hearing All-Knowing. (Dawood 2003, 24:60)  
 
According to Muslim theologians (Mernissi 1992), the modesty emphasized in 
these passages encompasses all aspects of life and calls for decency, humility and 
moderation in speech, attitude, dress and total behaviour. Modesty prevents human 
beings from indulging in indecency, vanity and obscenity. The Islamic rule of dressing 
modestly applies to both men and women but religiously appropriate modest dressing 
has come to connote especially female clothing. This is mostly because women are 
generally thought of in terms of their sexual attractiveness, their essential weakness and 
their need of protection on one hand, and in terms of their strong sexual impulses which 
threaten the honour of males on the other hand. The veil therefore operates as a double 
protective shield: ‘against external offences of society and against women’s inherent evil’ 
(Makhlouf 1979, 38).  
What happens, then, when women do not appear to follow the mainstream 
aesthetics and politics of the veil? Should such practices be interpreted as 
‘transgressions’, as a repudiation of socially shared standards, religious beliefs and moral 
ideals? By wearing headscarves of different shapes, colors and patterns, girls of room 42 
were slightly changing its meaning: from purely functional garments, their veils were 
turned into fashion accessories. Their make-up was matching the color of their veils, and 
by putting such an effort in selections and arrangements, girls answered their personal 
desire to appear beautiful, fashionable and modern. But in their own opinion, these 
practices were not contradicting religious values. Girls were constantly reminding each 
other that they were Muslims and that as such, they had to behave in a particular way. 
They justified their attention to how they looked by citing the Islamic principle 
stipulating that Believers should have a pleasant and beautiful appearance. Rather than 
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transgressions, girls’ beauty practices revealed the tensions and frictions between the 
contradictory expectations in which they were caught.  
The pressure to look beautiful and fashionable mostly came from their peers but 
also from their work place where internationals tended to value Afghan women who 
displayed an emancipated Self. At work, the modern gendered subject was constituted 
through women role models and repetitive performances, including language styles and 
dress codes. This external pressure was revealed to me when Naheed, a woman 
employed in a local women’s organization in Kabul, told me how her application to a 
position in a foreign embassy was turned down because of her wearing hijab, a long 
overcoat and a veil covering everything except the face and hands. ‘They basically made 
me understand that if I wanted the job, I had to make an effort in the way I dressed’, she 
said (Fieldnotes, 09/10/2007). She then went on explaining that her husband was happy 
for her to work outside of the house as long as she wore proper Islamic clothes. It is 
difficult to know whether this was common practice among foreign employers but it 
anyhow remained a tacit rule to give advantage to women who could represent the ideal 
of a liberated feminity the international community was eager to promote.  
As a matter of fact, the imperative of ‘beautiful and pleasant appearance’ was the 
subject of different and conflicting interpretations. More traditional segments of society 
would associate this principle with a concern for health and hygiene: a proper Islamic 
dress should be functional, clean and not attract attention. University working girls 
generally considered jeans, tighter and shorter jackets more suitable for the lifestyle of 
active women. The actual practice of clothing was in fact a subjective experience, shaped 
by various personal and social factors as well as scriptural interpretations. If all the 
dormitory girls agreed with the principle of modesty, they had different understanding of 
what could be considered as modest and not sexually attractive dresses.  
By tying up their veils differently, and choosing different patterns, fabrics, sizes, 
shapes and designs, girls of room 42, like many other Afghan girls employed or seeking 
employment opportunities, were exploring and negotiating its symbolic potentiality. 
Their head-covering practices embodied their struggle between remaining faithful to the 
Koranic principles on religiously appropriate dressing and constructing a fashionable, 
beautiful and modern appearance. Girls of room 42 spent a considerable amount of time 
in shops looking at the latest veils’ arrivals, usually buying a few of them at once, to 
match their different dresses and the colour of their skin or to offer as presents to their 
friends. Choices of colours, patterns and shapes were influenced by a variety of factors: 
female TV presenters, Indian movies stars, advertisement, comments from others and 
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personal understanding of ‘appropriate Islamic clothes’. Lutfia, for instance, mostly wore 
black square veils tied up under the chin as she considered black as a decent and ‘chic’ 
color and the square foulard practical. Maryam often wore the hood she had brought 
from Iran, for similar practical reasons: she enjoyed the fact that she did not have to 
think about fixing it all the time, once it was on her head it would not move. Roqia and 
Maryam were more fashion-oriented as a result of their greater exposure to the feminine 
press and the fashion industry during their years of exile in Iran. 
 However, achieving a beautiful yet not sexually attractive look was a complex 
task that required a lot of calculation and beauty work. Girls would generally comment 
on each others’ scarves, go shopping for scarves in small groups and be attentive to each 
others’ advice. Girls were also very susceptible to comments they received from others. 
They spent considerable time and effort to have their veil look straight and symmetrical 
on their head. In scarves shops, girls tried them on in front of a mirror and checked the 
comfort quality of the fabric, the good position of their motives, the matching of their 
colours with their own skin colours. They also took a particular care of their veils: 
washing, ironing and storing them with great meticulousness. The time and effort 
expended on daily head-covering practices and the signification of the beautification had 
many similarities with hair works undertaken by women in other countries.  
 A prevailing discourse among the more fashion-conscious covered girls was that 
proper Islamic dresses had to be beautiful and that their work in foreign organizations 
necessitated a more modern approach to dressing. Girls were well aware that physical 
appearance helped creating a distinction with other dormitory girls, while creating 
rapprochement with foreigners. Their emphasis on appearance indicated not only the 
new meanings of covering available in a society that was slowly opening to market 
economy but also, at a deeper level, the quest for being ‘modern’.  
 For working girls like Roqia, Mariam, Massoma and Lutfia, and for girls who had 
lived abroad during the war in general, women in chadari were symbols of the oppressed 
Other, symbols of women who would always be excluded from modernity. In their 
understanding, girls wearing the traditional chader today were the ones who would accept 
the chadari tomorrow if their husbands asked for it. In contrast, dormitory girls who were 
sympathetic to longer chader felt they were closer to religious principles of modesty and 
resistance to luxury consumerism. By wearing formal chader, they showed their entire 
dedication to the quest of knowledge, a central pillar of Islam and the primary purpose of 
their presence in the dormitory. Girls of room 42, on the other hand, despised such girls 
quite overtly, calling them ‘Taliban’ and mocking their ‘old fashioned’ style. ‘These girls 
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have never been abroad and they have never worked’, Roqia told me once, ‘the only 
thing they know is their village and what the mullah has taught them. They think women 
should listen to men and do whatever they say.’ (Fieldnotes, 04/04/2007) 
The opposition between Islam and Western consumerism that gradually emerged 
in the urban landscape challenged the stability of commonly shared Islamic values. 
Consumerism promised a range of possible lifestyles that suddenly competed with, or 
contradicted the uniform lifestyle demanded by Islamic conservatism. As Navaro-Yashin 
(2002) argues in the case of the re-veiling movement in Turkey, globalization together 
with the transnational circuits of desires created as a result of economic exchanges, have 
reinforced contestations around cultural issues. Consequently, the intellectual separation 
of ‘culture’ from the ‘economy’ is artificial as it fails to uncover the ways by which 
commodification shapes politics of culture (Navaro-Yashin 2002, 79).  
The actual dressing practices of urban, educated and working women that I 
observed in the Dormitory contest the stereotypical discourses and images about covered 
women, complicating the tension between Islam and consumerism (Sandikci et Ger 
2005). The aesthetics and politics of the veil that I have described in this section show 
that veiling in contemporary Kabul has become an unstable sign, a cultural codifier of 
the tensions and promises of modernity. The veil as a fashion accessory connotes a 
political posture but also a rank and an identity. Urban educated working women, like the 
girls of room 42 striving to look modern and Muslim, are not mere symbolic repositories 
of the tensions between Islam and Western consumerism. The selection and wearing of 
veils entail an elaborate process that requires invocation of economic and cultural 
capitals. The actual practices and discourses of these young women indicate the 
personalized nature of Islamic covering. The beauty work around the veil gives the 
subject the sense of a self-constructing person, who can take control of her own body 
and image. Personalization and bodywork together create a sense of modern agency that 
is free to choose and shape. Through their continual attention to their physical 
appearance, girls of room 42 were not simply the symbolic repositories of conflicting 
interpretation of culture/religion but they were actively involved in making or in 
renegotiating culture/religion. In their capacity of ‘resistance’ and ‘transformation’, these 
girls’ bodies became tools or templates for reinterpreting culture. 
Of course, their capacity to aspire to a ‘modern’ self-image was also the result of 
the cultural hybridity that had marked their upbringing. Raised abroad, Maryam, Roqia, 
Massoma and Lutfia had a greater panel of possibilities at their disposal to negotiate 
cultural and social norms. Unlike the other girls who stayed in Afghanistan during the 
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Taliban regime, girls of room 42 had never directly experienced the beatings or the fear 
of the religious police. In this respect, the audacity with which they negotiated their 
appearance in public settings was less a sign of courage than a reflection of this 
fundamental ignorance. But if girls’ personal positions - urban, educated, cosmopolitan 
and financially autonomous- somehow explained the underlying scripts behind their 
claim to modern identity, the power of the market in shaping their aspirations should 
also be acknowledged.   
The availability of fashion and cosmetics in the shops of Kabul while on TV 
alternative images of women started to appear in commercials, TV programs and soap 
operas changed the modalities of young women’s relations to their bodies and 
subjectivities. As Sabdickci and Ger (2005, 80) argue, ‘the domination of market 
capitalism and its discourses of modernity, individuality and independence, propagated 
by tools such as marketing, advertising, fashion and media’ cannot be ignored. It is 
important to take into account the broader economic, political and social contexts in 
which new identities emerge. The identities that were produced among young women 
involved in this ‘lipstick jihad’ revealed the complex and conflicting nature of the 
‘biopolitics’ that structured their lives. 
While they viewed fashion and cosmetics as a conscious personal choice in search 
of modern Islamic identity of an elite status, girls in actuality attempted to model 
themselves on the heroines of the Indian soap operas they watched everyday on TV. 
They wanted, like Tulsi and Perena, to look beautiful. They aspired to marry a liberal 
man, to be professionally successful while remaining caring, self-sacrificing and good 
Muslims in the eyes of their relatives. But taking such a political stand in an atmosphere 
marked by a return to religious orthodoxy was certainly a courageous act, that was often 
made possible thanks to the support of parents and relatives. ‘Sometimes, my parents ask 
me why I have abandoned my traditional clothes. My mother does not like it very much 
when I wear blue jeans. But I explain her that I cannot wear village clothes in Kabul. My 
parents trust me and they know I am working hard for the family. They know I am not 
lying to them or hiding anything from them’, Lutfia explained (Interview – Lutfia, 
12/09/2007).  
With or without lipstick, and despite girls’ claims to independence and autonomy, 
the social norm of male control over female presence in public space kept its primacy 
over women’s control over their bodies. This gender politics was not only pertinent for 
covered girls who simply wore classic Islamic clothes, but for girls involved in fashion 
and beauty work in general. While the latter felt a sense of empowerment provided by 
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the personalization of their appearance, the efforts they made to project their aesthetic 
judgments, religious interpretations and social position on their own bodies revealed the 
new forms of self discipline that came to regiment their lives.  In the model of 
performance operative in room 42 and among working-class female University students 
in general, one had to ‘retutor the body to behave in a different way in order to 
destabilize or disrupt the solidity of norms’ (Mahmood 2001, 217). Through these 
creative and skillful negotiations of the principles of Islam and the ideals of beauty and 
fashion, these young women attempted to enlarge the scope of their possibilities in the 
public domain. Paradoxically, this entailed both possibilities and limitations, since 
increased visibility often meant girls had to make extra efforts to activate their Muslim 
Self.  
 
Conclusion: Negotiating modernity 
 
The description I have made of these young women’s everyday beauty practices 
is not meant to romanticise their resistance to social norms. Their jihad remained, after 
all, nothing more than a ‘lipstick jihad’, a conflict over meanings and values, expressed 
through symbols and physical displays. However, these practices, despite their 
marginality, should not be trivialized either, as they help us to better understand the 
power relations at stake in the societies we study. As Abu-Lughod advises, feminist 
ethnographers must not only look for ‘hopeful confirmation of failure – or partial failure 
of systems of oppression’ but also ‘respect everyday resistance not just by arguing for the 
dignity or heroism of the resistors but by letting their practices teach us about the 
complex workings of historically changing structures of power’ (Abu-Lughod 1990, 53).  
 In the limbo that marked the Post-Taliban period, girls of room 42 were testing 
the boundaries of the social order with the only means they had at their disposal: fashion, 
cosmetics and soaps. They used their bodies as templates to project their views regarding 
religion and beauty and construct a modern Islamic identity and class status. It can be 
argued that these simple forms of feminine ‘anti-discipline’ (De Certeau 1984) were 
tactics that combined both elements of compliance to gender hierarchies and elements of 
subversion of these hierarchies. The idea De Certeau develops regarding spaces of 
resistance as dis-located from those of the powerful is I think useful to understand the 
texture of these performances. Indeed, girls of room 42 were less invested in resisting 
structural relations on face-to-face grounds. Most of the time, ‘beauty performances’ 
were taking place in ‘semi-public spaces’, i. e in the dormitory itself where girls organised 
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parties among themselves to celebrate other girls’ engagement, and competed for the 
most beautiful make-up, dress and hairstyle. These deliberately hidden spaces were 
saturated with memories, fantasies and ‘cracked sounds of pleasure and enjoyment’ (Pile 
and Keith 1997, 17).  
As I have attempted to show through the ethnographic material used in this 
chapter, differences between individuals are not a simple matter of gender, but are also 
shaped by other identity patterns such as age, class and ethnicity. The specific position of 
the girls of room 42 as educated, urban, working-class and returnees, were influential 
factors in the decisions they made to present a modern Islamic identity.  
The moral panics that have emerged as a result of the arrival of ‘foreign’ 
consumption products on the Afghan market and growing popular discontent regarding 
the presence of the international community are indicative of the narrow room women 
have at their disposal to negotiate their public visibility. While calls in favour of the 
application of stricter Islamic orthodoxy have intensified in the political domain, most 
women have opted for strategies of dissimulation in order to access enclosed public 
spaces. These practices are explored in the chapter that follows. 
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Chapter 6 
Visible under the Veil: Dissimulation, Performance and 
Agency in an Islamic Public Space 
 
 
 
Chadari (burqa) seller in Herat, October 2007 © Julie Billaud 
 
 
Khâ I na-shawi raswâ amrang-ejamâ’at bâsh 
Not to be considered strange, conform to the crowd 
- Persian proverb 
 
In the previous chapter, I have analysed micro-practices of ‘resistance’ or to use 
De Certeau’s terms, dispersed tactics of ‘anti-discipline’55 (de Certeau 1984) among a 
segment of the girls living in the Women’s National Dormitory in Kabul, underlying the 
complex negotiations taking place when young women adopt alternative physical displays 
such as cosmetics and fashion accessories in spaces traditionally reserved to men. I have 
demonstrated that the bodywork of these young women is read as a form of 
provocation, a ‘lipstick jihad’ in the public arena when it is actually a common feature of 
                                                
55 De Certeau (1984) distinguishes between actors’ strategies and actors’ tactics. Tactics are ‘opportunities 
seized on the wing (…) clever tricks, knowing how to get away with things, manoeuvres, polymorphic 
simulations, joyful discoveries’ (xix) whereas strategies are more connected with the power that sustains 
them (xx).  
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women’s gatherings (especially at wedding ceremonies) during which showing a beautiful 
persona is a means to maintain a family’s reputation and strengthen ties with the broader 
community and kin. I associated the panics related to the ‘revealing’ of unmarried girls’ 
bodies with the broader anxieties that have emerged in the Afghan society as a result of 
foreign military occupation. Fears that have crystallised around women’s bodies can be 
explained by notions of ‘vulnerability’ generally associated with womanhood in 
patriarchal societies together with nationalist/militarized masculinities created during the 
war and reactivated by the presence of foreign invaders. In this scenario, masculinity is 
realized through men’s capacity to protect ‘their’ women against foreign ‘enemies’.  
In this chapter, I focus more specifically on women’s dissimulation strategies and 
meanings attached to the chadari (in Dari, burqa in Urdu) in the ‘post-Taliban’ context.  
My intent is to deconstruct Orientalist discourses on the necessity to ‘save Muslim 
women’ (Abu-Lughod 2002) that emerged short after the terrorist attack on the World 
Trade centre and provide a more problematized analysis of women’s veiling practices.  
Indeed, after 9/11, the West has been bombarded with images of Afghan women 
covered from head to toe under their blue burqa. The burqa suddenly became the symbol 
of women’s oppression, rendering the bodiliness of Afghan women a principal marker of 
their absolute ‘otherness’. As a result of these discourses, the necessity to ‘lift the veil’56 
was an argument used to gather public support for the military intervention. Seven years 
after the intervention of the coalition forces, as security continues to worsen and Karzai 
government is attempting to bring the insurgents/Taliban to the negotiations table, 
women have tended to re-veil and use dissimulation instead of exposure as a safer 
strategy to reach public spaces.  
In the West, visibility and power have been defined as synonymous terms rather 
than as historically related positions. This is because, as Silverstein (2008, 119) puts it, 
“the institutionalization of a distinction between the public and the private is considered 
central to the functioning of liberal political culture, as is the situating of religion in the 
private.” Social scientists (Rosaldo and Lamphere 1974; Ortner 1996) have tended to 
analyse gender relations in other societies through the prism of the public/domestic 
divide and to explain the ‘universal oppression of women’ through women’s relegation to 
the domestic domain and their ‘invisibility’ in the public realm. However, as much as 
these categories can be useful to describe women’s situation in Western societies, they 
largely misrepresent the position of women living in Muslim societies. In Afghanistan, 
                                                
56 In December 2001, Time Magazine featured a photo spread of Afghan women without veils, followed by 
a short article claiming that the US victory was the “greatest pageant of mass liberation since the fight for 
suffrage”. 
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masculine and feminine spheres of influence are segregated and oftentimes, 
complementary57 and religion is not alienated from other spheres of life. Normatively, 
women’s veiling is a religious sign of modesty, the marker of gender segregation but 
should not be systematically read as a sign of women’s oppression. As Mahmood (2001, 
353) wisely argues, ‘Muslim woman can only be one of two things, either uncovered, and 
therefore liberated, or veiled, and thus still, to some degree, subordinate (…). We need a 
way to think about the lives of Muslim women outside this simple opposition’.  
Foucault (1977) has analysed how the body is a political field upon which power 
struggles take place. The body is not only a repository of signs but it is also the material 
through which subjectivities are shaped. In this chapter, I show how the disciplining of 
women’s body is never total and absolute but rather constantly challenged, contested and 
negotiated. Afghan women are immensely aware of the conditions under which they 
have to negotiate their entry in the public domain. This knowledge is an embodied 
knowledge. It is the product of long years of war during which women have suffered 
from officially sanctioned discrimination. Visibility, over these past three decades, has 
found new meanings and has been associated with danger. Women’s re-veiling in the 
‘post-Taliban’ context is to be understood taking into account the broader social and 
political context in which it is occurring as well as women’s own analysis of cost and 
opportunities provided by sartorial devices such as the chadari. 
In this chapter, I discuss the different and contradictory meanings attached to 
women’s veiling practices and dissimulation strategies: Where and when women are 
using chadari? For what purposes? Who are the women who are not wearing it? How are 
these signs read and interpreted in public spaces? Through an analysis of women’s self-
presentation, I underline the complex ways in which women are attempting to become 
legitimate actors in the public sphere. Focusing on the veil is not anecdotic since it has 
become the symbolic marker of Muslims’ collective imagination in their encounter with 
the West. Paradoxically, it is through the veil that Muslim women make themselves 
visible, asserting through their ‘hidden’ bodies a set of values that contradict Western 
notions of modernity for which the withdrawal from religion is the prerequisite to 
women’s emancipation and gender equality. Nilüfer Göle in her book Interpénétrations: 
                                                
57 This complementarity is not based on notions of gender equality, even though equity is the guiding value 
behind these arrangements. For further analysis of the sexual division of labour in Afghan rural 
communities, see Lindisfarne-Tapper 1991, 100-131. 
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L’Islam et l’Europe (2005, 126) shows how ‘in the act of wearing a veil one can read the 
critique of a logic of extreme women’s emancipation solely founded on the body’58.  
Scholars working on gender in Islam have often interpreted the various styles of 
veiling available in Muslim societies as embodied markers of particular ways of practicing 
piety or producing pious selves through body discipline (Mahmood 2005) or as an 
expression of opposition to Western definitions of modernity (Mernissi 1992; Kandiyoti 
1991). If all these explanations are valid, my research among women MPs in Afghanistan 
suggests that the performative and strategic dimensions of veiling are the dominant 
motives that guide political women’s gestures. The women I interviewed and observed 
during my fieldwork were more invested in expressing pious identities via clothing than 
in cultivating virtuous selves. Veiling and clothing were part of intricate strategies aiming 
at managing others’ impressions in the context of public interactions where the presence 
of women was broadly considered as ‘abnormal’. Issues of religion and faith were not the 
main centre of their attention, even though all of these women were undeniably strong 
believers.  
 
The first section is a literature review of ethnographic accounts related to gender 
and veiling in the region. I place the veil in its cultural context, in an attempt to shed light 
on the variety of interpretations of male-female relations existing among the different 
ethnic and social groups populating the area.  I also demonstrate that the use of the veil 
is context-specific and therefore entangled in broader communicative patterns that 
impose restraints on both men and women who are unrelated to each other (part 1). The 
second section underlines the ambiguous meanings conveyed by the chadari in the New 
Islamic Republic. As a form of social make-up, the chadari reveals as much as it conceals. 
It is ‘a tool or weapon of domestication and disciplination and of identification, 
subjection and resistance’ (Van Wolputte 2004, 254). The irony that is revealed in the 
case study I develop in this section demonstrates that the use of humour can be an 
effective way for those in lower status positions to covertly express resistance to the 
more powerful (part 2). In the third section, I compare and contrast the public 
performances and experiences of women MPs who have entered the National Assembly 
in 2005. I distinguish between ‘nationalist/jihadis’ women whose strict veiling is a sign of 
opposition to Western influence in internal affairs and ‘liberal’ women whose veiling 
practices are less consistent and more context-specific. By looking at these public 
                                                
58 Translation from the author. The original sentence is: ‘On peut lire dans l’acte de porter le voile la 
critique d’une logique d’émancipation extrême de la femme reposant sur le seul corps’.   
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gestures, I aim to illustrate the ordinary ways in which women struggle daily with cultural 
ideas about the female body and highlight the political and performative dimension of 
women’s clothing (part 3). In the last section, I move on to other forms of dissimulation 
used by politically active women to reach various audiences. The conclusion of this 
exploration is that notions of ‘public’ spaces in Afghanistan are deeply rooted in 
discourses around collective moral values that challenge the liberal Habermasian 
conceptualization of the public as a space removed from ethical considerations (part 4).  
   
1. Honour, veiling and etiquette 
 
It is difficult to generalize about the meaning of the veil in Afghanistan, since 
veiling practices widely vary from one region, ethnic or social group to another. The veil 
is tightly connected to notions of honour or izzat. A woman shows her adherence to the 
honour system by doing pardah59, i.e covering her head and avoiding contacts with 
unrelated men. By doing so, she ensures that the honour of her male relatives (namus) is 
preserved. The veil therefore operates as a mediator of male-female relations in a society 
that puts high value on a social order maintained through human efforts at disciplining 
‘natural inclinations’ (nafs). However, the gamut of interpretations remains quite broad, as 
the variety of veils worn by women ranges from chadari of various colours, to long black 
hijab in the Eastern provinces running alongside Iran, or long colourful veils resting on 
the top of the head in the central highlands of Hazarajat. Ethnographers like Papanek 
(1973) Grima (1992) Maggi (2001) Lindisfarne-Tapper (1991) Anderson (1982) and 
Shalinsky (1986) who researched different tribal communities in this area, come up with 
relatively different findings, even though common trends of interpretations also emerge 
from their work. 
Despite these variations, it can be said that the veil is an instrument aiming to 
accommodate the segregation of unrelated men and women, i.e individuals not belonging 
to the same korwal or ‘inhabitants sharing a household’ (Anderson 1982). The Afghan 
society, like many other honour-based societies, distinguishes between dakhili (the private 
sphere, the household, what should remain hidden, the domain of raza or secrets) and 
biruni (the street, literally, the ‘outside’). Men’s honour (namus) is maintained through their 
capacity to control women and restrict their movements outside of the household. I 
often heard men saying: ‘Zan namus e ma’s’ (‘The woman is our honour’). Soldiers will also 
                                                
59 ‘Pardah’ literally means ‘curtain’. Women are encouraged to ‘do pardah’ after puberty, when they reach a 
marriageable age.  
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say: ‘Watan namus e ma’s’ (‘The nation is our honour’). Women stepping outside of their 
house are traditionally veiled and accompanied by a mahram that is a male relative with 
whom sexual intercourse is virtually impossible because it would be considered 
incestuous. The role of the mahram is to protect women’s honour (izzat). In practice, the 
room to negotiate who should be assigned the mahram’s role is quite broad and varies a 
lot according to the context. I was once surprised to discover that a colleague of mine, 
meant to travel to rural areas around Mazar e Sharif, had been assigned a five-year-old 
boy, her son, as her mahram. 
Namus can be defined as that which is defended by men for honour to be upheld, 
instead of acted upon to achieve honour (such as hospitality). If someone offends the 
rules of the gendered order, then there is reason to act in defence of one’s namus. Namus 
is thus an important institution for maintaining the gender segregated order of the 
society. For instance, women will ‘do pardah’ to maintain the reputation of their family: 
their veil is a sign of their modesty and more generally, of their adherence to the honour 
system (Kakar 2003).  
These rules defined in the Pashtunawali (‘The way of the Pashtuns’, the tribal code 
of honour, a conceptual body of rules passed on by oral tradition) are what make most of 
the Afghan etiquette. Even though Pashtuns represent the largest ethnic group in the 
country (40% of the total population), other ethnic groups such as Uzbek, Tajik, Hazara, 
etc. do abide by a code of honour that presents many similarities with the Pashtun one. It 
can be said that Pashtunwali is applied all over the country, even though with various 
degrees according to the different tribes, religious affiliations and social backgrounds.  
Women’s veiling, in particular under the full covering chadari, is to be understood 
as a means to maintain gender boundaries, a central component of Pashtunwali. The 
chadari operates as a ‘mobile home’ (Abu-Lughod 2002), as a means to maintain women’s 
separation from unrelated men. In Papanek’s words (1973) the chadari is a form of 
‘portable seclusion’. ‘Everywhere, such veiling signifies belonging to a particular 
community and participating in a moral way of life in which families are paramount in 
the organization of communities and the home is associated with the sanctity of women’ 
(Abu-Lughod 2002, 785). 
The Pashtunwali is built on various principles, including strict gender boundaries. 
Pashtunwali is integral to Pashtun identity. By adhering to Pashtunwali a Pashtun possesses 
honour (izzat); without honor s/he is no longer considered a Pashtun, and is not given 
the rights, protection, and support of the Pashtun community. Pashtunwali’s honour-
based society is governed by the concepts of chivalry (or bravery, courage) (ghayrat or 
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nang), hospitality (melmastia), gender boundaries (pardah or namus) and council (jirga) 
(Kakar 2003). 
In Pashtun expressions it is recommended that both men and women 
conceptually apply pardah, and doing so is a sign of dignity for both men and women. 
According to anthropologist Jon Anderson (1982) who observed various situations in 
which the veil is used among Ghilzai Pashtuns, the veil is less a means to separate men 
and women than, on the contrary, a device that brings them together by regulating the 
terms by which they are socially present. It is part of a broader pattern of comportment 
called haya or ‘extreme politeness’ by which persons who could be legitimately married to 
each other are prevented from direct contact and interaction. Indeed, it can be said that 
men wear a ‘veil’ too since their interactions with other marriageable women is 
accompanied by a constellation of behaviours which are equivalents to veiling. For 
instance, when a man and a woman encounter each other outside the kor (household-
inhabitants), restraint applies equally to both. The man will divert his gaze or act as if the 
woman was absent. He may additionally cover his face and turn away. He may also cover 
his mouth and avoid eye contact. This myriad of disengaging actions is to be understood 
as a form of respect on a man’s part. ‘Put another way, the veil is part of a pattern of 
comportment in which both sexes participate with slightly different but overlapping 
inflections’ (Anderson 1982, 402). 
Despite its applying to both genders, however, researchers (Papanek 1973; 
Lindisfarne-Tapper 1991; Kakar 2003) have found that Pashtuns commonly identify 
namus as “defence of the honour of women” and men often think of pardah as a way of 
controlling women, even though it also controls men. In principle, men are as bound by 
the rules of namus, and are thus as restricted from stepping into space reserved for 
women as women are from entry into men’s space. For example, if a man who is 
unrelated to any of the women present walks into a woman’s compound, he will be 
beaten, accused of dishonour, and even perhaps expelled from the community (Kakar 
2003).  
Lindisfarne-Tapper (1991, 105) however mentions that seclusion among the 
Durani Pashtuns does not translate into ‘women only’ or ‘men only’ spaces, like in some 
other Near Eastern countries. According to her observations, segregation is a practical 
consequence of the sexual division of labour. On day-to-day basis, rural women’s 
interactions are with their families more than with other women. Nancy Lindisfarne even 
mentions that Durani women do not cover their face to any man while they are on their 
home ground, that is in the villages and fields associated with the household in which she 
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lives. A man may even receive his guests in his wife’s private room and in her presence, a 
practice that would be impossible among other Pashtun tribes living in the South for 
instance.  
Despite the wide room for interpretation, observing the rules of accepted 
behaviour and following the prescriptions of etiquette is highly valued. As Nancy Dupree 
puts it (Dupree-Hatch 2002): ‘Honour is the rock upon which social status rests and the 
family is the single most important institution in Afghanistan’. In the honour system, the 
morality of a family is judged in relation to the behaviour of its women who carry the 
responsibility of passing on the values of the society to younger generations. These 
values include respect for elders and guests and proper behaviours in male-female 
relationships (Lindisfarne-Tapper 1991). Again, the criteria for appropriate behaviour 
may vary from group to group and often within each group, or even within extended 
families, but central to the rules of etiquette are those designed to uphold honour 
through the regulation of male-female relationships.  
A parallel can be drawn between the privacy maintained through the use of 
chadari and the traditional Afghan home, surrounded by its undistinguished compound 
walls, where the secrets of the family are kept. Indeed, indigenous domestic architecture 
is inward-looking and exteriors present anonymous surfaces to outsiders. Dislike of 
ostentation, another prominent characteristic, is evident in architectural patterns 
(Dupree-Hatch 2002). The traditional architectural ideals promote the hidden nature of 
the intimate to the outside world. Within compound walls, the protection against 
outsiders is complete. Unrelated men are never brought inside without a warning call. ‘A 
male visitor will never enter a room without knocking or coughing to announce his 
presence’ (Dupree-Hatch 1998, 52).  
Women, as central pillars of the family, are closely associated with this intimate 
and secret world. By wearing chadari, women symbolically carry the walls of their 
compound with them (Papanek 1973, 35). The sexual excitation, which is believed to 
exist when a man and a woman unknown to each other meet face to face, is prevented 
within the compound. Metonymically, the veil or chadari operates as a form of  ‘symbolic 
shelter’ (Id.1973) and announces that a woman is behaving in a proper manner and has 
dismissed the possibility of sexual desire and interaction. However, veiling can have 
other meanings and women are particularly creative in clouding their public 
performances. Indeed, the typical symbolic associations of the veil are sometimes 
manipulated and reversed by individual women. 
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 Stories of illicit sexual adventures, for instance, had mythic qualities in Kabul and 
women themselves criticized other women for using the chadari to conduct illicit sexual 
adventures or escape from the control of their relatives. One story was told of women 
walking Chicken and Flower streets in Kabul city centre, fully covered under their chadari, 
and stopping men in an attempt to sell sexual services. I never witnessed such activities 
myself, but always wondered about the logistics of sex work in Afghanistan when reading 
reports on the issue. Shalinsky (1986), in her ethnographic study of an Uzbek community 
in Northern Afghanistan, mentions similar stories of women dressing up with care and 
putting on cosmetics under their veil in order to flirt with shop keepers and obtain 
certain items cheaply.  The anonymity provided by the veil means that a woman’s identity 
cannot be revealed and the situation can remain secret. Ironically, the veil which primary 
aim is to prevent adultery can be used in adultery’s cause. ‘Thus veiling itself may be 
symbolically powerful for women since it provides an escape mechanism from the 
control of men. The power of veiling may lie precisely in the ambiguity: Does it protect 
the proper woman or shield the improper woman?’ (Shalinsky 1986, 329). 
 In the same way, many women’s rights activists, while opposing the compulsory 
veiling of women under chadari, used it to enjoy freedom of movement while carrying out 
their work. For them, the chadari was a symbol of women’s oppression but by complying 
to cultural norms, they were able to work within the system to bring about change.  The 
chadari was a guarantee of protection, particularly necessary when travelling to remote 
areas where security was often hectic. The example of the Revolutionary Association of 
the Women of Afghanistan provides a good illustration of the instrumental nature of the 
chadari among politically engaged women. Indeed, their documentation of human and 
women’s rights abuses under the Taliban was entirely realized ‘under the chadari’ 
(Interview - RAWA, 08/09/2007). During my fieldwork, I met a great number of 
women’s rights activists who continued wearing the chadari, not only for security reasons 
but also to gain people’s respect and trust when working in rural areas, where people 
tended to be suspicious towards anyone coming from the ‘outside’. This was, for 
instance, a tactic adopted by Rahela60, a member of the Afghan Women’s Network, when 
she lobbied mullahs on women’s rights in rural areas: 
At first, it was difficult for us, women, to approach mullahs. They were reluctant to talk to us. But 
they gradually got used to us. By wearing chadari, we eventually gained their respect. (Interview - 
Rahela, 20/09/2007). 
                                                
60 To preserve confidentiality and for security reasons, her name has been changed. 
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 What stands clearly out of ethnographic studies is that the use of the veil is a 
context-bound permutation of pardah or an ‘inflected’ or ‘marked’ form of interaction, to 
use Anderson’s words (1982, 402).  Veiled relations between men and women are guided 
by other behavioural idioms such as haya or ‘complete politeness’, which establishes 
complementarity and equality between two actors. In this respect, men do also ‘veil’ in 
the presence of unrelated women. This form of communication stands in clear contrast 
with ‘rough’ interactions, which dominate between men and women belonging to the 
same kor (Anderson 1982).  
Unlike in Turkey or Egypt where the State has initiated prolonged efforts to 
secularize society, wearing the veil in Afghanistan cannot be read as a way for women to 
assert their faith or their Muslim identity, even though most women would say that it is a 
Muslim woman’s duty to cover. But since most Afghans tend to be religious and religion 
is deeply ingrained in the everyday, veiling has become for most women part of the 
‘habitus’, something women just do when they leave their house or when they are in the 
presence of strangers. More subtle uses of the veil, such as decisions to cover one’s face 
to demonstrate respect for an older man or on the contrary, refusals to do so, are 
practices that reveal the potential power of women in challenging the gendered order 
(Abu-Lughod 1986). In the same manner, the multiplicity of veils available in urban areas 
where some level of diversity is allowed - squared headscarves leaving the front hair 
uncovered or transparent veils of shiny colours – demonstrates that new opportunities 
have opened for women to experiment and negotiate their identity and position in 
society. In short, as a communicational device that conveys meanings, the veil is one 
among the many other tools women use to convey messages to their audience in public 
settings. The story that follows is another illustration of this. It underlines the practical 
nature of the chadari, its ambiguous usages and the irony that underpins women’s 
performances in contemporary Afghanistan. 
 
2. Irony and resistance 
 
The bus was making its way through a dust storm. It was one of those days when 
I wished I wore a chadari. The dust was blinding us, entering our noses and throats, 
making us cough like asthmatic patients, reaching the under layers of our clothes. 
Women veiled under their chadari seated in the front of the bus were covering their 
babies under their long blue enveloping robes in an attempt to protect them from the 
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polluted air. ‘Chadari are sometimes practical’, commented Massoma who had invited me 
on that day to her parents’ home in Dasht-e Bashri, a poor and desolated suburb located 
South West of Kabul (Field notes, 08/10/2007).  
Seeing Massoma dressed up with her semi-long black blouse, her polished shoes 
and her black trousers, walking in the muddy alleys of Dasht-e Bashri in which latrine’s 
wastes were overflowing, had something of a surreal scene. The contrast between her 
pampered appearance and the desolation which surrounded us was simply too sharp. 
‘Now you understand why I prefer staying at the dormitory’, she commented while 
pushing the front gate of the compound where her parents lived.  
Massoma’s family shared a house with three other Hazara families recently 
returned from Iran, each of them occupying one room. The carpets spread on the floor 
and the toshak (matresses) and cushions displayed along the walls were the only pieces of 
furniture available. Massoma’s parents, her three brothers and her sister had piled up in 
this place for the past three years, waiting for their financial situation to improve in order 
to find a better place to live. But jobs were scarce in Kabul and Massoma’s father was old 
and sick. After long considerations, they had eventually encouraged their eldest son, 
Farid, to leave the country and find work abroad. Their last savings had been invested in 
a smuggler who organized Farid’s long journey to Europe. According to the latest news, 
Farid had reached France, after a few months spent working illegally in farms somewhere 
in Northern Greece. He was now kept in a detention centre next to Calais, waiting for 
his asylum claim to be reviewed. He had told the French authorities that members of his 
family were Taliban supporters who pressurized him to take part in terrorist activities, 
which he had constantly refused until he had taken the decision to escape and seek 
asylum in Europe where he thought he would be safe. To support his case, Farid had 
asked Massoma to send a picture of the family dressed up as ‘terrorists’. My mission on 
that day was to take some pictures of the ‘terrorist’ family and make sure they would 
arrive in France on time, before OFPRA (French office for the protection of refugees 
and stateless persons) had deliberated upon Farid’s case.  
In spite of my attempts to explain to Massoma that, because of his Hazara 
ethnicity61, Farid’s story had limited chances to be taken seriously, she had insisted and 
                                                
61 Repression by the Taliban of the Hazara ethnic group, which is predominantly Shia Muslim, was 
particularly severe. Although the conflict between the Hazaras and the Taliban was political and military as 
well as religious, and it is not possible to state with certainty that the Taliban engaged in its campaign 
against the Shi'a solely because of their religious beliefs, the religious affiliation of the Hazaras apparently 
was a significant factor leading to their repression. The Taliban have been accused of committing mass 
killings of the Hazaras particularly in the north. It has been claimed that the Taliban massacred thousands 
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here I was now, observing the boys applying thick layers of kohl under their eyes, ‘to 
look more scary’.  
‘Mamajan, you need to wear chadari if dad is a Taleb’, Massoma noted, 
unconvinced by her mother’s look.  
‘I never had one…but I think our neighbour has. Let me see if I can borrow it 
from her!’, she said playfully while running to the room next door.  
She came back giggling, holding the blue piece of cloth in one hand, raising it to 
the sky as a sign of victory. Everyone was ready now: boys had their turbans around their 
heads, kohl under their eyes and Mamajan was hidden under her blue tent. ‘Now make 
scary faces!’ I advised while looking through my camera’s objective. And as boys started 
to frown and purse their lips, I was already caught into the game, amused to discover 
how stereotypes about Taliban abroad had been assimilated in their country of origin.  
What surprised me the most was to discover that even here, the local imagination 
was filled with the twin figures of the Islamic fundamentalist and his female victim. For 
Massoma it was very clear that her mother could not expose her face in front of the 
camera if she was to act as the Taleb’s wife. Even here, in this destitute suburb of Kabul 
deprived of clean water and electricity, it was possible to envision the burqa-clad body of 
the Afghan woman as a visible sign of the West’s invisible enemy. In the mud of Dasht-e 
Bashri, irony was the primary ‘weapon of the weak’ (Scott 1985) and people laughed 
about and played with this piece of cloth, which had become under the Taliban regime, 
the universally recognized stamp of Islamic fundamentalism.  
The double irony that is easily detectable in the situation that I have described 
above – Massoma’s mother being caught in the impromptu situation of having to 
perform her own oppression in order to support her son’s freedom abroad and the 
anthropologist becoming an accomplice in the masquerade of representation – is very 
much revealing of the ambiguities and inconsistencies of subjectivity that characterize the 
contemporary world (Marcus 2001). To quote Marcus (2001, 211): 
 
It seems to me that there are practices, anxieties, and ambivalences present in any location that 
are specifically keyed as a response to the intimate functioning of non-local agencies and causes, 
                                                                                                                                      
of civilians and prisoners during and after the capture of Mazar-i-Sharif in August 1998; this massacre 
reportedly was aimed at ethnic Hazaras. In September 1998, approximately 500 persons were killed as the 
Taliban gained control of the city of Bamiyan. The Hazaras regained control of Bamiyan in April 1999 
following prolonged guerilla-style warfare; however, the Taliban recaptured Bamiyan in May 1999 and 
reportedly killed a number of Shi'a residents. (World Directory of Minorities and Indegenous People, 2008) 
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and for which there are no convincing commonsense understandings. The basic condition that 
stimulates this widespread predicament of irony is an awareness of existential doubleness, 
deriving from a sense of being here with major present transformations ongoing that are intimately 
tied to things happening simultaneously elsewhere but without certainty and authoritative 
representations of what the connections are.  
 
This sense of inescapable ‘doubleness’ that Marcus discusses here is very relevant 
to account for the tensions surrounding women’s visibility in contemporary Afghanistan. 
Indeed, what irony reveals perhaps most evidently is the conflict between the inner and 
the outer, between private desires and understandings on one hand and public pressures 
and official transcripts on the other hand. The chadari in itself does not tell us much 
about the type of subjectivities, negotiations and aspirations that exist ‘under the veil’. 
More often than rarely, women use the chadari as a strategic device, as a means to remain 
anonymous and maintain a sense of safety. The chadari, more than a mere status symbol, 
has become a functional instrument, the costume worn by women for a public play that 
has been written by others.  And ironically, it is this ‘theatrical’ dimension of the veil as a 
form of ‘social make-up’ that allows women to go to work, go to the bazaar, or even in 
the case of Massoma’s mother, purposefully perform the role of the ‘oppressed Afghan 
woman’ in order to reach out foreign audiences. This is what Fernandez and Taylor 
Huber (Fernandez and Taylor-Huber 2001, 6) call ‘the Hobbesian paradox that men and 
women in their natural condition of life –“solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short”- can 
only gain their freedom by giving up their freedom.’  
In the section that follows, I provide a deeper analysis of the reasons guiding 
women’s performances in public spaces, focusing more specifically on women’s physical 
displays. I draw on Goffman’s notion ‘performance’ to demonstrate that the ‘veil’ 
participates in resolving fears related to wider anxieties about social relations and the 
social order in general. In the post-Taliban period, the veil and clothing have become 
devices used by women to project identities and manage others’ impressions in public 
settings.   
3. The legacy of fear and the occupation 
 
The short period of relative liberalism that marked the three or four years after 
the eviction of the Taliban gave opportunities for individuals to experiment with the way 
they appeared in public. During my first stay in 2003-2004, one could see in the streets of 
Kabul, especially in the city centre where stores selling bright coloured clothes imported 
from neighbouring countries had re-opened, young men with blue jeans and long hair or 
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girls wearing colourful veils over semi-long blouses. These street scenes had become 
more rare in 2007. An increased level of insecurity, with regular suicide attacks, robberies 
and kidnappings, had initiated a reversed return to physical conformity in public spaces. 
The necessity to physically conform is closely related to the increasing level of 
public violence that women have experienced over the past decades. The Taliban and the 
mujjahedin created a precedent by allowing unrelated men to punish women for 
infractions perceived to threaten diffuse notions of ‘honour’. Since the invasion, the State 
has been unable to protect women in their transition from the private to the public 
sphere. In conflict-affected areas, women continue to face sexual violence, abduction, or 
forced or underage marriage (Azerbaijani-Moghaddam 2009, 67). However, the 
perpetrators remain immune from prosecution since sexual violence is a taboo and the 
justice system is corrupt62. ‘Forms of public violence including deliberate attacks on girl 
students and women teachers continue today and remain unpunished’ (Azerbaijani-
Moghaddam 2009, 67).  
The explanations I often heard from women wearing chadari was that it allowed 
some privacy and created a sense of security, when the outside world, beyond the 
compounds’ walls of the house was seen as threatening, chaotic and oppressive. Many 
times during my journey in Kabul, I wished I could wear one too. After a bad experience 
in a taxi, which could have turned into a real nightmare if I had not had the life-saving 
reaction of opening the door to escape from the moving car, I eventually purchased one 
in a local bazaar. I did not make great use of it because the reduced vision together with 
the impossibility of wearing glasses under the knitted singeing made for the eyes, turned 
what I thought could be a protective piece of equipment into a dangerous experiment for 
the untrained user that I was. But for many women, the chadari increased their mobility 
while guaranteeing their anonymity, a precious asset when conservatism and insecurity 
were on the rise in Kabul. 
It is when I heard Mehria Azizi’s story that the association of visibility with 
danger became clearer to me. Mehria was a camerawoman working for the Afghan Media 
and Culture Centre in Kabul. She was only 24 but her charisma and her maturity – 
features of personality that many young working women had in common in Kabul - 
                                                
62 Because sexual violence is a crime that diminishes the honour of a woman and her family, victims have 
often been reluctant to report it to the authorities. However, in recent years, some reports have underlined 
a behavioural shift, with families (probably encouraged by the media and human rights organizations) 
beginning to go public and threatening to commit mass suicide if the perpetrators were not brought to 
justice (IRIN-News 2008; Nagpal 2009; Muahid 2008). 
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really impressed me. After the collapse of the Taliban, Mehria and 13 Afghan women set 
out to chronicle the lives of the women in their country. Their film, ‘Afghanistan 
Unveiled’, marked the first time any of them were able to travel freely inside Afghanistan 
- in fact, it was the first time any of them had been outside of Kabul. They were the first 
female journalists to be trained in Afghanistan for more than a decade. They spent a year 
learning the fundamentals of film production, then set out for the rural provinces of 
Afghanistan. Several times, the filmmakers found themselves in verbal confrontations 
with Afghan men in the provinces who thought they had no business walking around 
showing their hands and faces. Mehria herself appeared in the movie, confronting a 
group of heavily armed village men unhappy with her public appearance without a 
chadari.  
A few weeks before we met, Mehria’s younger brother had been kidnapped and 
her family had had to give a ransom of 5000 USD to get him back. Another brother had 
been attacked and had ended up at the hospital with a broken nose. Mehria received 
constant death threats on the phone as well as anonymous letters. She complained to the 
police on several occasions but her complaints never got registered. I asked her if she 
had a clue who could be the authors of these anonymous calls and she smiled: 
 
If the police are doing nothing for me and my family, can’t you guess who is responsible for 
threatening me? It is obvious that some high-ranking authorities are involved in poisoning my life. 
All members of the government are uneducated war criminals who cannot stand women like me, 
who work with foreigners, go abroad and tell the truth about the political situation of my country 
to the rest of the world. But I won’t give up, because it is too late anyway. Now I have enemies 
forever. But I do not worry for myself. I worry for my two younger brothers. They are so young, 
you know. They deserve a better life. (Interview- Azizi, 22/02/2007) 
 
Listening to Mehria’s story and to the stories of other female public figures I 
came across during my fieldwork, I started to get a sense of the price women had to pay 
for their public visibility. The international community had encouraged their 
reappearance in the public domain, through the funding of NGOs working in the field of 
gender and through government’s lobbying. However, women who had taken this 
opportunity and who were willing to participate in public life did not benefit from any 
protection mechanism. This meant that public women had to take immense risks for 
their speaking out or find alternative protective mechanisms in order to reach the public.   
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Mehria Azizi makes the front cover of Roz, a women’s monthly magazine  Afghanistan Libre 
 
As explained in the previous chapters, the foreign occupation of the country and 
its insistence on the necessity to carry out important and rapid social reforms has created 
tensions at different levels of the Afghan society. The current preoccupation of the 
Afghan government with controlling women’s appearance in public places is to be 
understood in the light of this external pressure. With the return of conservative 
elements within the political arena, an area of cultural resistance has emerged around 
women and the family. In her book Women and Gender in Islam (1992), social historian 
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Leila Ahmed has underlined the relation between colonial encounters and the emergence 
of specific discourses on the veil in the Muslim world. In Egypt under British rule or in 
Algeria under French domination, political elites used the veil as a symbol of Muslim 
women’s oppression to justify the colonial enterprise.  Veiling, under such circumstances, 
turned into an act of resistance against the modernizing elite coopted by the colonial 
establishment (Ahmed 1992, 152). As Ahmed (1992, 164) phrases it:  
 
The veil came to symbolize in the resistance narrative, not the inferiority of the culture and the 
need to cast aside its customs in favor of those of the West, but on the contrary, the dignity and 
the validity of all native customs, and in particular those customs coming under fiercest colonial 
attack – the customs relating to women- and the need to tenaciously affirm them as means of 
resistance to Western domination (…). Standing in the relation of antithesis to thesis, the 
resistance narrative thus reversed – but thereby also accepted – the terms set in the first place by 
the colonizers. 
 
It is certainly possible to draw a parallel between the current situation in 
Afghanistan and earlier colonial periods during which discourses on women and the veil 
first started to emerge. After years of total disregard for Afghan people, the sudden 
interest of the West in the plight of Afghan women and the focus on the burqa confirms 
that old colonial narratives on the veil have been reactivated in order to gather public 
support for the military occupation. At once urged to take back their ‘freedom’ and 
unveil by the West and urged to remain faithful to Afghan ‘culture’ by the new regime, 
women in occupied Afghanistan have become a ‘figment in someone’s else dream’, as 
Azar Nafisi (2003) beautifully phrases it in her memoir Reading Lolita in Teheran. This 
renewed public attention to women’s bodies and the use of ‘colonial feminism’ (Ahmed 
1992) as an imperialist tool to assert domination, has trapped the struggle for women’s 
rights in struggles over culture. Various political developments that have taken place in 
recent years confirm this vision. 
In order to preserve an illusion of political autonomy and resist Western 
influence, conservative MPs have submitted various draft laws aiming at preserving 
patriarchal authority. These draft laws proposed the reinstallation of the religious police, 
the reopening of the Ministry for the Elimination of Vice and the Promotion of Virtue, 
and a ban on Western clothes such as jeans, long hair for men, cosmetics and make-up 
for women (Heikkila 2008). More recently in April 2009, Karzai signed a personal status 
law for Shias legalizing the rape of a wife by her husband and forbidding Shia women to 
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leave their house without their husbands’ permission63. These legal proposals, even 
though not approved yet, are already announcing a return to homogeneity after a brief 
period of diversity, associated with anarchy and loose morals.  
‘I spent all those years fighting against Islamic fundamentalism and the 
compulsory wearing of chadari for women and now I advise women to wear it again,’ 
complained Hamida 64 , a 24-year-old representative of a Southern province at the 
National Assembly and former University professor (Interview – MP1, 03/10/2007). 
Married by force to a local commander, the young MP became a widow 24 days after her 
marriage. She is now a single mother, well determined to bring change for the women of 
her province whose sufferings she has ‘felt in her own heart’. But Hamida is also aware 
that in the current political situation the scope of her possibilities is extremely reduced. ‘I 
have to be very careful not to upset anyone. If I don’t wear chadari when I return to my 
province, commanders and mullahs, the one who are in power at the local level, will say: 
‘She is a bad woman. She does not respect Islam. Don’t vote for her!’ And my people 
will listen because they are illiterate, poor and traditional’, she explained to me in the 
Parliament conference room, lowering her voice to avoid indiscreet ears.  
Afghan women are immensely aware of the conditions in which they have to 
negotiate their entry in the public domain. This knowledge is an embodied knowledge. It 
is the product of long years of war during which women have suffered from officially 
sanctioned discrimination. Visibility, over these past three decades, has found new 
meanings. In Western societies, the visibility of people brings about public security in 
urban spaces. Public figures are expected to reveal their private life and expose it to 
public scrutiny. For Afghan women, public visibility has become equal to insecurity and 
to being subjected to constant control by others (the police, religious leaders, community 
and neighbours). Even though the moral police have disappeared in most cities, the new 
Islamic Republic still expects people to conform to Islamic prescriptions. Several male 
students at Kabul University even mentioned to me being arrested by the police on 
several occasions and asked for the identity of the female friend accompanying them. 
They eventually had to bribe the policemen in order to avoid arrest. 
This controlling gaze is the same apparatus that Foucault (1977) referred to in 
Discipline and Punish in his description of the architecture of Bentham’s Panopticon, the 
huge prison with only a single jailor. As described by Foucault, the concept of the design 
                                                
63 The new and redrafted law was signed in mid July 2009. The new version omits original provisions that 
allowed men to demand sex from their wives and that required women to ask their husbands’ permission 
to leave their home. However, the law still includes a provision that states a man does not have to provide 
financial support for his wife unless he has ‘access to her.’ 
64 To preserve her anonymity, the name of this MP and her province of origin have been changed. 
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is to allow an observer to observe all prisoners without the prisoners being able to tell 
whether they are being watched, thereby conveying the sentiment of an invisible 
omniscience. Thus the visibility of an individual and his awareness of the existence of 
authority and the possible presence of a surveyor result in his/her constant obligation to 
observe discipline. The efficiency of the system lies in the fact that the individual 
‘assumes responsibility for the constraints of power’, making himself ‘the principle of his 
own subjection’ (Foucault 1977, 202-203). A feeling of insecurity results from the 
prisoner’s constant visibility. This fear constitutes the central motor of self-discipline. In 
the case of Afghanistan, the fear of punishments has resulted in the production of ‘docile 
bodies’ that have internalized power hierarchies to the extent that they have become 
almost natural. The reluctance of women to remove their chadari is a good illustration of 
the long lasting psychological effects of the Taliban’s ‘technologies of power’. 
As Afghan sociologist Nasrine Gross (Interview - Gross, 23/05/2007) argues, 
the Taliban rule has been particularly traumatic for Afghans because for the first time, 
their faith, a fundamental component of their identity, has been radically questioned. If 
before the Taliban, rarely did people interrogate the depth of their own ‘Muslimhood’, 
the harsh rules and punishments imposed by the religious students contributed to spread 
a general feeling of guilt regarding religion. Indeed, under the constant control of the 
religious police, men and women, especially in the cities, were persistently reminded of 
their inherent ‘sinning’ nature. According to my observations, the long-term effect of 
such a trauma is noticeable in people’s obsessive urge to justify the way they physically 
present themselves or to make comments on the ways other people look. Of course, in 
any society, people are always expressing something with clothing, sending out 
intentional or unintentional signals about themselves. Clothing is an important visual 
aspect of performance, part of the expressive equipment identified with the performer. 
In the case of Afghanistan, as clothing has become the centre of political attention, 
physical displays that do not strictly conform with the norm are perceived as potentially 
threatening to the social order.  
During the civil war until the Taliban, Afghan women have lived with the same 
feeling of continual but secret and unverifiable control. Thus, the experience of wearing 
chadari has become in fact the paradoxical experience of some kind of freedom along 
with an acceptance of enclosure and discipline. To be disciplined and similar to others 
allowed women to be less subjected to others’ sight and consequently be freer in their 
movements. This dissimulation and social invisibility in terms of appearances and 
behaviours is constantly shifting, according to variables such as place and time and is 
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defined according to the status, gender and age of social actors. To maintain their 
security and right of presence in social spaces, individuals must obey assorted codes that 
are particular to each space or vis-à-vis the others. While such codes existed in 
Afghanistan well before the Taliban, the Taliban regime has refashioned them, forcing 
individuals to play roles and to adopt new appearances according to their moral system. 
In the new Islamic Republic, even though such rules are no more officially sanctioned, 
they remain an unwritten law. As a result, dissimulation through conformism constitutes 
the dominant strategy to access public spaces.  
Women have adopted strategies of dissimulation and invisibility that have 
become part of a process of social inclusion and negotiation. For instance, women 
continue to wear the full covering chadari in order to go to work, attend public meetings 
and demonstrations. In June 2007, for example, hundreds of women organized a 
collective peace prayer at the sacred Shrine of the Prophet (Kherqa Sharif) in Kandahar, 
a mosque that is normally barred to women. The mullah even allowed the women to 
broadcast their prayers from the shrine loudspeaker (AdvocacyNet 2007). A few months 
later, in January 2008, 600 women rallied in Kandahar in order to protest against the 
kidnapping of an American female aid worker (BBC 2008). This public event was even 
more surprising that it took place in one of the most conservative areas of the Pashtun 
South where women are rarely seen in public spaces. Women’s demonstrations of this 
type were not isolated occurrences. In May 2005, hundred of widows marched in Kabul 
in protest against the kidnapping of Clementina Cantoni, an Italian aid worker from 
CARE International. A river of blue chadari suddenly flooded Kabul city centre, 
displaying photographs of Clementina and carrying banners requesting her immediate 
release.  Under the Taliban regime, women protested on several occasions, for instance, 
against an edict that closed public baths and against the rise of the price of bread. 
Protected from external gazes, able to see without being seen, women could feel safe to 
occupy the public arena and make their voices heard. Their ‘absent presence’, to use 
Amir-Ebrahimi’s words (2006), under the disciplinary monotony of the chadari, enabled 
women to step in spaces traditionally occupied by men. 
Women were proud to recount how they distorted the original meaning of the 
chadari during the Taliban time by hiding books and stationary used in the clandestine 
schools they ran from their homes.  Retelling stories of covert disobedience, defiance 
and resistance to the moral police was always a source of excitement and laughter.  To 
ridicule the rules imposed by the Taliban was their favourite technique for exorcising 
fears and anxieties accumulated during this time while regaining a sense of self worth. 
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Clandestine organizations like the sewing circles of Herat ran by Muhammad Ali Rahyab 
a professor of Literature at Herat University, reached an almost mythic status inside and 
outside Afghanistan65. There, instead of sewing dresses, women studied banned writers 
such as Shakespeare, Joyce, Nabokov, Tolstoy, Dickens, Balzac and Dostoevsky as well 
as classic Persian literature. One of these underground literary circles gave birth to the 
renowned Afghan poetess Nadia Anjuman, who was only in grade 10 when the Taliban 
took power in the eastern provincial capital. Her poetry, produced ‘under the chadari’, 
helped her transform into hope the greyness of her secluded life. ‘Memories of Light 
Blue’66, written in reference to the chadari’s most usual colour, is one of those attempts at 
transcending the dullness of the everyday, a central motive of her artistic work: 
 
You, exiles of the mountains of oblivion 
You, diamonds of your names sleeping in quagmire of silence 
You, the ones your memories faded, memories of light blue 
In the mind of muddy waves of forgotten sea 
Where are your clear-flowing thoughts? 
Where did your peace-marked silver boat moon craft go? 
After this death-giving freeze, the sea calms 
The clouds, if they clear heart from bitterness 
If daughter of moonlight brings kindness, induces smiles 
If the mountain softens heart, grows green and turns fruitful 
Will one of your names, above the mountain peaks, become the sun? 
Sunrise of your memories 
Memories of light blue 
In the eyes of tired-of-flood-water fish and 
Scared-of-rain of darkness 
Will it become a sight of hope? 
 
Women who have broken into the political apparatus share this common-sense 
understanding of the possible physical and social dangers associated with visibility. In the 
section that follows, I look more precisely at political women’s public performances in a 
space where their presence remains highly contested: the Afghan National Assembly. 
Indeed, the new Constitution ratified in 2004 foresaw a 25 percent quota for women in 
                                                
65 See Christina Lamb (2002). The sewing circles of Herat: A personal voyage through Afghanistan. HarperCollins. 
66 Poem translated by David Tayari. Accessed online in January 2009. http://www.thehypertexts.com/ 
Note from the translator: ‘light blue’ means ‘great hopes’ in Persian. 
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the Parliament, a political move initiated with the view of repairing past injustices. This 
legislation was passed thanks to the pressure of women’s groups and the international 
community, but jihadi leaders who occupied the majority of seats in the Assembly 
broadly perceived women’s presence on their side as ‘abnormal’ and as a result of 
exogenous forces, with little or no endogenous legitimacy at all.  
Even though adding women in politics can never be a guarantee for gender 
equality in the broader society, the presence of women in the parliament has undeniably 
been a positive step. It remains that the women who have joined the legislative apparatus 
are not only divided along political, class and ethnic lines, but their room of manoeuvre 
within such a conservative environment is extremely narrow. As a result, many female 
MPs have had to develop subtle strategies in order to gain political recognition and 
validation from their male counterparts. This included, among other techniques of body-
discipline, a constant attention to the way they looked and veiled in public. 
 
4. Veiled politics 
 
An observation of clothing and veiling practices among women involved in 
politics in Afghanistan reveals the central and contested place of Islam in the new Islamic 
Republic. It also reveals to what women should renounce in order to become public. In 
this respect, the comparison between parliamentary women and female university 
student is very telling. As I have demonstrated in the previous chapter, female university 
students struggled to veil as little as possible in order to display a modern yet Muslim 
persona.  In contrast, women MPs often had to renounce to feminism and veil more 
strictly if they wanted to gain entry into mainstream politics. Different social positions 
involved alternative uses of the body.  
In general, women sitting in the parliament can be divided into two categories67: 
Conservative/nationalist women who defend a formalist approach to Koran and liberal 
women who support an interpretive approach. While the majority of them belong to the 
first group and have been co-opted by various mujjahedin factions, women from both 
tendencies agree that Islam provides them with a means of being involved in the public 
sphere. However, their fashion statements mirror their political inclinations and to some 
extent, their different understanding of Islam and the place of women in society. 
                                                
67 The Wolesi Jirga is mainly composed of Pashtuns (118 seats), Tajiks/Aimaqs (53 seats), Hazaras/Shias 
(41 seats) and Uzbeks (20 seats). For further details on the ethnic and political composition of the 
parliament, see Wilder 2005. 
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Indeed, for both men and women, self-presentation is central to convey 
meanings regarding political affiliations and as a result, clothing reflects a political 
posture. President Karzai, for instance, played the card of reconciliation between the 
‘old’ and the ‘new’ by choosing to wear at once the traditional long-sleeved chapan68, a 
karakul hat and the black suit of Western diplomats. Observing the clothes of the MPs 
sitting on the benches of the Afghan National Assembly is already revealing of their 
political inclinations or at least, of the political identities they strive to project on their 
audience. Long-bearded men in traditional shalwar kameez (large pyjama), tubans and 
pakols (woolen headgear mostly worn by Tadjiks) mix with clean-shaved men in Western 
suits. On the women’s side, the length and colors of veils are a source of constant 
comments.  
Generally, political women’s veiling practices were informed by the geographic 
location of their respective constituencies. Women MPs originating from rural areas felt 
more compelled to veil in a more conservative manner than their female colleagues who 
came from urban areas. 
‘For Shukria Barakzai (MP for Kabul province), it does not matter if she wears small veils 
because people who vote for her are educated…they come from the city. For me it is different. 
My people did not go to school. My people are illiterate and conservative. So I have to pay 
attention to the veils I wear’, an MP from Farah, explained to me (Interview - MP1, 03/10/2007).  
 
Women who are affiliated with jihadi groups tend to dress more traditionally than 
women who belong to more liberal groups. Their veils are longer and less colourful 
(black, white or light beige) and their interpretation of women’s rights is based on a belief 
in the inherently different nature of men and women. Many of them wear chadari or long 
veils when returning to their province of origin but abandon it as soon as they return to 
Kabul. Their public performances convey monolithic nationalist meanings about the 
primary role of women as mothers and family carers.  
For female MPs who affiliate themselves with more liberal groups, choices of 
veils’ colours and length are a matter of perpetual arrangements and meticulously 
weighted decisions. Veils and clothes change according to the audience they face and the 
context in which they navigate. Their decision to wear chadari when travelling to the 
provinces is mostly influenced by the security situation or the individual dressing 
practices of their female colleagues. Their performances are more contradictory and less 
                                                
68 Chapan is a long coat worn over clothes, usually during the cold winter months. Usually worn by men, 
these coats are adorned with intricate threading and come in a variety of colors and patterns. 
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consistent than conservative women and involve constant negotiations and calculations. 
‘If I don’t wear chadari when I go back to my province and my colleague Bilqhis  does, 
then she appears as the modest one and I appear as the amoral one’ (Interview - MP6, 
10/03/2007), an MP from a Northern province noted to underline the necessity to 
embody strict Muslim norms in order to reach out more ‘traditional’ or rural audiences. 
For both ‘nationalist’ and ‘liberal’ women, clothing is linked to different 
conceptions of the place of Islam in politics. For nationalist women, wearing long veils 
and occasionally chadari is partly a means to conform to proper religious and cultural 
practices. But most importantly, it is about honouring the work achieved by the 
mujjahedin during the jihad and opposing the hegemonic influence of the West in internal 
affairs. On February, 23rd 2007, in a public gathering organized by jihadi leaders in Kabul 
National Stadium, Shakila Hachemi, MP of Logar province, took the microphone and 
harangued the crowd, denouncing the blasphemy committed by her fellow MP Malalai 
Joya who had accused some mujjahedin sitting in the Parliament of being war criminals 
(Islah-e Milli 2007). The rally had been organized in order to gain public support for a 
legal proposal preventing the state from independently prosecuting people for war 
crimes committed during conflicts in recent decades69.  
That Hachemi was given the opportunity to talk in a conservative assembly of 
prominent political leaders, not particularly renowned for their progressive approach to 
women’s issues, was in itself very telling. It showed that far from being united, women 
from different political and ethnic backgrounds, tended to engage in identity politics and 
put forward the specific political agenda of their own ethnic or religious groups, while 
dismissing or ignoring the ones of their gender.  
Vice-President, Mohammad Karim Khalili, Lower House Speaker, Mohammad 
Younus Qanooni, former Jihadi Leaders, commanders and a number of MPs took part in 
the gathering. Surrounded by heavily armed men, raising an accusative finger to the sky, 
her speech suddenly reached a climax: ‘Death to Malalai Joya! Death to human rights!’ 
she screamed while receiving an overwhelming round of applause.  
The association of Joya with human rights and therefore, with the West, was 
typical of conservative/nationalist discourses. Indeed, Joya was regularly accused by her 
detractors of being sponsored by Western leftist groups and as a result, of being an 
infidel, a Communist and therefore, disrespectful of national values. During her 
campaign in Farah for the legislative elections, Joya’s enemies circulated pamphlets on 
                                                
69 The lower house of parliament, the Wolesi Jirga, approved the bill after President Hamid Karzai revised 
an initial bill that had been approved by both chambers of parliament that gave amnesty to all Afghans 
involved in war crimes during the last three decades of fighting. 
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which she appeared bare-head. The pamphlets called her a ‘prostitute’ sold to the West 
and attacked her for her lack of modesty: ‘If Joya removes her veil now, soon she will 
remove her pants too’, commented one of these pamphlets (Mulvad 2007). Joya’s 
fearless interventions in parliamentary sessions unfailingly provoked sexual insults, 
physical attacks and death threats. A secularist at heart, Joya regularly appeared unveiled 
on foreign TV stations and newspapers, Western journalists being particularly found of 
her outspoken and charismatic character. The outburst of resentment against the values 
she defended (women’s rights, human rights and secularism), ironically forced her to 
constantly wear chadari while travelling in the country. 
In such a conservative atmosphere, women MPs having a liberal agenda for 
women have as a primary goal to keep the support of their own constituencies while 
lobbying potentially supportive men within the parliament. If some of them admit 
supporting Joya behind closed door, they pay attention not to be associated too closely 
with her70. The way they look in public is a fundamental issue of attention, many of them 
preferring not to talk to the media at all or appearing on TV in order to have free hands 
for back stage negotiations. In the same way, many ‘liberal’ female candidates to the 
legislative elections conducted their campaign under the chadari and gradually removed it 
once elected. This was for instance the tactic adopted by Fatima Azim (pseudonym), now 
representative of a Northern province at the National Assembly, and running a small low 
profile group of female MPs involved in civic education activities in rural areas.  
 
I gave all my speeches wearing chadari. My family is an intellectual family. My father is a university 
professor and my mother is the director of a kindergarden. It is not common in our family for 
women to wear chadari. When I started my speeches, I just removed a little corner of the veil to be 
able to speak. If I had not presented myself this way, my people would have thought that I was 
disrespectful of our traditions. You know, wearing chadari is essential in my province. It has 
become a tradition. Now, since I have been elected at the parliament, my people sometimes see 
me in the press and they see that I don’t wear chadari anymore. They are getting used to it. When I 
return to my province to attend political meetings, I wear long veils instead of chadari. For people, 
it is becoming normal to see political women without it. Slowly, slowly people will change their 
mind. We should not go too fast. (Interview - MP8, 30/06/2007)  
 
Younger female MPs who had lived abroad during the war are less eager to 
compromise and less reluctant to openly support Joya. This is for instance the case of 27-
                                                
70 Some women’s rights activists also disagreed with Joya’s insistence on secularism as a means to enhance 
women’s rights. They perceived her approach as disconnected with the political reality and political 
sensitivities of the country. In their view, gender equality was embedded in Islam. Joya’s desire to 
disconnect politics from religion was, in their opinion, a dangerous path to advance the cause of women. 
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year-old Maryam Sohrat71, a representative of Kabul province, who returned from her 
exile in Iran especially to run for the elections. At first glance, the poster she printed for 
her campaign resembled an ad for a Bollywood blockbuster. It showed her smiling face, 
her hair covered under a bright canary yellow veil over a background of a similar color, 
an image that wanted to transmit hope and change to Afghanistan’s youth.  But the 
image gave rise to severe critics from conservative clerics and political leaders. “Her 
posters are driving our youth towards sin,” thundered the Dari language Cheragh 
newspaper supported by Rabbani, former President of Afghanistan and now head of the 
major opposition party, the United National Front. “It is a political weapon against true 
Islamic voters” (Walsh 2005).  Sitting in UNIFEM resource centre for women in 
Parliament, with her lipstick, fluent English and matching Nike trainers and headscarf, 
Maryam Sohrat undeniably brought a touch of glamour to Afghan politics. She recalled:  
 
I got several telephone calls during my campaign. Once, an old man told me: ‘What is this colour? 
What is this poster? We are Muslim people! This is an Islamic country!”. And I told him: ‘What is 
wrong with Islam? I have my scarf on and if you are talking about the colour, this is my favourite 
colour, I like it. And if you are talking about my smile, it is one of my features. This is not 
abnormal to smile. I wanted to show what the wish of the young generation in Afghanistan is. 
You know, young people are tired of darkness.’ (Interview - MP9, 29/08/2007)  
 
Maryam’s response to her critics was to a great extent the product of her lack of 
political experience and her second-hand knowledge of the power relations at stake in 
the political apparatus. She envisioned Islam as a religion that promoted gender equality 
and granted many freedoms to women. She was inspired by Islamic feminism and its 
achievements in Iran, Malaysia and elsewhere. Devoutly Muslim, she called herself a 
feminist but avoided using this term in the parliament, for fear of receiving the same 
treatments as Joya and losing her already fragile credibility due to her young age and her 
‘modern’ physical appearance.  
 
Feminism has some negative connotations here. It is understood like: ‘You want your rights. You 
want to divorce men.’ You know, if you are talking about women’s rights, the two main things 
men think about are: women want to be free to wear whatever clothes they like and then, women 
want to get divorce. Because of this, men have a negative understanding of women’s rights. Men 
feel threatened. People who are more conservative or more religious, like mullahs and others, they 
are thinking that the women who are active in the field of women’s rights, they come from the 
                                                
71 For security reasons, her real name has been changed. 
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West, their ideas come from the West, they want to be free like the women in the West and they 
want to get divorced. (Interview - MP9, 29/08/2007) 
 
The political characters represented by Malalai Joya and Maryam Sohrat, in spite 
of their differences, present common distinctive features that help us delineate the 
boundaries of women’s political participation and public visibility in contemporary 
Afghanistan. Both MPs are young, educated and both display a physical appearance that 
does not conform to traditional standards of Islamic dressing. In addition, both speak 
fluent English and take their political inspiration from ‘abroad’. Joya looks at Western 
secularism while Sohrat draws her political views from models of Islamic feminism that 
have emerged in other Muslim countries. However, neither of them benefit from a 
strong social base of support outside of their limited constituencies: a few 
RAWA72/Maoist/secularist supporters for Joya and a few University students for Sohrat.  
The reasons behind Joya and Sohrat political marginality are varied but 
undeniably, the outward looking political postures they embody cannot receive a strong 
echo in the context of the occupation. Of course, neither Joya nor Sorat’s political 
projects aim to target Islam or Afghan culture, but those laws and customs to be found 
in society that express andocentric interests, indifference to women, or misogyny. Such a 
discourse, as seductive as it may be for the urban and educated person’s consciousness, 
has currently no place in the Afghan political landscape.  Without nationalist/Islamic 
veils to ideas of reforms related to women’s issues, the persuasiveness of Joya and 
Sohrat’s discourses remains absolutely marginal. 
So what do we learn from political women’s public performances? What does 
their veiling and clothing practices teach us about the nature of power relations in 
contemporary Afghanistan? Why are women who have made their ways into the highest 
political circles still reluctant to completely abandon the chadari? What emerges from the 
ethnographic material I have presented above, is that in a context of foreign occupation 
where women’s bodies have become the symbolic markers of the broader social body, 
veiling represents the privileged medium of expression of one’s nationalist endeavours 
and resistance against external influences. The veil ensures the cohesion of the 
collectivity and provides a sense of national continuity when society is threatened of 
fragmentation by the presence of an external ‘enemy’. By strictly conforming to gendered 
norms, nationalist women strengthen their integration within their own political groups. 
‘Liberal’ women, i.e women who are more radically inclined to advance women’s rights 
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through an interpretive approach of sharia, cannot simply avoid the nationalist discourse 
for this would lead, as the case of Joya demonstrates, to their total marginalization. The 
groups to which they belong are too weak already in the political landscape and cannot 
afford a radical rejection of nationalist politics. In short, in public settings, women from 
both tendencies have to adjust their performance in order to conform with gendered 
norms of appropriate behaviours in order to maintain their public presence.   
The mobilization of religious repertoires in nationalist movements has been 
observed in Algeria during the revolution when the meanings of the veil as a cultural and 
social object got transformed as a result of the French colonizers’ attempt at eradicating 
Islam from the public domain. In response to these attacks, many Algerians turned 
inward, retreating in the traditional Islamic community and family life that remained the 
only safe havens from which a sense of independence could be preserved. Fantasia and 
Hirsch (1995) explain that when the colonial elite attempted to expand its control over 
the private sphere through new laws designed to supposedly ‘liberate’ women, Islam 
became the ‘language of refusal’ and as a consequence, traditional gender practices such 
as veiling and cloistering of women were reinforced (Fantasia and Hirsh 1995: 149). 
According to Fanon (quoted in Fantasia and Hirsch, 150): ‘Every new Algerian woman 
unveiled announced to the occupier an Algerian society whose systems of defence were 
in the process of dislocation, open and breached’. A public figure like Joya, who 
appeared unveiled on Western TV, addressed Western audiences dressed in ‘un-Islamic’ 
clothes and advocated for secular democracy, was perceived as a threat for the same 
reasons underlined by Fanon in the case of colonized Algeria. Her unveiled body 
displayed on satellite TV channels became a source of fear because it carried the signs of 
shattered boundaries and disappearing worlds.  
Mahbouba Seraj, a member of the Royal family returned to Afghanistan in 2001, 
worked with women MPs under a UNIFEM programme designed to enhance female 
representatives’ political skills and help them develop alliances among themselves in 
matters related to women’s rights. She explained to me that the greatest difficulties for 
these women was to gain the support of their male colleagues since men were the ones 
who had the real power to initiate change: 
 
If you want, as a woman, to make it in the political arena, you need three things: First you need to 
have a well-known family name. Second you need to be Pashtun, since the Pashtuns represent the 
main ethnic group in the country. Finally, you need the support of men. This support, you cannot 
get it if you’re young because respect is gained with age and experience. But the support of men is 
decisive. This is the reason why it is difficult to build alliances between women. They compete to 
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get men’s recognition and they cannot see the advantage of working together yet. (Interview - 
Seraj 07/10/2007)  
 
Several other women MPs who mentioned receiving regular misogynist 
comments when they referred to international women’s rights standards in the Assembly 
confirmed these dynamics. ‘Wear a proper veil first, hamshira (sister), and then you will be 
authorized to talk. This is what some of them (men) tell me sometimes’, complained 
Masooda Babak (Interview - MP3, 16/09/2007), founder of a women’s organization and 
now MP for Kabul province. Even in liberal circles, prejudices against women are 
widespread. Women are often accused of hysteria and are reproached their lack of 
rational thinking or their ignorance of the rules applying to political negotiations. A 
moderate male MP at the head of the National United Front, the main opposition group 
in the National Assembly, viewed his female colleagues in these terms: 
 
We should always apply logic to our talks. I am always present inside of the parliament and I can 
tell you that most women are not able to speak logically. They simply can’t do it. They don’t have 
enough knowledge about Islam. Mullahs become upset and angry. When this happens, I raise my 
card and I say: ‘This woman doesn’t mean that’. I say the same thing in another language, and 
then all MPs agree with me. (Interview - MP4, 25/10/2007) 
 
In these circumstances, displaying a respectful Muslim persona through proper 
veiling and clothing amounts to affirming one’s patriotic allegiances and a certain form of 
recognition for the historical heritage of the jihad. With a parliament dominated by jihadi 
factions for whom women’s rights are certainly not the priority, women are left with little 
choice but to conform in order to gain men’s recognition. The ‘emotional glue’ (Mayer 
2000, 3) conveyed by nationalist ideas, despite their systematic reproduction of gender 
stereotypes, cannot simply be ignored. As Mayer (2000, 6) puts it, ‘because the nation 
was produced as a heterosexual male construct its “ego” is intimately connected to 
patriarchal hierarchies and norms. These enable men and nation to achieve superiority 
over women and a different Other by controlling them. As a result the intersection of 
nation, gender and sexuality is a discourse about a moral code, which mobilized men 
(and sometimes women) to become its sole protectors and women its biological and 
symbolic reproducers’. Nationalist/conservative women, and to some extent, liberal 
women too are participating in defending the ‘moral code’. Through their dresses, 
women compete to embody the perfect model of the ‘pure’ and dedicated Muslim 
mother/sister. But liberal women’s indirect or direct participation in the reinforcement 
 213 
of this discourse allows them to gain credit and support in their own political groups 
when women’s rights issues are put on the negotiation table. 
 In her study of the women’s piety movement in Egypt, Saba Mahmood (2005) 
distinguishes between veiling practices as embodied production of Self, the purpose of 
which are to produce or create Selfhood and veiling practices as signs of collective 
identity. She argues that while the latter endows some nationalist or identitarian 
dispositions and rest on a conception of self as distinct from the outside world, the 
former are predicated on a sense of self constructed through norms and conventions. 
Indeed, embodied practices are forms of socialization which involve forced and forceful 
reiterations – what Bourdieu came to theorise as ‘habitus’- so that the subject, caught in a 
set of ‘structuring structures’ appears as if behaving ‘naturally’.  Building on Bourdieu’s 
concept of ‘habitus’ and Foucault’s theory of power and discipline, Butler (1997) offers a 
new reading of the notion of performativity by applying it to gender. She argues that 
gender is not a fact or an essence but a set of reiterated acts that produce the effect or 
appearance of a coherent substance. In short, gender is something that people do rather 
than an entity or a quality they possess. It is a set of acts, a performance, it works and 
derives its compulsive force from the fact that people mistake the acts for the essence 
and in the process, come to believe that they are mandatory. 
However, the distinction between embodied and identitarian veiling practices 
may be erroneous and both forms of subjectivities may coexist among the Afghan 
political women who are the subject of my study. The ethnographic material I have 
presented here demonstrates that conceptions of the relationship between the self and 
the body are not radically opposed. Liberal and nationalist women equally strive to 
cultivate virtuous selves while expressing pious identities through clothing. All of them 
(except Malalai Joya who defends secularism) insist that they do not aspire to the 
freedom enjoyed by Western women. They all view Islam as the basis of gender equality 
and the family as the core unit within which women can develop and empower 
themselves.  
As a result, the concept of performativity developed by Butler is too much 
centred on the individual to fully grasp the multiplicity of other factors that shape 
political women’s performances. These factors include the space within which the 
performance occurs, the others involved and how they might see and interpret what they 
witness. The theory of ‘performance’ developed by Goffman (1969) seems to integrate 
these factors in greater depth by relocating the individual in the context where s/he 
navigates and in a set of relations. In Goffman’s view, the performance is not the mere 
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product of discourses, as Butler suggests, but it is an act, which is validated through 
interactions with different audiences. These different interactions constitute the reality of 
the every day. 
Nationalist as well as liberal women navigate in the public sphere and the 
projection of identities is part of the construction of collectivities. Even those more 
liberal women who are most concerned with embodying modern Muslim personae are 
also engaged in performances, while the most nationalist-oriented women are concerned 
with embodying piety and national autonomy. Their encounters with the public are 
necessarily performative in the sense of ‘theatrical’ and changing according to audiences 
and situations. As Goffman argues, there is no essential self (Goffman 1967, 85): ‘While 
it may be true that the individual has a unique self of his own, evidence of this possession 
is thoroughly a product of joint ceremonial labour, the part expressed through the 
individual’s demeanour being no more signification than the part conveyed by others 
through their deferential behaviour toward him’.  
 Selves performing identities do not need to be conceptualized as autonomous or 
distinct from the social world. Similar to the case argued by Rachel Rinaldo (2007) for 
women’s groups in Indonesia, among women MPs sitting on the benches of the National 
assembly, the veil serves both to inculcate piety and to express identity, both intentionally 
and unintentionally.  
I qualify the body practices that I have described in this section as ‘performances’ 
in the sense of Goffman (Goffman 1956), not because I assume that women’s veiling 
practices are mere cynical or alienated responses to a dominant discourse, but in order to 
highlight women’s acknowledgement of and participation in a moral system in which 
their bodies are constant centres of attention. 
 
5. Reinventing the ‘public’ 
 
Public spaces are imbued with multiple ideologies, which contextually frame the 
multifaceted subjectivities that actors who navigate within them possess. Scholars have 
argued that models of the public sphere founded on the modern nation-state create and 
necessitate individuated subjectivities (Habermas 1989). I have shown that by contrast, in 
Afghanistan, the public sphere simultaneously sanctions political women’s subjectivities 
as Muslim women, as mothers/wives/daughters and as dependent on men. Their 
capacity to maintain a public position depends on their ability to embody such 
subjectivities. As has been observed in other post-colonial states, women activists in 
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Afghanistan are being rooted in nationalism and the struggle against foreign influence 
and therefore when they articulate demands for women, they ‘inevitably run the risk of 
being stigmatized as anti-nationalist and anti-religious’ (Al-Ali 2000, 1).  
Women know, when stepping into male dominated domains, the risk they face of 
getting caught in the middle of an international discursive struggle portrayed as a simple 
matter of human rights on one hand and a nationalist discourse that defends with 
absolute certainty ‘Afghan culture and traditions’ on the other hand. In order to 
manoeuvre in this very narrow corridor, Afghan women have had to create and reinvent 
new public spaces for themselves. Women entering public spaces are therefore bringing 
with them expectations of traditional, feminine behaviours. The parameters of women’s 
public behaviours are strictly circumscribed in both covert and overt ways. Women’s 
public presence is justified through the language of women as ‘carers of the nation’. This 
suggests that women are entering an anomalous space neither purely private nor strictly 
public, but rather a public space restricted by traditional principles of sociability, thereby 
modifying but not fundamentally disrupting rigid distinctions between public and private, 
male and female.  
Women employed in Ministries, in NGOs as well as women elected at the 
Afghan National Assembly are very careful to present themselves as dutiful mothers or 
daughters. The way these women talk about their ‘people’ is very similar to the way they 
talk about their children. Dr Massouda Jalal, for instance, who was the only female 
candidate for the 2004 Presidential elections, used the slogan: ‘Vote for the Mother’ for 
her campaign (Interview – Jalal, 22/11/2007). Mahbouba Seraj, a woman’s right activist 
running Koran reading groups for women in rural areas, insists that despite the fact that 
she has no children, she has motherly feelings for the women with whom she works 
(Field notes, 28/09/2007). She likes to call herself ‘Mother Afghanistan’ and the way she 
interacts with her ‘beneficiaries’ is in many ways similar to a mother dealing with her own 
children: patting them, kissing them and encouraging them to learn. In her opinion, 
women are teachers and have the religious duty to be educated in order to be able to 
educate their own children. For these ‘visible’ women, maintaining a motherly figure in 
the public domain is an effective means to gain recognition and legitimacy. 
The ceremonies organized for International Women’s Day by the Ministry of 
Women’s Affairs and other women’s organizations under the patronage of prominent 
feminine political figures followed the same discursive lines. In Shar-e-Naw luxurious 
hotels’ reception rooms, walls were covered with banners on which one could read the 
following passages of the Koran: “Women rock the cradle with one hand and carry the 
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earth with the other”, “Paradise lies on mothers’ feet”, “Thanks to women, men can 
reach mountaintops”. Girl scouts dressed up in military uniforms sang the Afghan 
national anthem while radio presenter Rana Nooristani, daughter of a woman 
representative of Nooristan province at the National Assembly, read poems in which 
women embodied the beauty of the Afghan land: “Women, you’re the beauty of the land, 
the basis of life. You know the secrets of life. God created you. You, modest queen.” 
(Field notes, 08/03/2007) 
Among the various government officials and religious leaders attending the 
ceremony, one figure in particular attracted my attention: General Khotul Mohamadzai, 
her military uniform covered with medals, was among a small group of military officers 
to be present here. In her traditional annual speech, she underlined the glory gained by 
the sacrifices made to protect the motherland: “My respected mother, I write about your 
dignity with my blood. As long as I’ll live, I’ll always be yours, my mother. At home or in 
a deserted place, you are a treasure of love for your daughters and sons. You are a 
patriotic woman. May each drop of our blood be sacrificed for you.”(Field notes, 
08/03/2007). Ill at ease in such an ostentatious deployment of nationalist feelings, I left 
the room before the end of the ceremony, a female organizer running after me to offer 
me the gift that would later on be distributed to all the female attendees: a bridal veil and 
a Koran. 
But Mohamadzai’s public discourses had not changed since, in the early eighties, 
she had been appointed General by the Communist regime, eager to showcase women in 
a political apparatus that wanted to present itself as ‘modern’ and progressive. This is 
what I would discover when I would come to interview her in her modest apartment in 
Makrorayan a few days later, this time without video cameras to record what she had to 
say. ‘I hate politics and I hate war’, Mohamadzai confided after she had recounted how 
she lost all her family members during the successive conflicts (Interview – Mohamadzai, 
08/04/2007). Widowed a few years after her wedding, Mohamadzai was living with her 
only son in a flat decorated with various trophies, prizes and official photographs. While 
she turned the yellowed pages of an old photo album, I realized the instrumental role 
women like Mohamadzai had played in sustaining the democratic pretence of the 
successive governments, a role Mohamadzai continued to occupy in the new Islamic 
Republic. 
As tactical as these performances may well be, they are part of a specifically 
feminine repertoire that allows women to engage in public activities without frantically 
challenging the gender order. If the ‘nationalist’ discourse remains a favourite avenue, it 
 217 
often goes with a religious decorum. Indeed, models of the Islamic government are 
based on religious figures such as Prophet Muhammad, Fatimah, his daughter and 
Khadija and Aisha, his first and second wives. Women who have entered the political 
arena have appropriated Fatimah, Khadija and Aisha’s models in new ways. By adapting 
and conforming their appearances and their behaviours to these predetermined Islamic 
socio-cultural models, Afghan women have gradually managed to access arenas where 
they were originally perceived as illegitimate. Their knowledge of the Koran and their 
ability to refer to it in different circumstances are powerful tools to break through the 
public, and sometimes to bring about small changes for women, under the veil of 
compliance and invisibility. For instance, a few businesswomen have emerged in Kabul, 
most of them supported by US-based organizations. They are running small and medium 
enterprises specialized in jam making, tailoring and regional trade. During interviews, 
these women often mentioned Khadijah, a rich merchant of Mecca who became the 
prophet’s first wife, as the original source of their inspiration (Interviews – Siddiqi, 
15/05/2007; Zarghona, 21/03/2007).  
Being able to refer to the Koran and to demonstrate one’s mastery of religious 
texts was therefore pivotal for women to assert their presence in public arenas. Women’s 
rights activists commonly used this tactic to access women living in remote rural areas 
and to avoid the suspicion or reluctance of local mullahs. They reclaimed the heritage of 
Islam as a religion that originally attempted to protect women against the discrimination 
and violence that marked the pre-Islamic order and promoted women’s rights through an 
Islamic framework. Among the rights they wanted other women to be aware of were the 
right to inheritance, to mahr  (the money a woman can claim from her future husband 
before her marriage and in case of divorce), to nika (religious marriage contract in which 
a mutual consent should be expressed for the marriage to be valid), to education, health 
and respect (as a daughter, mother, sister and wife).  
These were, in women’s rights activists’ opinion, the legitimate rights women 
could claim in a Muslim society. On her arrival to a village, Mahbouba Seraj would first 
meet the mullah and the village chief. Greetings were long and elaborate, news from the 
city and nearby villages were exchanged before the purpose of the visit was eventually 
revealed. A male colleague who would run similar discussion groups with local village 
men and mullahs would always accompany her. Obtaining men’s consent and including 
them in the debates was the precondition to getting access to the women. She would be 
very careful not to use the jargon of international human rights and would use her family 
lineage (Mahbouba belonged to the Royal family) and her age (she was a kala safed, a 
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white head) as entry points in the community. She would then gather the women in the 
house of a well-established local woman (usually a nurse, midwife or school teacher) who 
already enjoyed some kind of public recognition for her work within her constituency.  
Discussions would usually start on this note: 
 
Mahbouba: Before Islam appeared, what do you think the life of humans was like?  
A woman: Before Islam appeared, when a child was born and she was a girl, they would bury her 
alive.  
Mahbouba: Yes, you’re right. When a girl was born at that time, people would bury her alive. 
People were illiterate and they did not know about their rights. No woman could get married or 
receive heritage. Society did not treat women well. They threw girls in rivers and they buried them 
alive. Because of this, God sent his prophet Mohammad to the people. 1400 years ago, God sent 
Prophet Mohammad to the people of Saudi Arabia. And women started to have rights. (Field 
notes, 28/08/2007) 
 
The session would discuss issues related to marriage, inheritance, violence against 
women and education and would usually end up with a meal offered to all the 
participants, as a token of their newly formed friendship. These women’s gatherings were 
quite revolutionary in rural areas where women’s spheres of sociality were often reduced 
to their own family circles, with little opportunities for unrelated women to meet and 
discuss. There, in the safe space created by the motherly figure of Mahbouba, women 
were encouraged to talk freely about their problems and sorrows and find collective 
solutions for themselves. A new public sphere not predicated upon a Habermasian 
assumption of secular liberalism and the attendant separation of public and private, 
politics and religion or group and individual, provided discursive fields within which 
Muslim women were able to contest notions of work, body, honour and piety. This 
political repertoire, imbued with collective moral virtues derived from religious texts, 
allowed women to gain a sense of pride and self-worth while contesting the margins of 
the gender order.  
 
A woman gave birth to Prophet Mohammad. It’s not possible for a woman to give birth to 
Prophet Mohammad if she is dirty. I don’t understand these ideas according to which women are 
dirty. Islam says that no woman is dirty. Prophet Mohammad says that the paradise is at the feet 
of mothers. I want to tell you that Prophet Mohammad says that women should take care of their 
children so they become good Muslims and they guide other people in society. (Field notes, 
28/08/2007) 
 
 The cultivation, embodiment and display of virtuous selves, copied on famous 
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Islamic female figures, were the common denominator of the women who ran for the 
legislative elections. Many of them ran their campaign from home, receiving visitors in 
the same manner as a Queen holding court, listening to people’s demands and problems 
while using their networks of personal contacts to help them find solutions. It is thanks 
to the direct or tacit support of their male relatives that such gatherings were made 
possible. They were proud to say that they did not individually decide to run for the 
elections but were rather called by their own people to take part in the electoral 
competition. A common argument they used to justify their participation was that, unlike 
most male candidates, they had ‘no blood on their hands’, they did not commit any 
crimes during the war and that, as mothers who had suffered the death of their husbands 
and sons, they were dedicated to establish peace in their country. 
 What emerges out of the examination of these feminine public performances is a 
general sense of deference and respect for rules of conduct, which from the outside, may 
be understood as mere reinforcement of gender hierarchies. But by behaving according 
to societies’ expectations of appropriate feminine/Muslim comportments, women were 
able to create for themselves an alternative public space or ‘semi public spaces’ from 
where they could increase their participation in public life. It is their behaviours as 
women holding a certain status or position that expressed compliance, not their other 
substantive selves dedicated to achieve change for women. For these rules were parts of 
a necessary cultural ‘ceremonial’ - i.e highly specified, extended sequence of symbolic 
action performed by august actors on solemn occasions when religious sentiments are 
likely to be invoked’ (Goffman 1956: 5) - to follow in order to become legitimate in the 
public arena. Because ‘the rules of conduct which bind the actor and the recipient 
together are the bindings of society’ (Goffman 1956, 25), women were careful to create 
terms of familiarity with the ‘super ordinates’. And by doing so, they struggled to enlarge 
the scope of their possibilities. 
   
 
Conclusion 
 
 In Afghanistan, the use of the veil is part of a broader set of rules that define 
proper gender behaviours in public settings. These rules apply to both men and women 
and vary according to variables such as age, ethnic affiliations, social status. To some 
extent, men do wear veils too and abide by these rules in their daily interactions with 
members of the opposite sex. In the context of a military occupation, showing respect 
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for these rules, as instrumental as it may appear, has become all the more significant in 
that it provides a sense of continuity and collective belonging.  
My aim in this chapter was not to diminish or question the religious endeavours 
of the women I observed, but rather to underline the possibilities that were enabled 
through the reiteration of these feminine ceremonials. As it would be erroneous to 
reduce the veil to its instrumental functions, it is also inappropriate to see in it a pure 
religious expression. Deference and dissimulation were indeed political gestures that 
worked as the necessary social make-up for women to break through the ‘public’. A 
deeper analysis of their motives and actions showed that women were able to strategize 
and adapt to their audience, displaying different layers of their multiple selves, according 
to the different audiences they wished to address. As a result, the dichotomy proposed 
by Saba Mahmood (2001) between veiling practices as embodied forms of subjectivity 
and veiling practices as identitarian forms of expression may be too simplistic to describe 
the complex ways in which women positions themselves in relation to others in specific 
contexts. The concept of ‘performance’ developed by Goffman provides a more 
appropriate framework to analyse these practices since it relocates the individual in a set 
of interactions that constitute the everyday of individual men and women. 
The following chapter provides a deeper insight into the concept of Islamic 
performance that I have started to develop in the course of this analysis. I show how the 
mobilization of a collective memory and shared cultural imaginaries through emotional 
performances are key to achieve public recognition and preserve a sense of self-
definition.  
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Chapter 7 
Ambiguous Speech: the Politics and Poetics of Emotions and 
Feelings among Afghan Women 
 
 
 
Rabia Balkhi by Afghan poet and artist Hameed Naweed 
 
 
 
I am an Afghan girl and it is right that I always cry 
Nadia Anjuman 
 
 
A legend says that in the 10th century, Afghan poetess Rabia Balkhi wrote her last 
love poems with her own blood. Born in Balkh in the court of the Samanids where many 
Persian poets held residence, Rabia fell in love with Baktash, the Turkish slave of her 
brother Haares. Mad with rage at the discovery of her sister’s secret liaison, Haares killed 
Baktash. It is said that Rabia would have retreated into the house’s hamam, cut her veins, 
and written these last words on the bathroom’s walls: “When you see things hideous, 
fancy them neat / Eat poison, but taste sugar sweet”.  
There is in the poetry of Rabia Balkhi, like in the literary work of the many 
Afghan poetesses who followed her, a peculiar voice, that one could define as specifically 
feminine. Nadia Anjuman’s poems, for instance – whom I quote in the introduction to 
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this chapter - communicate grief, sorrow and sadness, which combined together, convey 
strong impressions of despondency and suffering. Nadia, like Rabia, was turned into a 
national heroine when she died under mysterious circumstances in 2005 – probably 
assassinated by her husband although suicide was the official explanation - after the 
publication of her first collection of poems under the title of Gul-e Dodi (Flowers of 
Smoke). Thousands of people, among them government’s officials, Herati poets and 
students attended her funeral. 
Drawing on previous anthropological studies on emotional meanings systems 
(Abu-Lughod 1986, Grima 1992, Rosaldo 1984, Leavitt 1996), I analyse women’s 
articulation of despondency as a means to maintain relationships, honour and gain public 
recognition. Indeed, to the external observer that I was, women’s expressions of feelings 
through emotional performances had a particular and distinctive flavour. Women’s 
rhetoric was emphatic, lyrical and tinted with a nationalist imagery in which women, as 
symbols of the nation, embodied the country’s pains and sufferings. In this chapter, I 
argue that these distinctively feminine narratives are tools widely used by women to 
manage others’ impression and gain public validation. While reproducing common 
stereotypes about female irrationality and emotional fragility, these discourses allow 
women to access the public without disrupting social expectations of femininity. 
In an attempt at moving beyond the simple association of emotions with the 
domains of the private and the intimate, recent anthropological work has highlighted the 
various ways in which emotions can create, maintain, challenge or redefine social 
relations (Rosaldo 1984; Ong 1988; Scheper-Hughes 1997; Abu-Lughod 2007). Indeed, 
Western philosophical tradition, from Plato to Descartes, has analysed emotions through 
a ‘romantic’ framework, connecting them to biological instincts or primary body 
experiences and placing them in opposition to rationalism. In this perspective, emotions 
have been seen as disordering and problematic or at least, as vague and irrational (Lutz 
and White 1986). As a result, scholars of ‘culture’ have tended to neglect the study of 
emotions for their assumed ‘universal’ existence made cross-cultural comparisons 
unworthy.  
In recent years though, a body of literature challenging these conceptions has 
emerged. These studies have attempted to criticize the binaries (individual/social, 
universalism/interpretivism, romanticism/rationalism, public/private) that have for a 
long time framed academic debates on emotions and feelings by proposing alternative 
categories of analysis. These new studies have highlighted the ‘constructed’ and 
‘relational’ aspects of emotions by underlining the complex ways in which the moral 
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order - notions of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ - was in all societies defined or filtered through the 
language of the Self, i.e emotions. Lila Abu-Lughod (1986), for instance, has shown how 
Bedouins in Egypt both assert and challenge their acceptance of social hierarchies 
through discourses of emotions linked to the ideology of honour and modesty. In a 
similar move, Nancy Scheper-Hughes (1997) has shown how the combination of 
particularly harsh living conditions, high infant mortality rates and religious beliefs in a 
slum in Northern Brazil impact on women’s capacity to express mother love.  
In this chapter, I look more specifically at women’s emotional rhetoric and 
performances in various contexts in order to map out the various instances in which 
these ambiguous communicative codes are used as political or persuasive strategies. 
Although emotions unarguably involve instinctive and unconscious body experiences 
‘under the skin’, they also assume a pragmatic communicational function tightly 
intertwined with broader systems of values, identity and ethnopsychological 
understandings. As Leavitt puts it (1996, 530): ‘Emotions are understood not to be 
exclusively “under the hat”, not “locked in the heart”, the liver or the belly (even if that is 
where people say they feel them) but as forming systems of differently toned 
feelings/meanings that are learned by socialized bodies as typical responses to social 
scenarios and that are expressed (or suppressed) in social contexts’. As the different cases 
I present in this chapter demonstrate, the performance and rhetoric of feelings among 
the women I observed took place within culturally defined cognitive frames that have 
identifiable boundaries. Women’s enactment of such culturally framed emotional 
repertoires allowed them to loosen patriarchal control over their lives and challenge 
gender hierarchies, while preserving the core values of the honour system. 
I also link women’s emotional repertoires to the broader nationalist and poetical 
frames within which they develop. The relationship between affects and politics has been 
underlined in studies related to the development of the nation-state (Anderson 1999; 
Smith 1991). However, these studies have tended to deny the central role of gender in 
shaping national sentiments. On the contrary, feminist scholars (Aretxaga 1997; Einhorn 
2006; Yuval-Davis 1997) have demonstrated how gender and nationalism are tightly 
connected together and how both work to strengthen patriotism, especially in times of 
war and conflicts.  
In her study of the conflict in Northern Ireland, for instance, Arextaga uses 
Foucault’s concept of ‘microphysics of power’ to analyse the subjectivity of nationalist 
women taking part in the resistance against the British occupation. She argues that spaces 
of social transformation are not necessarily infused with upfront resistance to dominant 
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discourses but rather determined by subtle, marginal and oftentimes contradictory 
attempts at modifying these discourses. These ‘everyday forms of resistance’ (Scott 1985) 
are informed by conscious and unconscious social practices, which involve a great deal of 
engagement with emotions. This is because, as Jane Flax points out, ‘political action and 
change require and call upon many human capacities including empathy, anger and 
disgust’ - and I would add, suffering – ‘that are not always expressed in language’ (Flax 
1992, 458). These analyses are key to understand the predominance of emotional 
performances and discourses as ‘oppositional practices of everyday life’ (de Certeau 
1984) among Afghan women trying to break through the political/public sphere. 
In the first section of this chapter, I investigate women’s emotions in poetry. I 
specifically focus on Nadia Anjuman, a young Afghan poetess who died shortly after the 
publication of her first collection of poems and became a sort of national icon. I 
confront her poetic production to her life story in order to highlight the transgressive 
potential of poetry as a literary genre. I argue that poetry, as a well-respected literary 
form, is an important expressive device used by women to comment on society. This 
analysis sets the basis of the imaginary framework that impregnates women’s world (part 
1). I then move on to explore narratives of martyrdom that were recurrent among 
Afghan political women. I show how women borrowed notions of self-sacrifice and jihad 
from mainstream politics but reinterpreted and slightly changed their original meaning in 
an attempt to gain public validation (section 2). I then move on to analyse women’s 
emotional performances by looking more specifically at the issue of women’s suicide. 
Indeed, in the recent past years, an increasing number of women have been reported to 
resort to self-immolation to ‘escape’ from domestic violence, especially in the Western 
provinces of Afghanistan. These dramatic gestures were often interpreted by women’s 
rights groups and international human rights organizations as signs of women’s despair 
and hopelessness. Using the case study of two sisters from the dormitory who attempted 
to end their lives through poisoning, I highlight the expressive, ritualized and subversive 
nature of female suicide (section 3).  
 
1. Poetic Resistance 
 
Poetry writing and recitation in Afghanistan have been and still are very 
important activities. Nancy Hatch-Dupree mentions that ‘while treasuring the poets of 
the past, a great many gifted Afghans try their hand at writing poetry and poetry readings 
or mushaira are a popular form of entertainment’ (Dupree-Hatch 2002, 979).  A Persian 
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proverb says that ‘good poets are like angels of heaven’. Indeed, it is commonly believed 
that a poem can put an end to a family problem or to troubles in a village. Lutfia, a girl 
from the dormitory whose family lived in Parwan province, told me that her mother, 
who only attended school for three years, knew a large amount of poetry, despite her 
poor level of literacy. She explained that using poetry brought validity and strength to an 
argument and that in her village, women resorted to this form of expression on a regular 
everyday basis. She said: 
 
In our village, most people, especially women, are illiterate. So if a woman uses poetry, it shows 
that she has some kind of knowledge and her ideas get more easily accepted. (Fieldnotes, 
13/02/2007) 
 
Although women’s oral poetry has a long tradition in Afghanistan73, until a few 
decades ago, women were rarely individually recognized as poets or writers on a par with 
men. As almost any educated woman will tell you in Afghanistan nowadays, the artistic 
and cultural achievements of Persian poetesses – from Rabia Balkhi, Mustahi Khujandi, 
Qaratul Ahin to even Forough Farukhzad – have been suppressed and insufficiently 
examined.  
A few Afghan poetesses have however started to gain public recognition after the 
USSR withdrawal from Afghanistan, as a reward for the patriotic endeavour expressed in 
their poetic work. Indeed, from the Communist regime up to the Taliban, poetry has 
gradually become a means of resistance. But whereas men’s poetry was deeply influenced 
by the ‘Kalashnikovation’ of society (Goodson 1998), encouraging men to take arms and 
resist the occupation, women’s poetry explored feelings of pain, captivity, darkness, 
loneliness, wandering, escape, absurdity and nothingness, sometimes assuming 
metaphysical dimensions. The expression of such feelings, while reinforcing certain ideas 
of women as essentially emotional individuals, opened doors for a certain form of public 
validation. 
Lila Abu Lughod’s (1886) work among the Awlad Ali Bedouins in Egypt has 
underlined the centrality of poetry as a form of ‘resistance’ or as a means to mediate 
relations between men and women. I share with her the view that poetry, as an aesthetic 
and spiritual domain of life, is about beliefs and values and therefore about politics. In 
countries like Afghanistan, where two thirds of the population is illiterate, oral poetry has 
been traditionally used as a channel for commenting on society and politics. Poetic 
                                                
73 See Bahodine Majrouh (2003), Songs of Love and War: Afghan Women’s Poetry, New York, Other Press 
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composition and performances structure social relations and provide individuals with a 
form of political expression and persuasion. Studying the poetry of women is particularly 
interesting since the ambiguous messages that are channelled through their literary work 
allow them to express covert forms of dissent. Through poetry, women compose with 
the boundaries of gender norms and gain a relative sense of autonomy while conforming 
to the honour system.  
a. Poetry ,  honour and res i s tance 
 
Political literature has a long history in Afghanistan and many female writers have 
contributed to its flourishing, especially during the emergence of leftist political 
movements in the 60s. While women had remained largely excluded from the artistic and 
literary life of the country prior to this period, Faridullah Bezhan (2007, 2008) has 
documented well how the relative liberalization of the Afghan society in the 1960s and 
1970s produced a new urban middle class politicized elite in Kabul that gave birth to a 
handful of female writers. Some of them, like Spozhmai Zaryab and Maryam Mahboob 
who specialized in the art of short story writing, have become notorious for their 
denunciation of violence against women committed by both sides during the war.   
While the Communist regime tried to assert its control over the country with the 
military support of the USSR, poetry gradually became a genre of preference for 
expressing political dissidence. In opposition to the official literary forms promoted by 
the PDPA, some Afghan poets attempted to escape from the rigidity of socialist realism, 
using poetry, a genre despised by the ruling elite, to denounce political abuse. The Party, 
seeking to rally the Afghan people to the cause of the revolution, wanted to create a 
literary and artistic elite capable of fostering the national ideology. ‘Art for art’s sake’ 
(poetry) had to be abandoned for socialist realist fictions. As Ahmadi (2008, 95) explains, 
the Writers’ Union founded in 1980, encouraged authors to produce literary work that 
‘reflected the lives of workers, peasants, farmers, and, above all, the armed forces that 
defended the regime and safeguarded the revolution. Anticipating the necessary demise 
of ‘evil forces’ of reaction and the dawn of a bright future, these works were expected to 
deal with the development of a revolutionary hero who overcomes all odds and, even if 
he – and only rarely she – is not to see the fruit of his endeavours, plants the seeds of hope 
for the future of the masses at large’.  
Literary production had therefore to convey enthusiastic messages, to transmit 
the revolutionary ideals of progress and freedom from feudal oppression to the broader 
nation. In order to achieve this project, the ideal manhood was forged around 
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stereotypical images of dedicated and tireless workers, labouring farmers and above all, 
dutiful soldiers fighting against the ‘enemies of the revolution’. As in the poster 
reproduced below, womanhood was used as an allegory of the nation, in need of the 
same protection as the fragile gains of the revolution constantly under the threat of 
‘backward antirevolutionary forces’.  
Ironically, literary works (whether oral or written) produced in the Afghan 
refugee camps during this same period reproduced the same ideals of militarized 
masculinity and subservient domestic femininity. Anthropologist Audrey Shalinsky 
(1993) for instance, has documented how the various jihadi parties in Pakistan distributed 
tape cassettes both in the camps under their control and in Afghanistan, which 
promoted, through lyric tales and stories inspired from the life of prophet Mohammed, 
appropriate behaviours for women in time of jihad. These stories linked religion, courage, 
honour and territory and promoted differentiated roles for men and women in the war 
effort. What jihad meant for women was to maintain their chastity and purity by staying 
at home and remaining totally segregated from men. As a consequence, the Jihad was 
endowed with a moral dimension, which women had the responsibility to maintain 
through appropriate veiling and (re)-production of future soldiers and umma members 
(Shalinsky 1993, 674). 
However, men had other moral duties like showing courage in the battle against 
the enemies. The landays74 collected by the Afghan poet Bahodine Majrouh (2003) among 
Pashtun women living in the refugee camps in Pakistan, reveal that women, far from 
being passive servants of the honour ideology, actively participated in reproducing it, 
shaming the men who did not demonstrate enough bravery in the art of war.  
 
In battle today my lover turned his back to the enemy. 
I am ashamed of having kissed him last night. (Bahodine Majrouh 2003, 16) 
                                                
74 Brief poem of two verse lines of nine and thirteen syllables respectively. Landays are exchanged and 
spontaneously improvised by Pashtuns and used in their everyday interactions.  
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Propaganda poster produced during Kamal’s government. The big banner says: ‘Have you joined the Sawr 
Revolution yet?’ The small banners say: ‘Learn from champions!’, ‘Hurry up, defend the nation and the 
revolution!’ and ‘It’s our duty to defend the country and the revolution!’ 
(Government-of-Afghanistan 1984) 
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The nationalist project, from the civil war up to nowadays, has gendered the 
nation around rural patriarchal values, emphasising a heroic tradition of fearless Afghan 
jihadis and locating feminine traits of characters in the imported follies of urban life. For 
the mujjahedins, the liberation of Afghanistan went far beyond physical force and far 
deeper than an independent political system. The Afghan nation had to return to its 
original ‘authenticity’ by purifying its soul from foreign ‘pollution’. As Olesen (1996, 276) 
explains: ‘The Islamic discourse dominant in the resistance revolved around the concepts 
of hijra and jihad leaving two identities available for the believer: muhajir (exile), mujjahed 
(holy warrior) and in the last instance shahid (martyr)’. For the holly warriors, the two 
identities were not conflicting: when they went on military operations, they were 
mujjahed, and when they returned to the refugee camps in Pakistan, they were muhajir.  
Besides references to the Koran, the mujjahedin also used the tribal code of honour 
(Pashtunwali) to reaffirm the patriarchal order. To protect namous-e watan (the honour of 
the nation) became synonymous with protecting women, namous-e mard (the honour of 
men).  The necessity to protect women from the polluting influence of kafir (unbelievers) 
was a central motive in discourses of resistance. This theme was emphasized in the many 
political pamphlets and songs produced in the refugee camps. For instance this one 
written by Rafiq Jan (quoted in Olesen 1996, 279): 
 
O, Muslim, modesty, shame and to be in pardah75 
Is a great nang wa namus76… 
 
You can’t tell her not to go somewhere 
She has the freedom to be at everyone’s side, 
Whoever she wants 
She could spend the night with him… 
 
Everyone has to accept this command 
All of us should taste each other’s women77 
Khalqis believe that zar, zan wa zamin78 
                                                
75 Pardah, literally means ‘curtain’. Women start doing ‘pardah’ after puberty. This includes veiling and 
avoidance of unrelated men (see chapter 4) 
76 Nang wa namus refers to the tribal code of honour. 
77 This verse means that under the Communist regime, women are no more the ‘property’ of their kin and 
families. The poet interprets the communist ideology as an encouragement to loose morals and adultery. 
78 ‘women, gold and land’ (Pashtun saying).  
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Are common things 
O, Muslim! Think about it… 
 
It is not surprising that the response of Afghan nationalism to the colonialist 
discourse of the Soviets who justified their occupation of the country by the necessity to 
modernize and ‘liberate’ women, was the idealization of traditional motherhood within 
the symbolic terrain of nationalist culture: the rural home. The national project, which 
materialized after the withdrawal of the Red Army, during the civil war and reached its 
peak with the emergence of the Taliban, was predicated on a rejection of modernity, a 
return to an essentialized rural and mythical tradition. The consequences were enormous 
for women who were erased from the professional and intellectual life of the country. 
However, while the country gradually grappled with violence and silence, the 
voices of women were not totally extinguished. Writers like Maryam Mahboob and 
Spozhmai Zaryab79 eventually fled from Afghanistan and continued exploring Afghan 
women’s suffering in the short stories they published abroad. Poetry writing seems to 
have remained more popular among the women who either stayed in the country or 
among the ones who lived as refugees in Pakistan and Iran. For many young girls 
excluded from education, and for professional women relegated to the home, poetry 
writing became an important means of self-empowerment. A number of girls living in 
the dormitory told me that during their years of exile in Pakistan or in Iran, poetry 
writing became a means to deal with their worries and anxieties. In an article published in 
the women’s magazine Sadaf (Pearl), an Afghan girl recalls how poetry writing helped her 
keep hope when the outside world was no longer accessible: 
 
Slowly, I found out that controlling words would help me find a voice, and so I found the poet 
inside of me. For five years I patiently tolerated the clouds that had come into my life because I 
believed in the saying: ‘patience is difficult but has its rewards.’ (…) After some time, the clouds 
vanished and the light of hope started to shine again. Bathed in light, I ran to my white world. 
(Najwa 2006) 
 
The choice of poetry as a primary form of expression is no accident. Writing 
poetry is positioning oneself within a respected genre as well as within an intellectual elite 
and female poets can expect to receive a similar kind of public respect and recognition as 
                                                
79 Maryam Mahboob left for Canada in the early 1980s after brief stays in Pakistan and India (Bezhan, 
2008: 374). Spozhmai Zaryab studied literature in France and in Afghanistan. She served as a translator at 
the French Embassy in Kabul. She left Afghanistan in 1991 and has lived in France since then (Bezhan, 
2008: 314).  
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their male counterparts. Using classic Persian poetical forms, some women wrote ghazal. 
But while respecting the structural requirements of an ancient poetic form, the themes 
women addressed were in rupture with tradition. Indeed, instead of employing allegorical 
or supernatural elements to derive some moral principle or some aspect of temporal life 
or life after death (Bezhan, 2007: 6), women talked about their intimate experience of 
war. They talked about their pain but also about topics considered taboo within a 
conservative society, such as love and beauty. Because poetry permits the manipulation 
of language and the covert alteration of mainstream discourses on womanhood, women 
found in it an appropriate way to preserve a voice while remaining within the cultural 
boundaries of a literary tradition. 
 
b. Women’s poetry :  the language o f  ambigui ty  
 
Laila Sarahat Rushani, for instance, expressed through her poetry the suffering of 
the nation at war. A graduate in Literature from the University of Kabul, Rushani was 
one of the few intellectuals who remained in the country during the conflicts. Her father, 
Sarshar Rushani, was a known journalist, who was tortured and brutally killed by the 
ruling wing of the communist Khalq party. She was born in Charikar, the capital city of 
Parwan province, north of Kabul. She was forced to leave Kabul after the Taliban militia 
intensified their abusive treatment of women. She went to the Netherlands in 1998, 
where she lived as a refugee. There, she published Eve in Exile, a literary journal in Farsi. 
On July 21, 2004, she died of brain cancer at the age of 46 in a hospital. On July 29, her 
body was received at Kabul Airport by a large number of Afghan poets, intellectuals and 
her friends and relatives, who mournfully escorted her funeral to Shuhadai-e-Saliheen 
cemetery where she was buried. 
Rushani is known for her strong spirit of protest, her courage and intellectual 
resistance against the communist regime and Taliban’s reign of terror, which permeate 
much of her poetry. In a poem entitled ‘Assamayi Mountain’80, the poet praises patience 
and courage, values that are metaphorically associated with the stillness of the Afghan 
                                                
80 The Assamayi mountain is located south of Kabul. In 1991, a part of the mountain cracked.  
In 2008, Afghan author Attiq Rahimi published a novel under the title Singue Sabour (Stone of patience). 
The book recounts the story of a woman who decides to use her paralysed and mute husband as a ‘stone 
of patience’. The silence of the man encourages the woman to share with him all the secrets of her life she 
had never dared to share before. In Persian mythology, Singue Sabour is a magic stone to which one can 
confide his/her sorrows. Like a sponge, the stone absorbs words and secrets until it cracks. After the 
explosion of the stone, the confident is forever relieved from his/her sadness. This poem written by 
Rushani uses a similar metaphor.  
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mountains but also with the rootedness of women as central pillars of the family and the 
broader nation: 
 
Oh Assamayi 
In your stony breaths 
Is the spirit of a thousand silent sparks. 
Oh stone, oh patience 
Your height is faith’s firmness -- 
History’s sublime poem 
Oh mountain 
The myth of sacred pride 
Is inscribed 
In your conscious mind 
The endless pain of this city 
Is for so long 
Engraved in your cold stony vein 
Oh stone, oh patience 
Oh silent witness of crimes. 
What wound was swelling 
In your inner-stone’s bleeding heart 
That suddenly sundered your heart? 
Oh stone, oh patience!81 
 
Unlike many young poets and intellectuals of her time, who either espoused the 
communist ideology or those who became disillusioned after a period of cooperation 
with the communist regime, Rushani never compromised her commitment to her art and 
her spirit of justice and integrity. Her poetry fully espoused the cause of the resistance by 
fuelling the nationalist imagery with loyal representations of women as ‘suffering 
mothers’. Like in the patriotic literature produced in the camps, the source of women’s 
power according to Rushani did not stem from their engagement in action but rather 
from their capacity to endure and remain silent, like singue sabour (the stone of patience) 
                                                
81 This poem was translated into English by Dr Sharif Fayez. Dr Fayez was the first appointed Minister of 
Higher Education after the fall of the Taliban. He holds an MA in English Literature from the University 
of Northern Colorado, and a Ph.D. in American Literature and Oriental Studies from the University of 
Arizona. Fayez has taught English literature at the University of Kabul in the 70s and at the University of 
Mashad in Iran, during the Soviet occupation. He is the founder of the American University of Kabul.  
http://www.ariaye.com/english/poem2.html 
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or the Afghan mountains. What is nonetheless striking in such a poetic piece is that while 
Rushani seems to reproduce the ideal of silent womanhood, her writing is already an act 
of defiance to such an ideal. The tension between the discourse of the poetess and her 
action demonstrates that Afghan women are not deprived from this dreamy imagination, 
an imagination that allows them to symbolically reconcile the vexed relationship between 
their own subjectivity and patriotism. Through Rushani’s poetry, the apology of silence is 
turned into a means of breaking that very silence itself.    
In 1994, under the government of Rabbani, Rushani was appointed chief editor 
of the short-lived women’s bi-monthly magazine Irshad-e Niswan (Ladies’ Guide). 
Granting such a political reward to a woman, when in the meantime, the mujjahedin 
started to implement gender discriminatory policies, is a good indicator of the efficiency 
of poetry as a means to gain public recognition and visibility. The language of poetry, 
with its subtle slipperiness of meanings, remains the most appropriate language for 
women to use in order to speak out. 
In some instances, women’s experiences of war helped them develop a political 
consciousness and challenge mainstream representations of women in a less covert 
manner. This is for instance the case of Meena, the founder of the Revolutionary 
Association of the Women of Afghanistan, assassinated by agents of KHAD 
(Afghanistan branch of KGB) and their accomplices in Quetta, Pakistan, in 1987. In a 
poem entitled ‘I will never return’ published in 1981 in Payam-e-Zan, a publication of 
RAWA, Meena challenges nationalist images of women as weak and powerless: 
 
I'm the woman who has awoken 
I've arisen and become a tempest through the ashes of my burnt children 
I've arisen from the rivulets of my brother's blood 
My nation's wrath has empowered me 
My ruined and burnt villages fill me with hatred against the enemy 
Oh compatriot, no longer regard me weak and incapable, 
My voice has mingled with thousands of arisen women 
My fists are clenched with fists of thousands compatriots 
To break all these sufferings all these fetters of slavery. 
I'm the woman who has awoken, 
I've found my path and will never return82. 
 
                                                
82 Poem published on RAWA’s website: http://www.rawa.org/meena.html 
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If the patriotic tone remains central, with the figures of the suffering mother and 
bereaved sister appearing right in the introduction of the poem, Meena also underlines 
the radical transformation of her political consciousness as a result of her experience of 
war. Meena’s poetry is a testament, a political vision and an encouragement for other 
women to follow her steps. She anticipates the coming of age of a new generation of 
women (‘My voice has mingled with thousands of arisen women’) who will struggle for 
women’s rights and democracy and who will be ready to sacrifice themselves for these 
higher ideals. It is interesting to notice that somehow the prophecy of the ‘martyred’ 
Meena got fulfilled through the emergence of a feminine figure like Malalai Joya on the 
Afghan political scene after the fall of the Taliban. In her memoir ‘Raising my voice’, 
Joya, who as a refugee child attended one of the Watan schools run by RAWA in Quetta 
(Joya 2009, 22), Pakistan, presents herself as part of a tradition of fearless women ready 
to die for the cause of justice. She writes: 
 
You cannot compromise the truth. And I am not afraid of an early death if it advances the cause 
of justice. Even the grave cannot silence my voice, because there are others who would carry on 
after me. (Joya 2009, 3) 
 
c .  Nadia Anjuman: a rebe l l ious voi ce  
 
It is probably the city of Herat, the cultural heart of Afghanistan that has 
produced most of the contemporary Afghan poetesses and the most powerful and 
sophisticated ghazal83. Herat is indeed deep in history, with a cultural richness that can be 
dated back to the 14th century. During the rule of Tamerlane’s son, Shah Rukh, Herat 
became the capital of the Timurid empire. This era spelt the beginning of a cultural 
renaissance, with the Court attracting numerous writers, architects, artists, poets and 
philosophers (Doubleday 2006). This was also the time when women were given greater 
political power. Gohar Shah, Shah Rukh’s wife, whose mausoleum is still standing in the 
women’s park, opened the first madrassah for girls and governed over the empire for ten 
years after the death of her husband. Herat was also home to a large number of poets 
and Sufi mystics – the poet Jami, the Sufi Ansari, the scholar Mahmud Arifi.  The saying 
                                                
83 The ghazal is a poetic form consisting of rhyming couplets and a refrain. Each line must share the same 
meter. A ghazal may be understood as a poetic expression of both the pain of loss or separation and the 
beauty of love in spite of that pain. The form is ancient, originating in 6th century pre-Islamic Arabic verse. 
In its style and content it is a genre, which has proved capable of an extraordinary variety of expression 
around its central themes of love and separation. It is one of the principal poetic forms the Indo-Perso-
Arabic civilization offered to the eastern Islamic world. 
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goes that under the Timurid dynasty, you could not stretch your leg out in Herat without 
kicking a poet. 
Herat has not lost its intellectual and cultural aura since then. During the five 
years of the Taliban rule, poets and writers organised a fierce resistance. Not with 
weapons, but with books and poetry. A network of clandestine literary circles, officially 
called ‘Sewing Circles’ to avoid attracting the authorities’ attention, flourished all 
throughout the city (Lamb 2002). There, young women, faces and bodies hidden by their 
Taliban-enforced uniform of sky-blue chadari and flat shoes, would come several times a 
week to read and comment on ‘illicit’ literature. In their handbags, concealed under 
scissors, cottons, sequins and pieces of fabric, were notebooks and pens. On the menu 
were classic Persian writers and poets as well as foreign authors like Dostoyevsky, Brecht 
and Shakespeare. Their teachers would also encourage them to develop their own literary 
creativity by initiating them to poetry writing, right under the nose of the religious police. 
 One of these young students, Nadia Anjuman, became notorious after the 
publication of her first book of poetry under the title of Gul-e Dodi (Flowers of Smoke) in 
2005. The poetry of Nadia Anjuman, a student at the Golden Needle, the first Sewing 
Circle established in the city by Prof. Mohammad Ali Rahyab, stands out in the midst of 
Herat’s vibrant underground poetic production, as a denunciation of the Taliban regime. 
In a poem entitled ‘Useless’ written in 1999, the nineteen-year-old Herati poet compares 
her life to the one of a bird in a cage: 
 
No desire to speak again; what should I sing about? 
I am accursed by time whether I sing or not 
Why should I talk of honey since it is poison for me? 
Alas! A group of oppressors closed my mouth 
I don’t have a confidante, who shall I be coy with? 
Why do I cry, laugh, die and remain? 
Myself and this corner of captivity, the sorrow of failure and regret 
I was needlessly created and I should seal my mouth shut 
I know that it is spring and the season of delight but 
What can I do with tied wings? I cannot fly 
Even though I have long been silent, I haven’t forgotten the songs 
Because my heart and soul speak in every moment 
Happy the day when I will break the cage 
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When I will leave this solitude and sing with abandon 
I am not a weak tree that sways with every breeze 
I am an Afghan girl and it is right that I always cry84 
 
 The repetitions of questions that remain unanswered together with a lexical field 
of imprisonment convey strong feelings of alienation and despondency. However, the 
ones who are responsible for Nadia’s sufferings are not easily identifiable. Referents 
remain vague and highly ambiguous. Who is this ‘group of oppressors’ Nadia is referring 
to? Is she denouncing the ruthlessness of the Taliban or more specifically, her family 
dissatisfied with her poetic activities and with whom she had regular arguments?  
Reading Nadia’s poetry through the prism of her life story and the specific social, 
political and cultural contexts in which she emerged as a poetess, helps us to get a grasp 
on the veiled meanings hidden under the surface of her words. Following the fall of the 
Taliban, Nadia continued to attend the literary meetings held at the Golden 
Needle.  Amy Waldman of the New York Times met her then. Nadia had already written 
some 60-70 poems.  As the first person in her family to be a writer, Waldman noted that 
Nadia had to fight for her family’s cooperation.  She also wrote that, ‘She has fought, 
too, to stave off marriage, fearing it [would] limit her freedom to write.  ‘I think I’ve been 
quite successful,’ [Nadia] said.  ‘Girls are expected to marry at 14 or 15.’ (Waldman 2001) 
 Marriage did come eventually, though, in 2004, and to a scholar.  Farid Ahmad 
Majid Nia, 27, was a lecturer in philology at Herat University.  Nadia’s brother Shaffi says 
that she had resisted this pairing, and that the marriage was not altogether a happy 
one.  “Nadia was a successful woman, a popular woman, a good poet, and he (Farid) was 
feeling jealous. He asked Nadia several times: Why are you popular and I’m not? Why do 
people know you and they don’t know me? I’m the husband. I’m a man,” he testified in a 
CNN interview (Obaid-Chinoy 2009).   
Despite the disagreement of her husband and family, Nadia did not stop writing. 
Her poetry can be read as provocative answers to their accusations. If she could not 
totally resist their authority, no one could prevent her from expressing her feelings and 
sorrows. Unleashing a ‘false smile’ (2004), she warned them: 
 
Don’t pretend that tiredness explains my blunt presence 
Don’t sing of my steep intelligence without salt 
                                                
84 Nadia Anjuman’s poems translated into English can be found on this website:  
http://nadia.afghanwire.org 
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Because of temptation my wings head towards disappointment 
At your turn, don’t send me into the night 
I am the happiest appearance of hope 
Desirous of sophistry, don’t call me sorrowful 
I know the language of life and disgust 
Don’t explain this speech inimically 
I have a story of a false smile 
Swear by God! Don’t make stories from my pain 
In this moment that we sat talking 
Don’t garb the time in poetry 
 
In 2005, Gul-e Dudi (‘Flower of Smoke) got eventually published, and it quickly 
became popular in Afghanistan and Iran.  Christina Lamb wrote in a piece for the Times 
on Nadia’s death that ‘friends say her family was furious, believing that the publication of 
poetry by a woman about love and beauty had brought shame on it.’ (Lamb 
2005)  Following Nadia’s death, Gul-e Dodi was chosen for republication by the 
Norwegian PEN Centre and the Centre Culturel Français in Kabul as the first 
publication in a series of Dari poetry books.  She was due to bring out a second volume 
of poems in 2006.  Ahmed Said Haqiqi, president of the Literary Circle of Herat, 
founded in 1920, said that Nadia ‘was becoming a great Persian poet.’ (Khadige 2007) 
But there was already, in a poem entitled ‘Poisoned’ she had written in 2001, three 
years before her marriage, an anticipation of her own fate. In this piece, probably written 
after another dispute with ‘the scorpions’ (her family members?), the young poet appears 
to be less afraid of death than of being silenced and forbidden of poetic production 
(‘injecting poison into Knowledge’s organ’). 
 
That night…. 
At the private gathering of the scorpions 
A heated and bitter discussion 
          Continued for a long while 
The topic: injecting poison into knowledge’s organs 
Choosing the poison 
          They couldn’t come to an agreement 
Suddenly, from their midst 
A black one, the worst of his offspring 
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Opened his barbed mouth 
          Saying that 
Night is passing, we mustn’t delay 
While the victims sleep 
Arise and find someone to sting 
I inherited from my grandfather 
A bottle of deadly poison 
I will sacrifice myself… 
 
 The exact reasons for Nadia’s death remain obscure. On November 5, 2005, the 
couple’s dispute reached a tragic climax. Twenty-five-year-old Nadia was brought to the 
hospital after having been beaten by her husband. She died soon afterwards, leaving 
behind her a six-month-old child. Her husband confessed to slapping her during an 
argument but contended that her death was a suicide, that she took poison after they 
argued. At the age of nineteen, when she wrote ‘Poisoned’ (poem reproduced above), she 
had already announced that she would sacrifice herself (‘I have inherited from my 
grandfather/A bottle of poison/I will sacrifice myself). But Anjuman’s friends and family 
denied this possibility. Anjuman felt that suicide violated the laws of Islam, they said 
(Khadige 2007). What’s more, bruising on her face indicated more than a slap. Both 
Anjuman’s husband and his mother were arrested in conjunction with the poet’s death, 
but they were eventually released. They refused to allow an autopsy and today the death 
is classified as a suicide.  
 Her husband Farid spent only five months in prison. ‘I had no problem with 
Nadia,’ Farid confessed in his prison’s cell. ‘But she and my mother were always fighting. 
I was two years old when my father died. My mother brought me up, and faced a lot of 
problems. I also had problems trying to marry Nadia. I did not want to make either of 
them unhappy.’ Interviewed by CNN after his release, he said: ‘Nadia was trying to put 
pressure on people to love her more. It’s just something women here do’ (Obaid-Chinoy 
2009). According to a report released by the Institute of War and Peace Reporting 
(Gardesh and Ghafari 2005), Nadia would have been limited in her movements, not only 
by her husband, but also by her mother-in-law. Nahid Baqi, a close friend of Nadia said, 
that ‘Farid’s mother wanted him to marry someone else. When he insisted on Nadia, she 
began to hate her.’ (Lamb 2005) 
Did Nadia swallow some poison to put an end to an unhappy marriage, staging her 
death as she had already announced it in her writings? Did she succumb from the 
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beatings of her jealous husband? Was her mother-in-law the main source of conflict in 
her household? Was Farid caught between his wife and his mother’s conflicting 
demands? These questions will remain partially unanswered. The Minister of Women’s 
Affairs, Massouda Jalal told a press conference in Kabul that Nadia had been murdered 
by her husband (Gardesh and Ghafari 2005).  Richard Jeffrey Newman, a poet, essayist 
and translator of Persian poetry, wrote on his blog that Nadia’s death could be 
understood as a form of honour killing. He explained Nadia’s tragedy in the following 
terms: ‘Male control of the female body. The female body as the repository of male, and 
therefore family, honour. The responsibility of upholding that honour in male terms 
weighing entirely on the shoulders of the woman. The resulting and often horrifyingly 
circumscribed nature of that woman’s life. The deaths, psychic and literal, of women 
who cannot survive such circumscription.’ (Jeffrey-Newman 2005). 
The reasons for Nadia’s death, whether self-inflicted or not, probably include all 
these various explanatory elements. But if Nadia is gone, her poetry will remain, all the 
more so that her death brought a heroic and romantic aura to her literary production. 
Her poems are fine examples of her arresting style and fearless examination of self and 
society. They describe her sentiments but they are perceived by others as personal 
statements about interpersonal relations, and it is this public denunciation, even though 
hidden under layers of ambiguous meanings that made her songs so potentially 
threatening.  
Nadia’s story is a good illustration of the sensitive nature of poetry as a vehicle for 
personal expression, confidential communication and political statement. Her ghazal 
reveal the tension between individual aspirations and the expectations of society. That 
Nadia reclaimed so fearlessly a voice in a context where women’s silence and modesty 
were perceived as society’s essential cultural means to preserve honour, underlines both 
the rebellious potential of women and the creative and symbolic nature of their protest. 
In the meantime, her story lies at the interface of complex relations between the intimate, 
the national and the international levels.  
 Indeed, Nadia’s readership was not restricted to her hometown. Her poetry 
reached an audience that probably exceeded her initial intent. It did not take long before 
Gul-e Dodi, first published in Dari, was translated into English and French on poetry 
blogs (Burch 2005, Badihian 2005), crossing the borders of Afghanistan, and becoming 
the most poignant voice of the oppressed women of this war-torn country. The publicity 
she received was, to a great extent, beyond her control. What a better story for Western 
audiences than the one of Nadia, a young woman who, with words only, audaciously 
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defied the Taliban’s ‘rule of terror’ and died for transgressing the rules of a the honour 
system? Nadia’s words spoke to international literary critics, who quickly compared her 
to Sylvia Plath, the American poetess who, after a suicide attributed to a dominant and 
exploitative husband, became the icon of the feminist movement in the West (Enszer 
2006). Reports of Anjuman’s death spawned memorial sites for the poet in the West and 
a flurry of poems by Western writers as paeans to her life and work. 
 There is little doubt that such a newly found recognition (even though mostly 
achieved post mortem) may have encouraged Nadia to find a stronger voice. As Julie 
Enszer rightly argues, ‘the fact of a young Afghani woman speaking about being treated 
poorly is potent after the United States invasion and purported liberation of Afghanistan 
from the Taliban. To hear a young woman continues to struggle with voicelessness, to 
read her assertion that there are things she cannot read and say inevitably resonates with 
western readers, and especially western feminists’ (Enszer 2006). We wanted to hear her 
say: 
 
Ah, remember the good day when this cage was broken; 
That loneliness is gone, my delight, I sing the cares away. 
I am a frail stick that trembles in air each time, 
An Afghan daughter who can say wherever she needs to say85. 
 
 But whilst it is important to take these broader geopolitical elements into account 
when analysing Nadia’s poetry, it is also necessary to recognize her individual drive for 
writing her feelings in such a hostile environment. The girls in the dormitory sincerely 
admired Nadia. Her story and her poetry talked to them in a similar way as those of 
Rabia Balkhi or Malalai of Maiwand. In many instances, they felt the same anxiety as the 
poetess regarding their future marriage, the restrictions it would possibly impose on their 
lives and the pressure of their family to conform to certain norms and values. They could 
relate to her desire to express her dissatisfaction. 
 To them, writing poetry was the best possible response to life’s uncertainties, 
especially for a young woman who had otherwise very few opportunities to express her 
discontent. Nadia tried to follow the correct path by relating her sorrows to those of 
other women, echoing their own loneliness, and therefore giving them hope in a brighter 
                                                
85 Ghazal translated by Khizra Aslam. 
http://www.thehypertexts.com/Nadia_Anjuman_Poet_Poetry_Picture_Bio.htm 
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future. They could feel a certain form of sisterhood, a universality of experience, when 
they read: 
 
Girls, grown up with hurting soul 
And wounded bodies 
Happiness has escaped their faces 
Hearts, old and cracked86 
 
 Even when she gained some popularity, first in the small literary circles of Herat, 
Nadia tried to follow the customary procedure for declaring her unhappiness. But in her 
poems, which increased in intensity as she became unhappier, she expressed a different 
set of sentiments and presented a side of her feelings not revealed elsewhere. Nadia’s 
anger, more evident in her last poems, might have crossed the boundaries of socially 
accepted forms of women’s expression.  
 
Oh dear God! 
I do not know if their soundless cries 
Reach the clouds, The skies? 
I hear the green 87paces of the rain88 
 
Her poetry was ultimately judged to be sincere and to reflect her feelings 
accurately, and this is probably the reason why thousands of poets, intellectuals and 
students turned up at her funeral (Webster and Olenska 2005).  
 
The case of Nadia confirms the relationship between poetry and conjugal/familial 
matters generally considered as private. Her discourse seems to be opposed to the 
mundane discourse of ordinary language structured around honour-linked personal 
ideals. But as Lila Abu Lughod so eloquently argues in the case of Bedouin women’s 
poetry, ‘individuals whose ordinary actions and statements conform to the modesty code, 
who take pain to represent themselves as moral and worthy of respect, use poetry to 
comment on their personal fortunes and tribulations in love and to express sentiments 
                                                
86 Ghazal translated by A.S. Shayek 
http://www.persianmirror.com/community/writers/MSN/2006/AfghanPoets.cfm 
87 Green is obviously the colour of Islam, but it is also associated with hope in Afghanistan. 
88 Ghazal translated by A. S. Shayek 
http://www.persianmirror.com/community/writers/MSN/2006/AfghanPoets.cfm 
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that violate the canon of modesty’ (1986, 232). This specific form of feminine expression 
has been observed elsewhere, among Pashtun communities in Pakistan and Afghanistan, 
and is beautifully analysed by Benedict Grima (1992). In her ethno-linguistic analysis of 
women’s narratives of misfortunes, she underlines the respect women gain when they 
use poetic forms to express their sorrows. She also comments that gham is socially 
recognized as the monopoly of elder women. This is perhaps the reason why Nadia’s 
writings obtained full national recognition only when she died as a wife and a mother, 
leaving behind her a six-month-old child.   
Although love, silence and death, the three central themes of women’s poetry, 
contradict the honour ideology while actively engaging with society’s ideals, women’s 
language with its ‘protective veils of form’ (Abu-Lughod 1986, 238), is also to be read as 
a commentary on those ideals. Rushani talked about the stillness of the Afghan 
mountains, but while praising patience and silence, central values attached to 
womanhood, she also regained a voice and eventually obtained political reward. Nadia 
expressed feelings of despair, beauty and love, themes that defied the honour system 
more frantically, but she remained within the appropriate frame of poetic expression.  
Indeed, ghazals are associated with traditional romances and the tragic tales of love 
and every time poets use this form, they evoke this grand and mythical world that 
Persian speakers feel proud of. By making use of sophisticated ghazals, Nadia inscribed 
her work in an estimated and highly valued cultural tradition, and indirectly likened 
herself to the much-admired tragic heroes and heroines of the lore. Her poetry 
denounced political oppression under the Taliban, but it also made more general 
commentaries on the restrictions imposed on women as a result of the honour system. 
By using the language of emotions, Nadia revealed both an intimate experience and a 
universal one. She could have been forgiven for her imprudence as Afghan women are 
generally perceived as emotionally fragile and child-like. In other circumstances, she 
probably would have. But war modifies culturally framed perceptions, rendering 
questions of honour all the more pregnant that men’s responsibility to control women 
becomes central to their identity, when the war has dispossessed them from everything 
else.  
The work of Nadia Anjuman and other Afghan poetesses helps us to better 
understand the imaginary universe that shapes Afghan women’s lives. It also gives a taste 
of the texture of the language they use in order to reach an audience. In the following 
section, I analyse how some of the themes that emerge in Afghan women’s poetry 
(death, silence, honour) can also be found in political women’s speeches. I argue that the 
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symbolic veils that women use in order to get a voice are ‘tactics’ that are essential to 
their political participation. 
2. Feminine Martyrdom 
 
When the new national Assembly was elected in 2005, a majority of former jihadi 
leaders, who had been evicted from politics by the Taliban, returned into power. Their 
main source of self-legitimisation stood in the fact that they had once conducted jihad 
against the Soviet occupiers and later on, against the Taliban, and that as such, a great 
number of their followers had been martyred to protect the nation. In spite of the 
downfall of the fundamentalist Islamist regime of the Taliban and its replacement by a 
supposedly ‘democratic’ Islamic republic, narratives of martyrdom and jihad remained 
central arguments to assert political authority.  
The concept of jihad today refers to actual fighting against ‘infidels’. It is generally 
translated as ‘holy war’ in Western media. However, the word in itself has several 
semantic catchments and also refers to exerting oneself for some praiseworthy aim 
(Olesen 1996, 11). The term jihad therefore encompasses a greater fight, i.e a believer’s 
inner struggle against the nafs (the lower or passionate soul filled with unrepressed 
desires), which aims at purifying the spiritual heart. While all Muslim men and women 
are exhorted to rid themselves from unruly emotions through prayers, knowledge seeking 
and self-discipline, jihad that involves actual combat has traditionally been reserved to 
men.  
As a source of political credibility, notions of jihad and martyrdom re-asserted the 
masculine nature of the State as defined in the new Islamic Republic. I was however 
surprised that such a vocabulary was broadly used by female MPs too, who reclaimed 
their participation in the national liberation movement and the sufferings they endured 
during the war as evidence for their political determination. But women’s references to 
‘martyrdom’ did not encompass exactly the same meaning as men’s ones. Playing with 
the polysemy of the concept, women’s jihad and martyrdom could be understood as a 
symbolic reinterpretation of a national mythology in which women’s bodies already 
played a central and ambiguous role. 
Indeed, the national history of Afghanistan does not lack female fighters who 
unhesitantly sacrificed themselves to defend the ideal of national autonomy. At the heart 
of it appears the character of Malalay who conducted an Afghan battalion against the 
English invaders during the first Anglo-Afghan war in Maiwand. The legend says that 
there came a point in the battle when the Afghan army, despite their superior numbers, 
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started to lose morale and the tide seemed to be turning in favour of the British. Seeing 
this, Malalay, the daughter of a shepherd who lived next to the battlefield, took off her 
veil and shouted out: 
 
Young love! If you do not fall in the battle of Maiwand, 
By God, someone is saving you as a symbol of shame!89 
 
Using her veil as a banner, she encouraged the soldiers to find a new resolve and 
to redouble their efforts, until she was herself stuck down and died. The killing of 
Malalay was considered as namardi, cowardly, literally, unmanly and the offense outraged 
the Afghan army. Malalay’s death spurred on her countrymen and soon the British lines 
gave way, broke and turned, leading to a disastrous retreat back to Kandahar and the 
biggest defeat for the Anglo-Indian army in the Second Afghan War.  
But Malalay is not an isolated figure in the Afghan national mythology. She 
belongs to a long-standing tradition of female warriors who committed suicidal acts of 
bravery to defend the motherland. Indeed, as in the epic tales of Medieval Times, Afghan 
history is full of powerful female fighters. Tales of warriors, horses and fortresses feature 
young women such as Shah Bori, described as a girl with a taste for male clothing and 
horse riding. She is said to have liked living the life of a warrior, refusing for a long time 
to get married. She is also said to have died fighting the troops of King Babur, in the 
16th century. Then comes Nazauna, who, legend has it, single-handedly protected the 
Zabol fortress with her sword in the 18th century. In 1980, another heroic female figure 
by the name of Naheed appears (Bahodine Majrouh 2003). She led the first 
demonstration of schoolgirls and female university students on the streets of Kabul, 
openly denouncing the Red Army’s occupation of the country. She was martyred while 
trying to fire a captured Russian machine-gun. Alongside her, hundreds of other 
innocent young Afghan girls were brutally murdered. 
These feminine martyrs have passed through the history of the country, giving 
their names to modern state institutions such as Rabia Balkhi maternity hospital or 
Malalay High School, the first high school for girls opened by Queen Soraya and 
sponsored by the French government in the 1930s, as part of King Amanullah’s 
modernisation programme. Malalay High School has trained the first generation of active 
women in Afghanistan, following the educative model of Jules Ferry schools in France 
                                                
89 See Ewing, Garen (2005) Malalai: Afghan Heroine of Maiwand.  
http://www.garenewing.co.uk/angloafghanwar/biography/malalai.php 
 245 
and remains until today the most renowned educational institution for girls (Abou-Bakre 
Gross 1998). More recent prominent feminine figures, such as Malalay Joya, the MP 
evicted from the Parliament in 2007, or Malalay Kakar, the first police woman of 
Kandahar shot dead by the Taliban in 2008, have inherited their names from Malalay of 
Maiwand. They share in common with their ancestor deep patriotic sentiments together 
with a sense of self-sacrifice.  
Reflecting on the meaning of these terrible tales, I came to wonder which cultural 
and social patterns had produced such a long lineage of exceptional women martyrs. Did 
these characters play the same roles as other national icons one could find elsewhere? 
Were they part of a man-made story in which women fighters were at once heroines and 
victims, instrumentalized to foster nationalist feelings? Like the character of Antigone in 
the Greek mythology, Malalay, Naheed, Nazauna and Shah Bori assumed a 
fundamentally ambiguous position, simultaneously challenging and reproducing the 
expectations of their gender all at once. On the one hand, their death embodied the 
suffering of the nation occupied by foreign invaders. On the other hand, their sacrifice 
fostered nationalist feelings around the necessity to protect the motherland. It is because 
they performed stereotypical masculine roles in the national story that they reached the 
status of heroines. Their jihad was meant to be a masculine battle, not a feminine one.  
The ambiguity and marginality of feminine acts of bravado is appealing because it 
challenges the honour system by underlining men’s incapacity to protect women-as-
bearers-of-the-nation. Stories of female warriors reposition women on the frontline of 
the jihad against the enemies of Islam, making them the pioneers of the national battle 
while underlining the fragility of gender relations as framed in the honour ideology. It is 
because men fail to perform their role as protectors that women are martyred. The killing 
of women by the ‘infidels’ (kafer) is namardi, un-manly, but the men who made the 
sacrifice of women possible by failing to protect them are also to be shamed for failing to 
prevent their deaths.  
Women who enter political spheres are perceived as threatening for these same 
reasons. Politics in Afghanistan, like in many other countries, is perceived as a dangerous 
masculine game that may involve violent death. In the turbulent political history of the 
country, power changes have often been achieved through bloody coups, with political 
leaders either killed (President Daoud in 1978, Prime Minister Taraki in 1979, President 
Najibullah in 1992, Commandant Ahmad Shah Massoud in 2001) or forced into exile 
(King Amanullah in 1929, King Zaher Shah in 1973). In politics like in buzkachi games -
Afghanistan’s national sport, a sort of local polo played with a headless calf weighing 
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about 150 pounds - masculinity is constructed through a man’s capacity to take risk and 
put his life in danger for serving the nation while protecting its womenfolk.  
Women assuming the same roles and accepting the responsibility to take the 
same levels of risk, through their mere presence in political arenas, are challenging 
conceptions of the ‘public’ as a space reserved to hegemonic masculine values. Their 
presence in the public provokes an ambivalence of feelings in the same way as Malalay of 
Maiwand on the battlefield. 
Women who accept their symbolic ‘martyrdom’ by challenging the gender order 
do so with the view of opening gates for future generation of women. The notion of 
‘sacrifice’ is indeed a frequent leitmotiv in their public speeches. What is put forward is a 
form of sacrifice made for the future generations, a sacrifice that does not involve blood, 
that confirms their innocence and purity and their traditional role as mothers. Political 
women, especially those who have a more liberal agenda for women, like to present 
themselves as path breakers. It is for instance the case of Masooda Babak, MP of Kabul 
province, who runs a women’s NGO and struggles for greater gender equality in the laws 
produced by the National Assembly. Trying to get a divorce from her husband who has 
remarried without her consent and who has deserted the family house, her fight for 
gender equality was also a personal struggle. Fascinated by her charisma and her 
outspokenness, I was curious to know what motivated her to keep going despite the 
threats she constantly received. ‘If no woman does it, who will? In your country too you 
have had women who died to defend women’s rights. I am glad if I am remembered as 
one of these women in my country,’ she told me during an interview at her house, after 
having introduced me to her daughters for whom she dreamt of a better future 
(Interview – MP3, 16/09/2007). 
Reclaiming ‘martyrdom’ was also a narrative intensively used by Farah MP 
Malalai Joya. In an interview with BBC News conducted in 2006, Joya, who survived 
several assassination attempts since her participation in the Constitutional Loya Jirga in 
2002, made it clear that death threats would not make her renounce her struggle for 
justice and women’s rights. She said: 
 
Never again will I whisper in the shadows of intimidation. I am but a symbol of my people’s 
struggle and a servant to their cause. And if I were to be killed for what I believe in, then let my 
blood be the beacon for emancipation and my words a revolutionary paradigm for generations to 
come. (Coghlan 2006) 
 
And later on she added, keeping the same lyrical tone: 
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They will kill me but they will not kill my voice, because it will be the voice of all Afghan women. 
You can cut the flower, but you cannot stop the coming of spring. (Coghlan 2006) 
 
A leitmotiv in Joya’s interviews was that she was less afraid of death than of her 
country’s going downward in terms of human and women’s rights. Abandoned by the 
political elite in power, evicted from the parliament for her denunciation of war 
criminals, the romantic persona Joya embodied was fashioned by notions of self-sacrifice 
and martyrdom of a different nature than the ones used by mainstream parties. Like 
other women’s rights activists who received the support of Western organizations, the 
image of women as pure and with ‘no blood on their hands’ almost assumed a religious 
dimension. 
Other women, who had greater political ambitions for themselves or who 
worked in a more conservative environments, often had to reaffirm patriarchal values in 
order to get entry in political circles dominated by men. In November 2007, for instance, 
Fatana Gailani, founder of the Afghan Women Council and daughter of Pir Sayed 
Gailani, a prominent political and religious figure, organized a conference for the 
International Day on Violence against Women in Jalalabad, her native city. Jalalabad is 
located in Nangahar, a province predominantly populated by Pashtuns and, which has 
faced a fresh upsurge of attacks against governmental institutions and NATO troops in 
the past years. On this occasion, Gailani had invited important political figures, mostly 
men, to attend the conference. As a representative of a women’s NGO, the official 
motive she used to organise such an event was to raise awareness on everyday forms of 
violence against women. In reality, the conference rapidly turned into a personal 
campaign during which Gailani tried to rally supporters for her candidature to the next 
parliamentary elections. Various local figures, including a law professor at the University 
of Nangahar and the Chief police were invited to participate and deliver speeches. Beside 
Fatana Gailani, only one woman, the head of the Department of Women’s Affairs, was 
given the opportunity to talk. After having denounced ‘these shameless women who ask 
for divorce and abandon their children and husband in the name of democracy’, she 
ended up her communication with those words: ‘My dear brothers and sisters, keep an 
eye on your daughters and never let them go out without a leash tightly attached to their 
necks!’ She ended her speech in a storm of applause (Field notes, 25/11/2007).  
A central figure of women’s resistance to the Soviet occupation, Gailani had run 
a clinic for women as well as girls’ schools in the refugee camps in Pakistan. Having 
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returned to Afghanistan shortly after the fall of the Taliban, she was well aware that 
women’s liberation would not just come with military intervention but through women’s 
political participation and greater economic opportunities for the people of Afghanistan. 
While supporting rural women through micro credit and literacy programs, Gailani also 
took the opportunity of this new visibility to campaign for herself. She wanted her 
beneficiaries to know that the loans given by her NGO were coming from her and not 
from Karzai’s government whom she considered corrupt and nepotistic. She also 
understood the importance of gaining the trust of male politicians. Using their language, 
their codes and to a great extent, reproducing gender stereotypes were key to obtaining 
their support.  
The speech she delivered on that day, in front of a dominantly masculine 
audience of local officials and ex-mujjahidins, used references to jihad and martyrdom, but 
in a manner that conformed more closely to patriarchal ideals. In an emphatic lecture 
that lasted for almost an hour, Fatana talked ‘of her feelings with an open heart’, as she 
phrased it herself. Raising an accusative hand to the audience, in the manner of a 
preacher, she said: 
 
I always tell my colleagues that women’s jihad has been to care for the orphans, to support the 
widows and to clean the tears of the mothers. (During the jihad) We provided education for 
hundreds of children and health services for the women. We promised on God and on the Q’uran 
that we would never lie to our people and we would never say anything wrong. This struggle has 
built our personality. We are struggling for the truth. We never committed any crime. Insh’allah 
we will succeed because God promised it. (Fieldnotes, 25/11/2007) 
 
What was striking in Fatana’s discourse was the ambiguity of the general 
message. Who was included in the ‘we’ that she used in the statements: ‘We never 
committed any crime. We are struggling for the truth’? Was she referring to the 
mujjahedins or to the women who struggled on their side, caring for the orphans and the 
widows? While reasserting women’s primary roles as carers during the Jihad, Fatana 
seemed at the same time to stress women’s respectability and purity at a moment when 
massive killings of innocent people took place.     
 
In their move away from the dakhili (home, private sphere), women distance 
themselves from traditions and create the condition for new forms of social imaginaries 
to take shape. Indeed, in Afghanistan like in many other Muslim countries which 
histories have been shaped by relations of domination with the imperial West, the 
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engagement of Islam with modernity has allowed new actors to emerge in the public 
sphere (Göle 2006, 10). These new actors belong to social groups that moved from rural 
areas to urban cities, from the margins to the centre of politics and oftentimes 
experienced migration to foreign countries. Women who have entered the political arena 
after the fall of the Taliban are all marked by this particular form of ‘social 
disembeddedness’ (Göle 2006, 12). Their move into the ‘public’, however, does not 
systematically involve a clear break up with patriarchal norms since maintaining 
continuity, as we have seen in the previous chapters, is crucial to preserving a sense of 
personal safety and communal cohesion.  
Acceptance, suffering and patience are the main qualities Afghan women are 
expected to have. Women in general are expected to sacrifice themselves for their 
families, not for the wider nation. However, the narratives that I have analysed in this 
section demonstrate that women are particularly resourceful in clouding their 
performances and in manipulating the different meanings of the nationalist/jihadi 
rhetoric. The tension created between discourses that are confirming certain notions of 
womanhood and acts of covert reinterpretation that challenge these notions are 
underlining the extremely narrow room of manoeuvre for women to exercise agency. But 
far from being futile gestures, these marginal social practices also highlight how women’s 
engagement with ‘mainstream’ politics brings nuances and changes to traditional gender 
discourses.  
In the section that follows, I further analyse the themes of women’s martyrdom 
through the case study of two suicide attempts I witnessed while I lived at the women’s 
dormitory on Kabul University’s campus. I highlight the performative and symbolic 
dimensions of this collective gesture by closely examining the social and cultural contexts 
in which such acts were carried out. I argue that the impossibility of overcoming social 
barriers leads women to resort to extreme solutions that both confirm and transgress 
ideas that associate womanhood with emotional fragility. These gestures, if carried out of 
despair, also entail a symbolic dimension rooted in the social imagination of the country. 
They are means to claim ‘the last word’ when all other verbal and non-verbal strategies 
have failed.  
3. The Last Word 
 
In Songs of Love and War, Afghan poet Bahodine Majrouh (2003) argues that 
Pashtun women’s poetry challenge society in a similar way as female suicide. ‘In her 
innermost self,’ he writes, ‘the Pashtun woman is indignant and sceptical, feeding her 
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rebellion. From this deep-seated and hidden protest that grows more resistant with every 
passing day, she comes out with only two forms of evidence in the end – her suicide and 
her song’. It is Majrouh’s conviction that Afghan women’s poetry, like their suicide, 
challenges the society by glorifying three themes that taste of blood - love, honour and 
death. ‘By eliminating herself in such an accursed way,’ he goes on, ‘a woman thus 
tragically proclaims her hatred of the community’s law’ (2003, xv). Indeed, the tribal code 
of honour considers suicide a cowardly act and men will never resort to it. Women’s 
choice of the means to end their lives emphasizes the iconoclastic meaning of the 
sacrifice: women will either resort to self-immolation or poison, not to bullets or ropes, 
which are the tools used by men to wage wars or to tie up cattle or pull heavy loads.   
In 2007, press and NGOs reported an increasing number of cases of women 
attempting to commit suicide through self-immolation (Motlagh 2007; Tang 2007). The 
phenomenon grew stronger and stronger particularly in Herat, to the extent that a NGO 
opened a special yard for burnt women in the city’s central hospital. When women did 
not immediately succumb to their wounds and were brought to health facilities, families 
usually tried to cover the self-inflicted gesture behind stories of domestic accidents. Some 
Afghan friends commented that women’s self-immolation had always existed even 
though it had never been part of the ‘Afghan culture’, since Islam forbade suicide. Like 
most social phenomena they considered shameful (like drug addiction, divorce or lack of 
modesty), women’s self immolation was seen as a foreign practice Afghans had brought 
to the country on their return from exile, something that was foreign to local social 
practices.   
However, the subject started to attract my interest when Orzala, an Afghan 
woman running an underground shelter for women victims of domestic violence in 
Kabul, made this comment about women’s self immolation:  
 
I don’t see such women as ‘victims’, to me victims are those who accept to suffer, but if they try 
to show to their in/outside world that they don’t accept repression, they are not victims anymore. 
In most of the cases I see it as a way of protest... To me it is not an act of despair only. It certainly 
includes the feeling of helplessness but not entirely. You go and meet up with many of those 
women, then you would understand that they truly didn’t want to kill themselves but to express 
their sufferings to people outside their boundaries. (Fieldnotes - 03/08/2009) 
 
The statement was indeed powerful, but Orzala’s analysis echoed other stories I 
heard elsewhere, at the Women’s National Dormitory, in women’s NGOs, in 
conversations with friends and in press reports. The issue of rape, for instance, started to 
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be publicized, with families coming to Kabul in search for justice for their dishonoured 
daughters. We saw on television and in newspapers reports mothers threatening to 
commit collective suicide if criminals were not prosecuted (Nagpal 2009). In the National 
Women’s Dormitory in Kabul, girls shared with a mixture of excitement, admiration and 
disapproval melodramatic stories of female suicide. These stories portrayed women who 
had resorted to such an extreme act either as deeply convinced of their due right to make 
certain demands pertaining to their lives and therefore as courageous and desperate 
justice seekers, or more simply as victims of patriarchal oppression. But in both cases, it 
is always with great thrill that stories dealing with probably one of the greatest social 
taboo were recounted. Suicide, for sure, had a certain romantic appeal among girls who 
spent a great part of their everyday reading poetry and classic Persian literature in which 
such stories abounded. 
But if the truthfulness of these tales exchanged in the intimacy of dormitory girls’ 
bedrooms could probably be questioned, it nevertheless seemed to me that the vivacity 
with which girls talked about female suicide was not the mere product of excitement 
provoked by discussions about illicit or socially repressed acts. Suicide talked to them in a 
much deeper and meaningful way. It echoed themes that had a specific cultural 
resonance and that Majrouh highlighted in Songs of War and Love: love, honour and death. 
 
In the last months of my fieldwork, I personally became the witness of two 
suicide attempts by two sisters who were students at the University of Kabul and to 
whom I was quite close. Beside the fact that these acts, like any other acts carried out of 
despair, were the outcome of deep feelings of alienation, I also believe that they illustrate 
well the rebellious dimension of female social performances that Majrouh mentions. My 
aim here is not to diminish the real pain Khadija and Fawzia (pseudonyms) actually felt 
when they decided, one after the other, to swallow a cocktail of cheap tablets purchased 
in the bazaar. I am deeply convinced that the two of them were profoundly unhappy 
about their situation and that they could not think of any other way to relieve the 
pressure they felt weighing on them. However, I also think there is something else to 
read in these stories, something that has to do with the ways women in subordinate 
positions find means to channel demands that cannot be expressed otherwise.  Neither 
Khadija nor Fawzia did really aim to end their lives but what they achieved through this 
collective gesture was quite powerful: not only did they get the last word in a family 
dispute that had lasted for months, but they also managed to momentarily reverse some 
of the power dynamics in which their relations to male family members were entangled. 
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Let me recount the story. The first sister, Khadija, was a singer, a musician and a 
student in musicology at the University of Kabul. She had developed a talent and a taste 
for music while in exile with her family in Iran during the civil war. There, Khadija 
together with her mother and sister weaved carpets to complement the sporadic earnings 
of their father and brothers. And while weaving, they listened to the radio and Khadija 
sang along. Once, Khadija showed me a picture of herself all dressed up in a black outfit 
with a panther print headscarf. She stood in a middle of a boys’ band in which all the 
boys wore leather jackets, crossing their arms on their chest in a nonchalant parody of 
virility. The picture had been taken during her high school time in Esfahan, when some 
friends had recruited her as the singer of their underground rock band. At the time, her 
parents did not see any objections to this extra curricular activity, as long as she did well 
at school and helped with the weaving. But back in Afghanistan, the situation of the 
family changed dramatically. The family house had been destroyed during the fighting 
and the father struggled to find a job. The family eventually ended up renting a small 
room in a collective house in a poor suburb of Kabul deprived from electricity and 
running water. The girls managed to integrate into the University after successfully 
passing the entrance exams. Both Khadija and Fawzia found part-time jobs to support 
the family but their income, even added to the one of their father, barely covered the 
household expenditures.  
In such a situation, and in the Afghan context, being a female singer and 
musician was much less acceptable than in Iran. Musicians have always suffered from 
social stigma in Afghanistan and female ones, even more (Doubleday 2006). A sign of 
this general contempt for the world of musicians can be found in the name of the district 
of Kabul where musicians have traditionally lived: Kharabat. Kharab in Dari has many 
meanings - something damaged, like a house hit by a rocket; a car that won’t start; 
something or someone bad or naughty; abat means a place where people live. 
Consequently Kharabat means a place where naughty people live. When the Taliban took 
over Kabul in 1996, their primary objective was to re-establish order and bring back 
morality in the capital city that had been perceived since the Soviet occupation as the 
centre of sins and corruption. One of the first edicts they promulgated banned music, 
even at wedding ceremonies. As a result, most Afghan musicians lost their means of 
subsistence and fled abroad. The ones who stayed buried their instruments to avoid 
repression. After the downfall of the regime, music reasserted itself in the streets of the 
capital, with tapes and CD shops reopening in Shar-e-Naw, their front windows 
showcasing colourful albums of most popular Afghan singers as well as foreign pop 
 253 
stars. But despite this rebirth, the stigma associated with musicians remained strong, 
especially for women singers. Khadija was the first Afghan woman to sing in public after 
the downfall of the Taliban.  
Khadija was not ready to give up her passion and she continued taking music 
lessons and performing at official ceremonies, without letting her parents know. 
Unfortunately, the news spread like fire in her neighbourhood and her father, Ahmed, 
alerted by Khadija’s younger brother, eventually found some music scores in her bag. A 
huge argument ensued, during which Ahmed destroyed her music scores and threatened 
to keep her locked in the house, a punishment he could not afford since Khadija was 
contributing to the household income by working in a marketing agency beside her 
studies.  
A few days later, I received a phone call from her sister Fawzia. Khadija had 
swallowed a cocktail of tablets and was at the hospital. I jumped into a taxi and found 
Fawzia, Khadija, their cousin (also a singer) and their father, Ahmed in a narrow, dirty 
and dark hospital room, an injection suspended above Khadija’s bed and plugged into 
her forearm. She was safe now, but weak and she could hardly walk. We hired another 
taxi and we drove back to the family house in Dasht-e Bashri. In the car, the father who 
had been speechless for a while, started to talk again and each of his sentences was 
punctuated by Fawzia’s groans, her fingers clutched tightly into her sister and cousin’s 
hand. ‘Dard darom! Dard Darom!’ (It hurts! It hurts!) She sobbed while pointing at her 
heart (Fieldnotes, 20/11/2009).  
The argument continued at home, but this time Ahmed had lowered his voice, 
leaving the space free for Fawzia, Khadija and their mother to burst into loud sobbing, 
tears and screams, a collective demonstration of pain that I had never witnessed before, 
except at funerals, when women rally together to mourn the dead, weeping one after 
another while recounting aloud biographic elements of the departed’s life. Unable to 
engage in a discussion with the women of the house, Ahmed desperately turned to me: 
‘We are Muslims, you understand Julie? We are Muslims and Afghans and Khadija is 
behaving in a non-Muslim way. Singing is not for respectable women. Everyone 
talks…you see (pointing at the next door neighbours), everyone talks…It is a shame… it 
dishonours the whole family’. And Khadija, suddenly recovering her lucidity, to respond: 
‘I am a Muslim too. I wear hijab. I pray. I read the Koran. I am educated. I work hard for 
the whole family. The Koran does not say that singing is bad. Singing brings peace in 
people’s hearts! Only ignorant people talk badly about singers.’ But before Ahmed had 
the opportunity to open his mouth, she rolled her eyes, got off the ground to catch her 
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breath and mimicked a dramatic fainting fit that kept him voiceless and petrified, as if the 
performance of pain had brought an indisputable element of truth to her daughter’s 
speech. This scene repeated itself several times, Khadiga and Fawzia taking turns to 
defend their views in front of a father who seemed totally overwhelmed by the situation.     
Five days only after this episode, I received a phone call from Fawzia who alerted 
me, in a voice I could hardly recognize on the phone, that she had swallowed tablets like 
her sister: ‘They have to understand, Julie, that we are not bad girls or bad Muslims. If 
they cannot get this, then there is no point for me to live either’. I knew that since a 
while, Fawzia had been pressurized by her father to find another job than the one she 
had as a sport teacher at Bagh-e Zanana, which he found inappropriate for a woman. He 
also complained about the way she dressed, which was not modest enough for his liking. 
Fawzia wore blue jeans and trainers, and small colourful veils, like most of the young 
professionals who attended courses at the University of Kabul. But Fawzia’s father had 
never been to the University. He was a daily labourer struggling to make ends meet and 
to provide for his five children. His situation made him particularly sensitive to gossips 
from relatives and neighbours and as it became more and more difficult to find jobs in 
Kabul, he consequently became more and more tense about the family reputation 
(Fieldnotes, 25/11/2009).  
Fawzia was a Kum Fu champion and one of the few female members of the 
Afghan Olympic team. She had taken part in an international competition in Sri Lanka 
shortly after the fall of the Taliban. If, under family pressure, she had eventually given up 
this title, she continued to practice once a week in a small gym club located on the 
outskirt of Kabul with a private coach, without her parents knowing about it. Like her 
sister, Fawzia led a double life but the public visibility she had gained over time, 
attracting the recently reborn press that now flourished thanks to foreign sponsors in the 
capital city, made it difficult for her to cover her secrets. Rumours ran wild that with the 
‘liberation’ of Afghanistan, women and girls in particular were being left without control, 
using the pretext of democracy to engage in ‘un-Islamic” activities. Sport and Music 
undoubtedly belonged to this category.  
I do not think that Khadiga and Fawzia sincerely wanted to put an end to their 
lives. Both of them were totally passionate about music and sport and they had many 
University friends who supported them. They were also very upset about their family not 
adhering to their choices and it was not rare for me to be used as an intermediary when 
there was a disagreement between them and their parents. ‘Women are the honour of a 
house’, the mother told me once. ‘If women misbehave, then the whole family’s 
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reputation is damaged’. And indeed, in a house without furniture, electricity and running 
water, reputation was all that was left to preserve. It felt uncomfortable taking the girls’ 
side when I could also empathise with their parents’ worries. It is easier to be liberal-
minded when there is always bread on the table. But I was also full of admiration for 
Khadiga and Fawzia’s commitment to pursue careers in fields that were not particularly 
favourable to women and in which they obviously had talent. 
Without attempting to diminish the veracity of the pain produced by the real 
dilemma in which they were caught, I understand Khadiga and Fawzia’s gestures not as 
purely desperate acts carried out of profound feelings of hopelessness. I also see in this 
reiterated performance an attempt at finding means to claim ‘the last word’ (Seremetakis 
1991) in a dispute where their voice had been silenced. I use the word ‘performance’ here 
to describe an action that is transformed through culture into a conventionally 
understandable symbolic product and to underline the communicative nature of female 
suicide. Bauman (quoted in Grima 1992, 10) states: ‘Performance as a mode of spoken 
verbal communication consists of the assumption of responsibility to an audience for a 
display of communicative competence. This competence rests on knowledge and ability 
to speak in socially appropriate ways. Performance involves on the part of the performer 
an assumption of accountability to an audience for the way in which communication is 
carried out, above and beyond its referential content’. I see Khadiga and Fawzia’s suicide 
attempts as performances in the sense given by Bauman here. Both of them had an 
intrinsic knowledge of their audience’s expectations and the ways in which they could be 
managed.  
In Durkeim’s typology (1897), suicide is described as either an individual’s default 
or an excess of social integration. Durkheim thus draws a link between individual and 
society, operating a radical move away from purely individualist psychological 
explanations. However, Durkheim’s sociology of suicide fails to acknowledge the 
communicative potential of self-harm. The data I use in this case study reveal that the 
display of self-harm and emotions is related to women’s identity as defined in the honour 
code. The concept of ‘performance’ helps us to understand how cultural expectations of 
women’s weakness, uncontrollability and emotionality can be used by women themselves 
(even though, oftentimes, unconsciously) in order to renegotiate the gender order.  
The intensity of the episodes I witnessed once the two girls returned, one after 
the other, from the hospital to their family house, made me realise the subversive 
potential of female suicide. Khadiga and Fawzia’s performances followed the same 
communicative patterns. The tears, the specific expression of women’s pain and 
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suffering (men do not cry), brought some validity to their claims. Through this 
performance, girls were not in position of listeners anymore but opened an expressive 
space for themselves to voice their demands. While reproducing the stereotype of 
feminine hysteria, tears and fainting fits asserted the seriousness of their respective 
demands. The same way Rabia Balkhi cut her veins to demonstrate her eternal love for 
Baktash, Fawzia and Khadiga swallowed poison to demonstrate the seriousness and 
sincerity of their aspirations.  
Similar feminine strategies have been observed in other honour-based societies 
where women’s communication patterns follow a comparable repertoire. For instance, 
Nadia Seremetakis (1991, 5) shows how death rituals in Inner Mani (Greece) represent a 
performative arena where pain figures prominently as an orchestrating and prescriptive 
communicative paradigm. During these rituals, women’s expression of pain through 
lamentations and screams, allows them to obtain some form of collective validation. 
According to Seremetakis, women’s capacity to receive such a validation is due to the 
almost legal value that pain assumes in the Inner Mani ethical code (Ibid 1991, 105). She 
says: ‘To ‘witness’, ‘to suffer for’ and ‘to come out as representative for’90 are narrative 
devices in laments that fuse jural notions of reciprocity and truth claiming with the 
emotional nuances of pain’ (Ibid 1991, 102).  
I believe that Afghan women’s expression of pain and sufferings has a similar 
function. In her ethnography of Pashtun women in Afghanistan and in Pakistan, 
Benedict Grima (1992) points out that in the tribal code of honour, gham (worry, sorrow, 
grief, sadness, hardship) is expected in women. To express gham is to do Pashto, i.e to 
participate in a moral system in which the preservation of honour is paramount. She says: 
‘Pashtun women earn respect and reputation by the amount of hardship and suffering 
they endure’ (1992, 13). However, young unmarried girls are not expected to participate 
in the gham rituals organized by women at moments of life crisis (deaths, illnesses, 
accidents). Young girls are seen as ignorant and inexperienced until marriage familiarizes 
them with the gham of mature womanhood. She goes on: ‘The precedence given to pain 
and suffering over joy, and to the ritual and narrative around each gham, also shapes the 
memory and perception of one’s life (…). Life stories are told as an attestation of being 
moral Pashtun women.’ (Ibid. 1992, 13). In such a moral framework, gham can be 
understood as the key to women’s social success, as well as a means for women to create 
a temporary sense of autonomy and to develop their own singular voice. 
                                                
90 The mourners occupy these three functions in death rituals among Inner Mani people. 
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As young unmarried girls, Fawzia and Khadiga’s performances could not be 
acknowledged as social expressions of gham. However, their violation of pardah (women’s 
modesty) through the scandal provoked by their respective suicide attempts and then 
later on, through their screams and tears brought some validity to their grievances. In a 
culture that values individuals’ capacity to suppress and deny the inner self (nafs), such 
behaviours amounted to loss of control resulting from extreme distress. Their father and 
brothers’ silence in front of these intense emotions reveals men’s fundamental fear of 
women’s behaviours. The threatening element of women’s emotional expression stands 
in the fact that men’s honour is assessed through a man’s capacity to remain in control of 
the gendered order of the family and the community. The only option left for Ahmed, 
Fawzia and Khadiga’s father, was to give up a part of his authority and allow both of 
them to continue their occupations.  
A few weeks before writing this chapter, a girl from the dormitory sent me a link 
to a video posted on youtube. ‘You will recognize this person’, she wrote at the end of 
her e-mail. And as the music started to play on my computer’s speakers, I saw Khadija’s 
round face appearing on the screen. She had been selected to participate in Afghan Star, 
the Afghan equivalent of American Idol, the most popular TV show in the country. Not 
only had she made it to the final, but she also appeared in a traditional Afghan dress, 
singing on stage, the only girl left out of eight participants. And in spite of my 
embarrassment towards such TV programmes, especially in countries still at war like 
Afghanistan, I could not help feeling overwhelmed with both joy and anxiety at the sight 
of Khadija’s smiling and singing in front of the camera. My worried excitement was not 
the result of a specific resonance that such a public visibility might have had for a 
Western woman like me – live TV shows have never been my cup of tea. But the moving 
image of Khadija on the computer screen when she was now so far away from my world 
made me realize the depth of her determination. It also made me wonder whether 
Khadija’s willpower was only the result of her personality and life trajectory or the 
outcome of broader global/external forces that shaped youngsters’ aspirations while 
encouraging the development of new feminine subjectivities: autonomous, rebellious, 
self-driven. 
In the newly reborn Western-sponsored national press and in the international 
news, it was not rare to see young women like Fawzia and Khadiga making the headlines. 
These feminine figures were gradually becoming the new role models of the young 
generations grieving for leisure; romance and Western pop music (Mackenzie and Sediq-
Behnam 2009), rightly deserved after long years of war and destruction. In the meantime, 
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such stories fed Western imaginations with necessary stories of liberation and women’s 
emancipation in sharp contrast with the images of Middle Age darkness personified by 
the Taliban, they had received prior to the military intervention. But the attraction of 
Afghan youngsters for ‘Western’ lifestyles, encouraged by an anarchic opening of the 
country to liberalism and market economy, while many regions remained at war, were a 
major source of social tensions, especially for older generations and rural inhabitants who 
understood the phenomenon as a new form of acculturation. I wondered what would 
happen to girls like Fawzia and Khadiga, who had initiated such a break-up with ‘old 
values’, as they called them, once the safety nets provided by NGOs and international 
constituencies, would disappear from their country.  
 
*  *  * 
 
This case study underlines the fluid nature of the boundary between the private 
and the public. It highlights how women, through emotional performances, are able to 
challenge the gender order, at least at the margins. With Catherine Lutz (1986), I share 
the view that emotions are partially rational, learned, voluntary, controlled and cultural. 
They represent a central component of the social and cultural life and expression. 
Outwardly manifested affects are inherently linked to individual consciousness. They are 
an expression of the Self, shaped by the cultural context and the moral framework in 
which individuals are rooted. Instead of a clear divide between the private (the emotional 
world) and the public (the political world), the study of emotions demonstrates that 
publicness is a continuum that varies according to audience size and status inequality 
(Grima 1992, 9). ‘A setting involving total status inequality, such as that between a young 
wife and her father-in-law, would be closer to the ‘very public’ end of the continuum. On 
the other hand, an interaction between two women of the same age would be closer to 
the ‘less public’ end of the continuum’ (Ibid.1992, 9).  
 In the case study I use here, the reiterated performance of Khadija and Fawzia 
can be considered as ‘rather public’ since they dealt with issues pertaining to family 
reputation and honour and reached a broader audience than the household members 
where family disputes are traditionally supposed to be locked. Hospital doctors, 
neighbours and relatives were given to witness Fawzia and Khadija’s distress. Since 
laments and suffering narratives are the counterpart to male forms of heroic self-
presentation (Grima 1992), Khadija and Fawzia’s performances, by following gendered 
forms of emotional expression, created realities of identity for both themselves and their 
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audience. The communicative competences such performances reveal, demonstrate that 
women are fundamentally aware of society’s gendered expectations. Emotions are not 
‘locked in the heart’ but rather learnt and practiced to convey meanings and manage 
others’ impressions.  
 The idea of emotions as means of expression is perhaps better illustrated in the 
context of marriage proposals. Afghans usually understand a woman’s silence as her 
approval. A girl, for instance, is expected to answer to a marriage proposal by keeping 
silence if she agrees to the offer. On the contrary, if she refuses to get married to her 
suitor, the expression of her refusal is often accompanied with screams and tears. In rural 
areas, where it is the wider family that usually considers marriage proposals, young girls 
rarely have their say in such decisions. Girls are from a very young age disciplined to 
remain silent and obey male relatives. Mahbouba Seraj, the grand daughter of King 
Habibullah, niece of King Amanullah and a woman’s right activist who also ran a 
national weekly radio programme called ‘My Beloved Afghanistan’ dealing with human 
rights in the Koran, worked with the objective of changing this trend. In several 
provinces of the country, she had organized women’s groups, which she visited on a 
regular basis.  
 Calling herself ‘Mother Afghanistan’, Mahbouba had lived in exile in the United 
States for twenty years, from the downfall of the monarchy to the US military 
intervention and had always remained hopeful of returning to her home country one day. 
And here she was now, Mahbouba, flamboyant with her grey hair, driving for days on 
mud tracks to visit women in villages that had never received any visits for decades, 
except the ones of the Taliban and, more recently, of the World Food Programme trying 
to make-up for the poor harvests. Making our way through the mountains to Panjao, a 
small village located in the breathtaking Dragon Valley, eleven hours drive from Bamyan, 
sixty-year-old Mahbouba was feeling enthusiastic.  
 
These women, no one cares for them. They don’t see anyone else from the outside. So I know 
that they appreciate my visits. I know they are waiting for me to come. They don’t have many 
opportunities to go out of their homes and discuss together. I give them this opportunity and for 
me, it is also very rewarding. (Field notes, 28/09/2007) 
 
Besides providing women with essential knowledge of their entitlements 
according to Islam, Mahbouba also focused on re-teaching women culturally appropriate 
ways of expressing their disagreements. I was surprised to discover that one hidden 
consequence of war, beside the more obvious losses of relatives, starvation and absence 
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of health care, was the elimination, in the literal sense, of women’s most basic means of 
expression: emotional performances. This is what Mahbouba felt the most strongly 
about: rebuilding a culture that once allowed women to cry and scream when they felt 
treated unfairly. Sitting in the middle of a room, between breastfeeding mothers and 
young schoolgirls covered with white chader, Mahbouba with the slightly authoritative 
tone of a Ustad (teacher), encouraged women to rehearse their protest. 
 
Mahbouba: When a boy wants to marry a girl, if she remains silent; what does it mean?  
A woman: It means that she agrees.  
Mahbouba: When a girl does not want to marry a boy, what should she do? 
A woman: She should cry and shout. (Laughters) 
Mahbouba: Yes, she should cry and shout. You should remember that when you disagree, you 
should not keep silent. You have to cry and shout. Now, shout…shout together! 
(women screaming and laughing). (Field notes, 28/09/2007) 
 
 The emotional performances of women I have described in this section 
demonstrate that transformations of gender relations often occur in the interstitial spaces 
they allow to open. It is the ambiguity stemming from their polysemic nature that 
provides the background upon which negotiation can occur.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The material I have presented in this chapter underlines the uneasy positioning of 
women within Afghanistan’s politics. The fundamentally ambiguous nature of women’s 
modes of expression demonstrates the difficulty of renegotiating gender norms in the 
‘post war/reconstruction’ era. Political women’s resort to jihadi rhetoric, through 
references to martyrdom and sacrifice, and to emotional performances such as the one’s 
of Khadija and Fawzia, while Anjuman’s poetry of feelings highlights the centrality of 
emotional repertoires in mediating women’s public visibility. These practices also show 
that as subalterns, women are not simply deprived of the ability to influence the social 
order by pushing the boundaries of the private. The fact that public figures such as Joya 
and Anjuman got eventually eliminated from the public domain highlights the disruptive 
nature of women’s presence in this space.  
The confining limits of representations of femininity within the nationalist 
ideology produce the experience of silencing for actual women. In order to break that 
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silence, women are left with little choice but to veil their protest with complex expressive 
forms. In the meantime, these ‘invisible’ practices, that disturb mainstream discourses of 
womanhood without fundamentally modifying their cultural roots, are crucial to the 
acknowledgement of the extraordinary resourcefulness of women in manoeuvring the 
honour system and the nationalist ideology that it sustains.  
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Conclusion  
 
 
 
A wall in Kabul displays the posters of candidates to the 2009 Presidential elections © Karim Amin 
 
 
In June 2008, Faiza Silmi, a 32-year-old Moroccan woman married to a French 
man of Moroccan origin, was refused French citizenship on the ground that her ‘radical’ 
practice of Islam was incompatible with French values like equality of the sexes. Faiza, 
like her husband and her four children (all of them French), was a practicing orthodox 
Muslim from the Salafi branch of Islam. As a result, Faiza wore a niqab, an Islamic facial 
veil that is among three flowing layers of turquoise, blue and black that covers the body 
from head to toe. It was the first time that a French court had judged someone’s ability 
to be assimilated into France based on private religious practice, taking laïcité — the 
country’s strict concept of secularism — from the public sphere into the home. Despite 
Faiza’s insistence on her personal choice in wearing niqab, the Court associated her veil 
with her submission to her husband and therefore, considered her appearance a sign of 
her inability to integrate French society (Bennhold 2008). 
Reading this news in the French press, a few months after my return from 
Afghanistan, I felt embarrassed by the confidence with which legislators, unanimously 
supported by French political leaders, from left to right, stood on their decision. France’s 
door was definitely closed to Faiza. Not to her husband who practiced the same religion 
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as her. But to Faiza only. Ironically, despite judges’ reassertion of the gender equality 
principle to support their decision, the law seems to present double standards when it 
comes to religion. Through the Court’s verdict to exclude her from citizenship, Faiza, 
like many other Muslim women who have started to appear veiled in public places in 
France, had become the symbol of the ‘oppressed’ other. By drawing such a strict 
boundary in the public consciousness and in its laws between the ones who could be 
French and the ones who could not even aspire to it, France had rejected not only any 
possibilities of dialogue but also further critical analysis upon its own relationship to 
these ‘different others’.  
This absence of dialogue reinforced by the West’s certainty to belong to the 
‘civilized’ world91 represents for anyone concerned with the representation of cultures, a 
major source of worries. The use of static, a-historical and essentializing ‘cultural’ 
explanations instead of analysis that take into account the broader social and political 
context in which the ‘veil issue’ is occurring is equivalent to reactivating old orientalist 
discourses about Muslim women. The imagery of Islam as a peculiar religion, 
predisposed to maltreating the female sex, seems always to have existed. Post-colonial 
feminist scholars such as Leila Ahmed (1992), Meyda Yegenoglu (1998) and Lila Abu-
Lughod (1990, 1998) have demonstrated how gendered discourses about the ‘Oriental’ 
woman have served colonial expansions while maintaining the hegemonic nature of 
Western identity. In the postcolonial era, veiled women remain caricatured in the West as 
oppressed victims while at the same time being accused of threatening the (overly 
tolerant) majority. What is seriously lacking in such discourses is any sense of genuine 
empathy (i.e an empathy based on true equality, and not on the superior ‘civilisation’ 
view) for Muslim women and how this ‘debate’ may be affecting them.  
At the time of writing this conclusion, Afghanistan just went through its second 
presidential elections since the downfall of the Taliban regime. News releases reported a 
general climate of fear, fraud and insecurity, with explosions, attacks of polling stations 
and intimidation of voters taking place all over the country and undermining the fairness 
of the entire electoral process. Notwithstanding this turbulant situation, two female 
candidates joined the presidential competition (only one participated in 2004) and 
women’s rights activists managed in extremis to bring gender issues on the agenda of the 
main candidates (Tzemach-Lemmon 2009). However, many Afghans hesitated to go and 
                                                
91 The word ‘civilization’ had disappeared from Social Sciences and was recently reintroduced in the 
political domain following Samuel Huntington’s writings on the ‘clash of civilizations’. As Nilufer Göle 
points out, the term ‘civilization’ used to refer to the Universal. Nowadays, the term refers to the 
fundamental difference of the West in terms of culture and religion. (Göle 2005) 
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vote, for fear of getting caught up in the midst of violence. Others, disenchanted by the 
widespread corruption and the unmet promises of the Karzai government, abstained 
from voting altogether. A run-off election was finally called after the UN-backed 
Electoral Complaints Commission revealed widespread ballot stuffing. Karzai’s main 
competitor, Abdullah Abdullah, finally pulled out, arguing that his demands for changes 
in the electoral commission had not been met and therefore, the conditions for fair and 
transparent elections were not ensured. His withdrawal turned the president into a 
winner by default, strengthening the popular perception that ‘democracy’ was nothing 
else but a mascarade orchestrated by the West in order to justify its occupation (Cooper 
and Zeleny 2009). Meanwhile, the election of Obama as President of the United States 
did not bring major changes in the US strategy for Afghanistan. The focus remains on 
military operations, not in the development of a country that ranks 175th among 177 
nations on the Human Poverty Index (UNDP 2007). Democracy has obviously not 
come to Afghanistan yet and it is likely that the country will remain under foreign 
military occupation for a much longer time than initially announced. 
In the meantime, I have received some both good and bad news from the 
dormitory girls. In a year’s time, they will graduate from the University of Kabul. Three 
of ‘the girls of room 42’ have obtained scholarships from foreign governments. Lutfia is 
now a student in my hometown in France, Maryam started a degree at the University of 
Rennes in September and Saida is in Turkey where she is being trained to become a 
gynaecologist. The ones who had no mastery of foreign languages had to stay behind. I 
heard that Masuda is worried that she will have to return to Ghazni and marry a cousin 
she does not like much. Most of them fear that with graduation, marriage proposals will 
intensify and their career dreams will vanish, unless serious employment opportunities 
give them some negotiation power in marital arrangements.  
As political unrest is firmly setting in and the prospect of a time-honoured peace 
under a unified country is gradually disappearing, women’s rights have been further 
pushed aside in the national political agenda. A few weeks before the elections, Karzai, in 
an attempt to obtain the necessary support from the Shia community in the Presidential 
elections, approved a law drafted by conservative Shia clerics and enforcing the right of a 
husband to starve his wife if she refuses him sex92. The rise of civilian casualties due to 
NATO bombings has strengthened popular resentment against foreign troops and a 
                                                
92 The new and redrafted law was signed in mid July 2009. The new version omits original provisions that 
allowed men to demand sex from their wives and that required women to ask their husbands’ permission 
to leave their home. However, the law still includes a provision that states a man does not have to provide 
financial support for his wife unless he has ‘access to her.’ 
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government perceived as the puppet of the US and their allies. As a result, nationalist 
sensibilities and sensitivities have been reactivated, rendering women’s lives occupied in 
two ways: by NATO forces and by nationalist discourses that associate national 
sovereignty with misogynist perceptions of womanhood.  
 
In this thesis, I have attempted to explain how women from different walks of 
life, generations, ethnic and social backgrounds, creatively try to accommodate, engage 
with or get around these different pressures. Taking into account the model of gender 
relations upon which the Afghan nation has been shaped as well as the broader 
geopolitical dynamics in which Afghanistan has been entangled over the past decades, I 
have shown how women sometimes contest and sometimes reproduce this model. I have 
essentially focused on ‘oppositional practices of everyday life’ (de Certeau 1984) because 
although these practices remain marginal, unconscious and even futile at times, they 
teach us a lot about what is usually obscured in relations of power. Indeed, the material I 
have presented in this thesis illustrates how subjectivity, experience and sexual difference 
but also culture and politics shape individual women’s capacity to exercise agency in an 
extremely constraining environment. 
Inspired by Sherry Ortner’s interdisciplinary approach to ethnographic studies of 
‘resistance’ (Ortner 1995), I have tried to avoid the three main weaknesses she identifies 
in the academic literature and that she calls respectively ‘sanitizing politics’, ‘thinning 
culture’ and ‘dissolving actors’ (1995, 176). The method I have adopted is therefore 
threefold. The first step consisted in underlining historical continuities between 
Afghanistan’s earlier encounters with the West and the current ‘post-war/reconstruction’ 
project. These historical parallelisms are useful to understand how the country’s vexed 
relationship with the ‘West’ and ‘modernity’ has traditionally crystallized around 
discourses on women and their bodies. In chapter 2, I showed how the different regimes 
that have succeeded one another have instrumentalized the woman’s question in order to 
promote broader political ideas and to give symbolic meaning to the construction of the 
national identity. Like the swing of a pendulum, any attempt at ‘modernizing’ the country 
has been immediately followed by violent insurrection in rural areas and by a return to 
conservative gender politics.  
I defined the current ‘democracy building’ project with its specific agenda for 
women as another attempt at ‘modernizing’ Afghanistan that bears many similarities with 
earlier modernization projects carried out under King Amanullah, Zaher Shah and later 
on, the Soviet-backed communist regime (chapters 3 and 4). In chapter 3, I underlined 
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how reconstruction has essentially focused on constitution-making and the writing of 
laws while more concrete reconstruction efforts in terms of infrastructures and security 
have been relegated to the background. The entire refashioning of the justice system 
from above as well as discourses on justice inspired by International Human Rights law 
have been experienced, at the local level, as new forms of cultural alienation and Western 
imperial domination. A closer look at the functioning of the Ministry of Women’s Affairs 
(Chapter 4), the first ever in Afghan history, highlighted how discourses about gender 
equality follow a liberal model that is totally removed from the material reality of 
ordinary Afghans.  
My use of a ‘post-colonial’ framework to understand power dynamics in 
contemporary Afghanistan is not particularly innovative. Other scholars who have 
written on Afghanistan such as Suhrkhe (2007), Lindisfarne (2008), Hanifi (2004), Ayotte 
& Husain (2005) have also underlined the relationship between the production of 
discourses on Afghan women/the veil and imperialism. My contribution to this literature 
is a description of how these discourses are reproduced at the ‘local’ level, what they do 
to actual women and how they impact on their ability to ‘speak’ as subalterns.  
In order to achieve this, the second step consisted in analysing women’s everyday 
practices and in particular women’s body rituals (chapters 5 and 6), emotional 
performances and discourses (chapter 7). The justification for an anthropology of praxis 
is that ‘resistance’ to systems of domination is often taking place at the margins of these 
systems, in the interstices left uncontrolled or in spaces opened up by global forces. In as 
much as actors in positions of domination do not constitute a homogenous group and 
are themselves caught in power hierarchies, subalterns are not necessarily rational agents 
struggling to maximise their profit. A study of women’s everyday practices demonstrates 
that ‘agency’ is not only shaped by cultural systems of values but is also made more 
complex by motives and social imaginaries that inhabit a specific moral universe in which 
women occupy a central role. Women’s dispositions are fashioned by cultural and 
psychological processes as much as material and political ones. But hegemony is often 
more fragile than it appears and if in many ways women reproduce the system, the 
system is also being changed, challenged and contested by practice (Ortner 1984). 
My analysis of University girls’ complex body work in chapter 5 demonstrates 
that while aspiring to embody modern (i.e urban, working-class and educated) feminine 
Selves, girls were also concerned with maintaining relationships and preserving the ideal 
of the ‘good Muslim’ girl. Their symbolic rebellion, through cosmetics and fashion, had 
little in common with the one of Western feminist movements that struggle to break free 
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from patriarchy, religion and the commoditization of their bodies.  In their quest for a 
balance between a modern feminine identity and a Muslim one, these girls experimented 
- sometimes painfully and sometimes playfully - with the boundaries of the gender 
system without attempting to break with what they understood was part of their ‘culture’ 
and ‘religion’. 
By contrast, because of greater public visibility, women who were more directly 
involved in politics were more compelled to wear ‘nationalist veils’ in order to achieve 
legitimacy. This did not mean, however, that their hands were totally tied to nationalist 
politics. My analysis of veiling practices among women’s rights activists and MPs in 
chapter 6 demonstrated that these women were both strategic and pragmatic when it 
came to manage their audience’s impression in the public domain. Their embodied 
knowledge of gender norms and social expectations allowed them to navigate in different 
circles and carve out new spaces for negotiations. Their public visibility under the veil 
was not totally tactical either, since all of them were devout Muslims who understood 
veiling as an Islamic prescription. But contrary to Saba Mahmood’s analysis (2005) of 
women’s veiling in the context of the Islamic revival in Egypt, I do not think that Afghan 
women’s bodywork can solely be explained as an attempt at producing pious selves 
through body discipline. If religion informed their actions in a meaningful way, religion 
was definitely not their only source of guidance.  
Finally, another process of social transformation that this work has underlined is 
what I would call the ritualized transgression of social taboos. These specifically feminine 
performances allow the irruption of a feminine experience that is silenced in language 
but that receives validation through the mobilization of broader social anxieties 
pertaining to the potentially threatening nature of women’s bodies. In chapter 7, for 
example, I examined how the public visibility of women’s suicide, through self-
immolation or poisoning, acted as a transgressive symbol of femininity excluded, rejected 
from existing field of discourses, thus forcing an opening in representation. I qualify 
these gestures as ‘rituals of resistance’ because they entail the mobilization of certain 
cultural notions of womanhood, the eventual outcome remains mainly symbolic but also 
permits a temporary redefinition of the gendered order. 
My intention in deciphering non-verbal cultural expressions by focusing on 
embodiment and performances was to highlight the extreme resourcefulness Afghan 
women are able to deploy in order to protect, widen or maintain the fragile spaces in 
which their lives are entangled. This recognition is all the more necessary that Afghan 
women have too often been portrayed as powerless and silent victims. I hope that this 
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work has contributed to drawing a more accurate and subtle picture of Afghan women 
by demonstrating their capacity to be historical agents capable of defining their own 
future.  
The study of Afghan women’s poetry and the cultural imaginaries that constitute 
the makings of their world, helps us to better understand how individual women’s ability 
to access the public is dependent on their capacity to mobilise socially appropriate 
cultural expressions.  In the last chapter, I showed how public women play with the 
polysemic nature of hegemonic political/religious repertoires (i.e notions of jihad and 
martyrdom) in order to assert their presence in men-dominated arenas. These covert 
reinterpretations, in spite of their inherent ambivalence, bring nuances and marginally 
challenge traditional gender discourses. In the same way, women’s emotional 
performances, even under their most dramatic forms like suicide attempts, carry with 
them communicative potential. By provoking scandals and disrupting social taboos, 
women do not manifest a lack of social integration such as Durkheim (1897) argued to 
explain suicide in Western societies. On the contrary, these highly dramatic gestures, by 
following gendered forms of emotional expression, strengthen realities of identity while 
bringing an almost legal validity to women’s demands. By following such cultural 
repertoires, women not only confirm their allegiance to the gender order but also 
demonstrate its intrinsic fragility.  
 
Feminists around the world know well enough that positive changes in gender 
relations cannot be achieved in the course of a day and that each step forward should 
never be considered as definite. In the case of Afghanistan, such transformations are not 
likely to occur as long as a sense of national autonomy (and a sense of pride) towards the 
‘West’ is not guaranteed. Besides, progressive gender policies can only develop when 
sovereignty is ensured, that is when a more straightforward and less unequal relationship 
to the ‘West’ can develop. The practices I have described here have to be understood in 
the light of these broader geopolitical dynamics that have been partly responsible for the 
‘colonisation’ of Afghan women’s lives over the past decades.  
Indeed, postcolonial feminists legal scholars such as Ratna Kapur (2004) and 
Nivedita Menon (2004) have highlighted the contradictions that emerge in the field of 
law when globalization and liberalism collude to redefine the subject ‘woman’ in Third 
World postcolonial countries. For instance, Menon demonstrates that by following the 
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logic of constitutionalism93 in its transition towards independence and the building of a 
‘modern’ State, India has inherited from its colonial past a definition of women as 
autonomous individuals entitled to rights. The shortcomings of these legal developments 
that Menon highlights – i.e the lack of connection between the imagined ‘woman’ of the 
liberal legal/radical feminist agenda and the ordinary woman whose life is entangled in 
intricate social relations that are part of a distinctive ethos - are, I think, worth recalling if 
we want to go beyong the normative framework that accompanies most ‘democracy 
building’ efforts. Can ‘women’ as subjects of politics come into being through different 
praxis? Can they, when caught in the midst of women’s rights talks in which their voice is 
constantly silenced, produce counter-hegemonic definitions of their own bodies? (Menon 
2004, 209). The analysis and empirical material I presented in this study demonstrate that 
women are not deprived of imagination when it comes to negotiate the norms that 
regiment their lives. However, the choregraphy of these ‘tactics’ occupies a specific moral 
universe that does not follow the path of a public ‘coming out’ like it is the case in more 
organised forms of social movements in the West or in countries that do not have to 
bear the burden of military occupation. 
I share with Kapur (2004) the view that we need to be cautious when gender 
essentialism informs legal reforms in the ‘South’. She writes: ‘By not remaining 
sufficiently attentive to cultural and historical specificities, gender essentialism 
constructed through a VAW discourse has prompted state actors, non-state actors and 
donors to embrace universalising strategies in responding to human rights violations 
against women. It has further obscured differences between women located in very 
different power relationships’ (2004, 106). The challenge that Kapur leaves us with is ‘to 
think of ways in which to express … [our] politics without subjugating other 
subjectivities through claims to the idea of a ‘true self’ or a singular truth’ (Kapur 2002, 
19). This, she argues, would lead ‘to a reformulation of the notions of agency and choice 
… [where agency] is neither situated exclusively in the individual nor denied because of 
some overarching oppression. It is situated in the structures of social relationships, the 
location of the subject, and the shape-shifting of culture’ (Kapur 2002, 19). 
This critical approach to ‘agency’ is important to keep in mind when analysing 
the norms that guide contemporary projects of State building. As the case of Afghanistan 
demonstrates, the current struggle over women’s rights has caught women in the tension 
between their demands for gender equality within their community and their dependence 
                                                
93  By constitutionalism, Menon refers to ‘a specific method adopted by modern democracies of 
safeguarding the autonomy of the individual self’ (2004, 1). 
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upon and support for the community as site for resistance to foreign occupation. The 
imposition of a Universalist framework to establish gender equality has not only 
hampered Afghan women’s capacity to speak for themselves but it has also derailed the 
conditions of possibility for constructing legal norms differently. This study has shown 
how legal metanarratives inspired by Western liberal tradition have been used to create 
modern state institutions that bolster the myth of reconstruction in the West while 
leaving Afghan elites with the task of either reproducing ‘the project of positive 
unoriginality’ (Morris quoted in Chakrabarty 1992: 1509) or redefining ‘culture’ in fixed 
and essentialized terms. 
 
As much as women’s micro-practices of resistance may often appear as futile and 
mostly symbolic, it is important not to ignore them, for they are integral part of what 
constitutes the psyche and subjective universe of Afghan women. With Judith Butler 
(2004), I believe that this acknowledgement of the ‘other’ is what is being frequently 
overlooked in the present efforts of media, politics and reconstruction in Afghanistan. 
Drawing from Emmanuel Lévinas’ concept of ‘face’ as the basis from which the ‘Other’ 
can make an ethical claim on a person, Butler remains wary of the responsibility with 
which the West has endowed itself as a result of ‘seeing’ the unveiled faces of Afghan 
women in the press, post 9/11. She says: 
 
According to the triumphalist photos that dominated the front page of the New York Times, these 
young women bared their faces as an act of liberation, an act of gratitude to the US military and 
an expression of a pleasure that had become suddenly and ecstatically permissible. The American 
viewer was ready, as it were, to see the face . . . It became bared to us, at that moment, and we 
were, as it were, in possession of the face; not only did our cameras capture it, but we arranged 
for the face to capture our triumph, and act as the rationale for our violence, the incursion on 
sovereignty, the deaths of civilians. Where is the loss in that face? And where is the suffering over 
war? Indeed, the photographed face seemed to conceal or displace the face in the Levinasian 
sense, since we saw and heard through that face no vocalization of grief or agony, no sense of the 
precariousness of life. (Butler 2004, 142) 
 
The revealing of Afghan women’s faces in this episode of ‘liberation’ concealed 
their ‘suffering over war’. While the apparition of faces in the media momentarily 
humanized the anonymous burqa-clad women whom we had seen earlier wondering in 
the rubble of Kabul, this staged collective unveiling did not result in a real 
acknowledgement of women’s faces, in the Levinasian sense. We remained blind to their 
loss, to their ‘grief and agony’. By seeing a reflection of our own aspirations in their faces, 
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we eventually de-humanized them. Butler’s hesitation to celebrate the unveiling of 
Afghan women as a symbol of ‘liberation’ is important because it insists on the ethical 
urgency to look beyond the veil, at women’s subjectivity and experience. I hope that this 
work will have contributed modestly to achieving this, to bringing flesh and soul to 
representations of Afghan women.  
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Glossary 
 
Afghanyiat: Afghan-ness. 
Biruni: Dari term, meaning the ‘exterior’, the ‘public’ arena, the ‘street’. It generally 
refers to the outside world, outside of the house. 
Burqa (burka, or burkha) is an Arabic term (also used in Urdu) that designates a full 
body covering garment worned by women in some Islamic tradition.  
CEDAW: The Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discriminations Against 
Women was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1979. It is often 
described as a general bill of rights for women.  
Chadari: The full Afghan chadari covers the wearer’s entire face except for a small 
region about the eyes, which is covered by a concealing net. This type of covering is also 
common in North Western Pakistan close to the Afghan border. 
Chadar: A chadar is a full-length semicircle of fabric open down the front, which is 
thrown over the head and held closed in front. It has no hand openings or closures but is 
held shut by the hands or by wrapping the ends around the waist. 
Chapan: Long sleeved overcoat worn on shoulders. It is the custormary uniform of 
tribal leaders in Afghanistan.  
CSO: Civil Society Organizations. 
Dakhili: Dari term, meaning the ‘interior’. It generally refers to the interior of a house. 
Dewana: crazy. 
Dokhtar: girl, daughter. 
Fransawi: Dari term for ‘French’. 
FRU: Family Response Unit. 
Gham: Pastun term for ‘sorrows’ and ‘worries’.  
IHRC: Independent Human Rights Commission. 
Izzat: Generic term for ‘honour’. 
Jirga: Pashtun term that refers to a tribal assembly of elders, which takes decision by 
consensus.  
Khaliji: foreigner. 
Korwal: Pasthun term for ‘household inhabitants’. 
Landay: Short piece of oral Pashtun women’s poetry, traditionally used to comment on 
everyday social events. 
Loya Jirga: Pashtun term for ‘grand council’. A loya jirga is a mass meeting usually 
prepared for major events such as choosing a new king, adopting a constitution, or 
discussing important national political or emergency matters as well as disputes in the 
Pashtun areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan. 
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Madrassah: Type of educational institution, usually with a central religious component. 
Mahram: In Islamic sharia legal terminology, a mahram is an unmarriageable kin with 
whom sexual intercourse would be considered incestuous, a punishable taboo. In 
Afghanistan, the mahram is responsible for escorting women when they venture outside 
of their house.  
MoWA: Ministry of Women’s Affairs. 
Meman-khana: Room reserved to guests in an Afghan traditional house. 
Meshrano Jirga: The House of Elders is the upper house of the bicameral National 
Assembly of Afghanistan. 
Mujjahed (Pl. mujjahedin): Arabic term. Literally, means ‘someone who struggles’. The 
term has taken on meanings that are specifically religious, or specifically military or 
paramilitary or both. It came to refer to ‘someone who fights in a jihad’, i.e ‘holly warior’. 
Nafs: Arabic term, meaning ‘self’ or ‘psyche’. Usually refers to unruly emotions and 
desires. Muslims are requested to remain in control of their ‘nafs’. 
Namardi: Dari term, meaning ‘unmanly’. 
Namus: Arabic term, meaning ‘honour’. For a man and his family, namus means sexual 
integrity of women in the family, their chastity in particular. On the other hand, the man 
has to provide for his family and to defend the namus of his house, his women in 
particular, against the threats (physical and verbal) from the outer world to members of 
his extended family. 
Nang: Pashtun term for ‘bravery’, ‘courage’. 
Pardah: Urdu term, meaning ‘curtain’. It refers to the practice of preventing women 
from being seen by men. This takes two forms: physical segregation of the sexes, and the 
requirement for women to cover their bodies and conceal their form under a veil. In the 
Muslim world, preventing women from being seen by men is closely linked to the 
concept of namus (honour). 
Pashtunwali: ‘The way of the Pashtuns’, refers to the tribal code of honour as practiced 
among Pashtun communities in Afghanistan and Pakistan. 
PDPA: People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan, a communist party established in 
1965.   
Poar: Term used in Pashtun customary jurisprudence, usually translated as ‘blood 
money’. It refers to what is given to a victim’s family to compensate for an offense. Poar 
can include cash, services, animals and also the transfer of women. 
RAWA: Revolutionary Association of the Women of Afghanistan founded in 1977 by 
Meena Keshwar Kamal. 
Shura: Arabic word for ‘consultation’. It is believed to be the method by which pre-
Islamic Arabian tribes selected leaders and made major decisions. This word is often 
used in the name of parliaments or village councils in Muslim-majority countries. 
SNTV: Single Non-Transferable Vote. 
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United National Front: The group is as a broad coalition of former and current 
strongmen, commanders from the anti-Soviet resistance, ex-Communist leaders, and 
various social and ethnic groups. Its leader is former President of Afghanistan 
Burhanuddin Rabbani. Many of its members were formerly part of the similarly named 
United Islamic Front (better known as the Northern Alliance). It represents the main 
opposition party at the National Assembly. 
Ustad: Dari term for ‘teacher’ or ‘master’ (in music). 
Wolesi Jirga: The House of the People is the lower house of the bicameral National 
Assembly of Afghanistan. 
Zan: woman, wife. 
Watan: Arabic term, meaning ‘country’, ‘nation’, ‘homeland’.  
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